

Marx's Discourse with Hegel

Norman Levine



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Also by Norman Levine

The Tragic Deception: Marx contra Engels (Clio Press, 1975).

Dialogue within the Dialectic (Allen and Unwin, 1984).

The Process of Democratization (State University of New York Press, 1991).

Divergent Paths: Hegel in Marxism and Engelsism (Rowman and Littlefield, 2006).

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*My last book was dedicated to all my children and now it is
the turn of all the grandchildren:*

*Benjamin Ari, Aaron, Benjamin Max, Madison, Sarah, Emma,
Rebecca Louisa, Aidan, Rachel, Meghan, Katie, Michael, Cassidy.*

Following in their parents' footsteps by again recreating the future.

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To Rose: Who made *Being There* an inspiration.

Norman Levine
December 2011

Chapter One

A Programmatic Excursus

Part One

My intent in the original conception of *Marx's Discourse with Hegel* was to describe Karl Marx's interpretation of Georg W. F. Hegel from 1836 to 1883 in terms of both continuity and discontinuity. I know of no other work that has analyzed Marx's reading of Hegel throughout Marx's lifetime.

Implicit in this enterprise was the awareness that the Hegel archive divided itself into two parts: 1) The Visible Bibliography, or the manuscripts of Hegel published during Marx's lifetime that were accessible to Marx and which he did or did not read; 2) The Invisible Bibliography, or those manuscripts of Hegel that were non-existent to Marx and that only started to be published in the 20th century for the most part. In other words, a substantial part of the Hegel archive was a vacancy to Marx.

I began the original *Marx's Discourse with Hegel* on the assumption that I could interpret the impact of both the Visible and Invisible Bibliographies on Marx. The approaches to each of these libraries would differ: the analysis of the Visible Bibliography, because Marx read most of these works, would be textual and exegetical, while the analysis of the Invisible Bibliography would be speculative. Since Marx was ignorant of the Invisible Bibliography it was only possible to speculate about the influence these vacant Hegel monographs might have exerted upon him. Regarding the subjectivity of this speculative approach I maintain that a knowledge of the Invisible Bibliography is important to understand Marx's reading of Hegel for two reasons: 1) The manner in which Marx comprehended Hegel is more comprehensively defined by what he did not know of Hegel; 2) The 20th century renaissance of Hegel studies, basically stimulated by the publication of the Invisible Bibliography, revolutionized previous estimations of the Hegel-Marx relationship by bringing to light Hegelian texts which revised 19th-century Idealist explications of Hegel and indicated a philosopher concerned with similar economic and social issues that absorbed Marx. The Invisible Hegel established in certain areas a community of interests, not necessarily conclusions, connecting Hegel and Marx.

In addition to the 20th-century publication of the Invisible Bibliography Marx scholarship also benefited from the publication of the *Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe* (*Mega2*).¹ An Invisible Marx archive was also brought to light. In particular, many notebooks in which Marx sketched the architecture to *Das Kapital*, materials that were preparations and exercises to the final draft of Volume One of *Das Kapital*, were removed from darkness. Specifically, in these early outlines of Volume One, Marx's utilization of Hegelian methodology, his absorption of methodological categories from *The Science of Logic*, became apparent. Additionally, *Mega2* brought to light manuscripts, *exzerpte* and letters of the Young Marx from 1836 to 1848, the years which this book focuses upon.

The publication of *Mega2* also erased the existence of two texts of Marx, manuscripts previously referred to as *The Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* and *The German Ideology*. It is necessary for me to comment on this disappearance because in the remainder of this book I will not use the title *The Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, but rather 'The Manuscripts' and I will not use the title *The German Ideology*, but rather 'The Leipzig Council'.

The extinction of The Manuscripts as a single monograph was primarily the work of Jürgen Rojahn, who worked on *Mega2* at the International Institute for Social History in Amsterdam.² Exercising enormous philological skill, Rojahn proved that 'The Manuscripts' did not form a cohesive text unified by a common theme, but was rather a compilation of diffuse drafts, notes, comments and personal exercises by Marx that were later intercalated by David Ryazanov into a single manuscript. Later sections and chapters of this book will offer a more detailed accounting of the literary archeology of The Manuscripts. However, at this point I alert the reader to the fact that while I accept Rojahn's demolition of most of the chapters of The Manuscripts I myself will treat the chapter in The Manuscripts entitled 'Critique of Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy in General' as a unitary text. I maintain the 'Critique of Hegel's Dialectic and Philosophy in General' manifests a sufficient singular and consistent theme as to render it unambiguous, non-contradictory and therefore a manuscript.

The German Ideology was essentially composed of two parts, the 'I. Feuerbach' chapter and 'The Leipzig Council', and was initially published in 1932 in the *Mega1* edited by V. V. Adoratskii. In the relation to the 'I. Feuerbach' chapter, recent research by Terrell Carver and by Inge Taubert/Hans Pelger³ proves that the 'I. Feuerbach' never took place. It was never a coherent text, but assembled into a single chapter by Ryazanov from scattered comments and marginal notations, by Marx. However, the disappearance of 'I. Feuerbach' does not extend to 'The Leipzig Council'. *Marx's Discourse With Hegel* is not a philological probe, it does not seek to participate in the deconstruction of either 'I. Feuerbach' or 'The Leipzig Council'. Furthermore, the *Mega2* version of the entire 'The Leipzig Council' has not yet been published. Thus, I will not engage in philological disputations and for the purpose of the arguments presented in this book under the title 'The Leipzig Council' I include the sections entitled 'Saint Bruno' and 'Saint Marx'. Even though Adoratskii initially laced together the 'Saint Bruno' and 'Saint Marx' sections into 'The Leipzig Council' I maintain that Marx's original manuscripts do display a common philosophical

intent, can be regarded as expressing a common message, and I will identify this monograph as 'The Leipzig Council' throughout the remainder of this book.

Just as the Hegel–Marx relationship must be perceived from the context of the Visible and Invisible Bibliographies so it also must be discerned from the pre- and post-*Mega2* frame of reference. The *Mega2* inaugurated a new era of Marx interpretation and included in this new age of evaluation is the Hegel–Marx affiliation. From the archival point of view *Marx's Discourse with Hegel* will compare the texts of the Visible Hegel Bibliography against the texts of the Visible Marx Bibliography now brought to light in the *Mega2*.

The publication of the complete works of Hegel and Marx not only transformed previous interpretations of the intellectual relationship between these two men, but also enriched me with a plethora of primary sources. Even though I was gratified to possess such a cornucopia of material it became apparent to me that I could not satisfactorily diagnose both the massive Visible and Invisible Bibliographies of both men for the years 1836–1883 in one volume. In order to satisfactorily probe the deepest depths of the intellectual relationship between these two men it was necessary to confine the investigative time span to the years 1836 to 1848, a manageable time period, and these are the chronological borders of the present text. I will not discuss 'The Communist Manifesto' because it is devoid of any reference to Marx's relation to Hegel, the gravitational center of this book, and it is essentially an introduction to Marx's absorption in political economy, the preoccupation of the 1850–1883 period of his life. The year 1849 was a vacuum in Marx's intellectual development because he was in transit from Belgium to London.

Marx's Discourse with Hegel is not intended as a deep penetration into the origins and development of Hegel's philosophy. It is not a study of the influences that shaped Hegel's mind, of the impact of Friedrich Hölderlein, Immanuel Kant, Johann Fichte, Baruch Spinoza or Friedrich Schelling. It is not a study of the epistemological viability of his dialectic, or the validity of his logical apparatus. It makes no effort to outline the historiography of Hegel interpretations from Karl Rosenkranz–Rudolf Haym–Wilhelm Dilthey–Georg Lukács–Otto Pöggeler–Ludwig Siep–Christoph Jamme–H. S. Harris–Rolf-Peter Horstmann–Dieter Heinrich, nor does it seek to chart the imprint of Hegelian thought on subsequent philosophy in Europe and America. It does not endeavor to trace the stages of Hegel's internal intellectual evolution, to account for the break between the Young Hegel of the *Jenaer Notebooks* and the Mature Hegel of *The Philosophy of Right*.

Nor will this book put forth a history of the discovery and publication of the complete works of Hegel. It does not pretend to be an introduction to, or narrative account of, how and when the entirety of Hegel's manuscripts were uncovered and brought to print. This book also does not offer a historiography of the interpretations of Hegel. However, since *Marx's Discourse with Hegel* scrutinizes the historiography of Marx's interpretation of Hegel from 1836 to 1848 I will indicate what Hegel texts were available to Marx, or were unavailable during this time frame. The complete accounting of the historiography of Marx's interpretation of Hegel during the 1836–1848 period is impossible without knowing the access or lack of access Marx had to the full Hegelian catalogue.

For those who are interested in the chronology of the publication of the texts written by the Young Hegel I refer them to the article by Professor Gisela Schöler, 'Zum Chronologie von Hegels Jugendschriften'.⁴

The purpose of my work is the reconstruction of Marx's understanding of the 'Parmenides of Berlin'. I use the phrase Parmenides of Berlin as a synonym for Hegel because Hegel considered Parmenides as the first to discover that 'Thought is thus identical with being',⁵ a concept Hegel borrowed and made the foundational principle of his own philosophy. A second synonym I will apply to Hegel is 'The Master'. In attributing this synonym to Hegel I copy the example of Marx who referred to Hegel as The Master in his dissertation on Epicurus and Democritus.⁶ The work of Hegel will be summarized in the following pages and this summary employed as the backdrop against which Marx drew his image of Hegel.

The contemporary philosophical debates over the relationship between Hegel and Marx divide into two camps, the School of Continuity and the School of Discontinuity. The proponents of the School of Continuity see a direct influence, although not in all areas, of Hegel on Marx, while the adherents of the School of Discontinuity, such as Louis Althusser, stress the break between the two men. Although huge gaps existed in Marx's knowledge of Hegel, and although Marx misinterpreted many dimensions of Hegel's thought, *Marx's Discourse with Hegel* belongs to the School of Continuity and validates the thesis that Marx perpetuated, most of all, the methodological tools of Hegel. My recent book, *Divergent Paths: Hegel in Marxism and Engelsism* (2006) is an in-depth study of Hegel's *History of Philosophy* and Marx's interpretation of this work found in his dissertation *On the Differences between Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature*.⁷

Marx's relation to Hegel divides itself into two eras: 1) His First Appropriation of Hegel, 1836–1848; 2) His Second Appropriation of Hegel, 1850 to the year of his death in 1883. In this context it is only possible to sketch the differences between these two periods and the reader is referred to my book *Divergent Paths: Hegel in Marxism and Engelsism* for a more penetrating analysis of this question.⁸ However, I wish to acknowledge an important difference between *Divergent Paths* and *Marx's Discourse with Hegel*. In *Divergent Paths* I presented Hegel as a political conservative.⁹ After a more prolonged penetration into Hegelian politics, and with the aid of K.-H. Ilting's work in Hegelian political theory, I have changed my mind. *Marx's Discourse with Hegel* presents The Master as a German Liberal in the tradition of Lorenz von Stein and Karl August Hardenberg.

Marx's First Appropriation of Hegel covers the period of his initial absorption of the Hegel bibliography as it existed during those years. His First Appropriation of Hegel spanned the years 1836 to 1848, but within that twelve-year time frame the years 1836 to 1844 are the most significant. During these years Marx studied the existent Hegel archive in depth as he wrote his doctoral dissertation *On the Differences between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature*, which was completed in 1841, the 1843 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right', the 1843 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction' and the 1844 The Manuscripts which contained the seminal essay 'A Critique of Hegel's Dialectic and Philosophy in General'. Marx continued to make comments on Hegel's

philosophy in *The Holy Family* (1845), 'The Leipzig Council' (1845–1846) and *The Poverty of Philosophy* (1847) but these were reflections, applications and diatribes against Bauer, Feuerbach and Stirner and no longer initial research. In his First Appropriation Marx was primarily concerned with Hegel's theories of labor and alienation. Marx's First Appropriation, the period of absorption and digestion, comes to an end in 1849 when Marx leaves Belgium and resettles in London because his relation to Hegel undergoes a transformation.

The present book is devoted to the period of Marx's First Appropriation of Hegel. However, even though the years 1836 to 1844 were seminal, it is necessary to recognize that October 1843 witnessed the transition of Marx's primary intellectual interest to political economy. In October 1843 Marx moved to Paris, attended meetings of the German workers' movement, discussed economics and Hegel with Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and also took the first steps in transferring his intellectual center of gravity from philosophy to Adam Smith and David Ricardo.

In traditional interpretations Marx's transition to political economy was aligned to his reading of James Mill's *Elements of Political Economy* in early 1844. I wish to amend this traditional interpretation and assert that the work of Friedrich List should take precedence over that of Mill. List's book, *The National System of Political Economy*, was read by Marx by 1843 and I make this claim because Friedrich Engels in his 'Preface' to the second volume of *Das Kapital* makes the following assertion: 'Marx began his economic studies in Paris in 1843 with the great English and French writers; of the Germans he was familiar only with Rus and List . . .'¹⁰ In addition, by the end of 1843 Marx was involved in the issue of free trade, an early indication of his immersion in economics. In his crucial essay 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction' Marx attacks protective tariffs. This essay was written between late 1843 and early 1844 and in it Marx attacked List.¹¹ Finally, in Marx's 1859 'Preface' to his *Critique Of Political Economy* Marx himself certifies that in 1842–1843 he turned for the first time to economics, specifically the debate over free trade and protectionism. In the 'Preface' Marx wrote: '. . . and finally the debates on free trade and protective tariffs caused me in the first instance to turn my attention to economic questions'.¹² Since List's book presented the claims for protectionism I take Marx's sentence as proof that he read List while he was writing for the *Rheinische Zeitung* in 1842–1843. Both Engels and Marx were in agreement as to the date of Marx's acquaintance with List and their concurrence established that Marx read List by late 1843. Therefore, when locating Marx's transformation from philosopher to political economist I will credit List as the initial causal agent.

'The Manuscripts' were scattered explorations, personal exercises, in Marx's initial speculations regarding the possibility of the conjoining of Hegel's *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, particularly the theories of labor and alienation, with Smith's *The Wealth of Nations* and Ricardo's *Principles of Political Economy and Taxation*.

Marx's Second Appropriation of Hegel, from 1848 to 1883, changes from absorption to implementation.

Beginning in 1848 Marx devoted himself almost entirely to the study of political economy, the launching of his journey to the composition of *Das Kapital*.

As the design of his writing of *Das Kapital* crystallized, as his creation of a new methodology of political economy concretized, he applied the Hegelian logical apparati as the substructure for his redefinition of political economy. In his Second Appropriation Marx was mostly involved with the exercise of Hegelian methodology.

It is wrong to characterize Marx as a full-time scholar of Hegel. He did not devote his entire life to a study of the 'Parmenides of Berlin'. It is erroneous to evaluate Marx's understanding of Hegel as if it were the product of a professional academic expert whose career depended upon the exactitude of his presentation of this philosopher. Conversely, Marx's interest in Hegel was a result of Hegel's philosophic prominence following his death and Marx's contact with Eduard Gans. Not only was Gans a close friend of Hegel, a member of 'The Society of the Friends of the Deceased', but he was also an editor of the journal which Gans helped publish with the approval and assistance of Hegel. While he was a student at the University of Berlin Marx took two courses from Gans: in 1836–1837 semester a course in Criminal Law, and in the summer of 1838 a course in Prussian Civil Law. Additionally, as a student at the University of Berlin Marx also entered into the Hegelian world, first as a member of the 'Doctors' Club', a group of admirers of Hegel that met for beer and philosophical discourse, and then as a member of the Left-Hegelian Movement, Bauer, Arnold Ruge and Feuerbach, in which he participated from 1841 until 1843. From the books by Hegel that Marx read he did acquire a deep knowledge, in terms of the books that were available at the time of the 'Parmenides of Berlin', but beginning in late 1843 his interest began to shift to political economy. Marx did not spend his entire life absorbed in the work of Hegel, but his youthful knowledge of the Visible Hegel archive served as a permanent foundation upon which he constructed his method of political economy.

The philosophical image Marx acquired of Hegel was directly related to the Hegel archive available to him. The mental portrait Marx sketched of Hegel derived from three sources: 1) the Visible Hegel Bibliography; 2) the influences of Ruge, Bauer and Feuerbach; and 3) the schools of Hegel interpretation prevailing during the years 1836–1848 of Marx's life.

In terms of the Visible Hegel Bibliography, the first edition of Hegel manuscripts, the *Collected Works*, was published between the years 1832 and 1845. Started after Hegel's death, the *Collected Works* was a joint project of the colleagues of Hegel who formed 'The Society of the Friends of the Deceased', and Gans was a leading member of this association. The *Collected Works* took thirteen years to complete because some of the volumes were collated from the lecture notes of Hegel and selecting and organizing these lecture materials was an arduous and time-consuming task. Karl Ludwig Michelet was the compiler of Hegel's *History of Philosophy* and *The Philosophy of Nature*, and Gans was the editor of *The Philosophy of History* and *The Philosophy of Right*. Many of the most important works of Hegel were published in his lifetime as independent editions, but the 1832–1845 *Collected Works* was the first assemblage of all the Hegel documents that were known at that time.

The publication of the *Collected Works* was not the only location from which Marx could familiarize himself with the books and essays of Hegel. In terms of

the separate publication of the books *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807), *The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1817), *The Science of Logic* (first published in three parts, 1812, 1813 and 1816) and *The Philosophy of Right* (1820), were all available to Marx, and some of these works were held in his personal library as later pages of this book will show.

In addition to the Visible Hegel Bibliography there was also an Invisible Hegel and this was written material penned by Hegel that stretched from his matriculation at the Tübingen Seminary in 1788 until 1807 when *The Phenomenology of Spirit* was published. With the help of Schelling, Hegel received his first academic appointment at the University of Jena where he remained from 1801 until 1807. While at Jena, Hegel wrote what is now referred to as the *Jenaer Outline* and these documents are the most important parts of the Invisible Hegel Bibliography because they presage the origination of the Hegelian System. With one important exception, Hegel's articles in *The Critical Journal of Philosophy*, the Invisible Hegel Bibliography was composed of material written before 1807 and the Visible Hegel Bibliography was constituted of material written after 1807.

The 20th century witnessed the publication of the *Jenaer Outline*, which for Marx belonged to the Invisible Hegel. The publication of the *Jenaer Outline* caused a volcanic eruption in the evaluation of the Hegel–Marx relationship and Georg Lukács' book, *The Young Hegel*, illustrated how these Jena materials compelled a total revision in the assessment of Hegel.

In order to facilitate a clear conceptualization of Marx's knowledge of Hegel I divide the Hegel archive into pre-1807 and post-1807 periods. Marx's study of Hegel begins with *The Phenomenology of Spirit* and therefore Marx's familiarity with the Hegel archive spans the post-1807 period of the Visible Hegel, the mature years of Hegel's career. Essentially, Marx knew the Mature Hegel. Although Marx's knowledge of Hegel began with *The Phenomenology of Spirit* it is important to note that 'The Manuscripts' of 1844 was not the first time that Marx alluded to this text. Marx's initial reference to this Hegel masterpiece occurs in his 13 March 1843 letter to Ruge. In that letter Marx criticized the manner in which Bauer referred to a chapter in *The Phenomenology of Spirit* as 'The Happy Consciousness'. The full title of this chapter is 'Freedom and Self-Consciousness: Stoicism, Scepticism and the Unhappy Consciousness'. A year before Marx wrote 'The Manuscripts', *The Phenomenology of Spirit* was an active presence in Marx's mind.

The conceptualization of the pre-1807 and post-1807 periods provides tools by which to grasp Marx's understanding of Hegel. The Young Hegel was lost to Marx who knew nothing of Hegel's intellectual trajectory from Stuttgart, Tübingen, Berne and Frankfurt to Jena and this void extends most consequentially to Hegel's *Jenaer Outline*.

The years 1836 to 1844 was a decade in which Marx conducted his in-depth discourse with Hegel. They were also the years of the Young Marx. Ironically, the Young Marx was totally cut off from the Young Hegel. The Young Marx's dialogue with Hegel was conducted with the Mature Hegel.

Even though *The Critical Journal of Philosophy* was published during the pre-1807 years I consider it a part of the Visible Hegel Bibliography because it was

available to Marx. Hegel co-edited this journal with Schelling and although Hegel did not sign the articles he contributed to the journal; this periodical was available to Marx and familiarity with this material was accessible to him if he pursued the issue. The six articles Hegel published in *The Critical Journal of Philosophy* were:

- 1) 'On the Nature of Philosophic Criticism'
- 2) 'How Common Sense Construes Philosophy'
- 3) 'The Relation of Scepticism to Philosophy'
- 4) 'Faith and Knowledge'
- 5) 'On the Scientific Method of Treating Natural Law'
- 6) 'On the Relation of Natural Law Philosophy to Philosophy in General'

The essay 'The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's Systems' was published as a separate monograph.

Of the seven essays mentioned above, six were reprinted in the *Collected Works*. The six essays that were reproduced in the *Collected Works* were:

- 1) 'Faith and Knowledge;'
- 2) 'The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System'
- 3) 'On the Scientific Method of Treating Natural Law'
- 4) 'On the Nature of Philosophic Criticism'
- 5) 'How Common Sense Construes Philosophy'
- 6) 'The Relation of Scepticism to Philosophy'¹³

Marx never alluded to any of the six essays contained in *The Critical Journal of Philosophy* nor to the separate monograph 'The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's Systems'.

In addition, Marx never referred to the six Hegel essays contained in the *Collected Works*. The six essays I listed above were contained in Volume One. Volume Two was given over to *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, which was published in 1807. The Hegel of 1807 is the point from which Marx's perception of Hegel begins. Later pages in this study will discuss the essay 'On the Scientific Method of Treating Natural Law' as a means to illustrate the Hegelian ideas to which Marx remained blind by not being able to become conversant with the Invisible Hegel. The realization that Marx was not an expert in Hegelian thought is further proven by the fact he never mentioned Volume One of the *Collected Works*, but he also never mentioned Volume Eighteen, the *Philosophische Propädeutik*, whose editor was Karl Rosenkranz. In his 1837 letter to his father Marx wrote that he 'got to know Hegel from beginning to end'¹⁴ but the evidence indicates that the young 19-year-old student was not telling the truth.

It is instructive to compare Marx and Rosenkranz in terms of the depth of their involvement in the mastery of Hegel. Whereas Marx left Germany in 1843, Rosenkranz contributed Volume Eighteen to the *Collected Works* and in 1844 published a biography of Hegel to which Marx never alludes.¹⁵ Later pages of this book will discuss the significance of Rosenkranz and in those pages I will

comment on the content of the *Philosophische Propädeutik*, which was Hegel's manual on how to teach philosophy to students in the gymnasium. In addition, Rosenkranz's Hegel biography refers to the *Yearbook of Scientific Criticism*, the work that Hegel and Gans jointly published from 1826 until Hegel's death in 1831; even though Gans died in 1836 the journal remained in existence until 1846.¹⁶ Rosenkranz also mentions Hegel's essay 'On the English Reform Bill', as well as Rosenkranz's general interpretation of Hegelian philosophy found in his *Psychologie: oder die Wissenschaft vom subjectiven Geist*, as well as Hegel's essays 'The German Constitution' and 'Proceedings of the Estates Assembly in the Kingdom of Württemberg'. None of the above-mentioned Hegel material which was crucial to a correct assessment of 'The Master' was ever cited by Marx.

Interestingly, while Marx remained ignorant of *The Yearbook of Scientific Criticism*, Engels knew of this journal and comments on it in his 1842 essay 'Schelling and Revelation'.¹⁷

Marx is also almost totally silent on the Schelling–Hegel controversy. Schelling, the professor who brought Hegel to the University of Jena and who collaborated with Hegel on the publication of the *Critical Journal of Philosophy*, gradually turned into a vocal and ardent opponent of Hegelian thought. In order to eradicate what he thought to be Hegel's attack on the unity of Throne and Altar in Prussia, the Prussian monarch, Frederick Wilhelm IV, brought Schelling to the University of Berlin in 1841 to refute the 'Parmenides of Berlin'. The lectures Schelling gave were a major philosophical event, which sent shock waves across the scholarly community. Rosenkranz was part of the defensive parameter built by the admirers of Hegel to protect the 'Parmenides of Berlin' from all detractors; in his 1844 biography of Hegel Rosenkranz refers to Schelling frequently and this book is in part a defense of Hegel against Schelling. Another contrast is between Marx and Engels, who was in Berlin when Schelling arrived to launch his vitriol. Engels attended these lectures by Schelling and wrote three articles: 'Schelling on Hegel';¹⁸ 'Schelling and Revelation';¹⁹ and 'Schelling, Philosopher in Christ'.²⁰ All these essays were impassioned justifications as well as statements of allegiance to Hegelian philosophy.

Marx defined himself differently. He did not take a public stand in this academic diatribe. His 1841 dissertation did contain limited critical comments on Schelling.²¹ From 1842 until 1843 Marx was primarily engaged as editor of the *Rheinische Zeitung* and the newspaper was absolutely silent on the Schelling–Hegel confrontation at the same time Engels was writing his toxic attacks on Schelling. Marx's 'The Leipzig Council' makes three negative short references to Schelling.²² It is clear that Marx was an opponent of Schelling, but Marx did not follow the path of either Rosenkranz or Engels and this underscores the fact that he did not wish to dedicate his entire career to becoming a master of Hegelian speculation as 'The Society of Friends of the Deceased' chose to do. He would apply Hegelian explanatory modes to investigate social formations, but he would never become a member of the praetorian guards who defended 'The Master' against all enemies.

Marx's First and Second Appropriation of Hegel were determined by the history of the publication of Hegel's entire archive. With the exception of Volume One

of the *Collected Works*, which contained the six essays mentioned above, and the *Philosophische Propädeutik*, and assuming that Marx read certain parts of the Hegel literary legacy as independent publications, Marx's acquaintance with the Hegel bibliography was confined to the first edition. Marx was a prisoner of archival history and what 'The Society of Friends of the Deceased' retrieved was the informational substructure of Marx's knowledge of Hegel. By creating the boundaries of the knowledge of Hegel until the 20th century 'The Society of Friends of the Deceased' cemented the parameters within which Marx's relation to Hegel would be conceived until the publication of the *Jenaer Outline*.

The above paragraphs provide a general picture of the Hegel sources available to Marx, but we must sharpen our vision and identify the particular books of Hegel that Marx read and the exact time frame in which he read them.

The standard I am using for the most part in determining if Marx read a specific Hegel text is whether Marx mentioned that text in his own writings. This method of verification can be referred to as the footnote system of proof. If no citation exists in all of Marx's writings referencing a singular manuscript of Hegel then I generally assume that Marx had no knowledge of this text.

There are nine primary sources from which it is possible to reconstruct the individual Hegel manuscripts Marx knew: his 1836 poem; the 1837 letter to his father; the 1841 doctoral dissertation; the 1843 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right'; 'The Manuscripts'; the 1845 *The Holy Family*; the 1845–1846 'The Leipzig Council'; the 1847 *The Poverty of Philosophy* and his personal library. These sources will be used in depth in later portions of this book.

Marx's essential approach to Hegel was characterized by five strategies: 1) the influence of Ruge; 2) the influence of Bauer; 3) the role of Feuerbach; 4) the question of the role of philosophy; 5) the relationship between System and Method.

1) Marx attacked Hegel because of Hegel's employment of Speculative philosophy. According to Marx, when Hegel fused mind and reality Hegel distorted reality. When reality was presented as the predicate of thought, reality was disfigured. In this strategy Marx was influenced by the work of Ruge. Even though Ruge looked upon Hegel as a Liberal monarchist he nevertheless felt that Hegel's defense of an inherited dynasty was flawed and that this error derived from Hegel's commitment to Speculative philosophy.²³ Marx followed Ruge in this line of attack and in his 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right', Marx attributed the conservative aspects of Hegel's political philosophy to his Speculative System. Furthermore, in his essay 'Critique of Hegel's Dialectic and Philosophy in General', contained in 'The Manuscripts', Marx judged Hegel's Idealist Speculative philosophy as the cause of Hegel's maiming of the philosophy of nature. Marx believed that Hegel asserted that nature was organized, made comprehensible by Idea, and that Hegel's Speculative approach to nature led to a distortion of nature in-itself.

2) Marx's dissertation *On the Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature* was heavily influenced by Bauer and from Bauer Marx learned that the function of philosophy was to critique thought. The development

of Marx's critical philosophy, his final achievement of a critique of political economy, was indebted to Bauer.

3) Feuerbach also fueled Marx's aversion to Speculative philosophy. In place of mind Feuerbach substituted anthropology, or humankind as a species being. By taking mind as the source of all activity Speculative philosophy reduced the centrality of practical activity. Hegel was wrong, according to Feuerbach, because he misplaced the power of human predication locating it in mind rather than in species being, or an anthropological substance.

As later pages will indicate, Marx's assessment of Feuerbach was ambiguous, but Marx did learn from Feuerbach that social being should replace mind. Marx also redefined Feuerbach and replaced species being with economic dynamics and contradictions. Marx agreed with Feuerbach that humans were social beings, but Marx did not define the social as commensurate with anthropological substance, but substituted economic historicism for the being of the species.

4) Influenced by Ruge, Bauer and Feuerbach, Marx's major concern in the area of philosophy was the discernment of its proper role. Marx changed what he thought to be the function of philosophy in Hegel. Marx believed that for Hegel the locus of philosophy was mind, whereas for Marx the proper role of philosophy was critique and praxis. Karl Löwith's book *From Hegel to Nietzsche*²⁴ is extremely insightful in this regard. Löwith was one of the first to bring attention to the fact that Marx revolutionized the role of philosophy and that for Marx philosophy was united with praxis and not fully circumscribed inside mind.

Löwith's *From Hegel to Nietzsche* and John Toews' *Hegelianism*²⁵ offer insightful discussions of the relationship between reason and reality in Hegel. Although Löwith stressed the religious aspects of Hegel's thought, Löwith and Toews both concurred that Hegel's philosophy was an attempt to reconcile reason and reality. Löwith writes that Hegel's 'philosophy of history is a theodicy of logic, a representation of God in the abstract elements of pure thought',²⁶ while Toews, forgoing the Christian aspects of Hegel's thought, describes the Hegelian project as the reunification of thought and reality, the transcendence of the dichotomy between the empirical and the rational.²⁷

Hegel wrote a philosophy of identity. The major thrust of Hegel's speculations was to establish the identity of mind and reality. Only when reason became an element of reality did reality become comprehensible because only then could reason rediscover itself in the real. According to Hegelian hermeneutics, reason could only understand itself and thus reality only became fathomable when subjective reason rediscovered itself in that part of reality in which reason had become objective.

Marx's philosophy was not a theory of identity, but a program of antithesis. Marx did not seek to assert the similarity between thought and reality, but rather their contradiction. Whereas Hegel presumed identity Marx presumed the antipodal.

Hegelian philosophy did not engage critique. Hegel's philosophy was an outcome of critique, of Kant's critique. Kant's philosophy explored the dissonance

between reality and the idea and liberated the idea from reality. Building on Kant's advance, Hegel took the freedom of thought as a presupposition but then attempted to reconcile mind in its freedom with reality. He sought to reconcile the two on the ground of reason's potency for objectification and reunification. Thus Hegelian thought emphasized reunification and not critique because critique assumed the discrepancy between thought and reality. Marx did exercise critique because he took the discordance between reality and thought as a presupposition.

Marx's essay 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction' (1843)²⁸ is the site in which this renovation of the role of philosophy was consummated. In this essay Marx attacks Speculative philosophy because it imprisons philosophy in reason and so detaches philosophy from reality. Contrary to Hegel, Marx averred that the proper role of philosophy was first to critique reality and then to alter reality through praxis, through the intervention of thoughtful action in the world.

5) Marx's flight from Hegelian Speculative philosophy did not entail an escape from Hegelian methodology. Marx's approach to Hegel was based on the distinction between System and Method and whereas Marx refuted the Hegelian System, or Idealist philosophy, he incorporated the Hegelian methodology. Marx condemned Hegelian Speculative philosophy, the System, as the source of all the errors in Hegel's theories, but he simultaneously absorbed the methodology of Hegel's logic. I will describe the most important features of the Hegel-Marx methodological umbilical cord in later sections of this book.

The distinction between System and Method is parallel to the distinction between form and content. I will emphasize in later portions of this book that content should be taken as a synonym for System and form as a synonym for Method. In the rejection of Hegel's Speculative philosophy Marx correspondingly negated the Hegelian content, mind. Since mind was the substance of the Idealist system Marx rejected mind as the content of human activity, or it was not mind that predicated, but rather labor. Similarly, Marx retained many forms of the Hegelian Method after they were shed of their Speculative content. Marx borrowed the Hegelian form of essence, but first stripped it of its Speculative content and redefined essence as the inherent movement of socio-economic formations. The economic methodology by which Marx explained the operations of social formations were Hegelian logical methodologies cleansed of their Speculative content.

The founders of the School of Continuity between Hegel and Marx were Lukács and Herbert Marcuse and I confirm my indebtedness to them. Lukács in his book *The Young Hegel*²⁹ and Marcuse in his book *Reason and Revolution*³⁰ focused on the similarities between these two men. Reacting to the publication in the 20th century of many previously unknown manuscripts of Hegel, the *Jenaer Outline*, both Lukács and Marcuse concentrated on the similarities between Hegel and Marx. Both portrayed Marx's reformulation of Hegelian Speculative philosophy into a philosophy of praxis as not only a correct statement of the Hegelian mission, but as a justifiable evolution of Hegelian principles. While Lukács and Marcuse were

to point out the similarities connecting Hegel and Marx, while they were the originators of the School of Continuity, they did neglect to discuss the disparities between Hegel and Marx. Although the main focus of *Marx's Discourse with Hegel* falls on the continuity of methodological forms between these two men it will also target the polarities that separated these two epochal figures.

This book will fill a gap found in the works of Toews' *Hegelianism* and Warren Breckman's *Marx, the Young Hegelians and the Origins of Radical Social Theory*.³¹ Even though I learned a great deal from both these books, and both these books deal with the relationship between Hegel and Marx, neither of them take account of the vacant Hegel bibliography. Both the Toews and Breckman books were written after all the Hegel and Marx manuscripts were discovered and made known, but neither author deals with the question of how this vacuum affected Marx. *Marx's Discourse with Hegel* is the first book to study the Hegel–Marx relationship from the point of view of this void.

In addition, I find Breckman's presentation of the relationship between Hegel and Marx to be seriously flawed. Although his argument concerning the role personalism played in the development of Left Hegelianism is insightful, his emphasis on personalism serves to distort. Breckman claims that Marx broke with Hegel during his journalistic tenure at the *Rheinische Zeitung*. I completely disagree with this interpretation and maintain that Breckman falls into this error because he fails to draw a distinction between Right, Center and Left Hegelianism. As I point out in later chapters, when Marx wrote for the *Rheinische Zeitung* he joined Hegel in the Center, German Liberalism, but this did not make Marx a republican in 1843. Lastly, by concentrating so completely on the issue of personalism, Breckman overlooked the far more important intellectual trend that encouraged Marx's break with Hegel, the question of property. Whereas Hegel defended the right of private property, Marx came to call for its abolition and he does so not because of his rejection of personalism, but because of his legal studies with Gans who pointed out to him that property did not derive from will, as Hegel maintained, but rather had a historicity. According to Gans, ownership was a historical product which differed in terms of the civilization in which it found itself. Marx did not negate private property because it was an expression of personalism, but because claims regarding the eternal nature of private property were philosophic fictions.

Part Two: Contending Contemporary Interpretations

Fueled by the recent archival excavations of both the full bibliographies of Hegel and Marx, the debate regarding the continuity or discontinuity between these two men is a major issue within contemporary Marxism. As I mentioned earlier I am an advocate of School of Continuity. The two most prominent protagonists of this school are Christopher Arthur and Tony Smith and they encapsulated their approach to the Hegel–Marx problematic under the title of Systematic Dialectic. I will discuss the work of Arthur in subsequent pages. Published in recent years, two other books entered the Hegel–Marx problematic, their contributions

enriched the Hegel–Marx debate and as a means of demonstrating the complexity and centrality of this discourse I will comment on each of these texts in the forthcoming paragraphs.

Stathis Kouvelakis's *Philosophy and Revolution: From Kant to Marx*³² focuses almost completely on the relationship between philosophy and politics. The section of the book that is dedicated to the discussion of Marx concentrates on the years 1842–1843 which Kouvelakis characterizes as a period of crisis in Marx's development. In this roughly two-year period Marx was Editor of the *Rheinische Zeitung*, resigned from this position in protest against the stifling censorship of the Prussian Government, suffered from unemployment, married Jenny von Westphalen and went to live with Jenny's parents in Kreuznach. Kouvelakis judges the Kreuznach year as a turning point in Marx's life, his baptism as a revolutionary and offers a deep probe into the *Kreuznach Manuscripts*, Marx's 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' (1843), and his 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction' (1843). Both of these Marxist texts were commentaries on Hegel's *The Philosophy of Right* (1821).

Kouvelakis belongs to the School of Continuity but his vision is confined to the terrain of the political. The major thrust of Kouvelakis's book is the exposition of how Hegelian philosophy impacted Marx's political views. His primary concern is the influence philosophy exerts on politics and in this pursuit he shows how Hegelian philosophy, or Marx's annulment of Hegel's Idealist philosophy, laid the foundation for Marx's embrace of Jacobinism.

When *Philosophy and Revolution* takes this path it separates itself from the intent of *Marx's Discourse with Hegel*. Both books agree that a continuity connected Hegel and Marx, but whereas Kouvelakis isolates this continuity in the sphere of philosophy and Jacobinism I concentrate on the continuity in the sphere of methodology. Kouvelakis is concerned with perpetuating the revolutionary eschatology of Robespierre while I am concerned with charting the evolution of Marx's theory of explanation in the social sciences, or Marx's method of political economy.

In his discussion of Hegel's political position Kouvelakis correctly sees that Hegel was a constitutional monarchist, and he refutes the right-wing view of Hegel, as expressed in Rudolf Haym's biography, that Hegel was an advocate of the feudal-monarchist basis of the Prussian state. Although Kouvelakis denies that Hegel was a Liberal, he does recognize Hegel's awareness of the 'social question', or the existence of poverty in civil society, and Hegel's calls for government action to ameliorate this distress. But Kouvelakis does not pay sufficient attention to the ethical foundation of Hegel's political theory. Hegel did not only read Smith and Ricardo, but also read Aristotle and, in the context of the early 19th century, Hegel, recognizing the economic-sociological upheavals of the Industrial Revolution, hoped to reincarnate the ethicality of the Athenian polis as captured in Aristotle's *Politics*.

Kouvelakis also exaggerates the Young Marx's embrace of Jacobinism. Kouvelakis finds the origins of Marx's Robespierrean commitment in the 1843 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction', but he, however, fails to reference Marx's comments on the French Revolution in the 1844 *The Holy Family*. In that

published work Marx offered a critique of the Jacobins – they confused their temporal placement, they sought to be Roman plebeians in a time zone that was not ripe for plebian radicalism. The actual political conditions of France in 1789 would not support a plebeian insurrection, and Robespierre and St Just were not the brothers Gracchus.³³

Regardless of these shortfalls Kouvelakis's book makes a persuasive contribution to the School of Continuity. Concerned with the discipline of politics, *Philosophy and Revolution* correctly displays the movement of Marx out of Hegelian theory to a philosophy of praxis. Hegelian speculation in itself presupposed the antinomy between philosophy and actuality, or philosophy-in-itself annulled the past society that brought it into existence. For Hegel, philosophy was a child of its time, but when the present passed into yesterday, philosophy became retrodiction, or retrodiction revealed the fault lines of past philosophical systems.

In Hegel, however, the antinomy between philosophy and actuality remained restricted to self-consciousness. The antinomy was the awareness of self-consciousness and it lacked an agent of political praxis. This was the nexus for Marx's rupture with Hegel, for Marx supplied this contradiction between philosophy and politics with a rationale and an agent. As articulated in 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction', theory, self-consciousness, was replaced by practical activity and the designation of a social class, the proletariat, as the subject of this practical activity.

The debate between the Schools of Continuity and Discontinuity extends itself into the question of textual prioritization. David Leopold's *The Young Karl Marx*³⁴ pits two early texts of Marx, the 1843 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' and 'The Manuscripts' against each other and concludes that the former is a better guide to the thought of the Young Marx than the latter. Leopold adds a new dimension to the Hegel-Marx debate and this new aspect can be labeled the 'Battle over Textual Prioritization'.

The first publication of 'The Manuscripts' appeared in 1932 in Ryazanov's *Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe (Mega1)*. However, these 1844 manuscripts did not comprise a complete text, but were intercalated by Ryazanov from disparate drafts written by Marx during 1844. By interpolating diffuse drafts, notebooks and comments, Ryazanov created a text which acted as one of the incubators of Western Marxism in the 1960s. However, in the 1980s, Rojahn, a scholar working at the Amsterdam International Institute of Social History, which possessed the original Marx drafts and notebooks, published two articles that challenged the authenticity of 'The Manuscripts' as a coherent and unitary text.³⁵ Leopold, building on the scholarship of Rojahn, and because of the lack of certainty as to the meaning of 'The Manuscripts' demotes the importance of these writings. Conversely, because the 1843 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' is a more coherent text and its authorship is undisputed, Leopold prioritizes it over 'The Manuscripts'.

However, the Battle of Textual Prioritization contains a greater meaning than the positioning of texts. 'The Manuscripts' is a source that lends credence to the continuity thesis. Hegel is a significant presence in 'The Manuscripts' and to disprove their existence as a unitary text presents a serious challenge to the viability

of the continuity thesis. Leopold opts to take this path and one of the results of *The Young Karl Marx* is to weaken the continuity thesis. *The Young Karl Marx* does not negate the presence of Hegel in the early Marx, but it does reduce and relocate its impact. Leopold argues that a more definitive evaluation of the influence of Hegel on Marx is found in the 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' and in making this claim Leopold shifts the center of the Hegel-Marx relationship from the phenomenology of labor and alienation, the axial thesis of the 'The Manuscripts', to the question of Hegelian politics, the axial theme of the 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right'. A Hegel-Marx continuity exists in Leopold's book, but the ground of the continuity is shifted.

Leopold's concentration on Hegelian politics leads him to analyze the distinction between civil society and state that performs such crucial roles in *The Philosophy of Right*. For Hegel civil society was the realm of family, private property and capitalist industrial relations, while the state was the domain of ethics. Leopold contends that *The Philosophy of Right* constructs a strict separation between civil society and state, but also that Hegel was aware of some of the inhumanities of capitalist civil society even though he never wavered in his support of private property.

Leopold is correct to emphasize the significant impact that Hegel's idea of civil society exerted on Marx. A pivotal theme of the 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' was the call by Marx for the abolition of the state, which meant that a democratically organized civil society would replace the state and assume its legislative and administrative functions.

But Leopold's exposition of the civil society dimensions of the thought of Hegel and Marx suffers from three errors. First, Marx's knowledge of civil society did not solely derive from Hegel, although Hegel was the most important contributor. Marx was acquainted with the Scottish School of History – Ferguson, James Steuart, Adam Smith and Francis Hutchinson – who wrote on the four-stage theory of the evolution of civil society and state.³⁶ In addition, Smith and Ricardo were also aware of civil society, or of an economic realm that operated autonomously from political life. In addition, Hegel himself did not invent the idea of civil society, rather he elaborated on a concept that he found in previous authors, such as Charles de Secondat Montesquieu, as well as his knowledge of some of the members of the Scottish School of History.³⁷ Second, Leopold is wrong in claiming that Hegel drew a firm barrier between civil society and state. A reading of Hegel's description of Athenian civil society in *The Philosophy of History*³⁸ documents Hegel's awareness of how civil society acted as the foundation of political structures. In *The Philosophy of Religion* Hegel discerned how the patriarchal nature of Chinese civil society evolved into Confucian ethics as well as the patriarchal hierarchy of Imperial China.³⁹ Marx's theory of the anatomy of social formations rested upon conviction that the state was merely a projection of the socio-economic structure of civil society. Third, Leopold totally ignored the ethical nature of both Hegel's and Marx's theory of the political. Whereas morality related to individual subjectivity, ethics related to the intersubjective and the economic-political. Ethics, or politics, was the site in which the individual subjective antagonisms were reconciled in the intersubjective and communal

nature of politics. The heritage of Athens, the polis, lived on in Hegel, but Leopold remained blind to this Aristotelian legacy.

Contrary to the School of Continuity, Leopold assigns Feuerbach a crucial role in the development of the Young Marx. Although Leopold affirms the problematic nature of the 1844 'The Manuscripts', he sees Feuerbach's influence in these inconclusive writings as the key to Marx's theory of alienation. Leopold defends the idea that Feuerbach's concept of species being is the instrument through which Marx hoped to overcome alienation, or that Feuerbach promulgated an ideal of social harmonization upon which Marx's idea of communism rested, a formulation first announced in the 1844 'On the Jewish Question'. By centering the Feuerbachian influence, Leopold takes a decidedly anti-continuity posture, because the School of Continuity is predisposed towards limiting the influence of Feuerbach. The School of Continuity stresses the role of methodology and not Feuerbachian philosophical anthropology.

By imprisoning the Young Marx into the years 1843 to 1845 Leopold created a chronological frame that substantiated his bias. By excluding 'The Manuscripts' as evidence, Leopold ensured that the 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' rose to the rank of uncontested authority, and that this critique contained the Young Marx's most decisive criticism of the Speculative philosophy of Hegel. By defining the Young Marx as only existing between the years 1843 and 1845, by invalidating the 1844 'The Manuscripts' as evidence, Leopold created a documentary archive confirming Marx's distance from Hegel because the archive only contained documents Marx wrote from this vantage point.

But the Young Marx was surely young in 1841, which raises the question of why Leopold excluded the years 1841 to 1843 from the chronology of the life of the Young Marx. From 1841 until 1843 Marx wrote his dissertation *On the Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature* and spent October 1842 until March 1843 as Editor of the *Rheinische Zeitung*. Leopold's exclusion of the texts from the 1841–1843 period was done to eliminate material that disproved his arguments regarding the rupture between Hegel and Marx primarily over the issue of Speculative philosophy.

Although it is possible to challenge the authenticity of Marx's dissertation because it is written in the hand of an unknown person, the weight of academic opinion accepts the validity of this document as the work of Marx. The dissertation is the site in which Marx's praise of and continuity with Hegel is most clearly averred. Consequently, when Leopold sets the dissertation off-limits he arbitrarily removes the most important source that disproves his interpretation of the Hegel–Marx relationship.

Furthermore, Marx's journalism in the *Rheinische Zeitung* is totally devoid of any criticism of Hegel. As later portions of this book show, most of the political positions Marx advocated in the *Rheinische Zeitung* were perfectly consummate with positions put forth by Hegel. By not addressing the journalism of the *Rheinische Zeitung* Leopold again arbitrarily excluded evidence that disproved his claims.

Even though I interpret *The Young Karl Marx* as an attack on the School of Continuity I recognize that the thrust of its critique is on Speculative philosophy

and politics. I agree with Leopold that Marx distanced himself from Hegel in these intellectual territories.

My disagreement with Leopold lies in the terrain of methodology, about which he is totally silent. My argument is that Marx did divorce himself from Hegelian metaphysics and politics, but not from Hegelian methodology.

The thesis that I develop in *Marx's Discourse with Hegel* differs from those of Kouvelakis and Leopold because whereas these two authors are concerned with Marx's politics I am engrossed in Marx's methodology, or his philosophy of explanation in the social sciences. In examining the presence of Hegel in Marx both Kouvelakis and Leopold dwell on the impact Hegel exerted on Marxian politics while my focus of concentration is on Hegel's influence on Marx's philosophy of explanation.

Marx's Discourse with Hegel is an exemplification of the School of Continuity, or more precisely I place myself within the School of Systematic Dialectic. Other members of this academy are Smith, Geert Reuten, Patrick Murray and Arthur. None of these men are in total agreement with each other, nor am I in total agreement with any of them, but we are all joined together by a common thread – that the methodological principles of Marx's *Das Kapital*, indeed of his theory of explanation in the social sciences, evolve out of Hegel's *The Science Of Logic*, and one of the purposes of *Marx's Discourse with Hegel* is to prove this interpretation.

In explicating the protocols of the School of Systematic Dialectic I rely most heavily on the work of Arthur. In two books, *The Dialectic of Labor*, and *The New Dialectic and Marx's Capital*, Arthur provides a clear analysis of how the regime of Systematic Dialectic led to a re-interpretation of Marxism. Although I have reservations about Arthur's use of 'ontology' when describing *Das Kapital* and I will expound on these reservations in later sections of this chapter, Arthur's work provides a clear guide into the heuristic principles of this school.

The School of Systematic Dialectic is characterized by four principles: 1) The opposition to a linear interpretation of Marxism; 2) The textual prioritization of *Das Kapital* over *The Phenomenology of Spirit* and 'The Manuscripts'; 3) The redefinition of the Theory of Value from labor to commodity exchange; 4) The understanding of a social formation as a totality.

1) The opposition to a linear interpretation of Marxism

The School of Systematic Dialectic rejects both dialectical and historical materialism on the grounds that both are a form of linearity. Dialectical and historical materialism are corrupted by a linear prognosis, the tendency to predict the future evolution of social formations, particularly capitalism. In this regard Arthur faults Engels, because it was Engels, most notably in his *The Dialectics of Nature*, and *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, who defined Marxism as linear evolutionism.⁴⁰ Engels also distorted *Das Kapital* by placing the idea of 'simple commodity production' into the text. Marx himself never used this phrase and when Engels inserted 'simple commodity production' into *Das Kapital* he supplied a justification for interpreting Marxism as linear developmentalism. The phrase 'simple commodity production', a fictional interpolation, an invention of

Engels, lent support to the linear idea that capitalism evolved through successive developmental stages and that 'simple commodity production' was the primary stage of this long evolutionary process.

2) The textual prioritization of *The Science of Logic* and *Das Kapital*

Lukács's *The Young Hegel* was the genesis of the School of Continuity and Lukács was the beneficiary of two bibliographical revelations, the publication of Hegel's *Jenaer Outline*, particularly the *System of Ethical Life* and the availability of Marx's 'The Manuscripts'. Georg Lasson published 'Schriften zur Politik und Rechtsphilosophie' and the 'Jenenser Logik, Metaphysik und Naturphilosophie' in 1923 while Johannes Hoffmeister published the 'Jenaer Rechtsphilosophie' in 1931 and the drafts and outlines of Marx's 1844 'The Manuscripts' were held at the Marx-Engels Archive in Moscow, under the supervision of Ryazanov. The original 'The Manuscripts' were held in Amsterdam at the International Institute of Social History and Ryazanov, a frequent visitor to this Institute, made photocopies of these Marx manuscripts and carried them to Moscow. Lukács and Ryazanov were friends, Ryazanov made these materials available to Lukács and *The Young Hegel* was a product of this marriage between the previously unknown Hegel and the previously unknown Marx.

The inception of the School of Continuity was constructed on the textual synthesis between Marx's 'The Manuscripts' and Hegel's *The Phenomenology of Spirit* and *The System of Ethical Life*. *The System of Ethical Life* stressed the activity of the subjective agent, or Spirit, as it appeared in human need, labor, intersubjectivity, economic exchange and a social community. Lukács took all these from *The System of Ethical Life* and united these ideas with *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, and in *The Young Hegel* he advanced an interpretation of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* that centered on the themes of objectification and alienation. The School of Continuity as advanced by Lukács in *The Young Hegel* was based on an anthropological view of human labor, the need of the subject to labor to objectify their productive potential in order to satisfy their needs and then tragically to suffer the alienation of objects the subject had externalized.

The School of Continuity as instanced in the work of Arthur displaces the interconnection between *The Phenomenology of Spirit* and 'The Manuscripts' and replaces it with the interlocking of *The Science of Logic* and *Das Kapital*. All the exponents of the School of Continuity understand *Das Kapital* as a projection of the methodologies of *The Science of Logic*. Arthur's book, *The New Dialectic and Marx's Capital*, is a deep probe into the relationship between specific economic categories from *Das Kapital* and corresponding categories from *The Science of Logic*. These two books now form the center of gravity of the contemporary debate regarding the continuity between Hegel and Marx.

The shift from the *Phenomenology*/'The Manuscripts' to *The Science of Logic*/*Das Kapital* involves more than a determination of textual primacy; it also touches on chronology. The *Phenomenology*/'The Manuscripts' nexus correlates to the Young Marx, while *The Science of Logic*/*Das Kapital* pivot measures the Mature Hegel and the Mature Marx. The shifting of the center of diagnosis to the methodology

of Marx automatically moves the gravity of investigation to the Mature Marx, because it was only when he began the preparation for *Das Kapital* that he arrived at his philosophy of explanation in the social sciences. The interpretation that Marxism is primarily a study of social totalities leads to the study of the Mature Marx because *Das Kapital* is the instantiation of his philosophy of explanation.

3) The redefinition of the Theory of Value from labor to commodity exchange

The traditional interpretation of *Das Kapital* – Joan Robinson, Paul Sweezy, Ronald Meek and Ernst Mandel – focused upon the labor theory of value. According to these commentators labor was the substance of value and labor divided into two components, necessary and surplus. Surplus value was a product of surplus labor and capitalism was in an unending pursuit for surplus value. The end of capitalist exploitation was contingent upon the release of surplus labor from the control of capitalists and the full return of both necessary and surplus value to the jurisdiction of the proletariat.

The School of Systematic Dialectic overturns this thesis and sees capitalism as resting upon the commodity. In support of this redefinition the School of Systematic Dialectic points to the first chapter of Volume One of *Das Kapital*, which is devoted to the commodity, as proof that Marx looked upon the commodity as the immanence of capitalism. For Arthur the end of capitalism does not concern the termination of surplus labor, but rather the end of those relations in a social totality that turns every object into a commodity and every intersubjective relation as a moment of commoditization.

The transfer of the epicenter of *Das Kapital* from labor to commodity carries enormous implications for the reading of *Das Kapital*. From the vantage point of the commodity the central drive of capitalism was not the appropriation of surplus labor, but rather the enlargement of the boundaries of commodity exchange. Money was no longer derived from the acquisition of increased metrics of surplus labor, but from the exchange of commodities. Commodity exchange as the cosmic law of capitalism bestowed on this social formation its unique meaning: Capitalism was an endless valorization process, or the limitless increase of value was the central telos of capitalism.

Hegel enters at this point because the employment of terms such as universalization lead directly to the Hegelian dialectic on two fronts. First, the use of the term universality to explain the inherent functioning of a society is exactly consonant with the Hegelian methodology of essence, or immanence. To isolate a mode of behavior of a society as determining all features of that society is to activate the Hegelian modality of essence. Second, according to Hegel, a universal is dialectically negated by a particular, or a particular is needed to define a universal. Social formations possess a universal, an essence, and also particulars, but each particular reflects the essence, or each particular in a social totality receives its meaning from the essence.

I disassociate myself from Arthur in the usage of such terms as 'ontology' and 'metaphysics' because of the echoes of Speculative philosophy from which Marx

divorced himself. Marx was a social science theorist and he believed in the historicity of social formations. He prioritized historical movement, that every social formation was temporary because its conditions of existence were in constant motion over time. I seek to maintain the importance of constant development and so I reject the usage of concepts like 'ontology' and 'metaphysics' which, because they are associated with the eternal, negate the reality of temporality and succession.

4) The understanding of a social formation as a totality

The concept of totality is the pivot upon which the methodology of Systematic Dialectic is based. The canon of Systematic Dialectic rests on the conviction that Marx appropriated the concept of totality from Hegel and that it became the defining idea from which Marx began his analysis of a social formation. My discussion of the concept of totality will be divided into five parts: 1) Totality; 2) Abstraction; 3) Synchronic-Diachronic; 4) Determination; 5) Universal-Particular. The five parts I mention here do not exhaust the full lexicon of Hegelian categories Marx appropriated, but the remit of this chapter limits me to this number. For a complete dictionary of the categories Marx borrowed from Hegel I recommend that the reader consult my book *Divergent Paths*; Chapter Three in that book contains a full index of the methodological forms Marx adopted from the 'Parmenides of Berlin'.⁴²

1) Totality

The concepts of essence and totality are interrelated and as I explained in previous paragraphs essence is telos, it is the immanent demiurge that activates a social formation. According to Hegel and Marx, every social system possessed an essence, or every social system functioned in terms of a universal principle that organized that system. For Hegel and Marx essence, totality and universality are synonymous.

In *The New Dialectic and Marx's Capital*, Arthur provides an excellent summary of Marx's concept of totality. Basing his argument on the Hegelian thesis of contradiction, that the dialectic is a movement that develops from inherent opposition, Arthur summarizes the hierarchy of a totality in the following manner:

Both poles are essential to each other as a matter of their very definitions;

Each produces its opposite through its own movement;

Each produces itself through the mediation of its opposite;

The totality is constituted out of its movements, but the totality reproduces itself in and through its movements even when the material reduced to single moments existed in some sense prior to the constitution of the totality.⁴³

2) Abstraction

In Chapter Three of my book *Divergent Paths*, I draw a distinction between Marx's method of inquiry and his method of presentation. The method of presentation

concerns Marx's written description of the results of his research, while the method of inquiry concerns the research practices of Marx, the procedures of investigation he used in the scrutiny of his object. The confines of this chapter only permit me to discuss the method of inquiry, or Marx's scientific protocols.

Abstraction is a hierarchical procedure. It is a movement of the stages of generality. As it investigates a phenomenon, abstraction studies different stages of that phenomenon on the assumption that each level will yield greater generality. The final stage of generality, a generality which describes all the preceding stages, is the universal.

Abstraction is the activity that produces a generality. For example, the attempt to decipher the universality of the Caucasian ethnicity begins at the level of skin color and at this level the generality granted by the investigation concludes that the Caucasian ethnicity is characterized by white skin. But this is only the primary stage of conceptualization and in order to reach the level of universality it is necessary to pass through additional levels of hierarchical abstractions. The process of abstraction must continue to a higher level of investigation onto the question of the average height of the Caucasian and when the discovery is made that the average of the Caucasian is 5ft 10in then this inquiry has advanced to a higher level of generalization, to a hierarchy that is now more inclusive of all particularities regarding the Caucasian ethnicity. The process of inquiry continues until it has reached the apex of the hierarchy, until a generality has emerged that encompasses all the particularities of a specific field of investigation.

3) Synchronic-Diachronic

Marx's method of inquiry is synchronic and opposed to the diachronic procedure; the latter is linear, it defines an object by its place in a linear development. Synchronic explanation is hierarchical, it explains ascending stages, it seeks to show how more general categories incorporate lesser general categories. Synchronic advance is not linear, but perpendicular, an advance of categories into more inclusive generalizations until an all-encompassing universal is attained. The end of the synchronic is essence.

4) Determination

In terms of Marx's theory of totality the concept of determination refers to the power of the essence to configure all the elements in an organic system. The cause of determination is essence, or essence is the prius of a social organism. The consequence of the determinations of essence is that particularities are assigned two roles in synchronic explanation; first, particularities are reflections of the essence, or they are attributed particular functions by the essence; second, particularities provide cement to the system because in fulfilling the roles assigned to them by essence, the particularity supports the synchronic structure of the whole.

5) Universal-Particular

Previous paragraphs described the mutuality between universal and particular and I will not repeat this analysis here. I will only mention that a synonym for

universal-particular is whole and parts. When Marx decoded a sociological formation he thought in terms of an anatomical organism belonging to a specific genus and that genus was composed of parts sustaining the genus. In *Das Kapital*, Marx used the terms universal-particular and whole-parts as synonyms and they were crucial instruments in his methodological paradigms.

The five categories I analyzed above were Hegelian in origin and *The Science of Logic* is the source from which Marx adopted these categories. All these categories (I selected only five of them), were among the engines that drove *The Science of Logic* to the Absolute Idea and *Das Kapital* to the understanding that the valorization process was the inexhaustible prius of capitalism.

Arthur is aware of this and in *The New Dialectic and Marx's Capital* he constructs a chart showing the correlation between *Das Kapital* and Hegel's 'Small Logic' in *The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* as well as *The Science of Logic*. In the last paragraph of the logical cartography Arthur compares Book Three of *The Science of Logic* to the essence of capitalism. Arthur's cartography is reproduced below:

The Doctrine of Concept	Capital (General Formula)
A) Subjective Concept	A) Price List
B) Objective Concept	B) Metamorphosis of money and commodities
C) The Idea	C) Self-Valorization ⁴⁴

Marx recognized that the infinite valorization of capital was the essence of capitalism. For Hegel the essence of logic was the Idea, that form or shape of self-consciousness that provided meaning to a particular. The Idea in Hegel was a universal, was that horizon that conjoined particulars thereby attributing meaning to them. Hegel's Idea or Marx's self-valorization of value were therefore parallelisms; each performed a similar function. As essence Hegel's Idea bestowed a form, the basis of meaning, and as essence Marx's valorization assigned meaning to a social totality. Both Idea and valorization performed coequal functions, attributing essence to form, and therefore both were correlates.

In *The New Dialectic and Marx's Capital*, Arthur appears as a leading advocate of the School of Continuity, specifically in relation to methodology, but this does not mean he was a blind devotee of Marx. The fact that Arthur correctly defended the Hegel-Marx continuity did not mean that Arthur was myopic in terms of Marx's misreading of specific Hegelian texts. In his *The Dialectics of Labor*,⁴⁵ Arthur was also one of the first to perceive that Marx's 'The Manuscripts', particularly the section, 'Critique of Hegel's Dialectic and Philosophy in General', was plagued by a misreading of Hegel's *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. In particular, Arthur isolates two areas of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* that Marx misunderstood, the Hegelian terrains of subjective labor and the critique of bourgeois society.

I am in total agreement with Arthur that Marx was blind to Hegel's interest in subjective labor and the critique of bourgeois society and I would extend Marx's misreading of Hegel to additional areas within the entirety of Hegel's philosophical system. At this point, however, I will briefly explore dimensions of

Marx's misreading of Hegel that Arthur does not investigate. Later pages of *Marx's Discourse with Hegel* will offer an exhaustive enumeration of Marx's misinterpretation of Hegel, a task that is missing in Arthur's work and a task that must be carried out. However, before putting this forth it is necessary to call attention to two points.

It must be recalled that this book concentrates on the Young Marx, or the years 1836–1848. These were years of acquisition, years in which Marx read Hegel and selected those modes of Hegelian logic he found fertile. Although this book frequently calls attention to the method of social science explanation in the Mature Marx, the Marx of 1850–1883, the center of gravity of this monograph is on the Young Marx's process of acquisition, his intellectual choice of specific Hegelian categories.

The fundamental cause of the Young Marx's erroneous appropriation of Hegel arose because he focused on Hegelian metaphysics. When Marx approached Hegel from this bias, when he concentrated on annulling the metaphysical aspects of Hegelian philosophy, he remained blind in regard to the subjectivity of Hegelian thought. Marx interpreted Hegel from the vantage point of Baruch Spinoza, or he approached Hegel as continuing the Spinozist metaphysics of substance. Hegel defined Spinoza's substance independent of materiality, as Idea, and this was the exact target of Marx's refutation of the 'Parmenides of Berlin'. This is the perspective that Arthur does not pursue.

I will only discuss four instances of Marx's miscalculations and in my exegesis I will reference *The Phenomenology of Spirit* and *The Philosophy of Mind*. These four instances are: 1) Speculative philosophy; 2) The theory of labor; 3) The ethicality of the state; 4) The critique of the bourgeois world.

1) Speculative philosophy

Marx read Hegel as an exponent of Speculative Idealism, or as a Spinozist who looked upon the Idea as constituting the substance of actuality. According to Marx, the Idea in Hegel was not an expression of the in-itself of subjectivity, but rather of a substance external to subjectivity. Marx read Hegel as reiterating Baruch Spinoza's interpretation of substance as an external and universal power independent of humankind.

In the 1844 *The Holy Family* Marx wrote the following paragraph on the Fichtean and Spinozist influence on Hegel:

The dispute between Strauss and Bauer over Substance and Self-Consciousness is a dispute within Hegelian speculation. In Hegel there are three elements, Spinoza's Substance, Fichte's Self-Consciousness and Hegel's necessary and antagonistic oneness of the two, the Absolute Spirit. The first element is metaphysically travestied nature severed from man; the second is the metaphysically travestied spirit severed from nature [. . .]

Strauss expounds Hegel from Spinoza's point of view and Bauer from Fichte's point of view in the domain of theology, both with perfect consistency. They both criticized Hegel insofar as with him each of these two elements was

falsified in the other, while they carried each of these elements to its one-sidedness and hence consistent development.⁴⁶

Marx repeated this characterization of Hegel as a hybrid of Spinoza and Fichte in 'The Leipzig Council'.⁴⁷ In actuality the interpretation that Hegel was a synthesis of Spinoza and Fichte was first made by Bauer.⁴⁸ *The Holy Family* and 'The Leipzig Council' contained extended attacks on Bauer, but despite of this negation of Bauerian philosophy *sui generis* Marx accepted the particularity of Bauer's reading of Hegel.

Even though Marx accepted the Spinoza–Fichte reading of Hegel in his own assessment of Hegel he deleted the Fichte presence. Marx remained blind to the vital role Fichtean subjectivity exerted on Hegel. But Marx emphasized the Spinozist influence, the impact that the Spinozist idea of substance had on Hegel. In his 1843 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right', Marx defined Hegel as a 'logical pantheist' meaning that Hegel believed that logic, or Idea, was the substance of the universe. Subtracting Fichte from Hegel, Marx interpreted Hegel as perpetuating the Spinozist tradition of the metaphysics of substance. In 'The Manuscripts' of 1844 Marx transmuted the Hegelian idea that substance issued from Idea to the concept that human labor was substance.

Marx's two critiques of Hegel, 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' and 'The Critique of Hegel's Dialectic and Philosophy in General', demonstrate a common theme. In the 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' Marx admonishes Hegel for maintaining that the state was a projection of the universal Idea. Marx presented a Hegel who proposed that the state did not evolve from economic and social conflicts, but was merely the devolution of the Idea. Marx continued this same form of refutation in his 'Critique of Hegel's Dialectic and Philosophy in General' in which he charges Hegel with accounting for the existence of nature as an emanation of the concept. In both Critiques Marx bases his negation of Hegel on the grounds that both *The Phenomenology of Spirit* and *The Philosophy of Mind* account for the presence of state, culture and politics as derivatives of the Idea.

2) The theory of labor

In order to fathom Marx's misconception of the theory of labor in Hegel it is necessary to divide this concept into two parts: a) The labor of the Idea; b) Subjective labor.

a) *The labor of the Idea*

Marx attributed to Hegel the belief that the social world was a product of the pneumatic force of the Idea.

The originality of 'The Manuscripts' lies in the fact that Marx transformed the Hegelian theory of labor, that Marx asserted that the existence of the world did not emerge from the Speculative Idea but from subjective action. Adopting Feuerbach's transformative method Marx transfigured Hegel's labor of the Idea into the subjective activity of the industrial laborer. Marx was a Feuerbachian in terms of content as he replaced the Hegelian Idea with Feuerbachian species being,

the transformation of the content, but he was a Fichtean in terms of relocating the Hegelian Idea into subjectivity, the transformation of the agent of action.

In spite of Marx's own reconfiguration of Hegel's idea of labor, the transmutation from the labor of Idea to the labor of the industrial working class, he continued to remain ignorant of Hegel's own awareness of subjective activity, or the economic work of the individual. Whereas Hegel's texts, particularly *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, as well as *The Philosophy of Mind*, possess numerous passages referring to the need and productivity of human work, Marx never comments on these passages. Whereas Hegel was cognizant of the role labor played in the anthropological evolution of the human species, Marx never demonstrates any recognition of these paragraphs.

b) Subjective labor

This section itself will be divided into two parts: b1) Subjective Spirit; b2) Objective Spirit. The purpose of these two sections is to demonstrate that Hegel wrote about subjective labor both in the realms of Subjective Spirit and Objective Spirit. Since I will discuss Hegel's concept of subjective work and labor at greater length in later chapters of this book my comments here will be brief.

b1) Subjective Spirit

Since Marx's 'Critique of Hegel's Dialectic and Philosophy in General' is totally given over to a refutation of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* no doubt exists regarding his knowledge of this text. In order to document Hegel's awareness of subjective labor at the level of Subjective Spirit I will quote two paragraphs from this text. The first quote is drawn from the subdivision 'The Freedom of Self-Consciousness: Stoicism, Scepticism and the Unhappy Consciousness'.

- I) In this return into self there comes to view its second relationship, that of desire and work in which consciousness finds confirmation of that inner certainty of itself which we know it has attained, by overcoming and enjoying the existence alien to it; viz. Existence in the form of independent things. But the Unhappy Consciousness merely finds itself desiring and working; it is not aware that to find it in this way implies that it is in fact certain of itself, and that its feeling of the alien existence is the self-feeling . . . that confirmation which it would receive through work and enjoyment in therefore equally incomplete . . .⁴⁹
The world of actuality to which desire and work are directed . . .⁵⁰

The second quote below is taken from the section on 'Pleasure and Necessity' in the chapter 'The Actualization of Rational Self-consciousness Through Its Own Activity'.

- II) Its action is only in one respect an action of desire. It does not aim at the destruction of objective being in its entirety, but only at the form of its otherness or its independence, which is a show devoid of essence; [. . .] It attains therefore to the enjoyment of pleasure, to the consciousness of its actualization in a consciousness which appears independent.⁵¹

The theme of these paragraphs and the chapters of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* from which they are taken is the development of self-consciousness to Subjective Spirit. The maturation of Subjective Spirit unfolds in three stages.

The first stage is the overall telos of the process which is the movement from self-consciousness to selfhood. To become an instrument of action, to become an agent of activity in the empirical world, self-consciousness must first gain a Self, it must be an Individuality inspired by a will. For Hegel will was synonymous with Selfhood.

The second stage was the utilization of a specific implement to achieve this Selfhood. The implements that Hegel mentions in these paragraphs are need, desire, action, enjoyment, pleasure, work and labor. As self-consciousness intervenes in the external world using the instruments described above it develops a sense of Self, or it becomes aware of itself as a Self that modifies the external.

The third stage is the culmination into Subjective Spirit, or subjective labor is the womb of Subjective Spirit. It is through the modification introduced into the external world by subjective labor that Subjective Spirit is born.

The opening chapters of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* describes the genesis of Subjective Spirit, but Marx remained oblivious to this discussion. Marx's 'Critique of Hegel's Dialectic and Philosophy in General' is devoid of any reference to Hegel's theory of subjective labor and this absence reveals Marx's blindness to the theme of subjective labor throughout Hegel's work.

b2) Objective Spirit

Hegelian philosophy traversed three stages, the advanced from Subjective Spirit to Objective Spirit to Absolute Spirit. The level of Objective Spirit was the terrain of intersubjectivity, or the Self now as a part of a community. Just as labor was the foundation of Subjective Spirit so labor was also the foundation of Objective Spirit, or individual labor served as the ground from which social man emerged.

As a means of demonstrating the interconnection between objective labor and Objective Spirit I will quote from two paragraphs of *The Philosophy of Mind* (524 and 525). Marx read *The Philosophy of Mind*, which is the third volume of *The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, because he lists the *Encyclopedia* in the bibliography to his dissertation.

B.I The particularity of the person includes in the first instance their wants. The possibility of satisfying these wants is here laid on the social fabric, the general stock from which all derive their satisfaction. In the condition of things in which this method of satisfaction by indirect adjustment is realized, immediate seizure (pa. 488) of external objects as a means thereto exists barely or not at all: the objects are already property. To acquire them is only possible by the intervention, on the one hand, of the possessor's will, which as particular has in view the satisfaction of their variously defined interests; while on the other hand, it is conditioned by the ever continuous production of fresh means of exchange by the exchanges over labor. This instrument, by which the labor of all facilitates the satisfaction of wants, constitutes the general stock.⁵²

B.II This 'morcellement' of their content by abstraction gives rise to the division of labor.⁵³

These two quotations offer good insights, although brief, regarding the palingenesis of Objective Spirit out of objective labor. It is objective labor that supplies the pneumatics for the emergence of Objective Spirit and the primary realization of Objective Spirit is civil society. By Objective Spirit Hegel referred to the origin of human social life.

In these two paragraphs Hegel demonstrated his recognition of economic intersubjectivity. In his ventures into economic theory Hegel recognized that the 'exchange of labor' led to the creation of a 'general stock' and this 'general stock' was the reservoir out of which the 'satisfaction of wants' flowed.

It is important to distinguish between subjective and objective labor. Subjective labor referred to the Self's first interventions in its material environment. At this stage subjective labor was pastoral, or hunting. Objective labor was the activity of workers who exchanged in a more advanced economic environment, an economic level in which manufacture had occurred. Production was no longer individual, but rather objective labor was intersubjective, or was executed by workers cooperating by specializing in specific functions in the production of goods to sustain life.

Hegel was cognizant of the 'division of labor'. Hegel was a capitalist and strenuously defended the rights of private property. The factory system depended upon the cooperation of workers and industrial labor was the exemplification of intersubjectivity, the Self's awareness that the new context of self-consciousness was societal.

Replicating his ignorance in terms of Hegel's concept of subjective labor, Marx was also myopic as to Hegel's concept of objective labor. Even though Marx read the texts in which Hegel expounded his ideas regarding objective labor, Marx did not allude to these vital aspects of Hegelian thought in either his 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right', or in the entirety of 'The Manuscripts', or in any other of his writings in which he analyzes Hegelian thought. Marx remained hostage to the Speculative interpretation of Hegel.

3) The ethicality of the state

Another area in which Marx completely misjudged Hegel concerned the nature of the state. In his 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' Marx constantly repeated that for Hegel the state was merely the externalization of the Idea. Marx's assertion was a total misinterpretation because in Hegel the state was an expression of ethicality. The ethicality of the state was idea concept that Hegel constantly repeated in his Visible Bibliography and Marx read all these works.

In order to document Hegel's belief that ethicality was the inwardness of the state I list below two quotations from Hegel. The first is taken from *The Philosophy of History*:

When the State or our country constitutes a community of existence; when the subjective will of man submits to laws . . . the contradiction between Liberty

and Necessity vanishes . . . The objective and the subjective will are then reconciled, and present one identical homogeneous whole. For the morality of the State is not of that ethical reflective kind in which one's own conviction bears sway; this latter is rather the peculiarity of the modern time, while the true antique morality is based one the principle of abiding by one's duty [to the state at large].⁵⁴

The second quote is taken from the second volume of *The History of Philosophy* in a chapter dealing with the political philosophy of Plato:

. . . but it is of man's moral nature that he treats in the Republic. Man's moral nature seems to us to have little to do with the State; to Plato, however, the reality of mind . . . that is, of mind as opposed to nature . . . appeared in its highest truth as the as the organization of the state, which, as such is essentially moral; and he recognized that the moral nature (free will in its rationality) comes to its right, to its reality, only in an actual nation.⁵⁵

In order to fully grasp the congruence between ethics and the state in Hegel it is first necessary to distinguish between morality and ethics. Morality functioned in the realm of the subject. Morality concerned actions by an individual whose outcomes were either Good or Bad. Ethicality, conversely, concerned the actions of an individual inside a community. Ethicality related to the world of the intersubjective, it concerned the interaction of a Self with an Other.

For Hegel the state, or politics, was the actualization of the ethical. The state, or nation, was inherently an ethical organism because it was devoted to the creation of intersubjective harmony. The state promulgated laws and law was the ground out of which intersubjective reciprocity would emerge.

In his political philosophy Marx continued the tradition of Plato and Aristotle. These Athenian philosophers were among the first to draw the correlation between ethics and the state. Children of Athens, Plato and Aristotle were cognizant of how the social unity of the polis acted as the ground of the ethical. In the polis the ethical – duty to and obedience to the community – was the presupposition of the state. Hegel understood his mission as resurrecting the glory of the polis in the 19th century. Hegel sought to demonstrate how the Greek idea of ethicality could be realized in the post-Industrial Revolution state.

Marx remained blind to the ethical nature of Hegel's political theory. He never referred to Hegel's theory of the state as a instance of ethical principles. Marx read practically all of the *Collected Works* of Hegel and where relevant in these published works Hegel repeatedly combined political philosophy with the ethical. Regardless of Hegel's constant assertions of the ethical, Marx remained a prisoner of the interpretation of Hegel as a Speculative Idealist, a gross distortion of the Hegel texts.

4) Critique of the bourgeois world

Hegel was a constitutional monarchist. In the context of the first three decades of the 19th century, the eras of Napoleon, and the Hohenzollern Restoration, Hegel was

a German Liberal. Hegel defended the rights of private property as well as the need for class divisions. He vehemently opposed socialism and communism and justified the unequal distribution of wealth which led to the stratification of classes.

These attitudes do not mean, however, that Hegel was blind to the corruptions of capitalist bourgeois society. Hegel was not opposed to the acquisition of wealth but warned that wealth corrupted. Hegel was not a political revolutionary or a social radical, but as a deeply moral person he was aware that the rabid and unchecked acquisitiveness of capitalist society was toxic.

In *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, which Marx commented upon extensively in his 'Critique of Hegel's Dialectic and Philosophy in General', Hegel wrote in paragraph 519:

Wealth thus shares its dejection with the recipient; but in place of rebellion appears arrogance . . . in this arrogance which fancies it has, by the gift of a meal, acquired the self of another 'I' and thereby gained for itself the submission of that other's inmost being, it overlooks the inner rebellion of the other; it overlooks this state of sheer disruption in which, the self-identity of being-for-itself having become divided against itself, all identity, all existence, is disrupted, and in which the sentiment and view-point of the benefactor suffer most distortion. It stands on the very edge of this innermost abyss, of this bottomless depth in which all stability and Substance have vanished, and in this depth it sees nothing but a common thing, a plaything of its whims, an accident of its caprice. Its Spirit is a subjective opinion wholly devoid of essentiality, a superficiality from which Spirit has fled.⁵⁶

In other sections of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* Hegel evidences Denis Diderot's *Rameau's Nephew* as a novel depicting the poisonous nature of bourgeois society. In the above-quoted passages Hegel is describing the narcissism produced by wealth. Abundant riches produce a Self which is a debasement of moral individuality; it produces the megalomania of self-gratification. Hegel defines this as a 'bottomless depth', the addiction to self-indulgence which is impossible to escape.⁵⁷

Marx drew no attention to Hegel's derision of wealth in-and-for-itself. By not commenting on Hegel's moral denunciation he created the impression that Hegel was silent on these issues, or that the Idea was unconcerned with them. Furthermore, Diderot was a figure known to Marx. In *The Holy Family*, in the section 'Critical Battle Against French Materialism', Marx alludes to Diderot as a major advocate of French materialism.⁵⁸ Later, on April 16, 1869, Marx wrote a letter to Engels explicitly praising *Rameau's Nephew*.⁵⁹ But Marx never acknowledges that Diderot's work played any role in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, or that it was ever used by Hegel as a symbol of bourgeois decadence.

Part Three: Statement of Author's Prejudices

I make these confessions because it will help the reader place the central arguments of this book within contemporary debates over Marxism.

The collapse of Stalinist Russia in 1991 was an act of liberation for the thought of Marx. Stalinist ideology was a debasement of Marxism and it was necessary for the Stalinist dictatorship to disintegrate in order for Marxist thought to be freed and to renew its authentic historical journey. The publication of *Marx's Discourse with Hegel* takes place in an Age of the Rebirth of Marxism. Emancipated from the Stalinist distortion of Marxism the Age of the Rebirth of Marxism is characterized by a return to the Marxist texts in order to read them uncontaminated by Stalinist politico-ideological strategic exploitation.

My refutation of Stalinism is not simultaneously an annulment of Leninism as I draw a distinction between Stalinist Bolshevism and Leninist Bolshevism. The relation between Stalinism and Leninism is a complex one that is impossible for me to enter into in these pages, but readers who want to pursue my thinking on this matter are advised to consult the chapter 'Hegelianized Leninism' in my book *Dialogue within the Dialectic*.⁶⁰ One corruption of the thought of Marx perpetuated by Stalinist Bolshevism was the attribution of the phrase 'dialectical materialism' to encapsulate Marx's system. I will not use this phrase in this book because it is entirely misleading.

Similarly, I will not use the phrase 'historical materialism' to characterize Marx's system of thought. Although the phrase 'historical materialism' does not misrepresent Marx's thought to the same degree as 'dialectical materialism' it also serves to shift attention away from the essential properties of Marx's system, specifically the study of the totalities of social formations.

The phrase that will appear in this text is the 'Method of Explanation in the Social Sciences'. In order to make this definition clear it is necessary to divide it into four parts.

1) Marx's Method of Explanation in the Social Sciences was finalized during the years 1850–1883, or during his Second Appropriation of Hegel. The years 1836–1848, his First Appropriation of Hegel, was his period of acquisition, the time in which he digested Hegelian logical categories.

The logical categories the Young Marx absorbed from Hegel were organized into a Method of Explanation in the Social Sciences during the years of the Mature Marx, 1850–1883. *Marx's Discourse with Hegel*, as previously mentioned, deals with the Young Marx as it sets forth the categories Marx adopted from Hegel that were later incorporated into a Method of Explanation in the Social Sciences.⁶¹

2) Marx applied his Method of Explanation in the Social Sciences to social totalities, to organic modes of production. His Method of Explanation in the Social Sciences was directed at isolating the core social relationships which sustained and preserved a social totality.

3) In order to discover the pneumatic force of a system of production it was necessary to investigate the social relations of production, or the historicism of social formations.

4) Marx invented new protocols of study for political economy. He rejected the empirical and positive approach as represented by Smith and Ricardo. In place of the protocols of classical English political economy Marx substituted new investigative paradigms that penetrated to the prius of an organic social formation. The deficiency of historical materialism arises from its preoccupation with linear development, whereas I maintain that Marx stressed the synchronic analysis of social totalities. Marx was not primarily interested in chronology, but with synchronic organic anatomies.

Keeping this explanatory hierarchy in mind it is now possible to more fully describe four features of Marx's Method of Explanation in the Social Sciences.

1) Marx was not writing specialized economics. The subtitle of *Das Kapital* Volume One was 'A Critique of Political Economy' and Marx continued the tradition of political economy that emerged in the 18th-century Scottish School of historiography that found its origin in the works of Montesquieu. Marx did not write economics as detached from politics, or economics as isolated from the general structures of a social formation, but he wrote political economy as an organic science, the investigation of a society as a total structure.

2) *Das Kapital* was not intended as a fixed and final statement on the capitalist system, but rather the initiation of Marx's Method of political economy. *Das Kapital* was an exemplification, a realization of Marx's Method of Explanation in the Social Sciences. Indispensable to the understanding of *Das Kapital* are not the reflections on the performance of the stock, but rather the fathoming of the instrumentality of the Method of political economy.

3) Marx's Method of political economy was an ensemble of procedures by which the productive activities of a social formation could be comprehended. Historicity was one of the basic principles of the Method of political economy. A major feature of Marx's Method is economic historicism, the transformations of social formations over time and so investigators must apply the Method of political economy anew to each new historico-economico-political formation that was born in order to penetrate into the essence of that formation. The Method remained the same, but the historico-economico-political object to which it was applied was ever-changing.

4) Hegel's logic provided the method for Marx's historicism of social totalities. *The Science of Logic*, as well as the Smaller Logic of *The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, offered him the analytic devices upon which to construct his Method. More precisely, it is essentially from 'The Doctrine of Essence' in *The Science of Logic* that Marx borrowed the logical forms upon which he built his methodology. Without understanding the function these logical modes performed in 'The Doctrine of Essence' it is impossible to understand Marx's Method. The key to *Das Kapital* lies in *The Science of Logic*.

Chapter Two

Marx's Incomplete Quest

Chapter Two is divided into four parts:

Part I: The works of Hegel available during Marx's lifetime that Marx knew

Part II: The works of Hegel available during Marx's lifetime that Marx did not know

Part III: The works of Hegel published after Marx died

Part IV: The creation of the Invisible Hegel

Part I offers a complete listing of the works of 'The Master' that Marx read. A careful reading of Marx's texts from 1836 until 1848 permits one to reconstruct the exact books of Hegel of which Marx had knowledge.

Part II is also a complete listing because modern research has uncovered all the material Hegel published during Marx's lifetime, making it possible for the first time to decipher those published books, articles and journalism of Hegel that escaped Marx's attention.

In Part III I have taken the liberty of simply noting the most significant works of Hegel that were first published in the 20th century and that probably would have compelled Marx to revise his interpretation of Hegel had Marx had the opportunity to read them. Part III is simply intended to give the reader a sense of the Hegel bibliography that was undisclosed to Marx.

In Part IV I will interpret Marx's creation of the Invisible Hegel.

I will make comments in Part I whenever it is important to highlight a particular significance a Hegel text carried for Marx.

I will also make comments in Part II only to point out why an undisclosed text could have reformulated Marx's reception of Hegel.

Part I: The works of Hegel available during Marx's lifetime that Marx knew

These are the works of Marx from which it is possible to reconstruct the Visible Hegel bibliography that Marx knew:

- 1) the 1836 poems;
- 2) the 1837 letter to his father;

- 3) the 1841 doctoral dissertation, *On the Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature*
- 4) the 1843 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right'
- 5) 'The Manuscripts';
- 6) The works of the 1845–1850 period: the 1845 *The Holy Family*; the 1845–1846 'The Leipzig Council'; and the 1847 *The Poverty of Philosophy*.

In addition, it is vital to keep in mind that the first *Collected Works* of Hegel, 18 volumes in total, were completed in 1845. Thus, by 1845 all the extant manuscripts of Hegel were available to Marx in the *Collected Works*.¹

1) Marx's 1836 epigram 'On Hegel'² contained a reference to Hegel's *Lectures on Aesthetics* and I take this as establishing that Marx read this work. This is the Young Marx's earliest reference to Hegel. As a young man of 18 Marx read into Hegelian aesthetic theory. Attention must be drawn to the fact that Hegel's *Lectures on Aesthetics* were published as three books within Volume 10 of the *Collected Works*, all edited by Heinrich Gustav Hotho. However, the second book of these lectures did not appear until 1837 and the third book did not appear until 1838. But the first book of the *Lectures on Aesthetics* was published in 1835. Therefore, Marx's 1836 epigram 'On Hegel' only certifies that Marx read the first book of the *Lectures on Aesthetics* contained in the *Collected Works*.

2) In his 1837 letter to his father Marx wrote that he 'got to know Hegel together with most of his students from beginning to end'.³ Regardless of Marx's statement, I maintain that Marx did not 'get to know Hegel from beginning to end'. Marx did not read the four Hegel essays contained in Volume 1 of the *Collected Works*, nor did he read Volume 18, *Philosophische Propaedeutik*. In addition, Marx did not read the essays as well as the journalism written by Hegel concerning contemporary German politics that were contained in Volumes 16 and 17. I will discuss all the black holes in later paragraphs of this chapter. However, the 1837 letter does contain Marx's first reference to Friedrich Karl Savigny and the German Historical School of Law.

3) The bibliography to the Young Marx's dissertation contains the following citations to books of Hegel:

The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, 3rd Edition (Heidelberg, 1830) [495].

The Philosophy of Right. In Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's *Werke* (Berlin, 1833), Volume 8 [309].

The Phenomenology of Spirit. In Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's *Werke*, 2nd Edition (Berlin, 1841), Volume 2 [400].

The History of Philosophy. In Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's *Werke*, Volume 14 (Berlin, 1843) [500].⁴

All these works played important roles in Marx's reception of Hegel, and later sections of this chapter will more comprehensively trace how they infiltrated into the various works of Marx.

For example, *The History of Philosophy* formed the scaffolding for the Young Marx's dissertation and his views on the historiography of philosophy. And *The Philosophy of Right* became the target of Marx's 1843 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right'.

It is, however, *The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* that draws our attention. This work consists of three volumes, *The Logic*, *The Philosophy of Nature* and *The Philosophy of Mind*. The Young Marx's *exzerpte* establishes that he read Volume 2, *Philosophy of Nature*, because in 1839 Marx made a four-page sketch of Hegel's speculations regarding the material universe.⁵ While the Young Marx was preparing to write his dissertation, which dealt with the Greek and Roman philosophies of nature, he read and took notes on Volume Two of *The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*. This *exzerpte* was placed in the fifth notebook the Young Marx used in the preparation of his dissertation.

In Chapter Three I single out the Young Marx's acquaintance with *The Philosophy of Nature* because in the 1839–1841 period, the years when the Young Marx wrote his dissertation, he was intensely involved with the problem of a philosophy of nature and these two or three years witnessed the origins of his materialism.

Marx's essay, 'Critique of Hegel's Dialectic and Philosophy in General', contained in 'The Manuscripts', is another important guide to his knowledge of Hegel. In this short essay Marx epitomizes his comprehension of Hegel. This distillation focuses on three Hegelian texts, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, *The Science of Logic* and *The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, with an emphasis on *The Philosophy of Nature* and *The Philosophy of Mind*. The fact that Marx in his 'Critique of Hegel's Dialectic and Philosophy in General' assumed he could encapsulate the essence of Hegelian thought from these manuscripts again indicates that all his information on Hegel was drawn from the boundaries established by the 1832–1845 edition of Hegel's *Collected Works*. This edition formed the parameters beyond which Marx's reading of Hegel could not pass.

4) Marx devoted the entirety of 'The Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right', written in early 1843, to a refutation of Hegel's *The Philosophy of Right*.⁶ References to *The Philosophy of Right* also appear in 'On the Jewish Question'.⁷

5) 'The Manuscripts': a disconnected and exploratory commentary on Hegel's *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. Marx wrote these notebooks as forms of self-exploration into Hegel's masterpiece. They are exercises, internal dialogues on the best way to critique Hegel's *The Phenomenology of Spirit*.⁸

6) The works of the 1845–1848 period. This subdivision will specify the works of Hegel that Marx cited in *The Holy Family*, 'The Leipzig Council' and *The Poverty of Philosophy* (references to original editions).

The Holy Family

'Logic', Hegel's *Werke*, 2nd Auflage, 5. Band, pp. 6, 9, 229, 13.⁹

Marx's citation here refers to the three volume *The Science of Logic*. Marx's dissertation does not allude to *The Science of Logic*, or 'Larger Logic', but only to the 'Smaller Logic' of the *Encyclopedia*, so *The Holy Family* reference is Marx's initial reference to *The Science Of Logic*, or the 'Larger Logic'.

The Holy Family also mentions the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, *The Philosophy of Right*, *The Phenomenology of Spirit* and *The History of Philosophy* and the editions of these works listed in *The Holy Family* match up with those in the dissertation. The 1845 Marx used the same editions of these works that he originally used in 1841.¹⁰

'The Leipzig Council'

The Philosophy of Religion, hrsg. vom Philipp Marheinecke, 2 verb. Aufl. Th. 2, ebendort, Bd. 12 (Berlin, 1840).¹¹

The Philosophy of History, hrsg. vom Eduard Gans, ebendort, BD. 9 1837.¹²

The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, teil 3, 'Die Philosophie des Geistes'.¹³ This is Marx's first reference to *The Philosophy of Mind* or to the third volume of the *Encyclopedia*.

*The History Of Philosophy*¹⁴

The Philosophy of Nature.¹⁵ This is the second volume of the *Encyclopedia*.

The Phenomenology of Spirit.¹⁶

The Philosophy of Right.¹⁷

The Science of Logic.¹⁸

I can find no specific citation in either the 1836–1844 or 1844–1848 periods that Marx read Volume 1 of the *Encyclopedia*, 'The Logic' or Smaller Logic, but since Marx refers repeatedly to the *Encyclopedia* and since he singles out Volumes 2 and 3, *The Philosophy of Nature* and *The Philosophy of Mind*, it is reasonable to assume that he also knew the 'Smaller Logic', or Volume 1 of the *Encyclopedia*. Furthermore, Marx had a copy of the *Encyclopedia* 'Smaller Logic' in his private library at the end of his life. For a more complete reference to this particular volume see the next section.

The Poverty of Philosophy

There is no citation in *The Poverty of Philosophy* to any work of Hegel not previously mentioned. However, *The Poverty of Philosophy* is a rich source of Marx's attitudes toward Hegel, the parts of Hegel that he rejected and the parts of Hegel that he later incorporated and transformed, and a long quote is required here in order to alert the reader to both the significance of this text and to later discussions of Marx's Method.

It is this absolute Method that Hegel speaks of in these terms: 'Method is absolutely unique, supreme, infinite force, which no object can resist, it is the tendency of reason to find itself again, to recognize itself in every object.' (Logic, Vol. III). All things being reduced to a logical category, and every movement, every act of production, to method, it follows naturally that every aggregate of products and production, of objects and of movement, can be reduced to

a form of applied metaphysics. What Hegel has done for religion, law, etc. M. Proudhon seeks to do for political economy.

But once it has managed to pose itself as a thesis, this thesis, this thought, opposed to itself, splits up into two contradictory thoughts; the positive and the negative, the yes and the no. The struggle between these two antagonistic elements compressed in the antithesis constitutes dialectical movement. The yes becoming no, the no becoming yes, the yes becoming both no and yes, the contradictories balance, neutralize, paralyze each other.

Just as from the dialectic movement of the simple categories is born the group, so from the dialectical movement of the groups is born the series, and from the dialectical movement of the series is born the entire system.¹⁹

Without a deep probe, which will come later, into the full meaning of these paragraphs two smaller, but important, factors deserve attention at this point. First, these passages document definitively that Marx read the chapter on 'Method' in Book III of *The Science of Logic*. Marx's knowledge of the 'Method' chapter of Book III in 1847 is vital when trying to assess the origins of Marx's new methodology of social formations and its derivation from the Hegelian System. Second, this passage also contains Marx's first allusion to the dialectic of thesis–antithesis–synthesis. In the context of *Marx's Discourse with Hegel* it will be impossible to track the subsequent historiography of the dialectic of thesis–antithesis–synthesis, but *The Poverty of Philosophy* is the starting point of this journey.

Marx's personal library

The only books of Hegel Marx retained in his personal library are listed below. Not only is it important to note the Hegel books Marx kept on his own shelves, but also the edition and the editor (cited in the original German).

The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, Theil 1. Die Logik. hrsg. vom Leopold von Henning (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot 1840). (Werke. Vollst. Ausg. Durch einen Verein von freunden der Verewigten), Bd. 6.

The History of Philosophy, hrsg. vom Carl Ludwig Michelet. Theil 2.3.2 verb. Saufl. (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot 1842–1844). (Werke. Vollst. Ausg. Durch einen Verein von Freunden der Verewigten . . . 2Aufl), Bd. 14, 15.

The reader's attention is called to the fact that the copy of *The History of Philosophy* Marx had in his private possession is different from the copy he used when writing his dissertation. In his library Marx had the Michelet edition published in Berlin by Duncker and Humblot, 1842–1844, while for his dissertation Marx used the Hegel *Collected Works*, Volume 14, published in Berlin in 1833.

The Philosophy Of History, hrsg. vom Eduard Gans (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot), 1837 (Werke, Vollst. Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten), Bd. 9.

The Science of Logic, hrsg. vom Leopold von Henning, 2., unverant. Augl. (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot 1840–1844). (*Werke*, Vollst. Ausg. Durch einen Verein von Freunden des Ewigten. 2Aufl.), Bd. 3–5.

The reader's attention is drawn to the fact that *The Science of Logic* in Marx's own library is the same edition as that quoted in *The Holy Family*.²⁰

Notice needs to be brought to the additions (*Zusatze*) made to the Hegelian texts by his editors. The additions were supplements introduced into the text by the editors who acquired this material from his own attendance, or from the notes of other students who were in the auditorium, when Hegel lectured on these subjects. Gans edited the 1833 edition of *The Philosophy of Right*, but there are no additions in this original edition. However, the three-volume *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* is different. Published in 1840, the *Logic* contains additions supplied by Leopold von Henning; published in 1842, *The Philosophy of Nature* contains additions by Michelet; published in 1845, *The Philosophy of Mind* contains additions by Ludwig Boumann. Specifically, the additions of Michelet and Boumann are the most important from the perspective of this book because they are extensive and relate to the question of subjective activity in Hegel. Moreover, these Michelet and Boumann editions were both published as part of the first *Collected Works* of Hegel, 1832–1845, and were thus accessible to Marx.

Part Two: Works of Hegel Available to Marx during His Lifetime that Marx Did Not Know

1) *The Difference of the Fichtean and Schellingean System of Philosophy*. Hegel moved to Jena in 1801 and in that year Seidler's Academic Bookstore published this pamphlet of over 100 pages. This long essay was Hegel's first publicly recognized publication. This article was a comparison of the philosophic systems of Fichte and Schelling and marked the moment 'The Master' emancipated himself from the influence of Schelling and embarked upon his own theoretical quest.²¹

2) In order to earn the right to lecture as a *privatdozent* at the University of Jena, Hegel was required to write a Latin dissertation. Hegel completed his dissertation, *On the Orbits of the Planets*, in 1801 on his thirty-first birthday.²² It is important to note that Volume 16 of the *Collected Works*, published in 1834, does contain this work. In Marx's 1837 letter to his father he stated that he had read in entirety the works of Hegel; Volume 16 was available to him, but he never mentions this dissertation in any of his own works.

3) Schelling left the University of Jena in 1803, but between the years 1802–1803 he and Hegel co-edited a journal called *The Critical Journal of Philosophy*. During these two years Hegel published six articles in this journal and Marx never read them. The unread articles are:

- a) 'On the Nature of Philosophic Criticism';
- b) 'How Common Sense Construes Philosophy';

- c) 'The Relation of Scepticism and Philosophy';
- d) 'Faith and Knowledge';
- e) 'On the Scientific Method of Treating Natural Law';
- f) 'On The Relationship of Natural Philosophy and Philosophy in General'.

All these essays documented the stages of the Young Hegel's philosophical development. With the exception of 'On the Scientific Method of Treating Natural Law' they depicted episodes in the evolution of Hegel's logic, as well as his relation to the philosophers Fichte, Kant and Schelling. A seventh essay that Marx failed to read, 'The Difference of the Fichtean and Schellingian System of Philosophy', was published in 1801 as a separate pamphlet bearing Hegel's name and therefore accessible to Marx (see above).

It is important to note that of the six essays mentioned above three were contained in Volume 1 of the *Collected Works*. These were: 'Faith and Knowledge', 'On the Relationship of Natural Philosophy and Philosophy in General', and 'On The Scientific Method of Treating Natural Law'. In addition, Volume 1 also contained the essay 'The Difference of the Fichtean and Schellingian System of Philosophy'.

Volume 16 of the *Collected Works* contained three of the essays mentioned above: 'On The Nature of Philosophic Criticism', 'How Common Sense Construes Philosophy', and 'The Relation of Scepticism to Philosophy'. If Marx had read Volume 16 he would have familiarized himself with all three essays. Volume 16 also contained Hegel's dissertation.

The reader must be made aware that the Hegel essays in *The Critical Journal of Philosophy* were unsigned, so if Marx had read this journal he could not have automatically attributed their authorship to Hegel. Nevertheless, these essays were included in the *Collected Works*, edited by 'The Society of Friends of the Deceased', so Marx's knowledge of the *Collected Works* was sufficient to make him aware of Hegel's authorship. In other words, if Marx's knowledge of Hegel had been limited to *The Critical Journal of Philosophy* he would not have known that Hegel was the originator of these articles, but since Marx was familiar with the *Collected Works* this should have provided him with confirmation of Hegel's authorship.²³

Even though Marx was involved in an intensive study of Hegel from 1839 to 1841, the years of his writing of his dissertation, he did not read these essays and there are two primary reasons for this. First, regardless of Marx's mastery of the Hegelian material that related to his doctoral dissertation he did not plan to write a biography of Hegel, or a monograph on the entire system of Hegelian thought and so these essays that were maps to Hegel's early development held no interest for him. Second, the gravity of Marx's interest in Hegel fell upon *The Phenomenology of Mind*, *The Science of Logic*, *The Philosophy of Law*, *The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, *The History of Philosophy* and *The Philosophy of History*, and Marx was mostly concerned with Hegel's logical, historical and political theories. *The Phenomenology of Spirit* drew his attention because of its speculations on subjective labor and Hegel's portrayal, patterned upon Diderot's *Rameau's Nephew*, of alienation in bourgeois society; *The Science of Logic* attracted him because it provided a method, analytic tools, by which to analyze the structure of social

totalities; *The Philosophy of Right* was the epitome of Hegel's social and political philosophy; *The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* contained the 'Smaller Logic' and insights into Hegel's philosophy of nature; *The History of Philosophy* provided him with Hegel's interpretation of the evolution of philosophy, Greek philosophy in particular, and acted as the background to Marx's dissertation; *The Philosophy of History* offered insights into Hegel's theory of historicity, or Hegel's belief that historicity defined every human endeavor and that philosophy itself was the *curriculum vitae* of the human mind. Marx studied the 'Parmenides of Berlin' because of Hegel's stature in Germany and because he hoped that he would offer him instruments for a critique of social structures, politics and the development of capitalist society. Hegel's own process of philosophical maturation was not Marx's predominant concern.

In addition to the essays listed above there were four other essays published by Hegel that were available to Marx and that he did not read:

- g) 'Proceedings of the Estates Assembly in the Kingdom of Württemberg', published in a newspaper in 1817 while Hegel was teaching at the University of Heidelberg. It was also published in Volume 16 of the *Collected Works*.
- h) 'The English Reform Bill'. This essay was published in 1831 in the *Allgemeine preussische Staatszeitung*. It also appeared in Volume 17 of the *Collected Works*, which appeared in 1835.

To summarize, Marx did not read any of the sources contained in Volumes 1, 16, 17 and 18 of Hegel's *Collected Works*.

- i) Hegel's 'Preface' to Hermann Hinrich's *The Philosophy of Religion*. This 'Preface' contained interesting information regarding Hegel's view of the relationship between philosophy and religion.²⁴
- j) Hegel's review of Alexander Humboldt's book on the Baghavad Gita in *The Critical Journal of Philosophy* in 1827. The debate on the relation between religion and philosophy was ignited by David Friedrich Strauss's *The Life of Jesus* and in Hegel's review he put forth his own viewpoints on this contentious issue and also revealed his own assessment of the nature and purpose of philosophy.²⁵
- k) J. Gustav Thaulow, *Hegel's Ansichten über Erziehung und Unterricht (Hegel's Views on Education and Instruction)* (1854)

Part Three: The Works of Hegel Published after Marx's Death

Hegel lived from 1770 until 1831 and Marx lived from 1818 until 1883 so the composition of these works can either date prior to or after Marx's birth. The works listed below are either completed works which were not published until after Marx's death, or incomplete drafts, letters, diaries or notes. Furthermore, the list of books, diaries, essays and correspondence cited below is not intended as an encyclopedic recounting of every instance of Hegel's writing published after Marx's death, but its purpose is to alert the reader as to the vast amount of

Hegel material that was brought out of the black hole after Marx died as a means of illustrating the limited knowledge of Hegel that Marx possessed in his own lifetime.

- a) None of Hegel's correspondence was available to Marx.
- b) In 1796 Hegel hiked through the Alps near Berne and wrote a travel diary that Marx did not know.
- c) In 1907 Hermann Nohl published *Hegel's Early Theological Writings*, a collection of previously unpublished essays. Nohl's volume contains the following drafts and essays that Marx did not know.²⁶
 - Before 1793: 'Popular Religion and Christianity'
 - 1795: 'The Life of Jesus'
 - 1795–1796: 'The Positivity of the Christian Religion'
 - 'The Spirit of Judaism'
 - 'Morality, Love, Religion'
 - 'Love and Religion'
 - 'Love'
 - 'Faith and Being'
 - 'The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate'
 - 'Fragment of a System'
 - New Introduction to 'The Positivity of the Christian Religion'
- d) 'The German Constitution' and 'The System of Ethics', both published by Georg Lasson in 1923.
- e) Hegel's Diary from the later period of his stay in Jena.
- f) *The Jena Logic, Metaphysics and Philosophy of Nature*, published by Georg Lasson in 1923.
- g) *Jenenser Philosophy of Reality*, Vols. I and II, published by Johannes Hoffmeister in 1931.
- h) *Documents of Hegel's Development*, published by Johannes Hoffmeister in 1936.
- i) Hegel's Lectures. Several volumes in Hegel's *Collected Works* were collated by editors from lectures Hegel gave when he was a professor at the University of Berlin. But these were lectures Hegel gave at both the University of Heidelberg and the University of Berlin that were not published until after the deaths of both Hegel and Marx. In this regard the work of Ilting is particularly important to this book because it deals with Hegel's political theory, which is a central theme of this work. In 1983 Ilting published *The Philosophy of Right*, which comprised student notes of the lectures Hegel gave at Heidelberg during 1817–1818. In 1973–1974 Ilting also published the six-volume *The Lectures on the Philosophy of Right*, which consisted of lectures Hegel gave at the University of Berlin from 1818 to 1831. I single out Ilting's works because they added substantially to the understanding of Hegel's political philosophy, an important subject in this book.
- j) J. J. Cart's *Confidential Letters*.
- k) 'On the Recent Domestic Affairs of Württemberg and the Municipal Constitution in Particular'.

The years 1836 to 1850 formed an epoch in which Marx conducted an extended discourse with Hegel. They were also the years of the Young Marx. Ironically, the Young Marx was totally cut off from the Young Hegel. The Young Marx's discourse with Hegel was conducted with the Mature Hegel.

Part Four: The Creation of the Invisible Hegel

For the most part, in the remainder of this chapter I will discuss Hegel material that was available to Marx, but that he allowed to disappear in the black hole of absence. I begin with a discussion of Hegel's essay 'On the Scientific Method of Treating Natural Law'. I will then proceed to discuss three books of Karl Rosenkranz, *Hegel's Life*, the *Philosophical Propaedeutic*, or Volume 18 of the *Collected Works*, and *Psychology: or the Science of Subjective Spirit*. In particular, Rosenkranz's biography of Hegel contained crucial references to a book Hegel had read, James Steuart's *Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy*, as well as to three vital Hegel essays, 'Proceedings of the Estates Assembly in the Kingdom of Württemberg', 'The German Constitution' and 'The English Reform Bill'. Marx had no knowledge of the books written by Rosenkranz or the Hegel essays mentioned by Rosenkranz.

I will discuss each of these texts because they are the best illustrations of the losses Marx suffered in his appreciation of Hegel due to being unfamiliar with these sources. The deficit Marx incurred by not reading them contributed to his misshapen interpretation of Hegel, and this is a pivotal theme of *Marx's Discourse with Hegel*. These texts form the center of gravity of the Invisible Hegel.

As a means of providing the complete bibliography which led to the gestation of the Invisible Hegel I will briefly comment on Rudolf Haym's biography of Hegel and Thaulow's collection of Hegel *exzerpte* and notes. Both of these books were in print while Marx was alive but in exile in London. Furthermore, in order to fully account for the Invisible Hegel archive I will also briefly comment upon Hegel's publication of Cart's *Confidential Letters* and his journalistic article 'On The Recent Domestic Affairs of Württemberg and the Municipal Constitution in Particular', although these last two Hegel sources were published after Marx's death.

'On The Scientific Method of Treating Natural Law'²⁷

This article begins as an attack upon Kantian morality and Jean-Jacques Rousseau's social contract theory of the origin of the state. Hegel's assault on Kant and Rousseau shared a common ground as it refuted the individualism that supported Kantian moral theory and Rousseau's political philosophy.

On the moral level Hegel rejected Kant's claim that the foundation of morality was inner personal legislation. According to Kant, morality was based in the domain of the universal. Applying his subjective rationality a person arrives at a principle of behavior that he judged to be a universal standard of behavior and then acts in accordance with that principle. Kant's moral theory was a combination of individuality and rationality, or the rational legislation of morality.

Similarly, Rousseau's contract theory of the state derived from a hypothesis regarding individuality. In a state of nature in which humankind lived prior to its entrance into society all individuals shared the same natural rights. This state of nature was a condition of absolute equality, but not absolute peace or harmony, because every individual was vested with the same natural right to act in terms of their own will. However, in order to escape the coeval condition of disharmony and violence, individuals surrendered their natural rights in order to benefit from social solidarity and reciprocal safety. This transfer of natural rights created a general will, the sovereign, and since the general will was composed of equal rights this collective in its turn treated all its participants equally. Rousseau's political doctrine was built on the fusion of individual natural rights and society.

Hegel rejected Kant because he did not think that a universal moral legislation could be reached originating from subjective reason. Hegel refuted Rousseau because of his natural rights theory, because it was only in society, not in nature, that humankind could achieve ethicality. Hegel wrote:

On the positive side, however, this consciousness is the singularity and separateness of the individual. But this inherent negativity (consciousness as such), of which the distinctions just made are merely its two aspects, is absolutely taken up into the positive; its separateness and infinity, or ideality, is absolutely and perfectly taken up into the universal and real. This unity (of universal and particular) is the Idea of the absolute life of the ethical. In this oneness of infinity and reality in the ethical organization, the divine nature . . . of which Plato says, 'It is an immortal animal whose soul and body are eternally bound together' . . . seems to display the wealth of its multiplicity both in the highest energy of infinity and in unity which is the wholly simple nature of the ideal element.²⁸

In this paragraph Hegel puts forth his own suppositions of the ethical. Contrary to Kant's individualism, the ethical for Hegel is the result of a combination of the individual and the universal. To be ethical the individual must act as a member of a totality, a fusion of the private and the communal. Contrary to Rousseau, Hegel defined the universal not as a natural state, but as a man-made state, or the social. Following the Greeks, Hegel defined man as a 'political animal', that is, as a being who by nature cannot be separated from the social.

In order to fully understand the historical emergence of ethicality in Hegelian thought it is necessary to describe the four stages in this evolutionary process: intersubjectivity, recognition, morality and ethicality. I will discuss each of these stages below

Intersubjectivity relates to the stage of human development in which the individual must relate to an Other. A relationship to an Other began on economic grounds. When the survival of the Self was only possible by means of a relation to an Other, intersubjectivity presented itself. Intersubjectivity and mutual dependence were synonymous. One of the earliest expressions of intersubjectivity

in the work of Hegel was the chapter 'Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness: Lordship and Bondage' in *The Phenomenology of Spirit* which is devoted to the 'Master-Slave' relationship, but in this chapter intersubjectivity is portrayed as enslavement, rather than the harmony of the Greek polis.

The existence of intersubjectivity was the ground out of which recognition arose. Mutual recognition was the understanding that survival of both the Self and the Other depended upon the co-existence of a Self and an Other. Mutual recognition was the consciousness that both Self and Other was a necessity if both Self and Other were to survive.

Morality related to individual behavior. Morality concerned the codes of actions adopted by an autonomous Self.

Ethicality became an actuality when a Self connected to a universality. The production of a code of behavior based upon the principle that an individual must be congruent with the collective, or universal, was ethicality. The definition of ethicality for Hegel was the conjoining of the subjective with the universal, or the state.

Returning to the Greeks for inspiration, Hegel quoted from Aristotle's *The Politics*:

The state comes by nature before the individual, if the individual in isolation is not anything self-sufficient, he must be related to the whole state in one unity, just as the other parts are in their whole. But a man is incapable of communal life, or who he is so self-sufficing that He does not need it, is no part of the state and must be either a beast or a god.²⁹

Hegel's 1802–1803 essay 'On the Scientific Method of Treating Natural Law' provided the scaffolding for his mature political philosophy found in *The Philosophy of Right*. Influenced by Aristotle's *The Politics*, Hegel defined politics as an exercise in the ethical. An admirer of the Athenian polis, Hegel sought to recapture the synthesis of *homme* and *citoyen* that the polis symbolized.

In order to arrive at this definition of the state Hegel embarked upon two strategies of displacement. He must replace the Kantian individual with a social collectivity and he must replace Kantian moral legislation with intersubjectivity. In his second strategy Hegel must displace Rousseau's state of nature with civil society. Whereas Rousseau believed in a mythical social contract through which individuals transcended the state of nature and legislated a sovereignty, Hegel replaced political mythology with sociology. Hegel rebutted the state of nature, accepted the evolutionary theories describing the ascent of man from hunter to civil society. Based on the principle of economic interdependence civil society was the social form that corresponded with the interconnected economic relations created by the commercial revolution of the 17th and 18th centuries.

Hegel drew a distinction between civil society and state. Civil society related to the familial, to economic activities, class and to legal and police functions. In Hegel's time the police were not limited to combating crime, but also performed administrative operations such as the dispensing of public welfare to the

impoverished. The concept of the state related to the political organization of civil society. Indeed, the structure of civil society provided the conditions upon which the state was built. Hegel asserted a historicist view of civil society and state: the socio-economic structure of civil society was constantly changing as a result of the change in the mode of production and the state was also a historicist product because the form of the state constantly altered so as to correspond to the form of civil society.

In the 1802–1803 'On the Scientific Method of Treating Natural Law' Hegel again demonstrated his awareness of political economy, a subject he first became aware of when he was a tutor in Berne. This essay contained the following passage:

There are physical needs and enjoyments which, put again on their own account in a totality, obey in their infinite intertwining one single necessity and the system of universal mutual dependence in relation to physical needs and work and the amassing (of wealth) for their needs. And this system, as a science, is the system of the so-called political economy that in a people the commonweal has to see to it that every citizen shall have sufficiency, and that there be perfect security and ease of gain. This last proposition, understood in an absolute principle, would be on the contrary exclude a negative treatment of the system of possession, and would allow the system full sway to entrench itself absolutely.³⁰

Hegel read political economy from the perspective of ethicality. Hegel was conscious of the unequal distribution of wealth in a capitalist society, but he justified the capitalist economic system because it gave rise to mutual recognition. The division of labor, the cooperative arrangements between the agrarian countryside and the industrial urban centers, were the wombs of social interdependence.

Political economy, for Hegel, was not merely the realm of commerce and manufacture, but also the foundational moment of the ethical. The inception of ethical life started in civil society, at the level of political economy, because it was instance at which human interdependence started. The need to produce and exchange goods was the ground out of which human relationships commenced, or civil society was the moment at which individuals were forced to relate to a social network larger than themselves.

Hegel extended his definition of ethicality beyond 'On the Scientific Method of Treating Natural Law' to his major notebooks from the Jena Period. Even though it is beyond the remit of this book, it is worth observing that one of these *Jenaer Outlines* carried the title of 'The Ethical System' and was a description of the economic activities of man, the recognition that the survival of humankind was dependent upon its ability to satisfy its physical needs. Nevertheless, Hegel entitled these politico-economic manuscripts 'The Ethical System' because his ultimate goal was to construct an ethical system and he was aware that interdependence, even economic, was the foundation of the ethical.

The sophistication of Hegel's grasp of political economy was made apparent by his inclusion of property and class in his discussion. Hegel defended private

property because it was the actualization of human will and as a consequence property must be owned by the human will. Hegel recognized class divisions within civil society and saw them as a necessary outcome of individual will and the differentiation of talent.³¹

The Philosophy of Right evinced a similar ethical strategy. Part Two of this book, the sections immediately prior to the discussion of the state, was called 'Ethical Life' and was a short analysis of the family, commerce and the police components of civil society. It also included a justification of private property and because Hegel validated private property he also of necessity was acquiescent towards the class structure of civil society.

Civil society was the first step of the ethical realm, but it was not the culmination. Civil society was the initiation of the ethical, but the fulfillment of the ethical was the state.

Nations, or states, embodied spiritual principles and therefore national sovereignty must be protected. Near the close of *The Philosophy of Right*, in a section entitled 'Sovereignty vis-à-vis Foreign States'³² Hegel did not justify war, but recognized war as a necessary instrument by which to preserve national sovereignty and therein a state's spiritual autonomy. In paragraph 333 of *The Philosophy of Right*³³ Hegel rebuked Kant for his call for 'perpetual peace' and a League of Nations because of its utopianism and because Kant did not recognize that war was the prerogative of the state in its endeavor to maintain its spiritual identity.

Hegel's recognition of the importance of civil society did not solely come from his acquaintance with the writings of Steuart, Smith, Ferguson and the Scottish School, but also from his reading of Montesquieu. *The Philosophy of Right* contains several passages in which Hegel expressed his esteem for Montesquieu, but this high evaluation of the French philosopher is also contained in 'On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law'.³⁴

Lastly, the German Historical School of Law was an important legal philosophy during Hegel's entire lifetime. Savigny, a leading exponent of the Historical School of Law, defended legal positivism. Savigny averred that laws obtained their validity because they were reflections of actual social practices.

Hegel's rebuttal of Savigny's legal positivism was one aspect of his denial of all forms of positivism. In his *The History of Philosophy* Hegel rejected the English empirical tradition from John Locke to David Hume because of its positivism. Empirical facts were not the ultimate determinants of truth. Sense perceptions do not generate reality. On the contrary, Hegelian Speculative philosophy was based on the belief that the ultimate predication flowed from reason. Law was not a predication of positivity, but rather of reason, and so, to Hegel, the school of legal positivism was as erroneous as Locke and Hume.

Savigny's positivism was a refutation of natural law theory, was anti-Rousseauist. Savigny nullified the doctrine of natural rights and understood social custom, and historical practice, as the basis of law. Hegel stood with Savigny in the attack on natural rights theory in his anti-Rousseauism, but Hegel superseded Savigny's idea of custom, of social positivity, with rational predication.

In 'The Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law' Hegel attacked the Historical School of Law because of its positivism. True to his historicism, true to his belief that legal systems changed in terms of the civilization in which they found themselves, Hegel drew an analogy between systems of philosophy and law. Just as each historical organism gave rise to its own philosophic perspective, so each historical organism encouraged the development of system of laws that corresponded to the spirit of that historical totality. Law was not static, it too underwent transformation.³⁵

While he was Editor of the *Rheinische Zeitung*, Marx published, in August 1842, 'The Philosophical Manifesto of the Historical School of Law'; in general he refuted the entire Historical School of Law, but in particular one of the major members of this school, Gustav Hugo.³⁶ As I indicated in the preceding paragraphs, Marx remained uninformed about Hegel's refutation of the Historical School of Law in 'On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law', and Marx also made no reference to Hegel's denunciation of the Historical School of Law and of Hugo contained in his 1820 *The Philosophy of Right*. I have established that Marx had read *The Philosophy of Right* by 1841 because it is listed as a source in the bibliography to his dissertation. In the 'Introduction' to *The Philosophy of Right* Hegel wrote several pages attacking the theoretic presuppositions both of Hugo and the Historical School of Law, but Marx does not call upon Hegel as a confirming voice in his own 'The Philosophical Manifesto of the Historical School of Law'. While Marx critiqued Hegel's *The Philosophy of Right* in 1843, one year earlier, in 1842, he did not call upon Hegel's work as a reference or support for his own essay in the *Rheinische Zeitung*.

Marx mentioned Savigny in his 1837 letter to his father and in the same year Marx took Savigny's lecture course on the Roman Pandects. The year 1837 was important in the intellectual maturation of Marx because during this time he was introduced to the legal philosophy of the Historical School of Law due to his attendance at Savigny's lectures and his reading of Savigny's book on property, and to the countervailing legal philosophy of Eduard Gans, whose course he also took at the University of Berlin.³⁷

The consequence of Marx failing to read 'On the Scientific Method of Treating Natural Law' was that he remained blind to important elements of Hegelian thought, elements that might have altered his vision of Hegel as a Speculative philosopher. A knowledge of this essay would have revealed to Marx a Hegel in which the practical, the political-economic and the notion of the evolution of the state out of the practices of civil society played crucial roles. In addition, a knowledge of this essay would have brought to light a Hegel who understood the ethical nature of the state.

In my book *Divergent Paths*³⁸ I examined Marx's reading of Hegel's *The Philosophy of Right*. Marx's 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' begins with paragraph 261 of Hegel's book, that is, Marx devoted his entire commentary to Hegel's theory of the state, and omitted any reference to Hegel's discussion of 'civil society', which runs from paragraphs 182 to 256. However, in his commentary Marx wrote a sentence indicating that in a future work he would return to *The Philosophy of Right* and offer a critique of Hegel's theory of civil society: 'This will

be further considered in the section on "civil society".³⁹ I maintain that the commitment Marx made in 1843 in Germany he fulfilled in 1844 in France because 'The Manuscripts' is the promised 'section on "civil society"' but buttressed at this point by Marx's greater familiarity with Ricardo and Smith, or English political economy in general.

A pivotal concept in Marx's Method of social analysis is the distinction between civil society and state. An understanding of Marx's theory of politics, of the state and communism, is simply impossible without presupposing the civil society-state differentiation. Marx appropriated this dichotomy from his reading of *The Philosophy of Right*.

The Hegelian division between civil society and state contributed to Marx's discovery of his Method of social analysis. By 1844 Marx learned about the clash between the means and mode of production from Wilhelm Schulz's book, *The Movement of Production* and to this insight he added the economic historicism of Hegel, that the galvanizing force in history was the metamorphosis of civil society and that political superstructures were themselves reflections of civil society.

Granting that Marx's ignorance of 'On the Scientific Method of Treating Natural Law' did not ultimately prevent him from grasping the foundational role civil society played in Hegel's historical perceptions it is nevertheless true that this ignorance caused a delay. If Marx had read this Hegelian essay his awareness of the centrality of civil society would have developed earlier. On the question of civil society the issue was one of timing and degree.

This conclusion does not hold in relation to the topic of political economy. By not reading 'On the Scientific Method of Treating Natural Law' Marx remained uninformed about Hegel's interest in political economy. Marx's interest in political economy was manifested for the first time in his 1844 *exzerpte* on List and Mill, but if he had read the 1802–1803 Jena 'On the Scientific Method of Treating Natural Law' his engagement with political economy might have started earlier. Marx was unaware both in the pre-1807 and post-1807 periods of Hegel's interest in political economy.

In addition, Marx was non-conversant with the regard of 'The Master' for Montesquieu as articulated in 'On the Scientific Method of Treating Natural Law'. Leaving this essay aside for a moment, Marx did read Hegel texts that did express Hegel's high regard for Montesquieu. In the research he undertook for his dissertation Marx read Hegel's *The History of Philosophy*, and Volume 3 of this work contains a short but laudatory paragraph on Montesquieu. Hegel wrote that in *The Spirit of the Laws* Montesquieu 'regarded the nations from this important view, that their constitution, their religion, in short everything that is to be found in a state, constitutes a totality'.⁴⁰ *The Philosophy of Right* also contained several pages in which Hegel praised this 18th-century French philosopher.⁴¹

Marx's earliest comments on Montesquieu occur in 1842. In an article he wrote for the *Rheinische Zeitung* in that year, 'Debates over the Freedom of the Press', Marx alludes to Montesquieu for the first time.⁴² His essay, 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' also makes reference to Montesquieu⁴³ as does his journalistic foray 'Debates on the Law on Thefts of Wood'.⁴⁴

In addition, it must be borne in mind that Marx made *exzerpte* from Montesquieu's *Spirit of the Laws* in 1843. After his departure from the *Rheinische Zeitung* and while he was living in Kreuznach, Marx jotted down almost 20 pages of *exzerpte* from Montesquieu's masterpiece.⁴⁵

Previous paragraphs indicated that in 'On the Scientific Method of Treating Natural Law' Hegel expressed admiration for Aristotle's *The Politics* because Aristotle defined politics as a practical expression of the ethical. Hegel idealized the Athenian polis because it served as the ground from which *homme* and *citoyen* were unified. Indeed, in Hegel's *The Philosophy of History* he explained the decline of the polis as the result of rampant subjectivity, to the fact that uncontrolled individuality took precedence over community in the post-Aristotelian age.⁴⁶

Marx's own vision of communism, taking into account that his comments on communism are brief and scattered, was heavily influenced by the polis prototype. Although Marx did not approach the issue of communism from an ethical perspective – he approaches communism from the theory of labor – the ends of a communist society resulted in ethical realization.

One of the benefits of a communist society was the re-unification of *homme* and *citoyen*. Communism, the complete implementation of democracy through the destruction of capitalist class domination, would allow all persons to become *citoyens*: that is, all persons would become politically active. This dimension of the human personality, political self-determination, was the entitlement of communism. Marx's dream harkened back to Aristotle, incorporating the ethical principles of political empowerment and self-determination, but minus Aristotle's defense of slavery and class privileges. Two parallel but disconnected lines of continuity ran from Aristotle to Hegel and from Aristotle to Marx.

In summation the consequences of Marx's failure to read 'On the Scientific Method of Treating Natural Law' are inscribed in the following question: Did the losses Marx sustained by remaining ignorant of this essay eviscerate Marx's knowledge regarding the categories of practice, subjective activity, political economy and the history of civil society in the thought of Hegel?

In responding to this question I will divide my answers into six categories: 1) Aristotle and Greek ethics and political philosophy; 2) Political economy; 3) Civil society; 4) The state; 5) Montesquieu 6) The German Historical School of Law.

1) Aristotle and Greek ethics and political philosophy

Admiration for antique society was endemic to German intellectuals in the 19th century, an attitude indispensable to *Bildung*. Both Hegel and Marx were afflicted with this passion and it was to be expected that they read many of the same classics.

Specifically, both Hegel and Marx read Aristotle's 'The Soul'. In his *The Philosophy of Mind* Hegel wrote: 'The book of Aristotle on the Soul, along with his discussion on its special aspects and states, are for this reason still by far the most admirable, perhaps even the sole work of philosophic value on the subject.'⁴⁷ The second volume of Hegel's *The History of Philosophy* contained a section on Aristotle's psychology which was a twenty-page discussion of Aristotle's 'The Soul'.⁴⁸ Marx read

both *The Philosophy of Mind* and *The History of Philosophy* so he was certainly aware of Hegel's respect for Aristotle's perspective on human psychology.

Additionally, the Young Marx knew Aristotle in his own right. In his 1837 letter to his father the 19-year-old Marx writes that he 'partially translated Aristotle's "Rhetorik"'.⁴⁹ In addition, Marx himself made *exzerpte* from Aristotle's 'The Soul' in approximately 1843.⁵⁰

Aristotle's 'The Soul' accentuated the practical aspects of human psychology. Aristotle described human behavior as the movement from potential to actual, the inherent tendency of humans to intervene in the external, and this portrayal of human psychology emphasized the subjective activity of the individual. Even though Marx read both *The Philosophy of Mind* and *The History of Philosophy*, he refused to acknowledge Hegel's appropriation of the subjective, practical and pneumatological aspects of Aristotle's portrait of humanity.

However, Marx was familiar with Hegel's glorification of Greek culture. Part Two, 'The Greek World', in Hegel's *The Philosophy of History* immortalizes the Greeks as the discoverers of subjectivity. This subjectivity assumes three forms: the idolization of the human form in painting and sculpture; the embodiment of heroic virtue in the epic and tragedy and the unity of the subjective and the communal in their political theory. Chapter Three of 'The Greek World', is subtitled 'The Political Work of Art' and was a hymn to the political genius of the Athenians.⁵¹

Volume 2 of Hegel's *The History of Philosophy* is devoted for the most part to an analysis of the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. In particular, Hegel extols Aristotle's politics because it attempts to create a synthesis between the subject and the community. For Aristotle politics was a branch of practical philosophy and as such it was a prolegomena to the ethical; in this manner the Athenian polis was a work of beauty and art.⁵²

Marx knew Hegel's *The Philosophy of History*, *The History of Philosophy* and *The Philosophy of Right* and both Marx and Hegel shared the Aristotelian project of perpetuating politics as an ethical domain.⁵³ Although Hegel and Marx shared this goal they took different paths to this end. In transforming the polis Hegel sought to maintain individuality and to preserve the Self's rational essentialism, while Marx, influenced by Feuerbach, saw man as anthropologically social and replaced rational essentialism with labor.

Marx's advance to the ethico-political was predicated on two axioms that contradicted Hegel, the inherent social nature of humankind and the universality of labor. In Marx, the social collectivity took precedence over the individual. Influenced by Feuerbach's concept of species being Marx began from the normative basis that human existence was social and not individual. Marx also rejected all forms of rational essentialism. Humanity was not distinguished by reason, but by practice, and practice in Marx was focused on economic labor. The intersubjective basis of society emanated from labor.

In *The Politics* Aristotle strove for the unification of the *zoon oikonikon*, the person of the household, and the *zoon politikon*, the person involved in the affairs of the state.⁵⁴ Aristotle's dream lived on in Rousseau's *The Social Contract* in which Rousseau envisioned the ethical nature of the state as arising from the conjoining

of *homme* and *citoyen*. Hegel and Marx, although by means of different strategies, also sought the homogenization of *zoon oikonikon* and *zoon politikon*. The vision of Hegel and Marx can best be described as the polis transformed as a means to accommodate both the industrial and capitalist revolutions.

Marx knew the most important works in which 'The Master' sought to configure ethics and politics, to assume the role of a 19th-century German Aristotle. In his 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' Marx made the following two comments: 1) 'namely, in that Hegel passes off the state which is based on such a morality for the actual idea of ethical life';⁵⁵ 2) 'But Hegel is content that in the state which he demonstrates to be the self-conscious mode of being of ethical spirit . . .'.⁵⁶ In terms of the problematic of ethics and politics in Hegel I fault Marx on two accounts. First, Marx seems skeptical and dismissive of Hegel's attempt to conjoin ethics and politics; Marx's strategy is to judge Hegel's Aristotelianism as just another projection of 'logical pantheism'. Second, due to his disbelief, Marx fails to devote sufficient time to the exploration of this aspect of Hegelian politics. It is impossible to understand *The Philosophy of Right* correctly unless the ethical dimension is given appropriate weight. On this problematic the absence of 'On the Scientific Method of Treating Natural Law' took a serious toll and helped to initiate this black hole. The gestation of the Invisible Hegel saw the light of day.

2) Political economy

Marx's failure to read 'On the Scientific Method of Treating Natural Law' only delayed his own study of political economy. It did not leave a permanent gap as he returned to this subject as early as late 1843 and the beginning of 1844 in his *exzerpte* on List and Mill. Nevertheless, Marx's ignorance of 'On The Scientific Method of Treating Natural Law' kept him uninformed about Hegel's investment in political economy. The side of Hegel who was interested in practical activity, concerned about the evolutionary products of human economic activity, was buried to Marx.

3) Civil society

Marx's ignorance of 'On the Scientific Method of Treating Natural Law' merely delayed his awareness of the importance of civil society. As I pointed out earlier, Marx already in his 1843 essay 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' promised to take up the issue of civil society, and in his autumn 1843 'On the Jewish Question' and his August 1844 'Critical Marginal Notes on the Article "The King of Prussia and Social Reform" by a Prussian' he started to address the issue of civil society even before the completion of 'The Manuscripts'.

4) The state

Leaving aside the issue of ethics, I separate civil society and state because both Marx and Hegel were aware of this distinction. I devote a separate subdivision to the concept of the state because it is impossible to understand Marx's definition of communism without an initial understanding of what he means by the dichotomy between civil society and state.

Hegel was one of the first to inform Marx of the difference between civil society and state. Like the Scots who influenced him, Hegel understood civil society as the terrain of the family and economics, while the state was a political entity whose organization reflected the structure of civil society. Just as history produced different civil societies, hunting, agriculture and commerce so history gave rise to separate forms of the state which were outgrowths of these variegated civil societies. Marx also adopted this paradigm, which ran from Montesquieu to Ferguson. Recapitulating the Scots and Hegel, Marx was convinced that states were transfigurations of civil society, or just as there was a historiography of civil society so there was a corresponding historiography of the state.

Marx's deep probe into the theory of the state begins in March 1843 with his 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right'. The theory of the state continued to be of central concern to Marx until August 1844 when his interests began to shift to political economy. Within this sixteen-month period Marx not only completed his 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right', but also 'On the Jewish Question' (Autumn 1843), 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction' (January 1844) and 'Critical Marginal Notes on the Article "The King of Prussia and Social Reform" by a Prussian' (July 1844), all of which are indispensable to fathoming Marx's theory of the state and politics. The fact that Marx had no knowledge of 'On the Scientific Method of Treating Natural Law' merely delayed Marx's entrance into the sphere of a theory of the state.

Having drawn this separation between civil society and state it is impossible for me to discuss in depth at this point Marx's definition of the state because such an analysis requires a volume of its own and will divert us from the issues before us at this point.

5) Montesquieu

As previous paragraphs indicated, Marx did not need Hegel to introduce him to Montesquieu. Nevertheless, Hegel and Montesquieu elevated Marx's awareness of the importance of civil society and encouraged him to read more deeply into 18th-century social theory and the Scottish School of Historiography. Marx's acquaintance with the Scottish School, Smith, Ferguson, Steuart, Hutchinson, brought his attention to the historiography of societies, the transformations socio-economic formation underwent over time, and as Marx read into Scottish historical sociology he found Montesquieu of greater interest. The historiography of societies of the Scottish School and Montesquieu were precursors of Marx's Method of political economy and social explanation.

6) The German Historical School of Law

The void that Marx suffered regarding Hegel's denunciation of the Historical School of Law did not only derive from the black hole occasioned by the vacancy of 'On The Scientific Method of Treating Natural Law'. Hegel published a newspaper article in 1817 called 'Proceeding of the Estates Assembly in the Kingdom of Württemberg' and I will discuss Hegel's article in greater depth in subsequent pages of this chapter. However, at this point it is relevant to note that Hegel also

ridiculed the Historical School of Law in this article. Furthermore, in his 1831 'The English Reform Bill' Hegel continued his nullification of the Historical School of Law. But Marx never read the 'Proceedings of the Estates Assembly in the Kingdom of Württemberg' or 'The English Reform Bill', and as a consequence he detached himself from the above-mentioned three sources in which Hegel expressed his antipathy to Savigny's school.

However, Marx's lack of knowledge of Hegel's denunciation of the German Historical School of Law was only a temporary loss to him.

Marx's antipathy to the German Historical School of Law came from different sources, in particular Gans. A professional colleague as well as a personal friend of Hegel, Gans continued the Hegelian tradition of invalidating the German Historical School of Law. When Marx was a student at the University of Berlin he took two courses from Gans and probably was introduced to the Hegelian-Gans aversion to the Historical School of Law. The coursework Marx took from Gans served as a preparation for the writing of his 1842 article 'The Philosophical Manifesto of the Historical School of Law'.

Karl Rosenkranz

Marx did not read any of the books published by Rosenkranz, a prolific commentator on the work of Hegel. In particular, there were three books published by Rosenkranz that Marx was ignorant of and this lacuna caused enormous inaccuracies in Marx's understanding of Hegel. One of these books was Rosenkranz's *Hegel's Life*,⁵⁷ published in 1844, and the second was the *Philosophical Propaedeutic*, Volume 18 of the *Collected Works*,⁵⁸ published in 1840 at the time Marx was writing his dissertation. The third, published in 1837, was *Psychology: or the Science of Subjective Spirit*.⁵⁹ It is important to remember that Marx and his new wife Jenny left Germany in October 1843 to resettle in Paris and Marx's resettlement in France symbolized his movement out of Hegelian debates and into the controversies of political economy.

Rosenkranz's *Hegel's Life*, the *Philosophical Propaedeutic* and *Psychology: or the Science of Subjective Spirit* are extremely significant in understanding those parts of the Hegel corpus Marx did not know and so I will discuss them according to the following outline:

- 1) *Hegel's Life*
 - a) Philosophy
 - b) Politics
 - c) Hegel's Reading of James Steuart's *Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy*.
 - d) 'Proceedings of the Estates Assembly in the Kingdom of Württemberg, 1817–1818'.
 - e) 'The English Reform Bill' (1831)
 - f) 'The German Constitution'
- 2) *Philosophical Propaedeutic*
- 3) *Psychology: or the Science of Subjective Spirit*

- 4) Additional Hegel materials uncovered by Rosenkranz: diary, correspondence and *exzerpte*
- 5) Rudolf Haym's *Hegel and His Time*
- 6) J. J. Cart's *Confidential Letters*.

1) *Hegel's Life*

a) *Philosophy* Rosenkranz belonged to the Hegelian Loyalists who defended The Master against the attacks of Schelling and those who accused Hegel of being an apologist for the Prussian Crown.⁶⁰ To a Hegel partisan like Engels, Rosenkranz was an active participant in the Schelling–Hegel debates and whereas Schelling advocated a philosophy of identity, Rosenkranz presented a Hegel preaching the duality between the concept and the actual.

In his 1843 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' Marx defined Hegel as a 'logical pantheist', but on this issue Rosenkranz contradicts Marx. Rosenkranz absolves Hegel of all 'logical theism',⁶¹ claiming that Hegel denied all forms of theology. Rather than 'logical theism' or 'logical pantheism' Hegel recognized the antinomies between idea and actuality. According to Rosenkranz, the Hegel of *The Science of Logic* offered an explanation of how the antithesis between concept and reality was overcome in the Idea.

The contribution of 'The Master' was a philosophy of reconciliation. Even though he began with the presupposition of the separation of materialism and rationality, of empiricism and thought, Hegel maintained that the antipodes could be reconciled by reason. *The Science of Logic* was a description of the productive activity of reason, or the modes by which reason achieved the unification between itself and reality in the Idea.

Hegelian philosophy was a description of the practice of the Idea. It was a recording of the stages through which Idea must pass in order to arrive at the unity of concept and reality.⁶² When this unity was attained the dualism between mind and actuality was overcome and the oneness of these distinct realms was accomplished.

But the historical nature of reality meant that the praxis of reason was also historical. Reality was in a constant process of transformation and reason had to comprehend these ceaseless historical mutations and therefore in itself became historical. As reason was presented with different historical totalities reason was required to accept this historicity in order to turn these objects into objects reason could enter.

Reason was the immanence of history. This did not mean that every aspect of reality was constructed by reason, that the totality of reality was rational. Rather, it meant that those particularities of the cosmology of reality were inserted into the real by reason. Since reason could only understand reason then the rationality of the real was the immanence of reason.

Rosenkranz denied that Hegelian philosophy was an 'ontological purism'.⁶³ He constantly stressed the historicity of philosophy and the praxis of the concept to adjust to this historicity. He wrote that The Master believed that there could 'never be a final system of philosophy'.⁶⁴

b) Politics Most of the members of 'The Society of the Friends of the Deceased' were Liberal Monarchist – the Hegelian Center – and since they claimed descent from Hegel it was to be expected that they defined him as the originator of this political position.

Rosenkranz pictured Hegel as a descendent of the German Reform movement led by Stein and Hardenberg. After Napoleon inflicted devastating military defeats on the Prussian Crown, Stein and Hardenberg became convinced that aspects of the Prussian state were residues of the Middle Ages. In order to modernize the Hohenzollern Monarchy, to render it politically and militarily capable of self-preservation against Napoleonic armies, Stein and Hardenberg proposed a series of internal political reformations.

Hegel perpetuated the reformist legacy of Stein and Hardenberg and in addition he supported Napoleon in the Emperor's attempt to uproot medievalism in Germany. Hegel was aware of the dangers of the overreaching ambitions of the French Emperor, but after Napoleon's victory at the Battle of Jena in 1806 he claimed that Napoleon was 'the world spirit on horseback'. Despite his fears of Napoleon, Hegel welcomed his political reformism. When he evicted Prussia from the left bank of the Rhine, Napoleon carried French revolutionary reforms to Germany, careers open to talent, the beginning of the centralization of the legal code, the ending of medieval particularism, the separation of Church and State, and the granting of self-government to local cities and communities. The Napoleonic victories, even though they entailed the subjugation of Germany to French will, also entailed the beginning of the modernization of Germany, and Hegel was a advocate of such modernization.⁶⁵

The reform movement of Stein and Hardenberg was not democratic and neither was Hegel. Possessing an ambivalent attitude toward Rousseau, Hegel adhered to Rousseau's principle of individual will,⁶⁶ but not to the Rousseauist ideal of democracy. The lowest levels of society – Hegel referred to them as '*pobel*', or rabble⁶⁷ – were uneducated, unemployed, lacking any awareness of, or engagement in, politics and should not vote. Hegel believed that voting should be restricted to the educated, those classes who had an interest in and a knowledge of politics. The *pobel* were encased in extreme subjectivity, or were driven by poverty to focus on their own self-preservation and such subjectivity was destructive of the state. Throughout his life Hegel viewed extreme subjectivity as the antipode to the ethical, or the universality of the state.

The 19-year-old Hegel was an enthusiast for the 1789 French Revolution. Rosenkranz describes how the three close friends of the Tübingenstift, Hegel, Hölderlein and Schelling, supported the early revolutionary events in Paris.⁶⁸ When Marx did not read the Rosenkranz biography he remained a stranger to the Young Hegel's political radicalism.⁶⁹ But the Young Hegel's pro-uprising sentiments of 1789 did not mean that he advocated a 1793 Jacobin Reign of Terror. The Young Hegel was more a Girondist than a Robespierrean.⁷⁰ As Hegel matured he grew suspicious of all forms of revolutionary activity and in his 1807 *The Phenomenology of Spirit* denounced Jacobinism.⁷¹ In 1819 a radical student organization, a secret society which advocated democracy, the *Burschenschaft*

(fraternity), held a meeting at Wartburg at which one of its members, August von Kotzebue, was murdered. The Prussian Government used this killing as the grounds to brand all secret societies as subversive and demagogues and to pass the Karlsbad Decrees in 1819, a series of pronouncements limiting the press, the freedom of association and also curtailing free speech. According to Rosenkranz, Hegel distanced himself from the *Burschenschaften* and all demagogues.⁷² More recent scholarship, however, offers a more balanced view claiming that while Hegel supported the *Burschenschaften* in their program for widening the suffrage, although not democracy, he rejected the terrorism exemplified in the murder of Kotzebue.⁷³ The Mature Hegel steadily moved away from his youthful embrace of the 1789 French Revolution and in 1830, while his colleague Gans supported the overthrow of the Bourbon monarchy, Hegel was ambivalent regarding the necessity of revolution. The Mature Hegel perpetuated the centrist tendencies of the Stein-Hardenberg reforms.

In his biography of Hegel, Rosenkranz defines 'The Master' as a Liberal Monarchist and I agree with this characterization.⁷⁴ In his 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' Marx also defined Hegel as an advocate of a 'constitutional King'.⁷⁵ Hegel believed in inherited monarchy because he maintained that every state required a single will to render the state as a coherent unit, a unified organism with a single volition. The issues of foreign policy, national defense, and appointments to and supervision of the military were all powers exclusively belonging to the monarch.

On the domestic front, however, Rosenkranz averred that Hegel advocated a two-house parliament to restrict the powers of the crown, although elections to the lower house would have a restricted suffrage based on property ownership. As an additional limitation on the authority of the monarch he espoused autonomy for communal organizations and corporations.

Hegel called for the separation of Church and State, the abolition of slavery and full citizenship for Jews. As a professor Hegel understood that public debate was a necessary instrument in educating the public and that the process of public education required full exposure and debate of cabinet, administrative and legal decisions. Hegel was a champion of freedom of the press because it was only a free press that could guarantee the full disclosure and discussion of government and legal decisions.

Hegel believed in the universality of the law, or that the law must be applied equally to each individual regardless of class. In other words Hegel wished to abolish any legal favoritism for the medieval aristocracy.

Most importantly Rosenkranz's biography emphasized the ethical nature of the state in Hegel's thought. Rosenkranz correctly saw that Hegel looked upon narcissistic subjectivity as a destructive force. Social harmony could only be realized through intersubjective cooperation, when subjectivities dropped their claim to exclusivity and recognized the claims of the Other.⁷⁶

Furthermore, Rosenkranz highlighted Hegel's practical philosophy. The creation of laws, the various expressions of culture, the fulfillment of civic responsibility and economic progress were all expressions of practical philosophy.

I draw a distinction here between practice and praxis. Both concepts are oppositional to theory, but they differ in terms of the areas of their activity. Practice is subjective activity directed at civil society, the production of conditions conducive to human well-being. In his *The Philosophy of Mind* Hegel understands the goal of the practical as the attainment of human happiness, eudemonism in the sense of Aristotle, or a social condition encouraging a sense of personal fulfillment.⁷⁷ Conversely, praxis is subjective activity directed at the political. Praxis is an endeavor to modify political structures for the purpose of increasing the expanse of human freedom. While Hegel acknowledged the role of practical activity in the advance of civil society, Marx applauded praxis as the best means to achieve the proletarian revolution.

Hegel thus bequeathed a reformist agenda to his partisans in 'The Society of the Friends of the Deceased'. In the period of the Restoration the legacy of Liberal Hegelianism called for the modernization of the Hohenzollern Monarchy and this was one of the reasons that Frederick William IV called upon Schelling to come to the University of Berlin to discredit Hegel. These were the political camps of Vormarz Prussia.

Marx's failure to read Rosenkranz's *Hegel's Life* augmented three deficiencies in his view of Hegel.

First, Marx remained unresponsive to the dialogue concerning the ethical nature of the state in Hegel. *Hegel's Life* was unequivocal and would have compelled Marx to confront this vital aspect of Hegelian political theory. Marx was led to distort Hegel's philosophy of politics when he refused to fully engage with Hegel's ethical definition of the state. When Marx described Hegel as a 'logical pantheist' he totally misrepresented The Master's thought.

Second, Marx read Hegel as a theoretical philosopher. His failure to read Rosenkranz isolated him from the interpretation of Hegel as a practical philosopher. Marx himself embraced practical philosophy for the first time in his 1843 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction', but one of the reasons that he never explored the dimension of practical philosophy in Hegel was his unfamiliarity with Rosenkranz's text.

Third, Marx also did not comment on the Hegelian concept of historicity. Hegel was primarily interested in the succession of organic systems, the amalgamation of art, religion and philosophy into a total system. Rosenkranz drew attention to the concept of historicity in Hegel, but the Rosenkranz lacuna meant that Marx did not pursue this Hegelian terrain. Hegel applied historicity to cultural formations, the Greco-Roman World, the Chinese World, the Hindu World and the Germanic World, but Marx did not comment upon this line of Hegelian speculation.

c) *Hegel's reading of Stuart's Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy* The failure of Marx to read Rosenkranz carried additional consequences, including Marx's failure to familiarize himself with Hegel's initial contact with political economy. While he was a tutor in the household of Carl Friedrich von Steiger from 1793 to 1796 in Berne, Switzerland, Hegel read Stuart's two-volume *Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy*.⁷⁸

Steuart's book played an important role in the evolution of Hegel's thought, because it brought him in contact with the Scottish School of Historiography, as well as with classical English and French political economy. Born in Scotland, publishing his two-volume work in 1767, Steuart was a contemporary of Ferguson, Smith, John Millar, William Robertson, Lord Kames, John Dalrymple and Francis Hutchinson, and one of the major focuses of the Scottish School was to trace the historiography of civil society. These eight men, as well as Montesquieu in *The Spirit of the Laws*, opened a new universe in political theory, because they interpreted civil society as the substructure of the state. In this endeavor Montesquieu and the Scots initiated the study of political economy because they regarded political economy as the propellant for the emergence of the state.⁷⁹

Hegel read Steuart from February 19 to May 16, 1799⁸⁰ and this book signaled the commencement of Hegel's interest in political economy and civil society. While Hegel read Steuart he jotted down *exzerpte* from the two volumes and although Rosenkranz attests to Hegel's knowledge of Steuart, Rosenkranz has been accused of losing these *exzerpte*. For those scholars who study the early Hegel, Rosenkranz's loss of the Hegel *exzerpte* left an enormous gap in their account of the maturation process of 'The Master'. These *exzerpte* were lost to Marx as well, but he would have been conversant with Hegel's recognition of the importance of civil society and political economy.

Steuart's book is an 18th-century political-economic version of Niccolò Machiavelli's *The Prince*, a discussion of the policies to be used by a wise executive of the state to, in his case, increase economic prosperity.

But, unlike Machiavelli, Steuart understands that good government evolves out of sound civil society and he is aware that a knowledge of political economy is mandatory for the making of laws conducive to a sound civil society. Steuart was a product of the early stages of the Industrial Revolution and for him modernizing the philosopher-kings of Plato's *Republic* made good government contingent upon the mastery of political economy.

Steuart asserted that the building block of a sound economy was private interest and defended the prioritizing of individual will, which was materialized as wants and desires. A prosperous civil society, and therefore a peaceful one, came into existence on the basis of the mutuality between wants and the gratification of these wants. Steuart saw supply and demand as forming interdependence, the mutual recognition of buyer and seller, and that social harmony would emerge out of this balanced equation of classes in need and classes who gratified these needs.

Without Hegel's Steuart *exzerpte* it is impossible to measure Steuart's influence on Hegel, but in the civil society section of *The Philosophy of Right* Hegel does address the theme of class reciprocity – the mutuality of need, the desire of the buyer to acquire matching the desire of the seller to trade, is the basis of community.

Interestingly, by 1847 Marx had already read Steuart's *Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy*. Marx mentioned Steuart in his *The Poverty of Philosophy* and credits Steuart with divining the rationale behind a tax on consumption. Marx wrote: 'James Steuart clearly developed this original purpose of the tax on

consumption in his *Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy*, which he published ten years before Adam Smith.⁸¹

Furthermore, Hegel and Marx were both acquainted with Ferguson's *Essay on the History of Civil Society*. Hegel read this work when he worked in Berne as a tutor in the household of Steiger from 1793 to 1797⁸² and Marx read Ferguson in approximately 1845 when he was expelled from France and resettled in Brussels.⁸³ Hegel, however, never mentions Ferguson's *Essay on the History of Civil Society* in his own work so it was impossible for Marx to learn of Hegel's knowledge of this outstanding member of the Scottish Enlightenment. Regardless, it is of interest to observe the important role Ferguson played in the independent evolutions of Hegel's and Marx's awareness of civil society and political economy. Both Hegel and Marx were responding to the same theoretical breakthroughs, the emergence of political economy as a discipline for understanding the structure of modern civilization.

When Marx failed to read Rosenkranz and learn of Hegel's interest in Steuart's *Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy* he condemned himself to ignorance regarding Hegel's interest in political economy. He remained unaware of the parallelism between Hegel's and his own studies. A new world of capitalism was born and both the 'Parmenides of Berlin' and Marx were attempting to comprehend this revolutionary upheaval. The failure of Marx to read 'On The Scientific Method of Treating Natural Law' imprisoned him in the vision of Hegel as a Speculative philosopher.

But Marx read Jean-Baptiste Say, Smith, Ricardo and Montesquieu and so did the Mature Hegel. In paragraph 189, entitled 'The System of Needs', in the 1820 *The Philosophy of Right* Hegel drew attention to Smith, Say and Ricardo.⁸⁴ Hegel mentions Montesquieu four times in *The Philosophy of Right*.⁸⁵ Marx read the Mature Hegel's *The Philosophy of Right*; his 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' was a diatribe against *The Philosophy of Right*, but he never credits the Mature Hegel with a knowledge of these authors.

d) 'Proceedings of the Estates Assembly in the Kingdom of Württemberg, 1815–1816' This article was an example of Hegelian journalism. After the 1806 Battle of Jena in which Napoleon decimated the Prussian military, Hegel emigrated to the city of Bamberg where he edited the *Bamberger Zeitung*.⁸⁶ In 1808 Hegel relocated to Nuremberg where he became Rector of the Nuremberg Gymnasium and where he wrote his *Philosophical Propaedeutic*. In 1816 he was awarded an academic position at the University of Heidelberg. While at Heidelberg Hegel not only published the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* in 1817, but also acted as co-editor of the *Heidelberger Jahrbücher*. His essay, 'Proceedings of the Estates Assembly in the Kingdom of Württemberg, 1815–1816' was published in the 1817–1818 issues of the *Heidelberger Jahrbücher*.⁸⁷

Hegel looked upon journalism as an important part of his educational mission. A professor, a member of the class that had title to *Bildung*, Hegel took seriously his obligation to inform the less educated person about the higher meaning of politics. Marx never read any of Hegel's journalism.

'The Proceedings of the Estates Assembly in the Kingdom of Württemberg, 1815–1816' was a synopsis of some of the major principles of Hegelian political theory. It was a precursor, a popular introduction to, his *The Philosophy of Right*. In this newspaper article Hegel again revealed his anti-democratic convictions. Democracy for Hegel meant social atomism. It meant a plethora of Selves who were simply absorbed in their own gratification. Democracy gave rise to narcissism, to an addiction to gratify the needs of the Self.⁸⁸

'The Master' abnegated Rousseau's social contract theory of the state because its ultimate foundation was the multitude of private Selves. Egalitarianism was merely a synonym for private interest. The social contract was also an expression of private interest, the decision that it is better for the Self to agree to cooperate rather than assault others and risk retaliation. Rousseauism in all its manifestations was an expression of atomism and molecules could never comprise a state. However, although Hegel nullified Rousseau's doctrine of natural rights he did appropriate Rousseau's principle that human will was the agency of individual rights.

Hegel's anti-Jacobinism derived from the same premises. In his view, the 1793 Reign of Terror was caused by the omnipotence of the Self. When Robespierre deified his own Self, the transcendental belief in the irrefutability of his political principles, the murder of an Other was an inexorable consequence. Robespierre was an example of the rampage of the Self when no intersubjective regard for an Other, ethicality, was part of the Self's consciousness.

Whereas Hegel's awareness of the dangers of the atomic Self was the foundation of his denunciation of Rousseau and the 1793 French Revolution so his repudiation of class based on inherited wealth and medieval privilege was the basis of his criticism of English constitutional monarchy. Although Hegel was conversant with the evils of capitalism he accepted capitalism as a motor of economic progress which distributed many benefits to society. And although Hegel was cognizant with the excesses stemming from the concentration of ownership of property he defended the right to property because he saw that right as a valid expression of will. The 'Parmenides of Berlin' never called for the abolition of classes even though he was familiar with how class could control political power, because he took class division or social stratification as an inevitability in any social organization. He was a political realist and not a political utopian. The fact that constitutional monarchy in England was debased did not turn Hegel against this form of government. Hegel's task was to devise a constitutional monarchical system free of the flaws of the English system.

In order to achieve this goal Hegel needed to overcome the obstacle of the principles of the German Historical School of Law, whose chief tribune was Savigny. In his rebuttal of the positivism of the German Historical School of Law, Hegel wrote in his Württemberg article:

Instead they simply stuck to the formalism of demanding an old positive law on the ground that it was positive and in accordance with the contract. One must regard the start of the French Revolution as the struggle of rational constitutional law against the mass of positive law and privileges by which it

had been stifled. In the proceedings of the Württemberg Estates we see the same struggle between these principles, only the roles are reversed. In France most of the Estates of the Realm and the popular party upheld the rights of reason and demanded their restoration while the government was on the side of privileges . . .⁸⁹

The application of the positive law theory of the German Historical School of Law to Germany in 1816–1817 was a validation of the powers of the feudal aristocracy. In the Middle Ages custom and normative practice was the epiphenomenon of feudal political privilege. The political domination of the feudal aristocracy was based on custom and normative practice and so the acceptance of custom and normative practice, the law of the Middle Ages, was simply a means to rationalize the contemporary privileges of this medieval landed class.

For both Rousseau and Hegel will was the energy of the Self. Right was the legal guarantee of the self-expression of the will. Hegel maintained a doctrine of rational rights and this meant that the self-determination of the will must be rational, or subject to the laws of reason. When Hegel wrote of rights he did not mean an autonomous Self, a Self totally immersed in its own gratification. For Hegel the complete autonomy of the Self was instantiated by Robespierre and the butchery of the Reign of Terror. Hegel did not believe in a voluntaristic interpretation of rights, but rather maintained that right became rational when right recognized the intersubjective nature of socio-political existence.⁹⁰ Rational rights, for Hegel, did not mean decision-making solely based upon the dictatorship of the Self, but rather rights that were rational, or that carried an obligation to the community.

Historicity was also a factor in the theory of rational rights. History was the womb of numerous cultures and rights must accord with these cultures. The right of the Athenians who lived in the age of Aristotle were vastly different than the rights of a citizen of Berlin in 1820. Right was not a gift of nature and therefore unchanging. The principle of right was the progress of self-determination to ethicality, but this endeavor was mediated by the historical context in which the will was located.⁹¹

Hegel was a representative of the *Aufklärung* (Enlightenment). True to the European Enlightenment Hegel maintained that reason was the foundation of law, government and state and Hegel interpreted the 1789 French Revolution as the struggle between medieval positive law and the rational reformist tendencies of the Enlightenment. Hegel was an exponent of the rational principles of the Enlightenment in its struggle to reform the vestiges of German feudalism.

This is one reason for Hegel's advocacy of the reforms Napoleon brought to Germany. In the Württemberg journalism Hegel appended the following footnote:

The great teacher of constitutional law sits in Paris . . . The German princes have not yet grasped the concept of free monarchy, nor attempted to realize it. Napoleon will have to organize all this.⁹²

Hegel looked upon Napoleon as the agent of the Enlightenment, a personality bringing rational reform to the residues of the Middle Ages in Germany. Hegel's respect for Napoleon demonstrated he was not inherently opposed to monarchy as long as Kingship governed according to rational principles. The basic outline of the constitution Hegel proposed in his *The Philosophy of Right* was patterned on the constitution composed of a three-house Parliament that Napoleon imposed on Italy.

Later chapters of this book will describe in detail the attributes of monarchy that Hegel envisioned. At this point, however, I will explain in greater detail Hegel's defense of class.

Hegel recognized that class was an inevitable result of bourgeois society, of the social stratification brought about by the economic revolutions of the 17th and 18th centuries, so he never hypothesized the elimination of social stratification. Class became an evil when class simply enabled self-aggrandizement. In 'Proceedings of the Estates General in the Kingdom of Württemberg', Hegel denounced political representation that was merely an expression of private acquisition.⁹³

Hegel's denunciation of the English constitution arose from his understanding of its Parliament as being controlled by class interest. He maintained that Germany could avoid the corruption of the English constitution by empowering the bureaucratic class with *Bildung*.

Bildung is the process of education through which an individual becomes informed about the cultural shapes that Spirit has produced throughout history. *Bildung* provides knowledge of the emanations of World Spirit – the Orient, Greece, Rome, the European Middle Ages, the Enlightenment, but with a special emphasis on Greco-Roman culture. Through the observation of the projections of World Spirit, *Bildung* opens up insight into the potencies of Spirit, its creative energies. In his inaugural address upon arriving at the University of Berlin in 1818 Hegel praised Germany as the center of philosophical study and acclaimed philosophy, basically Greco-Roman theory, as the entrance into the realm of Spirit.⁹⁴ Hegel's presentation of philosophy in this 1818 speech was in perfect congruence with the role he assigned philosophy in the 'Absolute Knowledge' chapter of *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, with a statement that philosophy was the epitome of *Bildung*.

By revealing the rationality of the World Spirit, *Bildung* also taught the powers of reason and the equality of the universal. Reason flowed into the actual. Reason was a force, a projection of mind, that configured, in part, the actual.

Bildung educated the government official as to the efficiency of reason. As *Bildung* exposed the government official to the fact that actuality was reason, this government representative would be more likely to act according to the regime of reason. Since the government representative who possessed *Bildung* was educated to act on the grounds of reason, or the universal, then personal, private greed and individual gain would most likely be eliminated from the decision-making process. Hegel referred to the government bureaucrat who possessed *Bildung* as 'the universal class'.

e) '*The English Reform Bill*' Hegel's article 'The English Reform Bill' appeared in the journal *Allgemeine Preussische Staatszeitung* in April 1831, shortly before his death.⁹⁵ This article was in print for Marx to read during Marx's entire lifetime, but he never took advantage of the opportunity. Marx suffered additional losses from his failure to read the Rosenkranz biography of Hegel because the book references 'The English Reform Bill'.⁹⁶

'The English Reform Bill' was a proto-Marxist document. Class struggle is the central theme. In England this class struggle raged between the medieval landed aristocracy and both the urban and agricultural disenfranchised and this domination of the Middle Ages over the Industrial Revolution was executed by the aristocratic control of 'rotten boroughs'. Although Hegel did not write the *Communist Manifesto*, although Hegel does not mention the proletariat, he was keenly aware of the class confrontation in a nascent capitalist society. 'The English Reform Bill' is also an analysis of British imperialism in Ireland advocated by the English aristocracy. The Irish Question was an important discourse in this journalistic essay and Hegel correctly surmised that the colonization of Ireland was a result of the class greed of the English nobility. Prior to Marx, Hegel entered into the imperialism debate. 'The English Reform Bill' was also a study of the interdependence of class structure and political ideology. Hegel's essay manifested how the English landed nobility perpetuated the juridical claims of the school of positive law because positive law legitimized their rights to property. Even though he used different terminology, Hegel adumbrated Marx's theory of the relation between the substructure and the superstructure. In the realm of ideology Hegel also drew attention to the symbiosis between the landed aristocracy and the Anglican Church, the support given by the Church to the class hegemony of the medieval aristocracy. The 'Parmenides of Berlin' had a sophisticated grasp of how cultures and political theories were shaped by the social underpinnings of class structure.

In the 1830s a large majority of the English male population was excluded from voting because they did not possess the necessary property qualifications. Wealth, either in agriculture or trade, was the basis of active political participation. In addition, 'rotten boroughs' were widespread throughout England. These were electoral districts under the control of the old feudal aristocracy, or the industrial affluent. They did not have sufficient population to be considered a valid electoral district, but the wealth of the agricultural feudal class and the urban rich were able not only to preserve these invalid districts, but they also used their money to buy votes in these districts to ensure members of parliament friendly to their interests were sent to Westminster. The Reform Bill Hegel discussed in 1831 became law in 1832 when it was ushered through Parliament by Sir Robert Peel and it introduced both the reapportionment and redistricting of seats. Hegel died before the 1832 Reform Bill passed, but his article showed his cognizance of class struggle and of how money corrupted politics.

Not only did the corruption of English of politics originate among the landed gentry and the urban capitalists, but also devolved from the Anglican Church. Germany and other continental states had already abolished the tithe, but the Anglican Church was still a beneficiary of the tithe. Originally the tithe,

a medieval invention, was used to pay religious teachers, maintain church schools and help the poor. But in England in the 18th and early 19th centuries the tithe was seen as a source of personal income for the clergy and led to the debauchery and immorality of this ecclesiastical class. Hegel not only called for the separation of Church and State, but for the eradication of the tithe as a means to end the abuse of these funds by the clerical establishment. The Anglican Church was another example of the class exploitation of the poor.⁹⁷

Hegel was also conversant with the Irish Question. Almost two decades before Marx and Engels drew attention to the Irish Question, Hegel had perceived the unique impoverishment of Ireland. According to Hegel one of the reasons for this unprecedented destitution of Ireland was the near impossibility of Irish farmers to acquire property and this barrier was wholly due to the laws passed by English aristocratic colonizers who legislated impediments to the private acquisition of land by the colonized Irish.⁹⁸ Hegel's 1831 analysis resembled nothing as much as Frantz Fanon's and those of the anti-colonization campaigns of the post-Second World War decades; that it was the desire to preserve English feudal advantages that prevented the Irish from acquiring private property.

Hegel's exposure to class rapacity did not mean he was a democrat. He disavowed universal suffrage,⁹⁹ defended the disenfranchisement of the *pöbel* (rabble),¹⁰⁰ championed property qualifications as the basis of the right to vote¹⁰¹ and repeated his denunciation of Robespierre and the Jacobins.¹⁰² Furthermore, he praised the constitution Napoleon gave to the Kingdom of Italy in which Napoleon distributed the right of representation in terms of three groups, government bureaucrats, the aristocracy and the business class.¹⁰³ Napoleon's representative system was similar to the corporate representation Hegel proposed in his 1820 *The Philosophy of Right*.

Not only did Hegel present England as a nation under the hegemony of the landed and capitalist aristocracy, but he also called into question the educational capacities of the classes that governed. In this regard, Hegel displayed his German nationalism. While the English landed and commercial aristocracies were simply guided by the principle of self-interest, the Germans benefited from the tradition of *Bildung*. The administrative decision-making of the English medieval and capitalist ruling strata were determined by the law of self-aggrandizement, while the German bureaucracy, enriched by the tradition of *Bildung*, had the expertise, the professional competence, to make better-informed administrative decisions. Hegel looked upon the bureaucracy as a 'universal class',¹⁰⁴ a class trained for and whose skills were cultivated for the tasks of proper administrative decision-making and in the service of the general welfare. Compared to the German 'universal class', the British administrative and executive strata were untutored and lacked the requisite skills for their jobs.¹⁰⁵

The Master possessed a sophisticated understanding of how the class structure of a society determined the religion, art, politics and philosophy of a civilization. The cultural levels of the civilization were not autonomous, self-generating, but were influenced and shaped by the social stratification that formed their foundation. For example, in 'The English Reform Bill' Hegel again attacked the German

Historical School of Law, and he refuted the positive theory of law that Savigny and his cohorts defended. The positive theory of law asserted custom, normative social practice, as the legitimating criteria of law. 'The English Reform Bill' showed how the theory of positive law buttressed the class interests of the landed and commercial aristocracies.

Hegel was aware that the culture-philosophic hierarchies of art, religion, philosophy, law and the state were realms molded by the underlying social structure. Class preferences partially sculptured the levels of culture and philosophy. Hegel recognized that social structures were foundational, were the scaffoldings upon which the culture-philosophic levels arose. Hegel understood a civilization as a relationship between two structures: the socio-economic basis of a society was foundational and primary; the higher culture-philosophic levels were influenced by the foundational level. By recognizing and advancing the priority of the socio-economic foundational level Hegel prepared the way for Marx.

The socio-economic analysis contained in 'The English Reform Bill' was pre-proletarian. Hegel wrote this essay seventeen years before the 1848 Revolution. His analysis of the socio-economic conditions of England did not carry a proletarian perspective, but rather a bourgeois vision. Hegel did not call for the emancipation of the proletariat, but rather for the enfranchisement of the propertied bourgeois. His analysis looked back to 1789 in France and not forward to 1848 in Paris or Frankfurt.

'The Master' presents himself in 'The English Reform Bill' as a Liberal reformer. Throughout the pages of this essay Hegel ridiculed the notions of equality and democracy,¹⁰⁶ and was particularly critical of 'the Year III in France under Robespierre'.¹⁰⁷ 'The English Reform Bill' was an anti-revolutionary document. The intent of Hegel was to prevent England from experiencing a Jacobin revolution and the most efficient way to escape such a catastrophic denouement was moderate reform. It is well to bear in mind that Hegel wrote 'The English Reform Bill' in 1831, one year after the French revolution of 1830, of which he disapproved.

Marx's failure to read Rosenkranz is difficult to comprehend. Rosenkranz was a major figure in the Hegelian Center and was widely read by the Hegelian Left. Although Ruge later deserted the Hegelian Left he was one of its founding members and was the co-editor with Marx of the Paris-published *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* in 1844. Additionally, Marx and Ruge exchanged correspondence as early as 1842¹⁰⁸ and Ruge was in correspondence with Rosenkranz beginning in 1837.¹⁰⁹

Ruge did read Hegel's 'Proceedings of the Estates Assembly in the Kingdom of Württemberg' as well as 'The English Reform Bill'. Ruge does comment on both these pieces of Hegelian journalism in an article in 1842 called 'Hegel's Philosophy of Right and the Politics of Our Time'.¹¹⁰ Marx and Ruge were friends and intellectual compatriots from 1842 until 1844 so it is a mystery why Ruge read these essays and Marx failed to do so.

The importance of Rosenkranz to the Hegelian Left was further revealed by the esteem with which Engels regarded him. As early as 1840 Engels placed Rosenkranz in the company of Gans and Ruge, demonstrating the influence Ruge exerted within the Left and Center Hegel cadres. In his letter to his close friend Friedrich

Graeber, dated December 9, 1839–February 5, 1840, Engels wrote: ‘. . . nobody has done Hegel more harm than his pupils; only a few of them, like Gans, Rosenkranz and Ruge and others are worthy of him.’¹¹¹ In addition, while Marx was associated with the *Rheinische Zeitung*, Engels published a book review in that newspaper in which he wrote: ‘Rosenkranz with his versatile and lively intelligence represents German philosophy [in] a most gratifying manner . . .’¹¹²

Even though Marx must have been aware of the high regard both Ruge and Engels held for Rosenkranz there is no evidence Marx read any of Rosenkranz’s works.

f) ‘*The German Constitution*’ Rosenkranz’s biography also contained important references to Hegel’s ‘*The German Constitution*’. Written between 1798 and 1802, this essay acknowledged the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire before the armies of Napoleon and began with the famous sentence ‘Germany is no longer a state’.¹¹³ However, the first complete version of this essay did not appear until George Mollat published it in 1893,¹¹⁴ by which time Marx was dead.

Nevertheless, Haym read Rosenkranz and was familiar with those selections of ‘*The German Constitution*’ that Rosenkranz included in his biography; Haym made reference to these selections in his own biography of Hegel. Regardless of the incomplete nature of these Rosenkranz extracts they did provide helpful insights into Hegel’s political thought. In particular, they drew attention to Hegel’s belief that the state was an ethical totality, and Haym made use of Hegel’s definition in his own biography of Hegel. But Marx never read Haym.

2) *Philosophical Propaedeutic*

In addition to not reading Rosenkranz’s *Hegel’s Life* Marx also failed to read Rosenkranz’s publication of Hegel’s *Philosophical Propaedeutic*. Rosenkranz discovered this manuscript in 1838 and published it in 1840 as Volume 18 of the *Collected Works*. Marx never mentioned the *Philosophical Propaedeutic* even though it was part of the *Collected Works*. This seems to contradict the statement Marx made in his 1837 letter to his father in which he claimed that he had read Hegel ‘from beginning to end’. It is worth reiterating that along with Volume 18 Marx never read Volumes 1, 16 and 17 of the *Collected Works*.

The *Philosophical Propaedeutic* is an instructor’s manual for the teaching of philosophy to the students at the Gymnasium Nuremberg at which Hegel was Rector from 1808 to 1815. Hegel structured this philosophic curriculum in terms of the ages of the gymnasium students: the 14 to 15-year-olds were taught the science of law, morality and religion; the 15 to 18-year-olds were introduced to the phenomenology of mind while the more mature 18 to 20-year-olds were initiated into the science of the concept and the science of logic.¹¹⁵ More important than the pedagogical design of the lectures is the fact that they were an embryonic form of Hegel’s *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, published in 1817. The *Philosophical Propaedeutic* was a summary of the complete System of the Mature Hegel and essentially was an abbreviation of the three-volume *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*.

As a course syllabus, even though intended for a gymnasium, the *Philosophical Propaedeutic* provides excellent insight into what Hegel meant by *Bildung*. This pedagogical manual, adjusted to the ages of the students, traversed the knowledge of the humanities from the science of law to the science of logic. More than education, *Bildung* was intended to supply the student with an awareness of the intellectual endeavors of history in order to enable them to comprehend the labor of humanity, or Spirit.

The *Philosophical Propaedeutic* emphasized the practical aspects of Hegelian thought. In this curriculum Hegel distanced himself from metaphysics and concentrated on the practice of subjective consciousness. The phenomenology of self-consciousness described the objectivity brought into the world and therefore it offered an account of the practice of mind.

3) *Psychology: or the Science of Subjective Spirit*

The remit of this chapter only allows me to make some general comments on this important book by Rosenkranz.¹¹⁶

Psychology: or the Science of Subjective Spirit was a refutation of the interpretation of Hegel as a Speculative philosopher. Published in 1837, in the book Rosenkranz joined forces with Michelet in presenting Hegel as essentially a practical philosopher who emphasized subjective activity as the pneumatological force that constructed the external world. According to Rosenkranz Hegel was a 19th-century reincarnation of Aristotle.

The proper way to read *Psychology: or the Science of Subjective Spirit* is to approach it as a commentary on Volume 3, *The Philosophy of Mind*, of Hegel's *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*. Rosenkranz makes no mention of Volume 1, the 'Smaller Logic', or Volume 2, *The Philosophy of Nature*, and his book basically follows the design of *The Philosophy of Mind*. The structure of Hegel's *The Philosophy of Mind* repeats the structure of Aristotle's 'The Soul', accentuating Aristotle's influence on Hegel with particular reference to the predicating power of subjective activity, the movement from potential to actual.¹¹⁷

Rosenkranz's book is divided into three parts, which correspond exactly with the three sub-sections in Section 1, 'Mind Subjective', in *The Philosophy of Mind*. The first part of *Psychology: or Science of Subjective Spirit* is called 'Anthropology' and sub-section A of Hegel's chapter 'Mind Subjective' is also called 'Anthropology. The Soul'. The second part of Rosenkranz's book is called 'Phenomenology' and sub-section B in Hegel is called 'Phenomenology of Mind. Consciousness'. The third part of Rosenkranz's book is called 'Pneumatology' and sub-section C in Hegel is called 'Psychology. Mind'.

The structure of Rosenkranz's book was intended to highlight the interconnection between subjectivity and objectivity. When Rosenkranz used the word 'pneumatology' he did so to emphasize the fact that human practice was the sole force which shaped actuality.

Psychology: or Science of Subjective Spirit made no reference to any part of Hegel associated with the dialectic, with the pantheism of the Idea. Rosenkranz explained human activity in terms of desire, or drives, or the psychological

instincts that propelled the personality outward, that made the person a pneumatological energy. Rosenkranz presented a picture of the external world as the outcome, the realization of human psychological drives.¹¹⁸

It is also informative to compare Rosenkranz and Marx's reading of Hegel's *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*. Marx read Volume 1, the 'Smaller Logic' and Volume 2, *The Philosophy of Nature*. Rosenkranz does not mention either of these volumes in his *Psychology: or the Science of Subjective Spirit*. However, Rosenkranz's book was an amplification of the 'Mind Subjective' in Volume 3 of *The Philosophy of Mind*. While Marx read Volume 3 he does not comment on it in any of his work. Marx does comment on the 'Smaller Logic' and *The Philosophy of Nature*, but Marx never makes any reference to Hegel's ruminations on human anthropology or psychology or to Hegelian pneumatology.

By only showing interest in the 'Smaller Logic' and *The Philosophy of Nature* Marx displayed himself as a captive to the interpretation of Hegel as a Speculative philosopher. By not reading *Psychology: or the Science of Subjective Spirit* he barricaded himself against any evidence showing the practical aspects of Hegelian thought. Whereas Rosenkranz eschewed Hegelian pantheism, Marx never relinquished this formatting of Hegel.

4) Additional Hegel material uncovered by Rosenkranz

The Rosenkranz void is crucial for an additional reason. At the end of his biography Rosenkranz included a section on sources and not all of these sources were included in the first editions of the *Collected Works*. For the most part this source material, published for the first time by Rosenkranz, consisted of diaries, fragments and *exzerpte* written by Hegel during the five years he studied at the Theological Seminary at the University of Tübingen. To give the reader a sense of these Young Hegel materials uncovered by Rosenkranz I will simply list the titles of the various sections organized by Rosenkranz:

- I) Hegel's Diary from his Gymnasium Period;
- II) Works from the Gymnasium Period;
- III) Fragments for a Critique of Theology from the Tübingen Period and the Thesis for a Theological Dissertation;
- IV) Diary of a 1796 Trip to the High Alps of Berne;
- V) Fragments of Theological Studies;
- VI) Fragments of Historical Studies;
- VII) 'The Concept of Positivity in Religion' (1800);
- VIII) Aphorisms from the Jena and Berlin Periods;
- IX) Forster's Poem for Hegel's Birthday in 1826;
- X) Marheineke's and Forster's Speeches at Hegel's Gravesite.

The diaries, fragments and *exzerpte* included in Rosenkranz's biography were not comprehensive, and a complete publication of these Hegel sources had to wait until Thaulow's book *Hegel's Views on Education and Instruction*, which I will briefly comment upon below.

It is not necessary to discuss every item contained in these ten sections and I will refer to just a few items as a way of illustrating what the Young and Mature Marx did not know about the Young Hegel. It should also be noted that the Rosenkranz collection is not the complete assemblage of all the written materials of the Pre-Jena Young Hegel since subsequent scholars of Hegel, particularly in the 20th century, uncovered additional texts. Furthermore, Harris's biography contains a listing of the Hegel *exzerpte* uncovered by Rosenkranz.¹¹⁹

Hegel wrote numerous *exzerpte* on theological matters, but this was to be expected from a student at a Protestant seminary. These *exzerpte* are important materials tracing Hegel's confrontation with religious positivism. During his pre-Jena period the Young Hegel abandoned religious positivism in favor of religious subjectivity, but regardless of how important this transition was for the individual development of Hegel this theological aspect of Hegel's life carried no interest for Marx who was not concerned with Lutheran inwardness but rather with social labor.

Of interest to Marx, however, were the many references to and *exzerpte* Hegel made from Greek and Roman authors. The works of Socrates, Euripides, Aristotle, Plato, Epictetus, Tacitus, Sophocles, a comparison between Greek and Roman religion, are either alluded to or copied in part. In itself such attention paid to the Classics was expected of a German student at the end of the 18th century. This was an expression of the importance Antiquity held in the German educational system, the addiction to Johann Winckelmann, the type of education to which Marx himself was exposed.

Irrespective of knowledge of the Aristotle-Rousseau influence on Hegel, Marx never alludes to this aspect of Hegelian political theory. Marx adopted a policy of absolute silence regarding the influence of Aristotle and Rousseau on Hegel, and the preservation of the ethical polis ideal on Hegel. Marx's 1843 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' is basically devoted to presenting Hegel as an exponent of the theory of the state as a predication of the Idea, as a rational abstraction, but Hegel's attempt to further explore Aristotle's union of ethics and politics is ignored.

Even though he bypassed the Hegelian connection to Aristotle, Marx found his own bridge to Athens. Marx followed two strategies in terms of the polis: the silencing of any Hegelian influence, while at the same time pursuing the same goal of Hegel, which was the presentation of the state as an ethical community. Hegel and Marx pursued the same end, but Marx refused to acknowledge that he and Hegel were on the same voyage.

Rudolf Haym

It is instructive to note the importance Rosenkranz's *Hegel's Life* exercised on future 19th-century studies of Hegel. It became an indispensable archive of source material on Hegel that no researcher could afford to bypass. Haym's *Hegel and His Time*¹²⁰ was greatly dependent on the Hegelian source materials preserved by Rosenkranz.

Haym's biography was published in 1857. By that time Marx was living in London and in 1857 Marx was beginning the composition of the *Grundrisse*. Marx never read Haym's book.

Although Haym was indebted to Rosenkranz, the picture of Hegel he supplied contradicted the one put forth by Rosenkranz. While Rosenkranz presented a Hegel as a cadre of the Hegelian Center, Haym sketched a portrait of Hegel as a partisan of the Hegelian Right. In his book Haym wrote: 'The Hegelian system supplied scientific justification for the Prussian Restoration'.¹²¹ In Marx's 1841 dissertation, *On the Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature*, he defended Hegel against the charge that Hegel was merely an apologist of the Prussian Crown. To the contrary, Haym saw the significance of Hegel exactly in his justification of the Hohenzollern monarchy. What Marx denied in 1841 Haym asserted in 1857.

Although they disagreed over Hegelian politics Marx and Haym agreed over Hegelian philosophy. In his 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' Marx labeled Hegel as a 'logical pantheist' and in his work Haym stigmatized Hegel as a 'rational pantheist'.¹²² Haym also characterized Hegel as a 'practical panlogistic'.¹²³ Marx and Haym were in agreement that Hegel's philosophy prioritized the Idea and that the actual was a reflection of the Idea. Rosenkranz dissented on this issue and emphasized the practical, subjective aspects of Hegelian thought.

Leaving aside these interpretive contradictions, Haym's reading of Rosenkranz enriched him with original Hegel source material. Haym knew of the books by Hegel that Marx avoided. Haym read those parts of 'The German Constitution' that Rosenkranz had preserved;¹²⁴ he also read the Rosenkranz presentation of 'The English Reform Bill';¹²⁵ he also read the 'Proceedings of the Estates Assembly in the Kingdom of Württemberg';¹²⁶ and he learned from Rosenkranz that Hegel had read Stuart's *Essay on the Principles of Political Economy*. Due to his contact with Rosenkranz, Haym enjoyed a broader knowledge of the writings of Hegel than Marx achieved.

J. Gustav Thaulow's *Hegel's Views on Education and Instruction*¹²⁷

The temporal boundaries of *Marx's Discourse with Hegel* encompass the years 1836–1850 and even though Thaulow's book exceeds these borders, since it was published in 1854, I will comment on it here. Thaulow's book was a collection of Hegel *exzerpte* made while 'The Master' was a student in Stuttgart. It is important as a guide to the intellectual interests of the Young Hegel, and to the subjects to which the 15 to 18-year-old was drawn. Even though Rosenkranz alludes to some of these *exzerpte* in his biography, as previously mentioned, the complete publication of these Young Hegel notes were delayed until 1854. At this time Marx was engaged in his preliminary studies for the writing of *Das Kapital* and never read Thaulow's book. Marx ignorance of Thaulow's anthology highlights the fact that his emigration to England completely detached him from the appearance of new Hegel source material as well as the continental academic debates over 'The Master'.

J. J. Cart's *Confidential Letters*

The first published work by Hegel appeared in 1798 and is known as J. J. Cart's *Confidential Letters*. Hegel published the book anonymously and it was not until 1909 that Hegel's authorship was established.¹²⁸

Since the *Confidential Letters* were not ascribed to Hegel until 1909 neither Marx nor any other Hegel scholars prior to that date knew of its existence as a text of Hegel. Although it is not possible to admonish Marx for not reading this book since it was unknown to be a Hegel manuscript, it is possible to now comment on the text as indicating the political attitudes of Hegel when he was 28 years old. The *Confidential Letters* tell us something about the Young Hegel's politics and these 1798 attitudes correspond to his beliefs as expressed in the other documents already analyzed in this chapter. The *Confidential Letters* confirm the Young Hegel's German Liberalism.

In the *Confidential Letters* the Young Hegel translated the letters of J. J. Cart, a French-speaking Swiss, and added a commentary of his own. Living in Berne, Switzerland, as a tutor in the house of the Steiger family, Hegel gained first-hand experience regarding the oligarchic hegemony of the Berne nobility. The *Confidential Letters* comprised a diatribe against the Bernese aristocracy for their domination of the inhabitants of the Vaud. The book praised the American Revolution, and during the period of the Directory in Paris excoriated the anachronistic interests of the Berne aristocracy. In his first published work the Young Hegel displayed himself as a Liberal reformer. Writing at the same time as the French Directory, Hegel exhibited his German Liberal contempt for the aristocracy and his reformist advocacy of the nascent bourgeoisie. The Young Hegel matured during the early years of the French Revolution, carried its imprint throughout his life, and this was an aspect of Hegel's intellectual biography that Marx misread.

'On the Recent Domestic Affairs of Württemberg and the Municipal Constitution in Particular'

Hegel wrote this essay in 1798 and sent it to some friends to read; they strongly advised against its publication and so it was not discovered until 1909. Haym's 1857 biography of Hegel contained a few fragments of the essay and a brief synopsis, but Rosenkranz does not mention this essay in his own biography of Hegel. Since Marx never read Haym or Rosenkranz this Hegel manuscript fell into the black hole. The first publication of this article was by Lasson.¹²⁹ The invisibility of 'On the Recent Domestic Affairs of Württemberg and the Municipal Constitution in Particular' created another void in Marx's appreciation of Hegel. In this essay Hegel appears as a political reformer. In 1798 Hegel sought to avoid Jacobinism in Württemberg, he was not a democrat, but he did call for political reform. This essay substantiates the classification of Hegel as a German Liberal.¹³⁰

* * * * *

Marx's self-induced ignorance of available Hegel texts created an Invisible Hegel. Marx's failure to read the full bibliography of Hegel material that was accessible to him in the public domain created an Invisible Hegel archive.

Specifically, the Invisible Hegel of 'The English Reform Bill' inflicted enormous damage on Marx because he remained blind to Hegel's awareness of class struggle. In his 1843 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' Marx defined Hegel as a 'logical

pantheist' and believed that Hegel accounted for the existence of the state as a devolution of the Idea. Marx never abandoned this view of Hegel and one of the reasons Marx never surrendered his interpretation of Hegel as a Speculative philosopher was his failure to acquaint himself with Hegel's views, such as those contained in 'The English Reform Bill', concerning social class, class stratification and the influence of the socio-economic base upon cultural spheres such as art, politics and philosophy.

Marx also remained myopic regarding the subjective-practical aspects of Hegelian thought and this vacancy manifested itself in two areas, economic and political.

On the economic level Marx's failure to read Hegel's 'On the Scientific Method of Treating Natural Law' left him unacquainted with the role subjective-practical human activity played in Hegel. In this essay, as well as in other writings, Hegel showed his recognition of political economy, and his awareness that the practical interchange between man and nature was the primary factor in the sustenance of life. For Hegel, economic practice was the foundation out of which the evolution of Spirit was born.

On the political level Marx's failure to read Hegel's 'Proceedings of the Estates Assembly in the Kingdom of Württemberg' condemned him to a void in regard to political practice in Hegel. In this journalistic endeavor Hegel displayed his awareness of the practice of class politics, his appreciation that within a capitalist society the subjective activity of the financially privileged would be directed at increasing their own gain. Hegel was convinced that the subjectivity of political action in a capitalist society was primarily directed at the augmentation of personal gain and this was the major reason for his denunciation of contemporary individualism. It was also one of the reasons for the hope he placed in *Bildung*.

Marx also cut himself off from Hegel's definition of politics as an ethical practice by not reading 'On The Scientific Method of Treating Natural Law'. Marx subjected himself to significant lacunae regarding the relation between ethics and politics in Hegel as well as the importance of Aristotle in Hegelian thought. This void in the knowledge of the ethical in Hegel made it impossible for Marx to assess Hegel's theory of the state correctly.

Subject to all these vacancies – other absences will be added later – Marx could only judge Hegel as a Speculative philosopher. Marx was wedded to and refused to abandon the idea that Hegel was a Speculative theoretician and remained remote from other terrains of Hegelian thought. Marx refused to familiarize himself with any information that contradicted this Speculative interpretation; here lies the origin of the Invisible Hegel.

However, Marx's misreading of Hegel in the areas of practice, subjectivity and ethics does not mean that he distorted the Hegelian distinction between System and Method. Marx confined the Hegelian System within the Speculative, which he rejected, but he still recognized the validity and applicability of the Hegelian Method. While the System distorted the actual, the Method was a productive metric by which to measure the actual. Marx separated the actual from the System, but maintained that the actual was made comprehensible by the application of the Method.

Chapter Three

The Works of Hegel that Marx Knew

During the years 1836 to 1848 Marx's thought passed through interrelated stages. In order to highlight the interconnected episodes of Marx's intellectual development I divide Chapter Three into Phases and I do this to emphasize the consistency in his development. Chapter Three is composed of six Phases and they are:

Phase One: Hegel and Marx in the Center

Phase Two: The Letter of 1837 and the Doctoral Dissertation

Phase Three: Marx and the *Rheinische Zeitung*

Phase Four: Marx's Development of Critique and His Delinking from Hegel

Phase Five: Critique of *The Phenomenology of Spirit*

Phase Six: In Defense of Hegel

Phase One: Hegel and Marx in the Center

Marx's first written comment on Hegel occurred in his 1836 epigram 'On Hegel' and testified to the difficulties the 18-year-old was experiencing in his attempt to comprehend Hegel's aesthetic theory. The movement of Marx's 1836 negation of Hegel to a positive appropriation of aspects of Hegelian thought is charted in his 1837 letter to his father written from the University of Berlin to which he had transferred from the University of Bonn.¹

In this letter he acknowledged his 1836 rejection of Hegel, when he wrote these words: 'I had read fragments of Hegel's philosophy and had found its grotesque craggy melody unpleasing.'²

However, by November 1837 Marx underwent a fateful conversion and became a student of Hegelian Speculation. Marx confessed to this transformation in the following paragraphs:

Setting out from idealism which, let me say in passing, I had compared to and nourished with that of Kant and Fichte I hit upon seeking the Idea in the real itself. If formerly the gods had dwelt above the world, they had now become its center.³

Marx accepted the Hegelian principle that the actual was the embodiment of rationality.⁴

I wrote a dialogue of about twenty-four pages entitled 'Cleanthes, or the Starting Point and the Necessary Progress of Philosophy'. Here, in a way, art and science, which had been severed, were reunited. And now, an energetic wanderer, I set out for the main task a philosophic-dialectical discussion of the godhead manifested as a concept per se, as religion, as nature, and as history. My last sentence was the beginning of the Hegelian system.⁵

Remnants of Marx's dialogue 'Cleanthes' still exist and are reprinted in the *MECW*, Vol. I, but what is more germane to the thesis of this book is that in the above quotation Marx connected himself to the philosophy of Hegel when he admitted that 'My last sentence was the beginning of the Hegelian System'. A little later in the letter Marx provided validity to this assertion when he confessed that 'While out of sorts, I had got to know Hegel from beginning to end, and most of his disciples as well'.⁶

This 1837 letter gives further testimony to Marx's embrace of Hegelianism. Near the end of the letter Marx wrote:

Through several meetings with friends in Stralow I became a member of the Doctor's Club in which some instructors and my most intimate friend in Berlin, Dr Adolf Rutenberg, belong. In discussions many a conflicting opinion was voiced and I was more and more chained to the current world philosophy from which I had thought to escape.⁷

The discussion up to this point established that by November 1837 Marx 'got to know Hegel from beginning to end' and that he converted to Hegelianism, although it is still necessary to determine to what form of Hegelianism he converted, but that question will be answered further on in Phase Three of this chapter. The November 1837 letter also documents that Marx rejected the Historical School of Law, and Savigny was the leading exponent of this school. The November 1837 letter to his father contains extremely important insights into Marx's philosophy of law at that time, a philosophy that was influenced by Hegel; I will discuss this aspect of the 1837 letter in Phase Two. At this point I employ the November 1837 letter to document the date of Marx's conversion to Hegelianism.

The 1837 letter already shows the influence of Gans upon Marx's first appropriation of Hegel. Gans was a Professor of Law at the University of Berlin and Gans, who was a student, colleague and friend of Hegel, carried on the Hegelian tradition after the death of Hegel in 1831 and decisively influenced the manner in which Marx perceived Hegel in the 1837 period. Gans belonged to the Hegelian Center⁸ and Marx interpreted Hegel as a member of the Hegelian Center.

A German Jew, Gans refined his instincts for political reform in his struggle to deepen the emancipation of Jewry in Germany, to facilitate the cultural assimilation of the Jewish community into German culture. Gans entered the School of Law at the University of Berlin in 1816, while Hegel became a Professor of

Philosophy there in 1818. Gans's conversion to Hegelianism occurred between 1821 and 1822.⁹

The two men became close friends and colleagues and Hegel became an advocate for Gans's appointment to a university professorship. But hopes for a university career were dashed in 1822, even though Hegel remained an ardent champion, when Frederick Wilhelm III effectively abrogated the law that emancipated the Jews, and this capitulation to German anti-Semitism decreed that Gans could no longer teach at the university.¹⁰ Gans converted to Christianity in 1825 and when he became a Protestant he was given a position at the university in 1826; his exile lasted six years.¹¹

Marx matriculated at the University of Bonn from 1835 to 1836, but in 1836 he transferred to the University of Berlin. While a student at the University of Berlin, Marx took two courses from Gans: in the winter semester I 1836–1837 he took private lectures from Gans on 'Criminal Law' and Gans rated him as 'exceptionally diligent'.¹² In the winter semester III 1837–1838 he took Gans's course in 'Prussian Law' and Gans again rated him as 'exceptionally diligent'.¹³ In the winter term I 1836–1837 Marx also took a private lecture course from Savigny on the 'Pandects' and Savigny classified him as 'diligent'. In the winter term I of 1836–1837 Marx simultaneously took classes from Gans and Savigny and was introduced to the whole controversy regarding the Historical School of Law.

Both the personal and intellectual bond between Hegel and Gans is illustrated by Gans's success in establishing the Society for Scientific Criticism. Gans was elected secretary of that society and although the organization was not solely constructed as an instrument for the propagation of Hegelian thought, a Hegelian prejudice was clear. The society published a journal, *The Yearbook of Scientific Criticism*, and opponents of Hegel referred to it as a 'Hegel journal' and also looked upon the whole venture as a Hegel 'counter-academy', a platform from which Hegel could publicize his ideas and combat his enemies at Berlin University.¹⁴ The Society and the *Yearbook* lasted from 1827 until 1832, a year after Hegel's death, and when Gans claimed the mantle as the leader of the Hegelian Center. Gans maintained that the Hegelian Center captured the true message of 'The Master'.

In 1825, during the years when he was exiled from the university, Gans visited Paris and thoroughly immersed himself in French Liberalism. While in Paris, Gans frequented the salons of French Liberal thinkers such as Benjamin Constant and Liberal Constitutionalsists such as Pierre Royer-Collard. He circulated among the writers of *The Globe*, a widely read French Liberal newspaper, became a champion of Victor Cousin, and absorbed the theories of constitutional monarchy. Five years later he was an advocate of the 1830 revolutionary overthrow of the Bourbon monarchy. Gans hoped to bring the message of French Liberalism to the pages of the Hegelian *Yearbook of Scientific Criticism*.¹⁵

Before proceeding to an analysis of Gans's definition of the Hegelian Center, and to Marx's later intellectual relationship to this Center, it is necessary to offer an outline of the division of the Hegelian School into Center and Right after his death. Marx's indebtedness to Left Hegelianism as well as his ultimate repudiation of this school will be discussed in depth throughout the remaining pages of this book and thus

there is no need to enter into an analysis of Left Hegelianism at this point. In my discussion of the Center and Right of the Hegelian denominations I will draw a line of demarcation between the political and philosophical aspects of these schools.

Gans and Michelet were two outstanding members of the Hegelian Center. Additional members of the Hegelian Center were Rosenkranz, Theodor Bayrholder, Henning and Hermann Hinrichs. I have already commented on the work of Rosenkranz and in the following pages I will focus on the work of Gans, Michelet, Bayrholder, Henning and Hinrichs. Center, Left and Right struggled over the legacy of Hegel, each school claiming it was the true heir of the Hegelian intellectual inheritance.

Politically, the Hegelian Center was for the most part Liberal Monarchist. Neither Gans nor Michelet wished to overthrow the Prussian monarchy, nor were they democrats. Both Gans and Michelet wished to retain the Hohenzollern monarchy, but both were advocates of significant political reforms. These two men were champions of a free and independent press, free religious worship, free speech and the end of government censorship over schools, journals and book publication, an enlargement, although not universal, of the electorate, a greater parliamentary voice in legislative decision-making and greater constitutional limitations on the Crown. Politically, the Hegelian Center continued the reformist aspirations of the Wars of Liberation. The members of the Hegelian Center propagated the dream of Hardenberg and Stein. They were opponents of the obscurantism of the Prussian restoration.

Alongside this advocacy of political reform inside a monarchical constitution, Gans and Michelet were proponents of the view that philosophy was a progressive force. The Hegelian Center accepted five basic principles of Hegelian thought: 1) Historicity; 2) Organicism; 3) History as the March of Freedom; 4) The Pneumatology of Reason; 5) The Reconciliation of Reason and Reality.

Gans was the editor of Hegel's *The Philosophy of Right* and *The Philosophy of History*. Michelet edited Volume 1 of the *Collected Works*, an assemblage of early essays by Hegel, the three-volume *The History of Philosophy* and *The Philosophy of Nature*, the first volume of the three-volume *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* and both Gans and Michelet accepted the principle of the Parmenides of Berlin that historicity was the presupposition of every manifestation of Spirit. Temporality was the foundation of every cultural organic, from religion to politics to philosophy itself.

These cultural productions were always totalities. Michelet's *The History of Philosophy* isolated essentially three great systems of philosophy – Oriental, Greco-Roman and Germanic-Christian – while Gans's *The Philosophy of History* also divided the history of humanity into the same three systems; both the Gans and Michelet presentations of philosophy and history were based on the theory of organic units. History was a series of evolving circles and each circle, be it Greece, or Germanic-Christian Europe, was an organic system in which particularity and universalities were fused and then escalated to a higher circle.

The overall movement of the human endeavor was towards freedom. In this regard, Hegel, Gans and Michelet were all children of the Enlightenment, all

upholding the German Liberal interpretation of the human saga as a march from primitivism to Spirit, or to self-determination. The progressivism of the Hegelian Center did not define freedom as egalitarianism, or as utilitarianism, but rather as self-determination. For Hegel, Gans and Michelet, self-determination did not mean unrestrained individualism, but rather decision-making in terms of the Self, but a Self that was a part of a community and a tradition and that recognized its obligations to that community and tradition. This German Liberal view of historiography was based upon the assumption that reason was a dynamic force in social evolution. Gans and Michelet did not believe that reason was the universal substance of the world, did not apply a Spinozist interpretation to reason, but they did believe that the pragmatics of reason and subjective activity were the only dynamics out of which progressive development could emerge.

In order to understand the theory of progress in Hegel it is first necessary to recognize that philosophy for the 'Parmenides of Berlin' was a process of self-education. The inherent drive in philosophy, reason, was to objectify itself, to enter into reality, or to take possession of reality. In order to know itself it was necessary for mind to observe the predications it originated in the past, and philosophical knowledge was retrodiction.

When reason took title of reality the self-learning process started. Hermeneutics was a vital element in Hegelian philosophy as 'The Master' believed that reason could only know itself. When reason claimed ownership of reality, this meant reason could understand reality because it was able to recognize itself in reality. Knowledge, for Hegel, was the self-identity of reason, or the in-itself recognizing its simultaneous co-existence in mind and reality. Hegel pursued a philosophy of identity.

Hegel thought in cultural holistic terms. On the philosophical level the Middle Ages were dominated by Catholic theology and as a consequence the philosophy of this historical period was metaphysics. This meant that the universe itself was the creation of a supernatural force and that the foundational principle of the universe was an ontological, non-historical substance.

But a subsequent cultural age disproved the metaphysical philosophy of the Middle Ages. Rather than an adamant spiritual substance, Enlightenment science proved that the universe was material and historical. One cultural age contradicted an earlier cultural holism. The self-observation of reason proved that the reason of the Middle Ages was incorrect. The process of self-observation required that medieval philosophy be annulled and a new philosophico-cultural holism be introduced, while simultaneously realizing that the Enlightenment itself would be superseded in the future.

Hegelian historicism rested on the principle of supersession. Retrospection led to the awareness of contradiction. The self-knowledge of reason expanded as the self-observation of reason's past objectifications grew. This expanded self-knowledge led to the contradiction and negation of these outmoded past objectifications and supersession was the result. A more informed reason, enriched by its own self-learning process, superseded the lower level of self-consciousness.

Hegel espoused a theory of non-congruence, or he recognized that a severance existed between reason and reality. The function of reason was to transform

reality into a resemblance of reason. Presupposing non-congruence, the mission of philosophy was to reform reality in so far as possible that reality reflected reason. Hegelian philosophy contained a theory of historical supersession. A more advanced cultural age, aware that it was non-congruent with the past, contradicted the past and only those elements of the negated past which still contained relevance and vitality were subsumed in a higher historical holism.

In addition, Hegel's theory of historical supersession was predicated upon the principle of the rational transformation of reality. Reason had overthrown metaphysics and with the abolition of the ontological the theory of historical supersession, the need to reconstruct reality, was validated. One purpose of philosophy was the progressive modification of the socio-ethico-political.

Philosophy was the esoteric for Hegel. Philosophy must penetrate into the exoteric, with reality, and when philosophy exteriorized itself it became cognizant of the fracture separating the exoteric and the esoteric. Reason in-itself was potential, but when reason intermingled with reality reason became aware of the chasm between the in-itself of reason and the impurities of the exoteric.

The non-congruent nature of Idea and reality was another source for the Hegelian theory of historical supersession. Philosophy realized that reality did not perfectly conform with the Idea and historical supersession was the attempt to bridge this gulf and bring about the identity between thought and reality. The attempt to bring an accord between reason and reality was another source of Hegel's philosophy of reconciliation as well as of the political reformism of the 'Parmenides of Berlin'.

It is important to understand that major differences distinguished Hegelian non-congruence from Bauerian critique. I will discuss these differences here because it will help in the definition of the Hegelian Center and the Hegelian Left. In forthcoming paragraphs of this phase I will analyze Bauer's utilization of critique and establishing the schism between non-congruence and critique will provide a background for a better understanding of the work of Bauer.

The origin of critique is found in the work of Kant. In his books, *The Critique of Pure Reason*, *The Critique of Practical Reason* and *The Critique of Judgement*, Kant explored the limitations of reason. Kant drew an insurmountable barrier between reason and reality and in his refutation of the empiricism of Locke and Hume maintained that the thing-in-itself always remained beyond the grasp of reason. Critique as employed by Kant was directed at specifying the limitations of reason. Critique, in its Kantian form, meant the erection of boundaries that constrained reason.

Influenced by Fichte, Hegel rejected Kantian critique. Hegel denied the unbridgeable schism between reality and thought. According to Fichte reason possessed a predicative power and projected itself into reality, and this absorption of reality by reason was the substance for the unity of reason and reality. Reason was phenomenological, it was a causeway between thought and the empirical and this connection was the source of the unity of reason and reality.

Hegel died in 1831 and the acolytes of 'The Master' remained generally unified until the work of Strauss, particularly in his 1835–1836 book *The Life of Jesus*. In

this two-volume work, Strauss presented a secularized portrayal of Jesus free from any theological adornments. At a deeper level, however, *The Life of Jesus* separated theology and philosophy. Strauss rebelled against the medieval ecclesiastical preemption of philosophy and not only detached the two disciplines, but also asserted the supremacy of philosophy. Strauss's book precipitated the bifurcation of the Hegelian school into Right and Center. The Hegelian Right upheld the supremacy of theology, while the Hegelian Center supported the superiority of reason. Strauss's book ignited the 19th-century warfare between these two opposing camps, those who proposed that ultimate truth lay in religion and those who proposed that philosophy in itself was the summit of truth.

Hegel regarded philosophy as the medium for the reconciliation of the Idea and reality. Even though a perfect identity of the Idea and reality was an impossibility, the agency working to fulfill this reconciliation was philosophy. The impossibility of the absolute identity between Idea and reality was the dialectic, negation or non-congruence. Hegel did not employ critique, but rather contradiction. One of the reasons Hegel never developed critique was his suspicion of free subjectivity. Nevertheless, Hegel made critique a possibility by recognizing the cleavage between thought and reality, but it was a cleavage that could be overcome by the phenomenology of reason.

Bauer extended Kantian critique and he re-created critique by modifying Hegel in three categories: subjectivity, free self-consciousness, and philosophy itself, and philosophy itself became a target of critique.

Bauer upheld the right of subjectivity. Whereas Hegel denounced Socrates for his assertion of his individuality, Bauer looked upon unrestrained subjectivity as the ground of philosophy. Bauer defended the right of the personality over the compromises of the social.¹⁶

Commensurate with his defense of subjectivity was Bauer's justification of free self-consciousness. Benefiting from the ultimate license of subjectivity, self-consciousness was endowed with the entitlement to nullify, to contradict all systems of thought. Even though Bauer continued to regard the discipline of philosophy as the unblemished doorway to truth, he opened up philosophical beliefs themselves to contradiction. Whereas Hegel considered philosophy above nullification Bauer opened up philosophical belief systems to dialectical negation.

The three elements, subjectivity, free self-consciousness and the scrutiny of philosophical beliefs, formed the substructure of critique. For Bauer critique was directed at the alteration of philosophical beliefs; personal behavior would be modified not through the transcendence of philosophy as a discipline, but by means of the modification of self-consciousness. Whereas Hegel and Bauer disagreed over the exercise of critique, Hegel and Bauer were in agreement over the centrality of thought. Change, personal or social, evolved out of the modification of mentality, of consciousness.

Marx continued the Bauerian tradition of critique, but made three vital alterations; the target of critique, the agent of critique and the purpose of critique. Marx's program for the realignment of critique, his break with Bauer, was first enunciated in the 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction.'¹⁷

For Marx the target of critique was those institutions in society which contributed to the exploitation of the industrial working class. Contrary to Hegel and Bauer, Marx did not accept philosophy as the foundation of human motivation. Rather, Marx judged social labor as the presupposition of human endeavor and therefore, for him critique should target those socio-economic institutions which defined the method of labor in a given society. It was not consciousness which defined the human, but rather the politico-economic structure of society.

The fact that Marx repositioned the central target of critique from philosophy to social institutions did not mean that he wished to abolish philosophy. Rather, it only meant that Marx wished to alter the purpose of philosophy. Marx wished to retain philosophy, but to direct its purpose not to metaphysical conundrums, the existence of a divinity or the powers of reason, but rather to questions of materialism, the nature of labor, the substance of economic value and the question of private property.

While Hegel and Bauer looked upon the agent of non-congruence as a philosopher, or at individual consciousness, Marx looked upon the agent as a social class. Whereas Bauer placed critique within a subject, in self-consciousness, Marx saw the source of critique as the proletariat. Marx moved the source of critique from the person to a social class.

Essentially, Marx was involved in a critique of political economy, but this meant that he was engaged in an endeavor to redefine political economy so that it would cease being an apology for private property and become an instrument for the democratization of the means and mode of production. For Marx critique was a justification for praxis, or a validation of proletarian revolution.

Marx redefined the Hegelian concept of practice. Hegel's *The Philosophy of Mind* contains a chapter on 'Practical Mind'.¹⁸ As opposed to theoretical mind Hegel understands 'Practical Mind' as related to individual action, as composed of feeling, impulse, choice, and happiness. In his understanding of practical mind Hegel was consonant with Aristotle.¹⁹ Marx, however, rebelled against the Aristotelian-Hegelian tradition. For Marx praxis meant political activism. Whereas Aristotle and Hegel made practice a subdivision of human psychology, Marx re-situated practice into the realm of politics, as a strategy of political reformation.

I maintain that Hegel himself was the founder of the Hegelian Center. Gans and Michelet were the legitimate heirs of Hegel, or the Hegelian essence was most closely approximated by Gans and Michelet. Obviously, differences existed between Hegel and these two epigones, but the message of Hegel was best replicated in the language of Gans and Michelet.

Politically I also maintain that Marx believed Hegel to be a member of the Hegelian Center, or that Marx viewed Hegel as a Liberal Monarchist. Marx did not perceive Hegel as a tribune of the Restoration. Marx's attitude toward Hegel's advocacy of constitutional monarchy passed through different stages.

As I will point out in greater detail in the phase dealing with Marx's dissertation, until the year 1841, when Marx completed the writing of the dissertation, he was an apologist for Hegelian politics. In 1842 Marx was already a convert to Bauer, but in the dissertation Marx embraced the philosophical methodology of Hegel and

remained silent on Hegelian politics. In 1841 Marx was most concerned with preserving the validity of Hegelian methodology and ascribed any failures of Hegelian politics to the inevitable fate of all philosophy when it confronts reality: an unavoidable corruption. At this stage Marx adhered to Bauer's protocols of critique.

Marx's overt attacks on Hegelian politics are syncopated with the oppression he suffered under the government of Frederick Wilhelm IV, who came to the throne in 1840. After the government of Frederick Wilhelm IV prevented Marx from attaining a university position Marx articulated his first direct criticism of Hegel and monarchism in Prussia. On March 5, 1842 Marx wrote to Ruge: 'I am preparing a critique of the idea of natural rights in Hegel, as far as it concerns the internal constitution. The central thesis is to fight the contradictory and superficial nature of constitutional monarchy. It is impossible to translate *res publica* into German.'²⁰ This letter was written in anger and before Marx joined the staff at the *Rheinische Zeitung*. It also shows that Marx considered Hegel a supporter of 'constitutional monarchy'. Even when Marx moved into an oppositional posture vis-à-vis Hegelian politics he still regarded Hegel as a Liberal Monarchist within the parameters of the Hegelian Center

Prohibited from pursuing a professional career in the university, Marx did find a position as editor-in-chief of the *Rheinische Zeitung* from October 1842 to March 1843. The *Rheinische Zeitung* was a Liberal newspaper and the editorials Marx wrote for it were Liberal Monarchist. Marx wrote editorials calling for the freedom of the press, defending the rights of small farmers against the predatory landed aristocracy and for the liberalization of marriage laws. He even called for the unification of the codes of law within Prussia, but in this Marx was in accord with Hegel since the 'Parmenides of Berlin' also wanted a single national law code for Prussia. Furthermore, imitating Hegel, Marx also attacked Savigny and the Historical School of Law.

Marx was brought to the *Rheinische Zeitung* to move the paper editorially to a Hegelian Center position and as the consternation he expressed in his March 5, 1842 letter dissipated he again assumed the role of Defender of Hegel. The two previous editors of the *Rheinische Zeitung* were Hess and Rutenberg, who were both of the Left. The owners of the *Rheinische Zeitung* hired Marx to purge the newspaper of this Leftism and cement the paper into a moderate centrist political position.

Marx fulfilled this anti-Left crusade and the article that he published in the October 16, 1842 issue of the *Rheinische Zeitung* was a denunciation of socialism and communism. In the article, 'Communism and the "Augsburg Daily News"', Marx wrote that socialist and communist ideas must be 'subject to a fundamental critique'.²¹ He also averred that neither socialist nor communist ideas contained any theoretical or practical relevance in their present form.²²

Marx's relation to Rutenberg is also indicative of his centrist posture at the *Rheinische Zeitung*. In Marx's 1837 letter to his father he credited Rutenberg with introducing him to the Berlin Hegel 'Doctor's Club' and referred to Rutenberg as 'one of the colleagues'.²³ However, this early friendship did not prevent Marx from later removing Rutenberg from the staff of the *Rheinische Zeitung*.

One of the major reasons Marx dismissed Rutenberg was Rutenberg's association with the ultra-Left Berlin Freien. In two letters to Ruge, one written on July 9, 1842 and the second on November 30, 1842, Marx denounced the socialism and communism of the Berlin Freien.²⁴ Not only did Marx separate himself from Rutenberg but also from Eduard Meyen. Marx accused Rutenberg and Meyen of seeking to turn the *Rheinische Zeitung* into a voice of the Berlin Freien. As a means of deterring any attempts by the Berlin Freien to seize control of the paper Marx terminated Rutenberg's employment.

Marx's detachment from the Berlin Freien was also one of the reasons that his first meeting with Engels was so unproductive. Engels was a member of the Berlin Freien when he came to visit Marx in Cologne in the fall of 1842. This first meeting ended without any wish on the part of Marx to continue his relationship with Engels, for the same reason that Marx terminated his relationship with Rutenberg. Marx sought to sanitize the *Rheinische Zeitung* of any influence from the Berlin Freien. The paper, and Marx, would remain at the Hegelian Center.

Consequently, until Marx resigned in March 1843 from the *Rheinische Zeitung*, a resignation brought about by Marx's disapproval of the newspaper's owners' subservience to the censorship of the Prussian government, Marx remained within the camp of the Hegelian Center and continued to see Hegel as a Center Hegelian.

Even before Marx became the editor-in-chief of the *Rheinische Zeitung* he wrote articles for the newspaper. On July 14, 1842, as part of a longer series called "The Leading Article in No. 179 of the "Kölnische Zeitung", Marx published an important component of this series, and in this component he praised Hegel:

Philosophy has done with regard to politics what physics, mathematics, medicine, and each science have done in their respective spheres. Bacon of Verulam declared that theological physics was a virgin consecrated god and sterile: he emancipated physics from theology and it became fertile. You should no more ask a politician if he is a believer than you would put this question to a doctor. In the period that proceeds and immediately follows the great discovery by Copernicus of the true solar system, the law of gravity of the state was also discovered. Its center of gravity was found to be in itself, and the different European governments tried to apply this discovery with the superficiality of every first practical trial, in the system of the balance of powers. Similarly, first Machiavelli and Campanela, then later Hobbes, Spinoza, Hugo Grotius, through to Rousseau, Fichte and Hegel began to consider the state through human eyes and deduced its natural law from reason and experience and not from theology . . .²⁵

This paragraph makes two important points. First, it separates Hegel from religion. Just as Bacon of Verulam detached religion from science, so philosophy since the Scientific Revolution divorced itself from religion. An important principle of the Hegelian Center was that religion and philosophy were two separate enterprises and on this issue Marx himself not only occupied the Hegelian Center but saw Hegel himself as one of the originators of this distinction.

Second, Marx praised Hegel. Marx saw Hegel as also distinguishing between politics and religion. The proper location of politics was in the sphere of philosophy and Hegel had allied political theory with 'reason and experience and not theology'.

This paragraph, written in July 1842, demonstrates that at this time Marx saw Hegel and himself as members of the Hegelian Center. This paragraph also makes clear that Marx had read Hegel's *The Philosophy of Right* and evaluated it as a document of political reform. Hegel was not an accommodationist, but a philosopher who incorporated political theory within philosophy and in so doing opened up the possibilities of reform, since philosophy itself was always in contradiction with reality.

Marx abandoned the Hegelian Center in March, 1843 and his desertion was due to the continued repression of the government of Frederick Wilhelm IV. The unrelenting censorship by the Prussian autocracy compelled Marx to sever his ties with the *Rheinische Zeitung* in March 1843. When Marx saw that Frederick Wilhelm IV would never reform the Prussian state Marx concluded that the Hegelian Center would never bring about the liberalization of the Prussian monarchy and that reform could only arise from a more oppositional camp, the legions of democracy.

When Marx saw the helplessness of the Hegelian Center he detached himself from Hegel, but only on the political level. Marx recognized that on the political level Hegel was a constitutional monarchist and never changed this interpretation. But when Marx came to the conclusion that Frederick Wilhelm IV would never reform the state, he finally accepted the impotence of German constitutional monarchy in itself.

Throughout *Marx's Discourse with Hegel* I will continue to position Hegel within the Hegelian Center. I do this primarily as a means of identification, to clearly establish boundaries between the Center, Left and Right Hegelian camps. However, my use of the phrase Hegelian Center should not be taken as an indication that I am unaware of the political reformist tendencies within this Center. Although it was Monarchist the Center advocated reforming the Prussian crown in a Liberal German direction. In order to achieve the liberalization of the Hohenzollern throne the Center did theorize the historical supersession of the feudal conservatism of the Crown, and Toews in his book *Hegelianism* refers to Gans as the 'godfather' of the desire for transformation.²⁶ Taking both of these considerations into account I will continue to identify Hegel, Gans, Michelet and Rosenkranz as the Center as a means of erecting clear territories between the Center, Left and Right.

However, this historical supersession of Hegelian politics was an important element of the Center. Gans, Michelet and Rosenkranz used the philosophical strategy of historical supersession to launch the negation and annulment of the Protestant Hohenzollern domination of Prussia.

It is necessary, however, to distinguish between the non-congruence of the Hegelian Center and Marx's critique in 1841. When Marx was writing his dissertation he was already a convert to Bauerism and this meant that Marx replaced

the Hegelian Idea with Bauer's self-consciousness. By 1841 Marx had rejected the Hegelian position that contradiction arose from the disparity between Idea and appearance, but maintained that contradiction was the result of the activity of subjective self-consciousness. By 1842 Marx was also under the influence of Ruge and altered the target of critique. Whereas Hegel used non-congruence to invalidate Ideas Marx used critique to invalidate political institutions and this was the origin of his Left Hegelianism. The non-congruence of the Hegelian Center was basically directed to Ideas, while the critique of the Hegelian Left emerged out of subjective self-consciousness and was directed at the alteration of reality. By 1842 Marx was also under the influence of Feuerbach and replaced Idea with species being. It was no longer thought that was the propellant force in the universe; instead it was social man.

Marx's position on Hegel's political theory changes in early 1843. At this time Marx changes from an apologist for Hegel to a strident critic. The beginning of Marx's anti-Hegelian politics dates from early 1843. The full force of Marx's critique of Hegelian politics is found in his summer 1843 notebook 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right'.

Marx's embrace of Left Hegelianism was inspired by Bauer and Ruge. From Bauer Marx took the strategy of subjective critique, but Bauer situated the battle lines against Prussian autocracy in philosophy and self-consciousness. Ruge supplied a new horizon for Marx, because the battle lines shifted to politics. The liberation of man could not be conquered in the realm of self-consciousness, but only in the realm of the real. Marx's move to the Left did not negate his belief that the politics of Hegel were still in the Center.

Left Hegelianism was populated by Bauer, Ruge and Feuerbach. Marx entered the ranks of the Left Hegelians in the summer of 1843 but left by February 1844. In that month Marx published 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction', which marked his baptism as a communist. Neither Bauer, nor Ruge, nor Feuerbach were communists and Marx's conversion to communism also marked his renunciation of Left Hegelianism.

Marx's indebtedness to Left Hegelianism as well as his ultimate repudiation of this school is a major subject of interrogation throughout this entire text, and thus there is no need to discuss it at this point.

Not only was Gans a prime mover in the founding of *The Journal of Scientific Critique* but after Hegel's death he also organized 'The Society of the Friends of the Deceased', which assumed the task of publishing the first collected works of Hegel, that is, all the works of Hegel that were known at that time. As a major force in 'The Society of the Friends of the Deceased', Gans wrote the 'Introduction' to both Hegel's *The Philosophy of Right* and *The Philosophy of History*. Gans's efforts to propagate the ideas of Hegel not only testifies to his high personal esteem in which he held his friend, but also to the depth of his commitment to Hegelianism as a philosophy and to his belief that his interpretation of Hegel corresponded to the true intellectual intent of his friend.

Gans's actions and writings provided the contours of the Hegelian Center. According to Gans the Hegelian Center was composed of the following ten

positions: 1) German political liberalism; 2) Reason in history; 3) Non-congruence; 4) Historicity; 5) Natural rights; 6) Athenian political theory; 7) The historical forms of the state; 8) The progress of freedom; 9) The Historical School of Law; 10) Property. I will discuss each of these categories below.

1) German political liberalism

Gans was a Liberal Reformer in the tradition of Germany. He supported the French Revolution of 1830, frequented French Liberal circles during his visit to Paris in 1825 and favored a constitutional monarchy in Prussia. The Hegelian Center believed in Liberal reform within the German context and as later sections of this chapter will illuminate Hegel himself advocated Liberal reforms. A direct line of continuity led from Hegel to Gans.

However, this does not mean that no differences separated the German Liberalism of Hegel and Gans. In particular, the two men disagreed over the French Revolution of 1830. While Gans enthusiastically embraced this revolution, Hegel disapproved of it. In 1830, a year before the death of Hegel, the two men recognized their differences and exchanged bitter words of confrontation.²⁷

2) Reason in history

In *The Philosophy of Right* Hegel wrote that 'The Real is Rational, and The Rational is Real'²⁸ and this defined the Hegelian Center. Gans rejected the idea of a perfect symmetry and instead believed that ruptures existed between the real and the rational. According to Gans, reality was not the perfect embodiment of reason. Reality manifested reason, reality was one of the results of reason, but this did not mean, as the accommodationists held, that reality and reason were perfectly synchronized. It was possible to argue that reality demonstrated a progress toward rationality without maintaining that reality was totally rational. There was no contradiction in affirming that reason was a part of reality and at the same time recognizing that parts of reality were non-rational.

3) Non-congruence

The Hegelian Center recognized the ruptures between the actual and the rational and the existence of these fissures was proof of the utility of non-congruence. Non-congruence was the device through which the contradiction between essence and appearance were exposed and the attempt made to bring appearance into greater accord with thought. Historical progress was measured by the degree to which actuality was brought into fuller commensurability with the Idea.

Non-congruence was essentially reformist. The exposure of the fault lines between the rational and reality required that actuality be brought into greater harmony with the rational, and this process of harmonization necessitates political reform.

4) Historicity

The idea of development was central to Gans's appreciation of Hegel. Like his teacher, Gans recognized that development defined the nature of reality.

The Hegelian system was predicated on the unity of thought and history. The dialectic proceeded in triadic stages, first a thesis, secondly a negation and thirdly a transcendence. The Hegelian dialectic was process and the notion of development was required if the dialectic was to unfold. The existence of historicity was a precondition if the dialectic was to complete itself, because the temporal was necessary if the movement from affirmation, negative and transcendence was to occur.

5) Natural rights

Following Hegel, Gans also rejected the doctrine of natural rights. They both attacked Rousseau and argued that the theory of natural rights was a distortion of the anthropological conditions of humankind. Excessive individuality led to the decay of community, and in his 'Introduction' to Hegel's *The Philosophy of Right* Gans claimed that Rousseau's was not the final statement of political theory and Hegel's concept of ethicality superseded Rousseau.²⁹

6) Athenian political theory

Emphasizing the need to integrate subjectivity and community, Gans interpreted Hegelian political theory as a return to the classical Athenian theory of the state. Gans asserted that in Athenian political thought the individual was always seen in the context of the community. In his 'Introduction' Gans wrote the following:

In the antique world the division between individual rights and politics was unknown: the ancients only concerned themselves with a community, with a universality and in *The Republic* of Plato, just like *The Politics* of Aristotle, the principles of subjectivity and politics were considered as interconnected. When the state is looked upon as the foundation of individual freedom then those who live outside of the state can only be seen as living in barbarism.³⁰

Not only did Gans applaud Hegel's return to the principles of antique political thought, but he also looked upon this return as providing the beginnings of a new age of political theory. Hegel's *The Philosophy of Right* transcended the Enlightenment and initiated a new era of political theory based on the presupposition that state, community and individuality were congruent.

7) The historical form of the state

Not only did the Hegelian Center regard the Idea of historicity as central to any understanding of socio-economic life, but also regarded the concept of historical forms as fundamental. If process was the ground out of which an understanding of history rested, then forms, epochs, periods were also ideas through which the evolution of socio-political events were fathomed. The Hegelian Center emphasized the idea of historical totalities or – a word that Hegel employed repeatedly in *The Phenomenology of Spirit* – 'shapes'.³¹

In his 'Introduction' to *The Philosophy of Right*, Gans maintained that Hegel drew a distinction between state and politics. The analogy that Gans used to

describe Hegel's approach to the state was 'anatomy';³² the evolution of history had produced a series of state forms, a sequence of the 'shapes' of the state. The state must be comprehended in historicist terms and Gans designated the 17th and 18th centuries as the period in which state and politics were presented as two separate entities.³³

If the state is 'anatomy' then politics are 'physiology'.³⁴ While the state was related to forms, politics were related to the actions of statesmen.

When Gans drew the distinction between state and politics he was essentially paraphrasing the Hegelian distinction between state and civil society, or Hegelian social methodology. Gans was aware that the political structure conformed to the contours of civil society. He acknowledged that in a political totality the political superstructure conformed to the social substructure. Gans incorporated the Hegelian Method of analyzing a historical phenomena, the unity of content and form.

8) The progress of freedom

In *The Philosophy of History* Hegel proposed that history demonstrated the advance of freedom and by freedom Hegel meant self-determination. Gans appropriated the Hegelian idea of the expansion of the sphere of freedom and used this progressive understanding of the movement of history to buttress German Liberal reformist politics. If reason did reduce the fissures between Idea and existence then freedom did progress because thought was self-determination and as reason increasingly ruled the world then humankind became freer.

9) The Historical School of Law

In *The Philosophy of Right* Hegel refuted the Historical School of Law, finding its main flaw in its positivism. Rather than law being a reflection of the customs of social life, law must be grasped as the evolution of the Idea. According to Hegel law was an Idea and like every Idea it displayed development and 'shape'.

Gans also refuted the Historical School of Law, applying the same methodology as Hegel. In Gans's case, however, his views were more influenced by a personal animosity toward Savigny, the leading exponent of the Historical School, because Savigny stood in the forefront of those who had denied a place for Gans at Berlin University because of his Judaism.

Gans may still be seen as the 'godfather' of the critical Hegelianism that emerged during these debates and eventually found institutional form in Ruge's *Hallische Jahrbücher*.³⁵

10) Property

Private property was a crucial ingredient in Hegelian political and ethical theory. Private property was foundational to the concepts of will, subjectivity and right.

In order to become an individual subject it was necessary for that person to possess a will. The 'I' was synonymous with will because the will was the power that enabled the 'I' to maintain itself.

Property is the result of the will entering an object. A table made by a craftsman becomes the property of that craftsman because he/she placed their will in that

table. Will creates property and then property protects and nourishes the will and the Self. When a table belongs to an individual Self that property preserves that Self because, by law, the property cannot be expropriated from the Self.

Property was thus the basis of individual freedom and also the founding principle of Hegel's constitutionalism, or theory of the state. One of the major axioms of Hegel's political theory was the defense of private property because this was vital to the protection of individual freedom.

Gans and the Hegelian Center agreed with this formulation of Hegel. Through his justification of private property Hegel was a defender of bourgeois industrial society, but only because he understood bourgeois society as a stage in the evolution of freedom, or self-determination. Hegel favored political reforms that advanced the movement toward freedom. All members of the Hegelian Center concurred with Hegel on this goal – the liberalization of government as an advance toward freedom.

As I indicated in previous paragraphs Gans joined Hegel in the refutation of Savigny and the Historical School of Law. However, neither Hegel nor Gans were the first to initiate such repudiations. In his book, *Das Erbrecht in weltgeschichtliche Entwicklung*,³⁶ Gans attributed the discovery that law, right, was governed by historicity to Montesquieu, but a more immediate precursor was Anton Friedrich Justus Thibaut,³⁷ a Professor of Law at the University of Heidelberg. Gans drew the evolutionary descent of the school of legal historicism/the philosophy of law from Montesquieu–Thibaut–Hegel and himself.

Thibaut was a pivotal figure in the development of the school of legal historicism/the philosophy of law. Thibaut and Hegel first met when they lectured at the University of Jena from 1802 to 1805. Thibaut left Jena before Hegel, and went to the University of Heidelberg, where he worked diligently to recruit Hegel to that institution. He succeeded and Thibaut and Hegel were reunited as colleagues at Heidelberg from 1816 to 1818, when Hegel left to go to the University of Berlin.³⁸ Hegel's embrace of the historicity of law/the philosophy of law was influenced by Thibaut.³⁹

Furthermore, Gans completed his doctoral dissertation in law at the University of Heidelberg in 1819 and Thibaut was his mentor.⁴⁰ Gans later perpetuated the juridical legacy of Thibaut in his own refutation of Savigny's Historical School of Law and his own embrace of the historicity of law was articulated in *Das Erbrecht in weltgeschichtliche Entwicklung*. Attention must be drawn to the fact that Marx took two courses from Gans when he was a student at the University of Berlin and undoubtedly became aware of Gans's attacks on Savigny and Gans's commitment to legal historicism/the philosophy of law. The evolutionary line running from Montesquieu to Thibaut to Hegel to Gans must be extended to include Marx. In Marx's 1837 letter to his father he mentions Thibaut. In that letter Marx wrote:

The two were closely linked that, on the one hand, I read through Heineccius, Thibaut, thus for instance, I translated the first two books of the Pandects into German, and, on the other hand, tried to elaborate a philosophy of law covering the whole field of law.⁴¹

By 1837 Marx was introduced through Thibaut to the concept of the historicity of law and property.

Thibaut was additionally a perfect example of the reformist inclinations of the Hegelian Center. In 1838 he published *Über die sogenannte historische und nicht-historische Rechtsschule*.⁴² In this essay Thibaut called for a unified legal code for Germany. He pointed to Napoleon who created a unified legal code for France and Thibaut, in this regard, wanted to Napoleonize Germany. Thibaut understood that a unified legal code would offer more equal rights to the entire German population. Thibaut's call for a unified legal code was echoed in the work of Hegel and Gans and was an instantiation of the reformist tendencies of the Hegelian Center.

Gans's own repudiation of the Historical School of Law paralleled those of Hegel and Thibaut. Gans labeled the Historical School of Law as the 'science of law',⁴³ or legal positivism. In the term 'science of law' Gans drew an analogy between Savigny and the empiricism of the natural sciences. For Savigny, law, or right, was the normative behavior of a people, it was the customary. Right was the social traditions of a people and therefore the study of law was based upon the positive identification of normative social behavior.

Contrary to Savigny's 'science of law', Gans expounded the 'history of law', or the 'philosophy of law', and this enterprise was composed of two parts. First, the 'history of law' involved the comparative study of right, or how different organic civilizations defined right. Whereas the goal of the 'science of right' was a singularity, the positivity of custom, the goal of the 'history of law' was the Idea of right as it was transmuted through different civilizations.

Second, the 'history of law' comprised the application of philosophy to right. Just as philosophy was the study of the ideas objectified by reason over time, so the 'history of law' was the study of the Idea of right throughout human history. Right was inherently an Idea and the Idea of right took on different meanings dependent upon the civilization in which it was located, and so the 'history of law' was simultaneously the philosophy of the Idea of right.

In order to explain his vision of the 'history of law' Gans employed Hegelian methodology. Michelet and Henning utilized the same methodology in their own works. This Hegelian methodology became the explanatory protocols of the Hegelian Center.

The methodology Gans adopted from Hegel compelled him to look upon the historical process as the evolution of organic systems. Each system, Oriental, Greco-Roman, Germanic-Christian, was an organic unit in which a universal principle defined that organicism. For example, the Greco-Roman organicism witnessed the emergence of the idea of subjectivity. In the Orient, in the civilizations of India and China, free subjectivity did not exist because individuality was still a captive of nature.

The organicism of Gans equipped him to perceive the particularities of a civilization as reflections of a universal principle. In the Greco-Roman organicism the particularity of art was an expression of the universal principle of subjectivity. Greco-Roman sculpture glorified the human form, and the Greco-Roman warrior hero displayed the same divine qualities as the Olympian gods.

A child of the Enlightenment, Gans, like Hegel, united the concept of organicism to that of progress. History, for Hegel, was the development of freedom, or the self-determination of the subject. For Gans, each organic civilization expanded the right, the self-determination of the subject, or the 'history of right' was characterized as the expansion of the realm of self-determination and thereby the progress of freedom.

In their scholarly endeavors Gans, Michelet and Henning employed the same Hegelian methodology. Michelet applied the methodology both to the exposition of the history of philosophy and the controversy between natural and rational rights, Henning employed this methodology in his diagnosis of morality and Gans exercised this methodology in his investigation of the laws of inheritance. The unity of the Hegelian Center was revealed by the fact that all three professors utilized the same Hegelian methodology, but applied it to different terrains of study. Marx was also a practitioner of this methodology, but Marx made it an instrument for the analysis of the historicity of the process of production.

Private property was not eternal. It was a historical product and came into being when the family changed its character. When the extended family as a commune disappeared, when the nuclear family of a single father and mother made its historical appearance, inheritance came into existence. As the communal family fragmented so communal property fragmented and parts of the former collectivity passed down to the nuclear family by means of inheritance; inheritance was merely a precursor to private ownership.

Gans was aware of the historicity of property. The first period of the history of property was the communal era, the age of the gens or of collective ownership by the extended family. The second period was the age of private property, or inheritance as a means of distribution. Private property was initially distributed to the male of the nuclear family. Gans, as well as Hegel and Marx, were the beneficiaries of the development of anthropology in the late 18th century. A German anthropologist, P. F. Stuhr,⁴⁴ recognized the historicity of property, drawing a distinction between the communal ownership of the gens and the private ownership of the Roman family. Hegel himself knew the work of Stuhr and in *The Philosophy of Right*, which both Gans and Marx read, commented on the gens. By 1820 Hegel knew of the two-stage development of private property, from the collectivity of the gens to the private ownership of the patriarchal family.⁴⁵

Gans began *Das Erbrecht in weltgeschichtliche Entwicklung* with the Romans and he did this because the Romans were the first to draw a distinction between public law and private law. The Romans were the first to provide the subject with juridical rights and one of these was the right to private property. Within Roman civilization the development of inheritance and the juridical right of the subject fused, thus creating the legitimacy of private property. Private property was the overlap between the right of inheritance and the right of the subject, *jus privatum*, and this became a universal principle of right in the Germanic-Christian world.

Gans was familiar with the existence of class struggle due to his acquaintance with the French Revolution of 1789 and the subsequent Terror. *Das Erbrecht in weltgeschichtliche Entwicklung* was published in 1824 and in it Gans recognized

the presence of class struggle in the Roman world. Within the Roman Republic class struggle was represented by the clash between plebeians and patricians⁴⁶ and the confrontation over property; property was the economic basis of this class struggle. Gans identified the Roman plebeians with Aristotle's demos,⁴⁷ thereby demonstrating his German Liberal tendencies.

Gans portrayed the plebeians as the class of subjectivity and the patricians as the class of authority and aristocracy. The class of subjectivity was also the embodiment of progressive activity and reform while the class of authority was simultaneously the class of stagnation and conservatism.⁴⁸ The dialectic between reform and the status quo was an eternal political logic in the historical process and Gans identified himself with Aristotle's demos and the plebeian quest for reform.

As well as Gans, Michelet was another prominent member of the Hegelian Center. Marx had high regard for Michelet. In the 'Saint Max' section of the 'The Leipzig Council', the section in which Marx attacks Stirner's *The Ego and Its Own*, Marx penned three laudatory comments on Michelet. In the subsection entitled 'The Unique and His Property' Marx wrote: '... in no other than the young "Stirner", the studious Berlin youth, busy with Hegel's Logic and gazing admiringly at the great Michelet.'⁴⁹ In the subsection entitled 'Hierarchy' Marx wrote: 'The cornerstone of the magnificent cathedral . . . as the great Michelet puts it . . .'⁵⁰ In the same 'Hierarchy' subsection Marx again applauded Michelet: '... the realm of spirits whose history was written by Herr Bayrhoffer and for which the great Michelet collected the statistical data.'⁵¹

The intensity and seriousness of Marx's reading of Michelet is further testified to by his quotation from the actual text of Michelet. The above-mentioned quote 'The cornerstone of the magnificent cathedral' is taken from Michelet's two-volume work *Geschichte der letzten Systeme der Philosophie in Deutschland von Kant bis Hegel*.⁵² The exact quote was copied from page nine of Volume One of the Michelet work.

Michelet was a prolific writer and I list here five of his works. I selected these books for four reasons: 1) They illuminate the major principles of the Hegelian Center; 2) They illustrate Marx's relation to this Center; 3) They illustrate some of the main causes of Marx's misreading of Hegel; 4) They capture the specific areas of Marx's misreading of Hegel.

These books are:

- a) *Geschichte der letzten Systeme der Philosophie in Deutschland von Kant bis Hegel*, and this was the work Marx cites in 'The Leipzig Council';
- b) *Anthropologie und Psychologie der Subjektiv Spirit*;
- c) *Naturrecht oder rechts-philosophie als die praktische Philosophie*;
- d) *Die Ethik der Aristotle in ihrem Verhältnisse zum Systeme der Moral*;
- e) *Die Lösung der gesellschaftliche Frage*.⁵³

Marx's relation to Michelet was filled with contradictions. As I indicated in previous paragraphs, Marx characterized him as 'the great Michelet' and his quote regarding the 'magnificent cathedral' establishes that he had read *Geschichte der*

letzten Systeme der Philosophie in Deutschland von Kant bis Hegel. Yet in 'The Leipzig Council' he overlooked specific references Michelet made to essays, journals and newspaper articles by Hegel that would have enlarged Marx's assessment of the 'Parmenides of Berlin'. Marx read Michelet's text citations to Hegelian manuscripts which are today considered indispensable to any comprehension of Hegel, but which Marx chose to ignore.

All the essays and newspaper articles that I mention in the following paragraphs date from Hegel's Jena and post-Jena years. Michelet knew nothing of Hegel's pre-Jena writing.

Michelet's bibliography of Hegel's authorship appears in the Third Book of the *Geschichte der letzten Systeme der Philosophie in Deutschland von Kant bis Hegel*. I will divide my mapping of this material under the following headings; 1) Journals; 2) Dissertation; 3) Essays; 4) Newspaper articles; 5) Identifying the Camp of the Hegelian Center.

- 1) *Journals*. Michelet calls attention to *The Critical Journal of Philosophy*, the journal co-edited by Hegel and Schelling while they were teaching at Jena.⁵⁴ Michelet also refers to *The Yearbook of Scientific Criticism*, the journal produced by Hegel and Gans when they worked together at the University of Berlin.
- 2) *Dissertation*. Michelet makes reference to Hegel's 1801 dissertation *Der Orbitus Planetarium*.
- 3) *Essays*. Michelet briefly comments upon these important essays of Hegel: 'The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy';⁵⁵ 'On the Essence of Philosophic Critique';⁵⁶ 'Knowledge and Belief';⁵⁷ 'On The Relation of Scepticism to Philosophy';⁵⁸ 'On the Relation of the Philosophy of Nature to Philosophy in General';⁵⁹ 'On the Scientific Treatment of Natural Rights'.⁶⁰
- 4) *Newspaper articles*. Michelet pointed out that Hegel both edited and wrote for the *Bamberger Zeitung* in 1807.⁶¹ More importantly he drew attention to the article 'Proceedings of the Estates Assembly in the Kingdom of Württemberg'⁶² that Hegel published while he taught at the University of Heidelberg and was editing the *Heidelberger Yearbook*. The article on the Württemberg Estates was significant because it demonstrated Hegel's German Liberalism and his advocacy of political reform. In addition, just prior to his death, Hegel published an exceptionally important series of articles in the *Allgemeine Preussische Staatszeitung* entitled 'On the English Reform Bill'. These were published in April 1831; Marx was only 13 at the time, but this article was available to the more mature Marx if he decided to undertake deep research into Hegelian thought and politics.⁶³
- 5) *Identifying the Camp of the Hegelian Center*. In the Third Book of the *Geschichte der letzten Systeme der Philosophie in Deutschland von Kant bis Hegel* Michelet outlines the schools of the Hegelian Center and Right. In enumerating the cadres of the Center Michelet makes frequent reference to Gans and Rosenkranz. Michelet published his *Geschichte* in 1837, three years before Rosenkranz's biography of Hegel appeared, and so Michelet did not know of the Rosenkranz manuscript. In Chapter Two of *Marx's Discourse with Hegel* I enumerated the losses Marx suffered by not reading Rosenkranz's life of

Hegel. But Michelet's *Geschichte* does identify Rosenkranz as an important member of the Hegelian Center as well as specifying works of Rosenkranz that made significant contributions to the study of Hegel.⁶⁴ Marx remained unaware of the importance Michelet assigned to Rosenkranz in the explication of Hegelian thought and this blindness regarding Michelet's assessment of Rosenkranz may have contributed to Marx's failure to read Rosenkranz's biography of Hegel, which, as I indicated in Chapter Two, was also a reservoir of Hegel articles that Marx failed to consult.

Chapter Four of this study, 'Marx's Mis-reading of Hegel' will offer a comprehensive depiction of those areas of Hegel's philosophy that Marx misunderstood. Since Marx's mis-reading of Hegel is vital to understanding the Hegel-Marx relationship I will also pause and draw attention to examples of this mis-reading in appropriate moments of this text. At this point, before proceeding to discuss Michelet as an example of the Hegelian Center, I will stop and briefly comment upon the losses Marx suffered in two areas by failing to read the Hegel material mentioned in Michelet's book: 1) Articles; 2) Marx's dismissal of Michelet's interpretation of Hegel

1) Articles

a) Marx failed to pursue the perspectives on Hegel that Michelet opened to him. When Marx rebuffed Michelet, when failed to read Hegel's articles in the *Bamberger Zeitung*, which supported the progressive reforms Napoleon brought to Germany, or the significant article 'Proceedings of the Estates Assembly in the Kingdom of Württemberg', he denied himself insights into Hegel's German Liberalism.

b) Marx did not follow Michelet in reading 'The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy'. This was a serious failure on the part of Marx because he denied himself insight into Fichte's influence on Hegel. When Marx did not read this article he remained uninformed of Hegel's receptivity to Fichtean subjectivity, to the pneumatic force of the 'I'. Marx's recognition of the Fichtean impact on Hegel could have prevented Marx from misinterpreting Hegel as a 'logical pantheist'.

2) Marx's dismissal of Michelet's interpretation of Hegel

a) In many areas Marx agreed with the 'great Michelet' in his presentation of Hegel and I will discuss these areas of agreement below. But in four areas Marx rebutted Michelet's interpretation: 1) Subjectivity; 2) Practical philosophy; 3) Anthropology and Psychology. If Marx had paid more attention to Michelet's discussion of subjectivity, practical philosophy and anthropology-psychology he may never have assessed Hegel as a 'logical pantheist'. 4) The Ethical nature of the state. In this regard Michelet's interpretation of Hegel is in agreement with the general wave of 20th-century interpretations of Hegel, particularly after the publication of Hegel's pre-Jena manuscripts. Conversely, due to his negation of subjectivity, practical philosophy, anthropology-psychology and the ethical nature of the state dimensions of Hegelian thought, Marx's interpretation of Hegel is considered to

be erroneous by 20th-century scholars of Hegel. My remarks here are based on Michelet's *Geschichte der letzten Systeme der Philosophie in Deutschland von Kant bis Hegel*, which is the only book by Michelet that Marx read. In subsequent pages, in my discussion of Michelet's Centrist Hegelianism, I will analyze three additional monographs by Michelet, *Anthropology und Psychologie der Subjektiv Spirit*, *Die Ethik der Aristotle in ihrem Verhältnisse zum Systeme der Moral*, and *Naturrecht oder rechts-philosophie als die praktische Philosophie*.

1) Subjectivity

Michelet accentuates the Fichtean moment in Hegel. The subject or the 'I' was the medium through which spirit externalized itself. The subject was the cause of the movement of spirit and substance. In order to support his claim that the subject was the instrument for the realization of spirit, Michelet quoted from Hegel, the best authority on this matter: 'According to my perspective, the Truth must be interpreted and expressed as subject and not as substance. The individual is the standpoint from which to grasp the inner, substantial spirit.'⁶⁵

2) Practical philosophy

Since the subject was the primary tool for the realization of spirit, Michelet believed that the center of gravity of Hegel was practical philosophy. The subject carried the burden of overcoming the non-congruent, of applying reason to reality with the hope of constructing the congruence between reason and the external.

Michelet recognized the difference between theory and practice, but maintained that Hegel prioritized practice. The activity of the subject, the actions of the individual, were the strategies by which non-congruence would be overcome.⁶⁶ The greatness of Hegel did not derive from his contribution to theoretical philosophy, but rather from his Aristotelianism, the awareness that subjective activity was the prius of the social world.

In 1866 Michelet published the book *Naturrecht oder rechts-philosophie als die praktische Philosophie*.⁶⁷ Marx could not have read this book because he was in London totally absorbed in finishing the first volume of *Das Kapital*, which was published a year later in 1867. Nevertheless, I will allude to Michelet's book because it is a clear exposition of Michelet's adherence to practical philosophy and his interpretation of Hegel's *The Philosophy of Right* as an instantiation of practical philosophy.

Michelet's *Naturrecht oder rechts-philosophie als die praktische Philosophie* applied the Hegelian concept of historicity to the issue of rights. Rejecting Rousseau's theory of natural rights and Savigny's program of positive rights, Hegel defined right as a historical product. As I mentioned previously Hegel looked upon history as a succession of cultural totalities, including Greco-Roman, Medieval and Germanic-Christian, and he maintained that the idea of right underwent transformations as it adjusted to the historical totality in which it was temporally located. Hegel used the term rational rights and meant that the definition of right experienced a rational adjustment, a process of reclassification depending upon the cultural organism in which it was embedded. Right was a form, but the content of that form was supplied by a cultural totality.

Michelet appropriated the Hegelian concept of rational right, or the historicity of right. In this regard Michelet performed the same philosophical undertaking that Gans performed for law, that Henning performed for morality, that Thibaut executed for property and that Hegel exercised for philosophy. All these Centrist Hegelians looked upon history as the generating energy providing the content of the Idea.

As psychological motivations, drive, desire and urge were consummated in will and will was the basis of personality. Subjectivity must be preserved and rights were rational as long as they preserved the personality; or, the metric of the rationality of rights was calculated by the degree to which it sustained the subject.

The theory of rational rights looked upon the preservation of the will, Self, as an affirmation of self-determination. When the will was encumbered by irrational constraints it was not free, or freedom was the ability of a Self to administer itself. At the end of *The Philosophy of History* Hegel summarizes the Western experience as the march toward 'subjective Freedom'; by this phrase he meant that the course of Western development had extended self-determination to escalating numbers of Selves.⁶⁸

Michelet's *Naturrecht oder rechts-philosophie als die praktische Philosophie* was in perfect agreement with Hegel's *The Philosophy of Right* over the question of property. In line with Hegel, Michelet defended the right of private property on the ground that it was an affirmation of free personality.⁶⁹ Private property was an extension of private will and the preservation of 'subjective Freedom' was impossible without the license to privately own property.⁷⁰

As with Hegel the purpose of Michelet's political theory was moral. The intent of Michelet's politics was the maintenance of the autonomous personality. History was the march toward freedom and the essence of freedom was the self-government of the Self. The self-determination of the 'I' was the essence of morality and therefore property was supportive of the ethical. In addition, the morality of individual right was the ground for the belief in the equality of right, or equality before the law. Since morality was universal and since morality was the basis of right then right itself must be universal; citizens in a state must be treated as equals before the law, but this did not imply democracy.

In pre-1848 Germany the political platform of the school of rational rights was not consonant with the socialist Left, nor with the Hegelian Left. Major differences separated the socialist Left from the Hegelian Left. The Hegelian Center was individualist while the socialist Left was communitarian. The Hegelian Center upheld the right of property, both in the form of private and corporate property, while the socialist Left advocated the socialization of property. The Hegelian Center, although it supported equality of right before the law, was not democratic, while the socialist Left stood for a universal franchise. The political program of the Hegelian Center was German Liberal and sought to reform the autocratic Prussian monarchy in the interests of the propertied classes. It was essentially a bourgeois program and this was one reason for the split between the Hegelian Center and the socialist Left. Marx's detachment from the Hegelian Center grew the more as his adherence to socialism grew.

The title of Michelet's book, *Naturrecht oder rechts-philosophie als die praktische Philosophie* presents the doctrine of rational rights, and Hegel, as practical philosophy. This was another attempt to define Hegel as an advocate of subjective action. The emphasis on subjective agency was another principle of the Hegelian Center.

The program of rational right was intended as a justification for practice; in other words, the attainment of the reform agenda of the Hegelian Center could only be attained through practice. The goals of German Liberalism could not be achieved without the active participation of citizens. Freedom could not be spread by means of philosophy, but only through the practice of the subject.

In his 1866 book Michelet confronted the theory of non-congruence in Hegel. Michelet recognized the non-congruence between reason and reality, the chasm between the political program of the Hegelian Center and the actualities of the Prussian monarchy, the divergence between political philosophy and political reality. Michelet understood the task of practical philosophy as bringing about the congruence between reason and the state. Philosophy could be realized through the practical action of the subject. Politics was a branch of practical philosophy.

It was Michelet's belief that he had perpetuated the tradition of Hegel in terms of practical philosophy.

3) Anthropology and psychology

Asserting the priority of subjective practice, Michelet pursued this line of investigation into the areas of anthropology and psychology. Chapter 14 of his book, *Geschichte der letzten Systeme der Philosophie in Deutschland von Kant bis Hegel* is entitled 'Hegel's Naturphilosophie und Philosophie des Geistes' and is an excellent condensation of Hegelian anthropology and psychology.⁷¹

In this chapter Michelet traces the origin of Subjective Spirit as it exits in nature. It is important to remember that Michelet was the editor in the 1832–1845 *Collected Works* of Hegel's *The Philosophy of Nature*, the second volume of the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*. Since he worked on Volume 2 of the *Encyclopedia*, I assume he also knew the remaining two volumes of the *Encyclopedia*, Volume 1, *The Logic*, and Volume 3, *The Philosophy of Mind*. I make this point here because Michelet's chapter 'Hegel's Naturphilosophie und Philosophie des Geistes' is basically a reiteration of the chapters on anthropology and psychology found in Hegel's *The Philosophy of Mind*.

However, a more detailed description of Michelet's evaluation of anthropology and psychology is found in his book *Anthropologie und Psychologie der Subjektiv Spirit*, published in 1840, when Marx was writing his dissertation. Similar to Michelet's chapter 'Hegel's Naturphilosophie und Philosophie des Geistes', although in greater detail, *Anthropologie und Psychologie der Subjektiv Spirit* repeats the structure of the anthropology and psychology chapters in Hegel's *The Philosophy of Mind*. Michelet's looked upon anthropology and psychology as proof that Hegel enunciated a practical philosophy.

According to Michelet, Hegel wrote the biography of spirit. Subjective Spirit was the level of personality, the coming to be of the 'I'; Objective Spirit was the life

of Subjective Spirit in the social world, the universe of family and civil society; Absolute Spirit was the domain of art, religion, philosophy and state. Michelet's *Anthropologie und Psychologie der Subjektiv Spirit* does not ascend to either Objective or Absolute Spirit, but Michelet maintained that Subjective Spirit was the foundation of both Objective and Absolute Spirit.

Subjective Spirit commences with the emancipation of spirit from nature. The first level of Subjective Spirit is anthropology, the point at which spirit's emancipation from nature begins. It is the level of tribes and the differentiation of the human species into races, each race with its own quality of mind.

The second stage of the evolution of Subjective Spirit is the psychological. In this copying of Hegel, Michelet expounds on the appearance of human drives, desires and will. Drives and desires, the need of sustenance, propelled the subject to intervene in nature, and they also acted as the substructure of will. For both Hegel and Michelet will was the ground of personality.

The final stage of the evolution of Subjective Spirit was the personality, or the 'I'. The 'I' was necessary before social life, or Objective Spirit, could begin. The existence of a multitude of subjective 'I's was a precondition for the construction of social life because a multitude of 'I's introduced the struggle for mutual recognition, and intersubjectivity was the glue of social life and Objective Spirit. With the conquest of personality, Spirit was ready to ascend to the next evolutionary stage of Objective Spirit.

Aristotle's 'The Soul' was the dominant influence not only on Hegel, but also on Michelet. Like Hegel, Michelet also appropriated the Aristotelian vision of subjective life as a teleological process. The end of the subject was self-determination and the practices of the subject were directed toward this end. Human practice embodied an entelechy and that purpose was the creation of the autonomy of the Self.

In the biography of Spirit the birth of Spirit occurs with the separation of the subject from the object. In the most primitive stages of human existence humankind was synthesized with nature, but that conjoining was essentially broken, bringing into being a subject, an individual, and an object, the natural world. Nature and subject became distinct. The coming-to-be of the dichotomy between subject and object was the foundation of the genesis of practice, because the subject must intervene in the objective to manufacture an environment more conducive to the survival of the subject.

The emancipation of the subject from nature inaugurated the freedom of humankind from natural phenomena. This is the anthropological stage of the evolution of the subject and at this level humankind not only divides into races, but also develops the capacity for sensitivity. Feelings emerge, dreaming, wakening, the naturalistic basis of human behavior.

The psychological stage of Subjective Spirit witnesses the emergence of consciousness, sensation and perception. The psychological level was a preparatory stage, a step toward the appearance of self-consciousness and an 'I'. The psychological stage gave birth to all the necessary preconditions for the coming-to-be of a self-conscious Self.

The highest stage of Subjective Spirit was the development of Selfhood. The ingredients of Selfhood were desire, drive and need. These instincts of the Self were the foundation of will and will was synonymous with the 'I'. Self-determination, or freedom, was impossible without a will because it was impossible to make a self-determination without knowing the desires of the will. In addition, will was the ground of practice, or practice was the outcome of self-determination. It was necessary to have a knowledge of the end, or purpose, toward which a will aspired before a practice could be decided. Practice was the attempt to realize the will.

This three-stage evolution of Subjective Spirit was a prerequisite for the initiation of Objective Spirit. It was necessary for an 'I' to exist before a community could come into existence. Social life was impossible without a population of 'I's.

4) The ethical idea of the state

Another area in which Marx negated Michelet's interpretation of Hegel related to the definition of the state. In his 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' Marx epitomized Hegel as a 'logical pantheist' and defined the Hegelian state as a projection of the logical Idea, an Idea that enabled the Prussian monarchy to form a union with a medieval feudal aristocracy.

The picture of the Hegelian state presented by Michelet in the *Geschichte der letzten Systeme der Philosophie in Deutschland von Kant bis Hegel* was directly opposed to the presentation contained in the 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right'. Michelet characterized the Hegelian state as an ethical community.

When humankind lived in a state of savagery its relationship to the Other was primarily individual, the contact between the 'I' and 'I', and this was the period of morality. However, when humankind entered into a community, the development of cities, this was the level of the mutual; recognition and ethicality were necessary complements to mutual recognition. The origin of ethics developed out of the need to provide a code regulating intersubjectivity, to ensure that every individuality was governed by the same canons of behavior.

The state was a national community. The duty of the state was to legislate codes of behavior between subjectivities that served as the ground of peaceful and cooperative mutual recognition. In performing this function the state became an ethical community. According to Michelet, Hegel understood the state to be an agent of ethical behavior because it created a community of peaceful intersubjectivity.⁷² Michelet saw Hegel as a continuation of Aristotelian ethics.

However, the disagreement over the four areas mentioned above, subjectivity, practical philosophy, anthropology-psychology and the ethical nature of the state, does not mean Marx rejected every aspect of Michelet's reading of Hegel. Marx agreed with major categories of Michelet's interpretation of Hegel: 1) Historicity; 2) Organicism; 3) Method; 4) The Role of philosophy; 5) Political reform; 6) Subjectivity; 7) Property; 8) Anti-Rousseau and natural rights; 9) Anti-Savigny. I will discuss each of these below.

The nine categories comprised many of the major principles of the Hegelian Center. When Michelet adopted these nine categories he did two things: He interpreted Hegel as the founder of the Hegelian Center and he identified himself as

a member of the Hegelian Center. Until 1843, up to which time Marx abided by these nine categories, he also did two things: He interpreted Hegel as a founder of the Hegelian Center and he identified himself as a member of the Hegelian Center until he wrote his 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right'.

The reader should juxtapose these nine Michelet categories with the ten categories I discussed earlier in this chapter in relation to Gans to acquire an inclusive picture of the major principles of the Hegelian Center. I will not include any reference in my following discussion to the ideas of subjectivity, practical philosophy, anthropology-psychology and the ethical nature of the state because, as I indicated earlier, Marx nullified them and by so doing erased them from his own understanding of the Hegelian Center.

1) Historicity

According to Michelet, Hegel invented the discipline of the history of philosophy. Other scholars chartered the narrative of philosophy but these accounts were primarily biographical, or were studies of the output of individual philosophers. For Hegel, historicity was the presupposition of knowledge and philosophy was the knowledge of the evolutionary objectifications of reason. In order to gain knowledge reason must observe its own past outputs.

Michelet's dedication to the Hegelian idea of historicity was strengthened by his editorship of Hegel's three-volume *The History of Philosophy* in the 1832–1845 *Collected Works*. Hegel lectured on the history of philosophy during his last years at the University of Berlin and Michelet collated these lectures into the three volumes, which were published in 1833. Michelet's dedication to the collation of these lectures was a further learning process that deepened his conviction of the centrality of the idea of historicity in Hegel's thought. For Michelet the history of philosophy provided a model for the history of the world. Just as historicity was a presupposition for understanding philosophy, so historicity was the presupposition for comprehending the evolution of global culture.

Michelet praised other members of the Hegelian Center because of their application of historicity to law and morality. He praised Gans because of his application of the idea of historicity to the study of property rights and he commended Henning for relating historiography to the examination of morality.

2) Organicism

Organic units were composed of whole and parts. The whole of an organic unit was its universal operating procedure. A principle, a drive, tendency, which was the cohesive, unifying energy of an organic unit, was its universal. However, the organic unit was also composed of parts and these particularities were made consistent with the whole by the universal principle.

Adopting the structure of Hegel's *The Philosophy of History* the Hegelian Center looked upon the Oriental, Greco-Roman and Germanic-Christian civilizations as organic units. Each of these civilizations was based on a universal principle and that universal principle was the magnetic force that enabled the particularities – religion, art, philosophy – to be supporting elements of the totality.

Oriental, Greco-Roman and Germanic-Christian organic units were each constructed of three levels. These levels were the Subjective, Objective and Absolute. The subjective level witnessed the emergence of Subjectivity, the Objective level saw the emergence of mutual recognition and the state, while the Absolute was the projection of art, religion and philosophy. Michelet's view of Hegel combined *The History of Philosophy* with the chapters on religion, art and Absolute Knowing from *The Phenomenology of Spirit*.⁷³ These three levels were the sub-systems sustaining the totality of these civilizations.

3) Method

Michelet drew a distinction between epistemology and method. Epistemology was Kantian, or concerned the examination of the relation between sense perception and the Idea. According to Michelet, Hegelian logic was not epistemology, but methodology.

The dialectic in Hegel was based on the principle of negation. Hegel was a Spinozist in the sense that he concurred with Spinoza that 'determination is also negation'. Definition, the coming forth of a singularity, was dependent upon negation. A 'thing' could only appear through its own limitation.

The dialectic of negation was the basis of historicity. If the being of a 'thing' arose only when it was negated then historicity was a result of negativity. History meant the passing on to something else and negation was the cause of that passing on.

Michelet understood Hegel's Method as a protocol of explanation. This Method consisted of four parts: a) the dialectic of negation; b) negation produced historicity and civilizations were products of historicity; c) civilizations were organic units, or history was the chronicle of the historicity of organic civilizations; d) organic units were constructed of a whole and parts and the explanation of these historical units required the depiction of how these parts were determined by the whole and conversely how these parts determined the whole.⁷⁴

4) The Role of philosophy

Michelet was the heir to Hegel's theory of non-congruence. A gulf separated reason from reality.

The subject was the instrument of reason.

Regardless of the non-congruence between reason and reality the subject must attempt to overcome this non-congruence. Reason was embodied in the subject and thus the subject was the agent for the transcendence of non-congruence.

The only way reason could be realized was through the activity of the subject. Since the subject was the agent of reason the realization of reason could only be accomplished by means of the activity of the subject.

The realization of reason involved the reconciliation between reason and reality. It was impossible for reality to ever become perfectly rational, but some degree of reconciliation, or identity, was attainable.

The Hegelian Center believed that subjective action could not completely overcome non-congruence, but that a narrowing was possible. The perfection of

reality was impossible, but it was possible to reform reality to a greater commensurability with reason.

Neither Michelet nor the Hegelian Center considered it possible to unite philosophy and religion. The aim of philosophy was not the justification of religion, but rather the purification of the real. Philosophy was not connected to the supernatural, but rather was an instrument of practice.

5) Political reform

The Hegelian Center stood for political reform. The Center's advocacy of political reform was an expression of its definition of philosophy and history. Since philosophy was the attempt to make reality commensurate with reason then political institutions must also be brought into greater approximation to reason, they must have a history.

Michelet agreed with both these propositions and in 1837 called for the reform of the feudal-aristocratic Prussian constitution. His book *Geschichte der letzten Systeme der Philosophie in Deutschland von Kant bis Hegel* contained this paragraph:

The highest expression of individual freedom, in which Right attains its greatest success, without damaging the unity of the state, is the representative constitution. The universal history of Right shows a progressive development of individual states, national spirits, or they gradually evolve to this goal.⁷⁵

In 1837, seven years after the French Revolution of 1830, Michelet sought to reform Prussia from a Restoration hegemony of Throne and Altar into a constitutional monarchy resting upon, not a democratic suffrage, but a representative parliament.

In addition, the reformist mentality of Michelet was further demonstrated in his response to the 1848 Revolutions in Prussia. In an article written in 1849, *Die Lösung der gesellschaftliche Frage*, which Marx did not know, Michelet appeared, not as a communist – he does not mention *The Communist Manifesto* – but as a social democrat. In this essay Michelet called for the unification of Germany, universal suffrage and, exhibiting a knowledge of French socialism, Proudhon in particular, as well as ‘my friend Cieszkowski’, and using the word ‘proletariat’, he advocated greater social benefits for that exploited class. I mentioned *Die Lösung der gesellschaftliche Frage* as a means of demonstrating Michelet's reformist passions, but this does not mean that Hegelian Center in general became social democrat in response to the 1848 Revolution.

But in 1837 Michelet was not yet a social democrat and *Geschichte der letzten Systeme der Philosophie in Deutschland von Kant bis Hegel* does not mention the ‘proletariat’, Proudhon or Cieszkowski. Michelet's intellectual boundaries in 1837 were still circumscribed by Hegelianism and this is demonstrated by his adherence to Hegel's definition of the state as an ethical organism. In his 1837 book Michelet wrote that Hegel ‘conceived of Right and the State as objective representations of morality’.⁷⁶ Like Hegel, Michelet looked upon the state as that totality based on the condition of mutual recognition and intersubjectivity and ethical life was an expression of

the necessity of these two factors. Michelet's agreement that the state was an ethical organism also revealed his awareness of the importance of Aristotle in Hegelian thought. Michelet understood that Hegel sought to adopt the principles of Aristotle's *The Politics* to the conditions of Prussia in the first quarter of the 19th century.

6) Subjectivity and freedom

Michelet prioritized subjectivity. On the philosophical level subjectivity was the instrument for the realization of reason and on the political level it constituted the duty of law to protect the rights of the individual. Since the individual was the source for bringing reality into greater proximity to reason, the rights of the individual were regarded as sacrosanct.

Michelet, however, refuted Rousseau's theory of natural rights and Savigny's theory of positive rights and substituted Hegel's theory of rational rights. On the issue of rights Michelet simply replicated The Master.

For Michelet freedom meant self-determination and therefore the foundation of freedom was the legal protection of will and subjectivity.

7) Property

Like Hegel, Michelet defended private property. According to both Hegel and Michelet private property was a protector of subjectivity and will and therefore was a pillar of freedom. Private property was the legal guarantee that subjectivity and will could not be preempted. According to Michelet a state that recognized the right of property was a state in which one condition of freedom was actualized.

Michelet's commitment to the principles of will, subjectivity and property prevented him from becoming a communist. Michelet did become a social democrat, but he never espoused the total eradication of private property. I make this point in order to define the differences that caused Marx to abandon the Hegelian Center. The Center remained loyal to private property and subjectivity while Marx's break with the Center occurred when he abandoned the principles of private property, subjectivity and individual will.

Attention should be paid to the fact that the 1837 publication of Michelet's *Geschichte der letzten Systeme der Philosophie in Deutschland von Kant bis Hegel* coincided with Marx's entrance into the Hegelian circles at the University of Berlin. Earlier paragraphs of this chapter referenced Marx's 1837 letter to his father in which he told of his membership in the 'Doctor's Club', a Hegelian discussion group at the University of Berlin. At this time Michelet was a professor at the university.

Since his relation to the Hegelian Center played such an important role in the maturation process of the Young Marx I will extend my discussion of the Hegelian Center to include brief references to Bayrholder, Henning and Hinrich.

The most important books Bayrholder published during his academic career were *Beiträge zur Naturphilosophie*⁷⁷ and *Die Idee und Geschichte der Philosophie*.⁷⁸ My comments here are concerned completely with the latter and are intended only as a brief summary.

The second book is essentially a reiteration of Hegel's three-volume *The History of Philosophy*, collated by Michelet. Following Michelet's organization, Bayrholder

divided the history of philosophy into three periods, Oriental, Greco-Roman and Germanic-Christian. Duplicating Michelet, Bayrholder judged each of these three periods as organic, total systems, the particularities of which always reflected the universal essence.

I point out the continuity between Michelet and Bayrholder because it allows us to understand the comment on Bayrholder that Marx made in 'The Leipzig Council': '... the realm of spirits whose history was written by Herr Bayrholder and for which the great Michelet collected the statistical data.'⁷⁹ Marx understood Bayrholder as a replication of Michelet. The formulation of Hegel's *The History of Philosophy* supplied by Michelet was faithfully adhered to by Bayrholder.

In addition to establishing the Hegel-Michelet-Bayrholder school of interpretation, *Die Idee und Geschichte der Philosophie* was also an articulation of the Hegelian Center, and I will refer only to two points to illustrate this assertion.

First, Bayrholder championed the political reform of the Hohenzollern monarchy. The book noted that the 'necessary demand of the historical moment called for the equalization of the monarchist-aristocratic form with the democratic form of government based on the equality of the many'.⁸⁰ Bayrholder maintained that the constant historical adjustment of reality to reason required the renovation of the Hohenzollern governing system.

Second, Bayrholder, imitating the Hegel-Michelet line, believed that the state was an ethical institution. Prioritizing the importance of subjectivity, Bayrholder looked upon the state as offering the grounds for the ethical principle of mutual recognition.⁸¹

Another important member of the Hegelian Center was Henning. Not only was Henning the editor of Hegel's three-volume *The Science of Logic*, and 'The Logic' of the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* in Hegel's *Collected Works*, but he also published an important book, *Prinzipien der Ethik in historischer Entwicklung*.⁸²

Henning took the Hegelian ideas of historicity and organicism and applied them to ethics. A historicist interpretation of ethics required the investigator to assume the evolutionary nature of ethics. True to Hegel, Henning identified three stages in the historicity of ethics, Oriental, Greco-Roman and Germanic-Christian.

Applying the concept of organicism, Henning looked upon these three periods as totalities. Each organic system was defined by a universal ethical principle and all other ethical microcosms within that system reflected the universal.⁸³

True to the syllabus of the Hegelian Center, Henning assessed subjectivity as the basis of ethics. Ethics was based on human actions and action did not occur without will. The propellant of individual behavior was will and the ethical was a means to harmonize the infinity of wills.⁸⁴

The institution within which the process of harmonization occurred was the state. In agreement with Michelet, Hegel and the Hegelian Center, Henning assessed the state as an ethical entity.⁸⁵

The entire historicity of the ethical was the unfolding of the philosophy of the ethical. The philosophy of the ethical needed to unfold itself in the temporal and thus unfolding produced its historicity. Philosophy was the cause of the reformation of the ethical.

The core issues of the Hegelian Center were further illustrated in the work of Hinrichs. Four concepts that contributed to the definition of the Hegelian Center were subjective activity, practice, rational rights and the separation between religion and philosophy. In three of his works, *Geschichte der Rechts- und Staatsprinzipien*,⁸⁶ *Politische Vorlesungen*,⁸⁷ and *Das Leben in der Natur*,⁸⁸ Hinrichs perpetuated these principles and in so doing contributed to the definition of the Hegelian Center. Hinrichs was a German Liberal.

In his *Geschichte der Rechts- und Staatsprinzipien* Hinrichs defended the Hegelian principle of rational rights. Hinrichs' book is a history of the definition of right in the works of Gottfried Leibniz, Christian Thomasius and Johannes Müldener in an effort to demonstrate that the meaning of right was an evolution, that reason redefined right in the course of history. Like Hegel and Michelet, Hinrichs opposed the natural rights of Rousseau and the positive rights of Savigny. In his two-volume *Politischen Vorlesungen*, Hinrichs extolled reason as the most accurate path to truth and therefore as the most reliable tool to define right and freedom. Reaffirming the Hegelian Center, Hinrichs defined freedom as the unity of the Self and community, or nation.

From the perspective of this phase, however, Hinrichs' most important manuscript was *Das Leben in der Natur* because it repeats the major ideas of Michelet in his *Anthropologie und Psychologie der Subjektiv Spirit*. Hinrichs and Michelet were in accord in selecting the principles of subjectivity and practice as the pre-eminent ideas of Hegel's philosophy, and in this concurrence they made subjectivity and practice the defining characteristics of the Hegelian Center.

Hinrichs' *Das Leben in der Natur* was an attack in the mechanistic interpretation of human life. Hinrichs rebelled against the teachings of Gustav Liebig and Jakob Moleschott. Both of these scientists used the models of chemistry and physics to interpret human life, applying an inorganic paradigm in their explanations of organic existence. Hinrichs repudiated this mechanistic approach.

Hinrichs drew a distinction between inorganic and organic existence. Organic existence was not physics-chemistry, but rather operated in terms of purpose. The uniqueness of organic life, human life, was its inherent teleology, its movement toward a desired end. Hinrichs' vision of organic existence was practical, it possessed a goal and designed a practice to fulfill that goal. In his book Hinrichs was an advocate of the vision of human existence of Aristotle, Hegel and Michelet.

Hinrichs is important not only because of his adherence to the Hegelian Center, to German Liberalism, but also because Marx called upon him for intellectual support. As I will document when discussing 'The Leipzig Council', Marx called upon him for help in his dispute with Bauer, and the above discussion of Hinrichs' work should clarify why Marx made such an appeal.

* * * * *

The formation of the Hegelian School began in the 1820s. The unity of the School was shattered in 1835 with the publication of Strauss's book *The Life of Jesus*, and beginning in 1835 a Right and Center Hegelianism emerged. I have defined the

Hegelian Center and I will now proceed to epitomize the Hegelian Right. Left Hegelianism, the school to which Marx was associated, did not arise until 1841 and only enjoyed a brief lifespan of two years, from 1841 until 1843. I will be discussing here the contrasts between the Right and Center of the Hegelian School, in the years between 1820 and 1841; the Hegelian Left therefore plays no role.

My analysis of the Hegelian Right focuses on Philipp Marheineke. A leading figure of the Hegelian Right, Marheineke was both a member of 'The Society of the Friends of the Deceased' and the editor of Hegel's *The Philosophy of Religion* in the *Collected Works*.

The two books of Marheineke I will discuss are his *Bedeutung des Hegelschen Philosophie in der christlichen Theologie* and *System der christlichen Dogmatik*.

The major cleavages between Center and Right arose over two points, the legacy of Strauss and the role of philosophy.

The Center perpetuated the legacy of Strauss and divorced religion and philosophy. Continuing Enlightenment secularization the Center ended the medieval unity of philosophy and religion and directed philosophy as a tool for the intervention in reality. Philosophy would no longer justify theology. The Right rejected Strauss and sought to retain the unity of philosophy and religion. For the Right, philosophy was a device to validate religion; philosophy must be theologized.

In his book *Hegelianism* Toews set forth the following analysis of Marheineke:

In his theological lectures and writings, Marheineke continued to maintain that the whole system of religious 'representations' revealed in the Bible and codified in the doctrinal teachings of the Evangelical Church could be approximated in the form of philosophical truth without compromising the legitimate demands of human freedom or the content of religious faith.⁸⁹

Toews' assessment of Marheineke is correct and is corroborated by Marheineke himself. In *Bedeutung des Hegelschen Philosophie in der christlichen Theologie* he wrote: 'the Christian religion is represented as the absolute and the identity of this religion and philosophy, they represent the same content, is established.'⁹⁰ Furthermore, in the same book Marheineke not only reiterated his belief in the unity between philosophy and religion but also defended the Restorationist Hohenzollern monarchy. Marheineke's *System der christlichen Dogmatik* saw subjectivity as the nexus unifying faith and philosophy.⁹¹ Marheineke took Hegel's concentration on subjectivity as enabling the reconciliation between religion and reason. He wrote: 'Belief in its subjectivity is immediately knowledge; but why? Because it is, in so far as it is true, Christian belief . . . It rests on divine validation and revelation.'⁹²

Marheineke's attempt to unify reason and religion not only demonstrated his rejection of Strauss and his refutation of the Hegelian Center's attempt to reconcile philosophy and reality, but also his opposition to the rise of the Hegelian Left. Marheineke published *Bedeutung des Hegelschen Philosophie in der christlichen Theologie* in 1842, and by that time the Hegelian School had dissolved into Left, Center and Right. Marheineke was a participant in the internecine warfare and

not only did he reject the Center, but also the Left. By 1841 Bauer had abandoned the Center, joined the Left and espoused critique, or the use of subjective self-consciousness as a weapon against reality and religion. Bauer's book, *Die Posaune des jüngsten Gerichts über Hegel, den Atheisten und Antichristen* was published in 1841 and in his *Bedeutung des Hegelschen Philosophie in der christlichen Theologie*, published one year later, Marheineke attacked Bauer.⁹³

I mention Bauer's book at this point not only to illustrate how Marheineke defined the role of philosophy, but also to document the Young Marx's position in the fragmentation of the Hegelian school into Left, Center and Right. The original plan of *Die Posaune des jüngsten Gerichts über Hegel, den Atheisten und Antichristen* called for it to consist of two parts; the *Posaune* was the first part and the second part was supposed to be an essay by Marx called 'Treatise on Christian Art'.⁹⁴ Marx's essay was never completed, but the fact that the original design called for its inclusion shows the early closeness of Marx and Bauer – which was later broken – as well as Marx's awareness of the Left–Center–Right civil wars of the Hegelian School.

By July 1843 Marx had completely rejected both Marheineke and the Hegelian Right. In a letter written to Ruge on July 9, 1842 Marx wrote: 'It is necessary to conclude that the old Marheineke has proven before the whole world the total impotence of the Old Hegelianism.'⁹⁵

Not only did Marheineke seek to reconcile philosophy and religion, something that both the Left and Center abjured, but he was also an accommodationist. Whereas Left and Center were reformist, the Right accommodated itself to the Prussian Crown.

Neither Left, Center nor Right should be confused with the Anti-Hegelianism of Heinrich Leo or Ernst Wilhelm Hengstenberg. The Center and Right never cut their links to Hegel, and the Left, as represented by Marx, only broke with the Idealism and politics of Hegel in 1842. By the 1830s, however, Leo and Hengstenberg were already denouncing Hegel as a Christian heretic. In 1838 Leo published a book, *Die Hegelingen*, which denounced Hegel and his followers as anti-Christian, while Hengstenberg was the editor of the *Evangelische Kirchenzeitung*, a newspaper that defended evangelical orthodoxy. The anti-Hegelianism of Leo and Hengstenberg was based on the unbridgeable schism between religious dogma and philosophy. Marx was aware of the writings of Leo, and probably of Hengstenberg, and in his article on the Historical School of Law placed Leo in the reactionary camp of Friedrich Julius Stahl and Karl Ludwig von Haller.⁹⁶

In addition to their campaign for the religious usurpation of philosophy, the Anti-Hegelians advocated the Restoration synthesis, the alliance of Throne, Altar and Aristocracy. Although reform, even in different metrics, was the slogan of the Left and Center, the Anti-Hegelians stood for the continuation of the medieval trinity of the incarnation of Throne-Aristocracy and Lutheran Church.

This Phase has so far described the Hegelian school which exerted the most influence on Marx. It is now necessary to show how Marx himself interpreted Hegel. Is it possible to distill from Marx's writings during the 1841–1844 period

whether he read Hegel as either Center or Right? What was Marx's own view of Hegel?

Marx looked upon Hegel as a member of the Hegelian Center. Marx never saw Hegel as a member of the Hegelian Right, nor of the Hegelian Left. This does not mean that Marx never criticized Hegel himself, but it does mean that Marx never separated himself from Hegelian methodology. Many of Marx's writings, 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right', 'On the Jewish Question', 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction', and the 'Critique of Hegel's Dialectic and Philosophy in General', the last chapter of 'The Manuscripts', were caustic attacks on the Hegelian System, but Marx continued with the Hegelian Method, as well as other dimensions of Hegelian thought. Marx was aware of the errors committed by Hegel in terms of System and Speculative philosophy, but he remained influenced by and perpetuated those terrains of Hegel he thought irreplaceable tools for understanding the functioning of social formations.

In order for me to clearly outline the argument I am presenting here it is necessary for me to first distinguish the following three concepts: methodology, politics and system.

By the term methodology I mean a program of explanation in the social sciences. Hegel used this methodology to explain every phenomenon in the natural world, but I am limiting this concept to the social sciences. Later portions of this book will detail exactly all the elements that Marx incorporated from Hegel to construct his program of explanation, but at this point I will only outline three Hegelian antecedents; the organic, the universal and the particular.

The organic image lay at the heart of Hegel's Method of explanation. Limiting myself to the domains of history and the socio-political, Hegel conceived of historical formations as totalities. The history of the Greco-Roman world was one such organic unit, and the history of the Oriental world was another such holistic unit. When Hegel analyzed these culturo-political organisms he applied the concept of universality to them. Each of these historic organisms were pervaded by a universal idea or substance that established the laws by which that holism functioned.

A huge gulf separated Hegelian methodology from Hegelian politics. Hegelian politics was an expression of the Stein-Hardenberg reform ethos and that ethos projected itself into the *Vormärz* period. I maintain that there is no contradiction in simultaneously rejecting Hegelian politics while incorporating Hegelian methodology. It is entirely possible to accept the methodology with which Hegel describes Chinese and Indian civilization while at the same time refuting his defense of constitutional monarchy. This is precisely the path that Marx took and the central thrust of this book is to trace the means through which Marx distinguished between Method and politics.

It is also possible to disengage Hegelian methodology from the inclusiveness of the Hegelian System. It is true that the methodology formed one aspect of the System, but Marx's approach to Hegel was stamped by his severing of the methodology from the System.

The Hegelian System was a form of Speculative philosophy, or, rather, one major part of the System was Hegel's belief in a universal substance. In this regard Hegel

was under the influence of Spinoza. The uniqueness of Hegel's belief in a universal substance derived from his Fichtean idea that thought was the original generator of this substance. Substance was the objectification of thought, the externalization of thought that came to shape the real. Marx himself in 'The Leipzig Council' described Hegel as a combination of Spinoza and Fichte⁹⁷ and I will discuss this comment in detail in later sections of this book.

It is impossible to differentiate the Hegelian System from the idea of substance; put another way, the Hegelian System was coequal with Hegel's Speculative philosophy. Marx's debates with Hegelian Speculative philosophy begin with his 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' and end in 'The Leipzig Council', and Marx concludes these internal ruminations by severing all contact with Speculative philosophy.

Marx's voyage was to discover that it was possible to refute Hegelian politics, Speculative philosophy and System, but to rescue Hegelian methodology. One of the areas to which Marx returned to Hegel was in his search for a paradigm by which to explain social formations. For Marx, in order to fulfill his mission to construct a scientific analysis of capitalist society, required an explanatory protocol, and for help in erecting this protocol he returned to Hegel.

Marx drew a distinction between form and content, the Method and System of Hegelian thought. Marx appropriated the form and Method of Hegelian thought, but he rejected the content and System. For example, in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*⁹⁸ Hegel writes about work and labor as intrinsic energies of the subject, but assumes that it is Spirit, self-awareness of self-consciousness, which works and labors through the subject. Marx appropriated the Hegelian form – he also regarded work and labor as intrinsic energies of social man – but he rejected the assertion that it was Spirit that labored – the content – and substituted a new content of social labor. *The Philosophy of Right* illustrates the Hegelian Method, the gradual supersession of family and civil society until this dialectical transcendence leads to the justification of the state and the warfare of sovereignties in the battleground of world history. Marx accepted the Hegelian methodology – bourgeois capitalism negated and superseded aristocratic feudalism – but he canceled the Hegelian systematic of substance and substituted political economy. Marx adhered to the Hegelian form and Method, but he discarded the content, substance, and the systematic, the advance of the Absolute Idea. In essence, Marx borrowed some of the tools of the transformative critique that Feuerbach applied to Hegel.

The remaining portions of this book will substantiate that Marx borrowed the form but not the content of Hegel's methodology. In this way it will be possible to demonstrate the various forms of Hegelianism that Marx incorporated and at the same time reveal those categories of Hegelianism that Marx abandoned.

Phase Two: The Letter of 1837 and the Doctoral Dissertation

In Phase One, 'Hegel and Marx in the Center', I drew attention to the importance of Marx's November 10–11, 1837 letter to his father. Whereas Marx's 1836 poetry expressed his frustration with the arcane qualities of Hegel's *Aesthetics* the 1837 letter is vital because it definitively establishes 1837 as the date of Marx's movement toward Hegelianism. Marx's break with the 'logical pantheism' of Hegel does not occur until the 1843 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right'. The 1837 letter contains the now famous self-confession of Marx:

While I was ill I got to know Hegel from beginning to end, together with most of his disciples. Through a number of close friends in Stralow I came across a Doctor's Club, which includes some university lecturers and my most intimate Berlin friend, Dr Rutenberg. In controversy here, many conflicting views were expressed, and I became ever more firmly bound to the modern world philosophy from which I had thought to escape.

However, I am by no means abandoning this plan, especially since all the aesthetic celebrities of the Hegelian school have promised their collaboration through the help of university lecturer Bauer, who plays a big role among them, and of my colleague, Dr Rutenberg.¹

The Bauer mentioned in this letter was Bruno Bauer who was then a lecturer on theology at the University of Berlin. This was Marx's first meeting with Bauer who played an important role in Marx's early philosophical development. In the winter term of 1838–1839 Marx took a course from Bauer on Isaiah. Even after Bauer left the University of Berlin to go to the University of Bonn, Marx continued a correspondence with Bauer² Bauer encouraged Marx to write his doctoral dissertation on the Democritean and Epicurean philosophy of nature. In addition, Bauer asked Marx to contribute a second part to Bauer's book, *Die Posaune des jüngsten Gerichts über Hegel, den Atheisten und Antichristen*, which appeared in 1841. Marx's contribution was to be called *Treatise on Christian Art*, but Saxon censorship forbade the publication of Marx's proposed essay and so it was never completed. Marx's interest in aesthetics lasted until 1841, the year he received his doctorate in philosophy. However, the Marx–Bauer relationship collapsed in 1843 when Marx published his 'On the Jewish Question', a vehement denunciation of Bauer's program for religious equality.

In order to properly assess the 1837 letter it must be approached as part apology and part description of the intellectual odyssey of a 19-year-old student. As an apology Marx was seeking to placate Heinrich Marx, his father. Heinrich wanted Karl to be a lawyer, but Marx's transfer in 1836 from the University of Bonn to the University of Berlin was an initial statement that Karl's interests were shifting toward philosophy. Furthermore, the letter describes a three-stage development in Marx's intellectual interests; the first stage was aesthetics, the second stage was law and the final stage was philosophy.

In the first stage Marx was absorbed in lyrical poetry. His love for Jenny von Westphalen, to whom he sent love poetry, was the basis of this Romantic outpouring.³ The second stage was the study of law, a gesture he made toward his father, but this second stage was superseded by the third stage in which he began his study of philosophy. In his letter Marx summarized this intellectual odyssey in the following sentence: 'Poetry, however, could be and had to be only an accompaniment; I had to study law and above all felt the urge to wrestle with philosophy.'⁴

Even though the letter of 1837 must be read as a diary of intellectual curiosity the direction toward which this curiosity pointed was undeniable. Irrespective of his desire to assuage his father, Marx was most interested in philosophy and although he had not yet made a full commitment to Hegelianism he was moving consistently toward that consummation.

Relinquishing Romantic poetry, Marx turned to law. His study of law, however, was predicated upon the need to apply philosophy to law. In his 1837 letter Marx wrote how he 'tried to elaborate a philosophy of law covering the whole field of law. I prepared this with some metaphysical propositions by way of an introduction and continued this unhappy opus as far as public law, a work of almost 300 pages'.⁵

In the attempt to outline a philosophy of law Marx rejected the approach of both Fichte and Kant. Fichte's philosophy of law was a 'metaphysics'⁶ because it simply dealt with concepts, 'divorced from all actual law and every actual form of law'.⁷ Marx also found Kant's classification of contracts in Part One of *The Metaphysics of Morality* as unsatisfactory because of its inability to connect form and content.

Not only did Marx reject the approaches of Fichte and Kant to law, but also that of Savigny. As I indicated in Phase One, by the winter term of 1836–1837 Marx took Savigny's course on Pandects and Gans's course on Criminal Law and in 1838 Gans's course on Prussian Law at the University of Berlin and was already familiar with the controversy over the Historical School of Law. In his 1837 letter Marx pinpointed Savigny's defining error, his separation of matter and form. Savigny neglected the form, the philosophical concept, and merely dealt with matter, or civil custom.⁸ For Marx, as early as 1837, it was impossible to dispense with form, or the concept.

Marx's transfer to the University of Berlin exerted a profound influence on his intellectual development. His matriculation brought him into contact with Gans and Savigny, the controversies dealing with the Historical School of Law and the work of Thibaut. In addition, Marx read Roman Law and the Roman distinction between private and public law and their definition of private property.

In relation to Roman Law, the 1837 letter establishes that Marx 'translated the first two books of the Pandects into German'.⁹ The Pandects was a compilation of Roman civil law commissioned by Justinian, the Emperor of the Byzantine Empire. Marx's knowledge of the Pandects strengthened his understanding of the distinction the Romans drew between *jus privatum*, private law, and *jus publicum*, or public law. Marx devoted two pages of his 1837 letter to an outline of the split

between *jus privatum* and *jus publicum*.¹⁰ In one subsection of this outline dealing with contractual private law Marx wrote about the 'Law of persons in relation to property'.¹¹ In another reference to Roman positive law Marx noted that he read Savigny's book *Das Recht des Besitzes*.¹² For the Romans private property fell under the rubric of *jus privatum* and that was the origin of property in the Germanic-Christian world.

By 1837 Marx had already entered the controversies over private property, the positivist approach of Savigny, and the historicity of law approach of Thibaut and Gans. Marx was already cognizant of the fundamental issues involved in the debates over the Historical School of Law, although he had not yet written on this issue. Nevertheless, his acquaintance with Gans, Savigny and Thibaut brought the issue of the positivity or historicity of private property to his attention and it was never to depart from his consciousness.

The third stage of Marx's 1837 intellectual trajectory took him to philosophy, or the application of philosophy to law. The 19-year-old Marx saw the necessity of relating philosophy to law, or reality, and this was the formula of Hegel and the Hegelian Center. However, his desire to apply philosophy to law, although a Hegelian paradigm, still leaves open the question of the exact philosophical categories Marx borrowed from Hegel.

The passage to Hegel led past Kant and Fichte. In the 1837 letter Marx wrote:

From the idealism, which, by the way, I compared and nourished with the Idealism of Kant and Fichte, I arrived at the point of seeking the Idea in reality itself. If previously the gods dwelt above the earth, now they become its center.¹³

In this sentence Marx acknowledged that he needed to transcend the thought of Kant and Fichte in order to come to rest in Hegel. In particular, the motivation of Hegelian philosophy was the reconciliation of philosophy and reality. Whereas Kant indicated that it was impossible to know reality, and Fichte restricted all knowledge to the Self, Hegel's challenge was to seek the identity between reason and reality.

The central category that Marx borrowed from Hegel was that of form and content. In seeking to overcome the dualism of Kant and Fichte, Hegel employed the form-content category as the device to reconcile reason and reality. A long quote from the 1837 letter is in order at this point:

. . . whereas I understand by form the necessary architectonics of conceptual formulations, and by matter the necessary quality of these formulations. The mistake lay in my belief that matter and form can and must develop separately from each other . . .

The concept is indeed the mediating link between form and content. In a philosophical treatment of law, therefore, the one must arise in the other; indeed, the form should only be the continuation of the content.¹⁴

Reality could only be understood through the application of a form, or concept, to materiality. The concept supplied a definition, a determination of reality, and a knowledge could not result without the concept.

However, even though the form carried priority, Marx sought to avoid Idealism, or the total independence of form from materiality. Rather, the form was an outgrowth of materiality, a product of reason's abstraction from reality, or 'the form should only be a continuation of the content'. Marx borrowed the categories of Idealism, but not the content. The content of Idealism was reason, but Marx substituted materiality for reason, or replaced the content of Idealism.

Before advancing to a detailed analysis of Marx's dissertation, *On the Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature*, my interpretation will be made clearer if I first set forth the general principles that guided this diagnostic.

On the Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature, composed between 1839 and 1841, as the culmination of the Young Marx's encounter with Hegel. Marx's 1836 epigram on Hegel illustrates the difficulty the Young Marx bore in trying to fathom Hegel's *Aesthetics*, and the 1837 letter to his father portrays Marx on the cusp of embracing the Hegelian Center. The dissertation is the fulfillment of the process begun in particular in 1837 and is a confession of Marx's conversion to the Hegelian Center. Marx's dissertation was never published, it never entered public circulation as a program and it should be read both as an expression of Marx's philosophical evolution and as a personal articulation of the possibilities of the Hegelian Center.

The dissertation displays the influence of Bauer and is in fact a Bauerian interpretation of the history of Western philosophy. Marx borrowed the Bauerian form of critique, or subjective self-consciousness, as the agency of critique. Evaluating Western philosophy, or specifically the philosophy of Epicurus and the Stoics, Marx's dissertation located the origins of critique in the thought of Epicurus, presented Bauer as the descendent of Epicurus and Western philosophy beginning with Francis Bacon in the Renaissance as the rebirth of Greco-Roman materialism and critique. By going backward the West prepared itself for the next leap forward.

At this point it is important to recall the distinction I drew earlier between Bauerian critique and Hegelian non-congruence, or contradiction. Hegel recognized the asymmetry between thought and reality, but Hegel presented this asymmetry as the non-alignment of a present philosophical epoch and a past philosophical age. Philosophy for Hegel was retrodiction, it was the act of present mind observing the past creations of mind. Philosophy was the self-reflection of mind, it was the acquisition of the mind's objectifications by the recollection of mind's past formulations. Retrodiction was also a form of contradiction, because the present always supersedes the past, the present is always the contradiction of the past.

Bauer united non-congruence with subjectivity and created critique. In Bauer non-congruence found a individuality, and this fusion of personhood and non-congruence was the origin of critique. In Bauer's critique it was the subject that was the agent of exposing the dislocation between philosophy and reality. The subject became the force seeking the congruence between philosophy and reality.

Marx converted to Bauer's transformation of non-congruence into critique. Although Marx later broke with Bauer he never broke with Bauer's definition of critique. The majority of Marx's writings begin with the word 'Critique' in their titles or subtitles. His masterpiece *Das Kapital* carries the subtitle 'A Critique of Political Economy'. By his constant use of 'Critique' Marx characterized his intellectual endeavors: using the tools of Bauer, Marx sought to fulfill the Hegelian project of reconciling reason with reality. For Marx, however, such an endeavor must lead from the philosophical to the political, or critique must become praxis.

Marx's doctoral dissertation was a revision of Hegel's *The History of Philosophy*. Whereas Hegel looks upon the Stoics and Epicurus as signs of the decline of Greco-Roman philosophy, Marx looked particularly upon Epicurus as opening new possibilities to Western thought, possibilities that were realized in the materialism and critique reborn in the Renaissance. For Hegel the Stoics and Epicurus introduced centuries of decay into Western philosophy, a decline starting in the Middle Ages and only reversed in German Idealist philosophy of the 18th century.

For Marx, Epicurus represented a renewed vitality of Classical Greek philosophy, a vitality resting on the possibilities broached by critique and materialism.

The fact that Marx revised Hegel's *The History of Philosophy* does not mean Marx was unaware of the reinvention Hegel brought about in the comprehension of philosophy. In the 'Draft of a New Preface' contained in his dissertation Marx wrote that 'The Master' had created the new discipline of the history of philosophy: '... in the admirably great and bold plan of his history of Philosophy, from which alone the history of philosophy can in general be dated.' Furthermore, in his 1858 Letter to Ferdinand Lassalle, Marx stated that 'Hegel invented the history of philosophy'.¹⁵ This complement Marx made to Hegel expresses Marx's recognition of the importance of Hegel to specific areas of philosophical thought. Marx meant that Hegel was the first to apply the notion of historicity to philosophy. Previous writers of the history of philosophy, Joseph Brucker, Dietrich Tiedmann and Wilhelm Tennemann,¹⁶ all penned their histories in the form of biographies, stagnant portraits of individual philosophers. Hegel revolutionized the history of philosophy by stressing its developmental nature, the progressive movement between the ages of philosophy. Hegel presented individual philosophers as moments of an evolutionary process, as representatives of a specific historical age in which they lived, and each philosophical school was an expression of that time period. Marx's statement that Hegel 'invented the history of philosophy' has two profound levels of meaning; first he recognized the breakthrough Hegel made in the understanding of philosophy, that Hegel invented a new discipline in philosophical study; second, he made known his own indebtedness to Hegel, and expressed the fact that Hegel brought his attention to the importance of historicity to any area of investigation.

Marx's revision of Hegel's *The History of Philosophy* strengthened the reformist tendencies of the Hegelian Center. Marx's revisions provided new weapons for reformism because Marx showed how critique allied to materialism could be used to revise both the philosophical and socio-political situation in Germany. Marx's dissertation was an expression of philosophical and socio-political progressivism and thus a possible platform for the Hegelian Center.

The revisions that Marx introduced to Hegel's *The History of Philosophy* were numerous. Marx moved from Hegelian non-congruence to Bauerian critique. Hegel's attitude to materialism was complex. On the one hand Hegel praised Thales for introducing the study of nature into Greek thought, but on the other hand Hegel was suspicious of materialism as empiricism because empiricism, the Locke and Hume wing of the Enlightenment, reduced reason to a mere reflux of sense perception, thus eliminating the primacy of the Idea. From this perspective Hegel attacked the materialism and empiricism of Epicurus and overlooked the role that subjective self-consciousness played in Epicurus. Contrary to Hegel, Marx embraced the materialism of Epicurus as opening new horizons in Western philosophy after the otherworldliness of the Middle Ages. Marx also emphasized the centrality of subjective self-consciousness in Epicurus. Hegel's *The History of Philosophy* judged Epicurus and Democritus as symbols of the decay of the Platonic-Aristotelian apex of Greek speculation, while Marx looked upon Epicurus, his advocacy of critique and materialism, as contributing instruments to Western philosophy that encouraged socio-political progressivism.

Regardless of the revisions Marx made to Hegelian philosophy, Marx still looked upon Hegel as belonging to the Hegelian Center. These revisions were consistent with other representatives of the Hegelian Center, such as Gans, Michelet and Hinrichs. To revise does not mean to reject. The new perspectives Marx put forth were not intended to remove Hegel from the Hegelian Center, but rather to uncover previously unforeseen potentialities of the Hegelian Center.

The formula of uniting critique and materialism, not empiricism, remained at the core of Marx's methodology throughout his life. In order to understand this statement it is necessary to draw a distinction between empiricism and materialism.

As articulated by Locke and Hume empiricism sought to explain the origin of ideas from sense perception. Its basic concern lay with the etiology of ideas and it reduced Idea to sense experience.

Materialism as articulated by the Frenchmen Claude Helvétius and Paul d'Holbach possessed a broader vision of the capacities of the human mind. Materialism recognized that sense perception was only one component of thought, but also drew attention to environmental factors in explaining the etiology of thought. The materialism of the early 19th century was a form of sociology, because in accounting for human thought it not only included sense perception but also sociological conditioning.

Marx's unification of critique and materialism was the launching pad for political praxis. One determinant of human thought was the social environment; therefore in order to alter human thought it was necessary to reconfigure social conditions, and this was called political praxis.

Marx's unity of critique and materialism was not reductive, did not reduce thought to sense impressions. As we have discussed, Marx's materio-critique still recognized the need of philosophy, of thought as a determining agent. Marx did not seek to abolish philosophy, but rather supply philosophy with a new mission, the task of uncovering the sociological causes of oppression.

On the Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature constitutes Marx's first deep probe into the philosophy of Hegel. The dissertation concerns Hegel's three-volume *The History of Philosophy*, but is specifically a detailed exegesis of the second volume, 'Plato and the Platonists', which contained not only a discussion of Plato and Aristotle, but also Hegel's assessment of the Stoics and Epicureans.

The original Marx manuscript of his dissertation no longer exists and what did come down to the present is an incomplete copy in the handwriting of an unknown person. The incompleteness of the dissertation is evinced by the fact that the fourth and fifth chapters of Part One are missing. However, each chapter of Part One and Two have their own footnotes as well as Marx's dictated notes confirming that Marx reviewed and authorized the copy. Assuming that the transcription is accurate, these notebooks are useful because Marx's commentaries, even though fragmentary, contain interesting statements revealing Marx's thought at the time.

In his 'Introduction' to *The History of Philosophy* Hegel divided this narrative into three large periods: 1) Greek Philosophy; 2) The Philosophy of the Middle Ages; and 3) Modern Philosophy.¹⁷ He did not include Oriental thought, Chinese and Indian, into his periodization because he did not believe Chinese or Indian scholars were philosophers; they failed to make the transition from substance, nature, to subjective self-consciousness.

However, Hegel additionally subdivided Greek philosophy into three compartments; 1) From Thales to Aristotle; 2) Greek Philosophy in the Roman World; and 3) Neo-Platonic Philosophy.¹⁸ From the point of view of my discussion I will presently focus on compartment 2, 'Greek Philosophy in the Roman World' because in this segment Hegel discusses the Stoics and Epicureans. Hegel discussed Democritus in compartment 1, 'From Thales to Aristotle' and he understands Democritus as an empirical philosopher, as someone who believed that ideas exclusively arose from sense perception. In comparing Epicurus and Democritus Marx's dissertation, following the Hegelian periodization, jumped from compartment 1, 'Thales to Aristotle' to compartment 2, 'Greek Philosophy in the Roman World' or from the early Ionic and Eleatic interest in nature philosophy to the Roman Empire.

Hegel referred to philosophy as 'the true theodicy'¹⁹ and 'the simplest revelation of the World spirit'.²⁰ He meant that the development of philosophy recounted the stages through which the subject and object, the Idea and reality, became one, the Absolute Idea, and consequently absolute freedom. In order to reach absolute freedom it was necessary for philosophy to pass through a learning process and the first stages of this self-education of thought were in the Greek period. In this first stage thought became aware of nature, Thales and Democritus, the self-determination of the concept, Plato and Aristotle, and free subjectivity, Socrates. In the second period of self-knowledge, the Middle Ages, abstract theology overcame, preempted, both nature and subjective concept. However, in the third epoch of the curriculum vitae of thought, Modern Philosophy rediscovered nature by separating the physical universe from the theological. This detachment of

empirico-materialist from eschatology was the triumph of the Enlightenment, but it was German philosophy beginning with Kant that opened the possibility of the conquest of freedom. German philosophy established the self-determination of the concept, the pneumatological force of Idea. It demonstrated that the rediscovery of nature did not place nature outside of mind, but rather that mind was the organizational framework of nature; this interpretative power of mind achieved the unity of subject and object. The fusion of subject and object was the ground of freedom because it made the empirico-materialist the canvas of thought, and thought was the logic of self-determination.

Within this matriculation of philosophy Hegel judged the Stoics and Epicureans, who lived in the Roman world, as symbols of the decline of Greek – Plato, Aristotle, Socrates – philosophy. In Volume II of *The History of Philosophy*, in the chapter dealing with the Stoics, Hegel does not mention Democritus at all and traces the genealogy of Stoicism back to Heraclitus.²¹ In the chapters dealing with the Epicureans Hegel does reference Democritus, but only on two occasions.²²

According to Hegel, Stoicism and Epicureanism represented the decline of post-Aristotelian thought for two reasons, dogmatism and excessive subjectivity. Epicureanism, in particular, suffered from dogmatism because of its credo that ideas originated through sense perception. Epicurus was an empiricist, and maintained that only sense perception generated ideas. Hegel negated Epicurean logic because it eliminated the role of mind. The sin of Epicurus was to remain imprisoned at the level of understanding, the stage of mind in which thought was simply a mirror of the empirical. The true essence of mind, for Hegel, was its ascent to reason, the ascent to reason in terms of its own powers constructed a concept, but Epicurus did not take this path and remained tied to the dictatorship of the senses.

The ultimate goal of philosophy was the unity of thought and being.²³ For Hegel, the Absolute Idea was defined as the reconciliation of Spirit and nature. If this unification was not achieved, if speculation was only thought, then speculation remained metaphysics. Conversely, if this unification was not achieved, if thought was imprisoned at the level of sense perception, or the understanding, then thought remained dogmatic. The failure of reconciliation divided thought into either metaphysics or positivism. Philosophy emerged in its highest form through the process of unifying thought and being.

In addition, Stoics and Epicureans praised the social topology of the 'wise man', a social type that sought isolation from the surrounding world and that made subjective freedom a paramount virtue. Hegel himself defended subjectivity, the Idea was the unity of the subject and the object, but he claimed that the subjectivity of the Stoics and Epicureans was excessive. For Hegel, ethicality was a function of the individual's engagement with the community and Hegel extolled the Athenian polis as the preeminent form of a political organism because its citizens were active in political life. The ethics of the Stoics and Epicureans was directed at ataxary, the absence of pain, and in order to achieve the erasure of pain from existence it was necessary to retreat from intersubjectivity.

Hegel's attack on excessive subjectivity is best expressed in the chapter 'The Truth of Self-Certainty' in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*.²⁴ The second part of

'The Truth of Self-Certainty' is entitled 'Freedom of Self-Consciousness: Stoicism, Scepticism and the Unhappy Consciousness'. The central target of this chapter is excessive subjectivity and, although Epicurianism is not mentioned in it, Hegel's attack is implied because Epicureanism was a prime constituent of excessive individualism. Stoicism, Scepticism and Epicureanism absolutized the 'I', turning the Self into an apotheosis and the necessary outcome of this glorification of the Ego is the 'unhappy consciousness'. The logical outcome of the incarnation of the Self is unhappiness, because social isolation does not permit mutual recognition and without the recognition of the Other the Self falls into a morose self-centeredness.

Initiated by the Stoics, Sceptics and Epicureans, the decay of post-Aristotelian philosophy lasted until the Renaissance and the work of Bacon. The Third Period of Western philosophy begins with Bacon because it was this English philosopher who resurrected the Greek love of the natural world. Modern Philosophy begins with a fascination regarding the operations of nature and out of this fascination Bacon revived the principles of empiricism and invented the inductive method. Bacon was the godfather of the Enlightenment and although Hegel was an opponent of Enlightenment dogmatism and positivism he never denied the fact that nature was the ground of human life. Mind could not ignore nature, but the task of mind was to supply nature with a rational architecture.

In his dissertation Marx had little to say about Volume I, which traced Greek thought from Thales to Socrates. His attacks on Hegel centered on Volume II, Hegel's presentation of Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics and Epicurus. Marx said little about Volume III, which covers the Middle Ages and the emergence of Enlightenment natural philosophy, but by inference Volume III played a significant role in Marx's critique. Whereas Hegel refuted the Enlightenment because it was natural philosophy, Marx looked upon the Enlightenment as opening a new age in the matriculation of philosophy, as the age of the rediscovery of materialism and the emancipatory effects of materialism.

However, in order to fully grasp the origins and intent of Marx's critique of Hegel's *The History of Philosophy* it is first necessary to examine the influence of Bauer on Marx. Bauer exercised a major influence on Marx's approach to Hegel, calling Marx's attention to the centrality of Method in Hegel. On December 11, 1839, as Marx stood at the beginning of his dissertation research, Bauer wrote him a letter encouraging him to separate the System from the Method of Hegel and to focus on the logical forms Hegel employed. Bauer wrote: 'It appears to me that what you say about the logical energies of contradiction Hegel has already developed in the chapter of Method.'²⁵

When Bauer mentioned the 'chapter on Method' he was referring to the last chapter in *The Science of Logic* entitled 'The Absolute Idea'. In this chapter Hegel describes the Method, the procedures used by thought to ascend to 'The Absolute Idea'. Hegel wrote the operational procedures utilized by thought to rise to the 'Absolute Idea'.²⁶ Bauer not only acted as a thesis advisor, but helped persuade Marx that the most valuable and useful part of Hegel was his redefinition of logic as operational functions.

Bauer's *Die Posaune* was a polemic against the Protestant Wing of the Prussian Restoration who represented Hegel as a supporter of religious belief.²⁷ These Lutheran Restorationists sought to provide validity to the Prussian Crown by using Hegel as a demonstration that religion could be justified through philosophy. In *Die Posaune* Bauer attacked this proposed marriage of Altar and Throne by portraying Hegel as both an atheist and an anti-Christ. According to Bauer, Hegel redefined the role of philosophy and rather than conjoining philosophy with Christology Bauer located the purpose of philosophy in critique as practiced by an independent self-consciousness. Thought was the dynamic prius of the universe and thought must discover the fissures that divided reason from actuality. Whereas Marx eventually moved to the position that praxis must be the outcome of philosophy, that human action was required to actually change external circumstances, Bauer never advanced to the practical-praxis position. Nevertheless, Bauer did introduce the principle of subjective freedom and critique into Left Hegelian consciousness.

Marx applied the Bauerian methodology of critique in three forms in his dissertation. First, Marx critiqued Hegel and, second, he interpreted Epicurus as an exponent of critique. In relation to Hegel himself Marx praised the 'Parmenides of Berlin' because he 'on the whole correctly defined the general aspects of'²⁸ Epicurean, Stoic and Sceptic philosophy. In the 'Foreword' to the dissertation Marx additionally recognized Hegel as the inventor of the history of philosophy.²⁹ Marx acknowledged that Hegel invented a new science. Third, the dissertation contains the first occasion in which Marx used the weapon of critique against a specific philosophy. As I mentioned previously, Marx's dissertation was a critique of Hegel's *The History of Philosophy*, but Marx did not designate that his dissertation embodied this particular purpose. However, the dissertation contained two additions and both additions carried the title 'Critique of Plutarch's Polemic against Epicurean Theology'. One addition carried the subtitle 'The Eternal Life of the Individual'³⁰ and the second addition the subtitle of 'The Relation of Man to God'.³¹ I single out these instances because they are the first times that Marx identified himself as employing the strategy of critique in his philosophical debates. Critique eventually became a central philosophical weapon for Marx, distinguishing his work from 1843 onward. Marx's activation of critique in his dissertation is an important moment because it is the origin of a crucial philosophical maneuver of Marx.

However, Marx also censored Hegel for devaluing the importance of these philosophers, including the earlier thought of Democritus, who invented both the atomic theory and the theory of the void. Hegel interpreted Epicureans, Stoics and Sceptics as instances of the decline of Greek philosophy, but Marx rebuked the Parmenides of Berlin on this issue. Specifically, on two points, the philosophy of nature and subjective self-consciousness, Marx judged Epicurus as the central figure of his dissertation, as introducing a new age in the history of philosophy.

Building upon Democritus, Epicurus advanced the study of the philosophy of nature, particularly in the area of physics. Epicurus thus left a buried treasure in the course of Western thought, a treasure rediscovered by Pierre Gassendi and that served as the historical precedent for the Enlightenment investigation of

nature. Marx did not believe that Epicurus represented the decline Greco-Roman philosophy, but that he was an ancient spirit that again came to life in the birth of modern materialism.

Additionally, Epicurus discovered the power of self-consciousness. In the 'Foreword' to his dissertation Marx wrote: '... its own aphorism against all heavenly and earthly gods who do not acknowledge human self-consciousness as the highest divinity.'³² In Part One of the dissertation Marx wrote: 'Is it an accident that with the Epicureans, Stoics and Sceptics all moments of self-consciousness are represented completely, but every moment as a particular existence? Is it an accident that these systems in their totality form a complete structure of self-consciousness?'³³

Marx's dissertation provided historiographic validity for Bauer's idea of free self-consciousness. Marx interpreted Epicurus as the intellectual precursor of Bauer. He showed that the origins of critique were to be found in antiquity and that it should be used as one of the central methodologies of contemporary Western philosophy. Critique should be allied with materialism and Epicurus was also an exemplar of how materialism and critique could be conjoined. Then the union of materialism and free self-consciousness would provide contemporary philosophy with a new role, the critique of actuality from a materialist perspective.

The fact that Marx assessed Epicurus, as well as the Stoics and Sceptics, as the prophets of the freedom of self-consciousness, was made irrefutably clear in the 'Draft of a New Preface' he wrote to his dissertation in late 1841 and early 1842. In this 'New Preface' Marx affirmed:

Only now the time has come in which the systems of the Epicureans, Stoics and Sceptics can be understood. They are the philosophers of self-consciousness.³⁴

Marx's dissertation projected a new historiography of the Left Hegelians. *On the Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature* was a possible replacement for Hegel's *The History of Philosophy*. The dissertation offered the Hegelian Left a new program for the future: criticism of the existent from a materialist perspective.

Marx's own awareness that he was putting forth a revision of Hegel's *The Philosophy Of History* is proven by his own statement. In a passage that was crossed out in the 'Draft of New Preface' Marx wrote:

The Epicurean, Stoic and Sceptic philosophies of self-consciousness were just as much underestimated up to now by the philosophers as unspeculative and by the German schoolmasters who also write history of philosophy as ...³⁵

Marx's dissertation even contains an explicit criticism of Hegel himself. Marx attacks Hegel for overlooking the significance of Epicurus:

If according to Hegel [see *Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. 14, p. 492] the Epicurean philosophy of nature deserves no great praise when judged by the criterion of objective

gain, from the other point of view, according to which historical phenomena do not stand in need of such praise, the frank, truly philosophical consistency with which the whole range of inconsistencies of his principle in itself is expounded, is admirable. The Greeks will forever remain our teachers by virtue of this magnificent objective naiveté, which makes everything shine, as it were, naked in the pure light of its nature, however dim that light may be.³⁶

No statement by Marx exists indicating his reason for choosing Democritus and Epicurus as the pillars of his dissertation. Due to the lack of positive evidence it is impossible to assert with certainty why Marx decided to focus upon Greek materialism and therefore only an inference is possible. I maintain that Feuerbach played a significant role in Marx's decision to concentrate on Greek atomism. The bibliography to Marx's dissertation lists two works by Feuerbach, *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie von Bacon von Verulam bis Benedict Spinoza* and 'Vorläufige Theses zur Reform der Philosophie'.³⁷ Even though it was written approximately five years after the dissertation, 'The Leipzig Council' contains important clues regarding the reasons for Marx's 1839–1841 interest in Greek atomism. In 'The Leipzig Council' Marx wrote: 'Philosophy was opposed to metaphysics as Feuerbach, in his first decisive attack on Hegel, opposed sober philosophy to drunken speculation.'³⁸ When Marx referred to Feuerbach's 'first decisive attack on Hegel' he was alluding to 'Vorläufige Theses zur Reform der Philosophie', as well as 'Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft', two works he singles out in the 'Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy in General', the last essay in 'The Manuscripts'.³⁹ In 'Vorläufige Theses zur Reform der Philosophie', Feuerbach attacks Hegel's Speculative philosophy as a form of theology and seeks to replace Hegel's 'logical pantheism' with materialism.

In addition, Marx learned from Feuerbach's *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie von Bacon von Verulam bis Benedict Spinoza* that Feuerbachian materialism, which Marx admired, found its ancient origins in Democritus and Epicurus. In *The Holy Family* Marx wrote: 'Metaphysics of the seventeenth century, represented in France by Descartes, had materialism as its antagonist from its very birth. It personally opposed Descartes in Gassendi; the restorer of Epicurean materialism. French and English materialism was always closely related to Democritus and Epicurus.'⁴⁰

Clearly, the Marx of 1841 was not the Marx of the 1844 *The Holy Family* and the 1845–1846 'The Leipzig Council'. The Marx of 1844–1846 approached Hegel from an entirely different vantage point than the Marx of 1841. But these statements of the 1844–1846 period, I surmise, establish the reasons that Marx's attention was turned toward Greek atomism and materialism in general. Influenced by Feuerbach and having read Gassendi, who is listed in the dissertation bibliography, Marx decided to study the origins of Western materialism in Greek antiquity. I do not say that in 1841 Marx reached the sophisticated level of understanding of materialism he displayed in the works 1844–1846. I do say that in 1841 his curiosity was stimulated, and under the influence of Feuerbach

he gleaned some of the emancipatory possibilities of materialism and because his interest was piqued he decided to investigate Hegel's perspective on Greco-Roman materialism.

I do not claim that Marx's dissertation is evidence of his break with Hegel. Indeed, in forthcoming paragraphs I will show that in the dissertation Marx set forth his continuity with Hegel. Marx's dissertation was an amalgam of Hegel, Feuerbach and Bauer. Nevertheless, in spite of these qualifications, at the age of 23, in his first philosophic enterprise, Marx was drawn to an examination of the history of materialism.

The study of Greek atomism in Hegel's *The History of Philosophy* was Marx's baptism in the analysis of materialism. Hegel's *The History of Philosophy*, Volume III in particular, combined with Feuerbach, were two influences that christened Marx's lifelong dedication to the study of materialism. Initiated in his dissertation, Marx's career added an additional chapter to the historiography of materialism.

Commencing in 1839, Marx's interest in materialism, natural and social, extended beyond Hegel's *The History of Philosophy*. In 1839, as he started research on his dissertation, Marx wrote an *exzerpte* of Hegel's *The Philosophy of Nature*, Volume II of Hegel's *The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*. Marx wrote three versions of this outline and each version was a syllogistic distillation of this complex and massively detailed book.⁴¹

This *exzerpte*, which is entitled 'Plan of Hegel's Philosophy of Nature', is important for two reasons. First, it confirms the young Marx's involvement in materialism and the philosophy of nature. Marx was not satisfied with *The History of Philosophy* and followed his interest in materialism to *The Philosophy of Nature*.

Second, the 'Plan of Hegel's Philosophy of Nature' is an example of how Marx interpreted nature. The methodology that Marx employed to render nature comprehensible was thoroughly Hegelian. This issue concerns the methodology employed by Marx in understanding a particular science. Since forthcoming Phases of this book treat the Hegelian methodology utilized by Marx, I will not take up this issue at this point.

The doorway opened by Hegel's *The History of Philosophy* was opened most widely in *The Holy Family*. This 1844 book contained a chapter entitled 'Critical Battle against French Materialism'⁴² and this is Marx's most revealing description of the origins of his own brand of materialism. 'The Critical Battle against French Materialism' divides the history of materialism since the Renaissance into two schools, the French Cartesian and the English Baconian, and documents Marx's adherence to the English Baconian tradition. An indisputable line of continuity regarding the philosophy of materialism runs from the 1839 'Plan of Hegel's Philosophy of Nature' to *The Holy Family* and beyond. To fully understand Marx's philosophy of materialism it is necessary to retrace the genesis out of Hegel because this is a precondition for comprehending the Mature Marx of the *Grundrisse* and *Das Kapital*.

Marx's dissertation was a mission statement regarding his place within the Hegelian Center. The dissertation was a prolegomena regarding his role within the philosophical trajectory of Hegelian philosophy. In the 'Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy', research notes that Marx took as he prepared to write his dissertation, he made this unequivocal assertion:

Antiquity was rooted in nature, in materiality. Its degradation and profanation means in the main the defeat of materiality, of solid life; the modern world is rooted in the spirit and it can be free, can release the other, nature, out of itself. But equally by contrast, what with the ancients was profanation of nature is with the modern salvation from the shackles of servile faith, and the modern rational outlook on nature must first raise itself to the point from which the ancient Ionian philosophy, in principle, at least, begins . . . the point of seeing the divine, the Idea, embodied in nature.⁴³

Marx's self-proclaimed purpose was the liberation of nature 'from the shackles of servile faith', and the metaphysics of Idealism. Marx wished to return the Hegelian Center and contemporary philosophy in general to an Ionian position, that nature must be studied as an existence independent of mind. The Scientific Revolution had abrogated the theological pre-emption of nature that occurred during the Middle Ages and the Hegelian Center must release nature from the secrecy of the metaphysical and thereby resurrect antique materialism. When Marx studies Epicurus and Democritus he was engaged in a project to win the independence of nature from Speculative philosophy. Greek atomism would liberate the contemporary world from the mysticism of Idealism.

However, the independence of nature from thought did not mean that nature had meaning in-itself. Only thought was determinate. Separation and determination concerned two different processes. Separation related only to the external, while determination related to form. Nature was both external to thought, yet it was determined, given a shape, by thought. Only thought was the force, the potentiality, that imparted form on that which lay outside of thought.

Marx's materialist methodology was in absolute accord with the Hegelian paradigm. The Absolute Idea in Hegel could only result from the harmonization of thought and actuality. The methodological principles that Marx designed for the study of nature were in perfect agreement with the Hegelian paradigm. Marx's venture into materialism was a reaffirmation of the Hegelian Center.

Epicurus was the instrument Marx used to resurrect antique materialism. But this rebirth took place within the Hegelian protocol of unifying thought and the exoteric.

In order to make Marx's Hegelian interpretation of Epicurus transparent it is first necessary to outline some of the essentials of Epicurean atomism and this involves differentiating between Democritus and Epicurus. In Volume I of *The History of Philosophy* Hegel claimed that Leucippus was the founder of atomic theory⁴⁴ and that 'Democritus perfected what the former began'.⁴⁵ Indeed, Democritus is reduced to a secondary status on *The History of Philosophy*. Conversely, in Marx's

dissertation Democritus is presented as a major exponent of atomic theory only surpassed by Epicurus.

The difference in the treatment afforded to Democritus by Hegel and Marx is emblematic of their approach to materialism. Hegel wrote a history and Democritus is presented as a representative of Greek philosophy, an example of the Greek immersion into the philosophy of nature. Marx was writing a critique, a contrast between sense perception and free self-consciousness. In order to empower this critique, to make the contrast between sense perception and free self-consciousness a stark opposition, Marx counterposed Democritus and Epicurus and judged Democritus as deficient in comparison to Epicurus. The failures of Democritus were the failures of empiricism vis-à-vis free self-consciousness.

Following Leucippus, Democritus argued that the basic building blocks of the universe were atoms that fell in a void. These atoms fell in a straight line, congealed as they accidentally collided and these conglomerations of atoms formed the material objects that populated the globe.

Epicurus added two additions to this atomic theory. He accepted the ideas that atoms fell in a void, but did not believe that atoms fell in a straight line. Rather, Epicurus believed in the declination of the atoms, or that atoms swerved as they descended. The conglomeration of the atoms was caused by the declination, because as they swerved they collided with one another.

Secondly, in the moral sphere Epicurus believed that tranquility, ataraxy, was the goal of life. The end toward which humankind strove was a life absent of all disquietude. The happy life was an existence void of intellectual, emotional or physical malaise.

The pursuit of tranquility was the distinguishing feature of the 'wise man'. Epicurus was one of the founders of Stoicism, an ethical belief that arose as the Roman world collapsed. The hero of the Stoics was the 'wise man' who avoided any form of turmoil in his pursuit of repose. However, the search for tranquility entailed a retreat from the world. To be devoid of any kind of disquietude entailed self-isolation, the lack of involvement with others or in the life of the community. The topology of the 'wise man' was the negation of the Platonic and Aristotelian principle of *zoon politikon*, the active citizen. Whereas Plato and Aristotle talked of citizenship, Epicurus and the Stoics believed in a radical subjectivity, a subjectivity devoted to severing any connection to pain-inducing objects.

In setting forth the conditions for ataraxy Epicurus determined that it was necessary to deny the existence of both meteors and the gods; humankind could not defend itself from these powers and therefore they were sources of distress. As a means of preserving ataraxy, the repose of individuality, Epicurus maintained that neither meteors nor the gods existed.

Marx justified Epicurus's strategy of denial because it affirmed the superiority of free self-consciousness. Marx did not judge the substance of the Epicurean policy of denial, he did not judge the correctness of the decision, but rather Marx applauded this instantiation of subjective freedom. The example of Epicurus supplied historical precedents for the exercise of critique, or Epicurus supplied the justification of the antique for the Hegelian Center's practice of critique. Epicurus

was the Bauer of the Greco-Roman world, prior to Bauer's exit from the Hegelian Center.

Marx's juxtaposition of Democritus and Epicurus offered him the opportunity to distinguish between dogmatism and positivism on the one hand and free self-consciousness on the other. The Democritean philosophy of nature should be excluded from theoretical employment because it was limited to sense perception. It remained frozen at the level of the empirical. The Epicurean philosophy of nature should become the standard of theoretical use because it was grounded in the freedom of self-consciousness. For Epicurus thought was not a mirror of nature, but an active force for the determination of nature.

The assessment that Marx made of Democritus and Epicurus differed from Hegel's evaluation. *The History of Philosophy* situated Democritus and Epicurus in the same philosophic school as they were both instances of dogmatism and positivism. Like Marx, Hegel did recognize that Epicurus originated the idea of the declination of the atoms,⁴⁶ but this perception did not prevent Hegel concluding that Democritus and Epicurus were fundamentally alike because they both regarded sensory stimulation as the ultimate initiator of ideas.

In order to fully explicate Marx's adherence to the philosophic principles of the Hegelian Center I will divide my discussion of Marx's dissertation into the following subdivisions: 1) Marx and *The Science of Logic*; 2) Hegel and Marx and the historiography of philosophy; 3) Marx and the historiography of critique; 4) Marx and the defense of Hegel; 5) Marx's first evaluation of the political.

1) Marx and *The Science of Logic*

The dedication that Marx displayed towards Hegelian logical categories is amply demonstrated in his dissertation. Marx interpreted Epicurus through the perspective of Hegelian epistemological methodology and when Marx embarked upon this course he demonstrated that he was a disciple of the 'Parmenides of Berlin'.

The epistemological categories utilized by Marx in his dissertation are numerous and it would take a separate study to discuss each one, and that is not the purpose of this work. Rather, I will be selective and only analyze those categories that prove that Marx was a practitioner of Hegelian methodology. In the dissertation Marx demonstrated his dependence on Hegelian methodology, or showed that it was only possible to explain the external through the employment of Hegel's *The Science of Logic*.

Hegel wrote two books dealing with logic, one was *The Science of Logic*, or the Greater Logic, and the second was 'Logic', or the Smaller Logic, which was the first volume of *The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*. The bibliography of Marx's dissertation lists *The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* and I presume that Marx read the Smaller Logic. The dissertation does not mention *The Science of Logic* but it is, nevertheless, clear that Marx read and used this book. I come to this conclusion because in the dissertation Marx used logical modes that Hegel employed in *The Science of Logic*, but not in the Smaller Logic. For example, when Marx discusses the issue of necessity and chance in Epicurus and Democritus he

used the concepts of real possibility and abstract possibility. Although Hegel discusses possibility in the Small Logic he does not include the difference between real and abstract possibility. The only book in which Hegel expounds upon real and abstract possibility is *The Science of Logic*, the Greater Logic. Since the ideas of real and abstract possibility only appear in the Greater Logic and since Marx utilizes both of these ideas I conclude that Marx was acquainted with *The Science of Logic*.

Before investigating the concepts of real and abstract possibility and necessity I will begin my discussion of Marx's indebtedness to *The Science of Logic* with reference to the categories of concept and existence. In the dissertation Marx needed to explain how Epicurus progressed from the concept of atom to the real existence of the atom. The concept of the atom was a product of theoretical mind because in antiquity the atom was not seen, but rationally surmised. The concept of the atom in-itself had no qualities, but the concept evolved into existence and in this transition from concept to existence the concept acquired properties. These properties did not exist in the original concept and therefore a contradiction existed between concept and existence. Contradiction was a term for delimitation, or the moment of distinguishing, or exposing the separation between the properties of concept and the qualified existent.

The development from the unqualified concept to the qualified existent passed through appearance. Epicurus assigned the properties of size, shape and weight to the atom and these properties were attributes of appearance. Before existence received its being it must first transit appearance, or must become qualified in-itself. Existence was the negation of concept, because it negated the property concept.

The atom was 'pure-being-for-self'.⁴⁷ It was the absolute singularity, the universal particularity. In order for the atom to come into existence as 'pure-being-for-self' the logical category of repulsion was required. Repulsion, the negation of attraction, was a force that multiplied oneness. In order for there to be many it was first necessary to have the one and repulsion isolated singularities so that the one could appear. Repulsion was the power of differentiation, of isolating one singularity from another, and this was the precondition of individuality.

Interestingly, atomism played an important role in both Hegel's *The Science of Logic* and the Smaller Logic. Hegel understood Greek atomism as supplying the empirical justification of the concept of the one and this concept of the one was a necessary presupposition for the concept of the many and the whole arena of quantity and measurement. In *The Science of Logic* and the Smaller Logic Hegel discusses the one in 'The Doctrine of Being'.⁴⁸ and in the Small Logic in paragraphs 96 and 97.⁴⁹ The concept of the one is important for Hegel not only as a necessary step to the creation of measurement, of repulsion and attraction, but also as a precondition for the establishment of the Self. The concept of the one is the foundation of the idea of 'Being-for Self'.⁵⁰ Without an awareness of a one there would be no logical foundation for a Self. Atomism thus helped the establishment of the Hegelian notion of Self as well as the Epicurean notion of self-consciousness, or the entire discourse of subjectivity.

Another example of Marx's adoption of Hegelian methodological modalities is found in Marx's discussion of Epicurus's idea of the atom:

The contradiction between existence and essence, between matter and form, which is inherent in the concept of the atom, emerges in the individual atom itself once it is endowed with qualities. Through the quality the atom is alienated from its concept, but at the same time is perfected in its construction. It is from repulsion and the ensuing conglomeration of the qualified atoms that the world of appearance now emerges.

In this transition from the world of essence to the world of appearance the contradiction in the concept of the atom clearly reaches its highest realization. For the atom is conceptually the absolute, essential form of nature. This absolute form has now been degraded to absolute matter, to the formless substrate of the world of appearance.⁵¹

In this quote Marx describes the genesis of appearance. These two paragraphs are a summary of the doctrine of appearance as it is presented in *The Science of Logic*, another proof of Marx's deep reading of Hegel's treatise. Book Two of *The Science of Logic*, 'The Doctrine of Essence', describes the evolution from Essence to Actuality, and the mid-point of this progression is appearance. Section Two of Book Two is entitled 'Appearance'. A synonym for appearance is reality, or the external. Reality does not in itself possess an inner, an implicit, but it shows, it shines, it makes itself visible to the senses.

In his analysis of appearance Hegel gives an account of how appearance makes itself known to the senses. Appearance displays itself because it takes on qualities, or properties. Examples of qualities are size, weight and shape and these qualities are visibilities, or they can be apprehended by the five human senses.

In the two paragraphs quoted above Marx accounts for the appearance of a conglomeration of atoms. This creation of appearance takes the following steps; an atom is first an unqualified concept; but this concept in its transition to appearance will take on qualities and in so doing becomes matter; the concept becoming matter is an instance of the alienation of concept and matter because matter can never fully clone the concept; the process of appearance is then a moment of contradiction for it illustrates the divergence between concept and appearance. Since a synonym for appearance is existence these two paragraphs also testify to the opposition between concept and existence.

This description of the origination of appearance is a restatement of Chapter One of Section Two of Book Two of *The Science of Logic*.⁵² The Small Logic does contain two paragraphs, Paragraphs 131 and 132, which do discuss appearance, but make no mention of the ideas of quality and property.⁵³ Therefore, the only source which located the interconnection between appearance, property, quality, matter, was *The Science of Logic*.

In order to document beyond dispute Marx's incorporation of numerous epistemological modalities of Hegel I will analyze Marx's discussion of chance and

necessity in Democritus and Epicurus, but to make this distinction clear it is first required to delve into the meaning of possibility and necessity. Marx enters upon this discussion in section three of his dissertation.⁵⁴

Marx asserts that in order to arrive at necessity it is first required to postulate possibility and he then divides possibility into two parts, real possibility and abstract possibility. Real possibility has boundaries, it is limited. Concerned with objects, real possibility is conditioned. Conversely, abstract possibility resides in the mind, in imagination and has no constraints, is infinite. Abstract possibility exists in the subject and is unrestrained by any conditionality.

Relative necessity is associated with real possibility, or relative necessity is the actualization of real possibility. Relative necessity is the achievement of what is latent in real possibility. Just as real possibility is limited so also is relative necessity confined inside borders. However, abstract possibility is horizon, it allows for alternatives. Abstract possibility is not confined by boundaries, but enjoys the possibility of multiple outcomes.

Epicurus believed in abstract possibility and thus favored chance. In his physics Epicurus accounted for the congealing of the atoms in terms of chance. On the other hand, Democritus believed in relative necessity and accounted for the conglomeration of atoms in terms of necessity. Relative necessity was the conditioned, the limited and therefore the amalgamation of atoms was best explained by the restriction of outcomes.

Marx's discussion of possibility and necessity in his dissertation is a restatement of Hegel's methodology in Section Three of Book Two, 'The Doctrine of Essence' in *The Science of Logic*. Section Three is entitled 'Actuality' and is the culmination of the movement of Essence. Thought advanced by Essence through 'appearance' to 'Actuality'. Chapter Two of Section Three contains a full discussion of possibility and necessity. For Hegel 'Actuality' was the union of the inner and outer, the implicit and explicit, and since it contained an in-itself it contained necessity. Hegel wrote: 'What is actual is possible',⁵⁵ and he meant that since actuality possessed an essence, a self-determination, it was activated by absolute necessity. Essence must be realized, must become an actuality, and absolute necessity was that inherent that fulfilled the development of essence into actuality. Absolute necessity was the determination of telos. Without absolute necessity the telos would be aborted.

Marx's discussion of the atomic physics of Democritus and Epicurus was a copy of Hegel's arguments in the 'Actuality' chapter, Chapter Two of Section Three in *The Science of Logic*.⁵⁶ In the *Smaller Logic*, paragraphs 142 and 143 are devoted to a short analysis of actuality, possibility and necessity, but there is no mention in either paragraphs 142 or 143 of the concepts of real and abstract possibility and relative or absolute necessity. Therefore, Marx could only come across Hegel's discussion through a reading of *The Science of Logic*.

The preceding paragraphs outlined a partial lexicon of Hegelian logical categories used by Marx in his dissertation. This partial listing of Hegelian epistemological modalities included; negation, contradiction, concept, existence, appearance, being, alienation, property, essence, realization, form, quality, real and abstract possibility and relative and absolute necessity.

The correct approach to the dissertation is to divide Marx's intellectual endeavor into two parts, appropriation and application. Marx appropriated the functions of Hegel's methodology. In terms of application, Marx used Hegel's methodology as interpretive tools to understand Epicurus. Marx presented an Hegelian vision of Epicurus. Areas of disagreement existed between Hegel and Marx as Hegel saw Epicurus as a dogmatist and Marx saw him as a champion of free-self-consciousness. Hegel's *The Science of Logic* supplied the logical forms by which Marx revised Hegel's original picture of Epicurus. Marx used *The Science of Logic* to reach two goals: to overturn the Hegelian portrayal of Epicurus; and to utilize Hegelian modalities to reinterpret Epicurus. Marx's dissertation was designed to demonstrate how a Hegelian Center critique could be used to resurrect Epicurus and present Greek philosophy as a force, not of dogmatism and decay, but as an exemplar of emancipation in Western culture. Marx used Hegelian instruments to overturn Hegelian errors.

2) Hegel and Marx and the historiography of philosophy

As I begin to discuss the remaining four subdivisions of my treatment of Marx's dissertation two points of clarification need to be made.

The material I am analyzing falls into two parts, the dissertation itself and the 'Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy'. The focus of *The Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature* was the speculations of Democritus and Epicurus themselves on physics, the attributes of atoms, the fall of atoms, the problem of declination and the non-existence of meteors as well as the gods. Due to the fact that the original manuscripts of Democritus and Epicurus were extinct, Marx, as well as Hegel, worked in large part from the secondary sources, such as Diogenes Laertius, Sextus Empiricus, Plutarch and Aristotle. In spite of this inescapable reliance on secondary sources Marx attempted to discern as distinctly as possible the thought of Democritus and Epicurus. *The Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature* is not adversarial toward these secondary commentators.

This non-adversarial posture changes in the 'Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy', which are largely Marx's evaluation of this secondary source material. The 'Notebooks' are blatantly polemical and the particular target of Marx's attacks was Plutarch. Specifically, Marx rebutted Plutarch's accusations that Epicurus rendered a tranquil life impossible by his atheism. I make this point to distinguish between these two portions of the dissertation and also to indicate that the content and intent of the 'Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy' differ from that of the dissertation.

In Marx's seventh 'Notebook on Epicurean Philosophy' he allowed himself to expostulate on the relationship between philosophy and history. History was the presupposition of philosophy. If philosophy was the study of the past creations of mind no such study could exist without history. Since history, time, was the precondition of mind's study of mind, or philosophy, every philosophy must be approached as an expression of a temporal location and so philosophy could not be anything but a historiography of the projections of mind. Neither the

personality nor the psychology of a philosopher gives his thought importance. Rather each historical stage of philosophy must be seen as a whole, as a unity of historical site with the objectifications of the philosopher. The clash between historical moment and philosophical consciousness establishes a contradiction, a dichotomy between reality and self-consciousness and this is the foundation of critique, the tendency of self-consciousness to explore the divergence of reality and concept.⁵⁷

This personal statement of Marx was essentially a restatement of parts A2 and A3 of Hegel's 'Introduction' to *The History of Philosophy*.

In preceding paragraphs I documented that Marx regarded Hegel as the progenitor of the history of philosophy. Central to the concept of the history of philosophy was the concept of development.⁵⁸ One of the defining elements in the concept of development was time – there could be no development without temporality.

The history of philosophy was the serialization of mind's emanations. The history of philosophy was the study of philosophy in-itself, or it was a chronology of the externalizations produced by mind. In order for philosophy to be historicized the concept of temporal succession was necessary, because ideas such as serialization, periodization, were impossible without the idea of temporality.

History was an axial concept within the Hegelian system, because mind's self-remembrance was impossible without history, without the occasion for mind to conduct a self-observation. For Hegel, historicity applied to every branch of the human sciences.

Marx adopted the Hegelian concept of historicity, but modified its content. Whereas historicity in Hegel was the precondition for mind's self-tutoring historicity in Marx was the development over time of different social formations. Just as Hegel created the historiography of philosophy Marx originated the historiography of social formations. Historiography was a prime feature of Marx's method of explanation in the social sciences.

Marx understood that the development of philosophy was systematic and Marx used the term System in its original Hegelian usage. A System for Hegel was an anatomical structure, or, like an organic totality, a System was a combination of the whole and its parts. Every System possessed a universality, or essence, and consequently every part of that System partook of that universality.

Esoterically, the history of philosophy was the process by which mind remembered its own external projections. Exoterically, the history of philosophy was the temporal succession of philosophic Systems, the Greco-Roman, Medieval and Modern. Each of these philosophical Systems was an organic unit composed of whole and parts.

Marx also borrowed the formula 4 'The Master' for System analysis. Hegel's Method for System analysis became Marx's methodological apparatus for disassembling social formations. Just as Hegel dissected every philosophic System into whole and parts, universal and particular, Marx deconstructed social formations into whole and parts. The logical apparati that Marx used to investigate social totalities was derived from Hegel's theory of the system.

Hegel's method of systematic analysis also included reference to the esoteric and exoteric. By the term esoteric Hegel meant the essence, the in-itself, the power of an object to fulfill its inner telos. By the term exoteric Hegel meant external reality, or the surrounding historical or natural environment. Every philosophic system, for Hegel, was a blending of the esoteric and the exoteric, or a system was the outpouring of essence into the historical conditions and the historical conditions shaped the esoteric. The philosophic totalities Hegel studied, Greco-Roman, Medieval and Germanic, were all composites of the esoteric and exoteric, of the self-determination of the in-itself and the form given to that implicitness by the materiality of history.

Thought did not operate in a vacuum. Just as thought required a reality upon which it objectified itself so reality was that resistance that required thought to objectify itself with the materiality of the real. The process of the productivity of thought was reciprocal, the co-dependence of Idea and reality.

Hegel's concept of historiography exerted an enormous impact on Marx. First, it introduced Marx to the idea of development, but whereas Hegel applied the idea of temporal succession primarily to the realm of theoretical mind, Marx applied it to social formations. Secondly, it introduced Marx to the apparatus of anatomical explanation, but whereas Hegel thought in terms of dividing philosophical shapes in terms of whole and parts Marx later applied this methodology to political-economic formations. Third, Hegel's theories of development and anatomical explanation persuaded him to interpret Western philosophy in terms of three large periods and the later Marx borrowed this theory of periodization and related it to the historicity of social formations. Fourth, Hegel's presentation of philosophy as suffering from a split personality, the esoteric and the exoteric, allowed Marx to validate critique. Since one personality of philosophy must enter reality the esoteric of that personality must be divergent from, discordant with, the real, and this non-congruence was critique. The wing of philosophy that entered the world was always unhappy, always felt estranged, because it could never remake reality into its own image.

3) Marx and the historiography of critique

In another personal statement, this time from the dissertation itself, Marx expressed his belief that the essence of philosophy was critique. Marx supplied the Hegelian Left with a new historiography of philosophy. He presented a revision of Hegel's *The History of Philosophy*. Although Marx still positioned Hegel in the Hegelian Center, Marx promulgated a historiographic justification of the Hegelian Left. Marx's dissertation drew line of continuity between Epicurus and Bauer. Hegelian Speculative philosophy accepted, in the tradition of Kant, the dichotomy between the Idea and reality, between the concept and the concrete, but Hegel did not unite these protocols with free-self-consciousness. Marx accepted this Hegelian contradiction between the Ideas and the concrete, but he added the principle of free self-consciousness. He confirmed the Epicurean strategy of allowing mind to impose a form on matter. Epicurus inserted Idea into reality when he defended on rational grounds the principle of the declination of the

atom, even though it was impossible for him to see an atom. Marx combined all these, the schism between the concept and the concrete with the Epicurean exercise of free self-consciousness, and thereby confirmed Bauer's ideal of critique. For Marx history progressed not by the Speculative unfolding of consciousness, but rather by the application of the free self-consciousness of critique. Political reform, according to Marx, was dependent on the syllabus of critique. Such a syllabus validated the program of political reform of the Hegelian Left. Philosophy always stood in opposition to reality and this duality was the essential dialectic of history.⁵⁹

Marx describes the origins of critique as a specific determination of philosophy. Critique emerges out of the duality, the splitting, the historical destiny of any philosophical system. One wing of a system relates itself to the existent, intermingles with reality, while a second wing remains encased in the implicit, the esoteric. The wing that penetrates into the existent is the practical wing, while the wing that chooses to maintain its inner-directed vision represents the theoretical wing of philosophy.

Critique evolves out of the practical wing. The practical wing is caught in the paradox of essence and existence. The practical energy seeks to make the existent conform to the concept, to transform the existent into a close approximation of the concept. This can never be done and in the attempt of transformation critique is contaminated by reality. When it enters the world critique is polluted by the world. In spite of this impurity the reform of the existent, the bringing of the existent into closer conformity with the concept, is the achievement of critique.

Philosophic Liberals are the adherents of critique because Liberals seek to change reality. German Liberals are the party of reform because when they seek to make the existent accord with essence they necessarily embrace change. If the existent is to conform to the essence the existent must be transformed. Philosophic positivists, those who restrict themselves to theory, refuse to relate theory to the practical, are conservatives, or conservatives are philosophic positivists because they do not confront reality.

Marx identified Hegel with the German Liberal camp. Marx applied a Bauerian interpretation of Hegel, and used the Bauerian idea of critique as a measure for defining the philosophic endeavor. Nevertheless, the fact that Marx assumed that it was possible to graft Hegel and Bauer to each other illustrated that Marx saw the 'Parmenides of Berlin' as a member of the Hegelian Center.

Although Hegel himself did not practice critique his philosophy possessed those instruments that led to critique. The philosophical presuppositions of Hegelianism contributed to the generation of the transformative power of critique and therefore Hegel was a member of the Center as well as being-in-himself a German Liberal. The idea that a wing of philosophy could turn itself against the world was Hegelian and so Hegel not only prepared the way for Bauer, but also for German Liberal reformism. The dissertation was the first occasion in which Marx used the duality of theory and practice. Early in his career Marx was involved in the controversy over theory and practice and it is clear that he favored the practical side.

Additionally, the paragraphs quoted above from Marx's dissertation are filled with a Hegelian vocabulary. Marx employed such Hegelian terms as 'immanent determination', 'self-consciousness', 'totality', 'appearance', 'essence-existence' and 'realization'. Marx could not explain his definition of critique without using this lexicon and this illustrates both Marx's dependence on and perpetuation of Hegelian ideas. The fact that Hegel originated these ideas, the whole theme of the concept reconstructing the existent, proves that Hegel in-himself laid the basis of Liberal Hegelianism.

4) Marx and the defense of Hegel

In the section in the dissertation entitled 'General Difference in Principle between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature' Marx set forth a three-pronged defense of Hegel.

First, Marx challenged the integrity of those who accused Hegel of selling out to the Prussian monarchy. Marx averred that many who attacked Hegel after his death were once pupils of 'The Master'. Those who maligned Hegel were dishonest to themselves, or showed their own inconsistency by impugning the teacher who once assisted them in their careers.

Second, Marx identified himself with Hegel's understanding of philosophy. Hegel sought the reconciliation between philosophy and reality, or reality's realization of philosophy. Marx accepted this Hegelian goal, but emphasized that in order to progress, philosophy must critique the world. According to Marx the matrix by which to measure the reconciliation of philosophy with the world was the degree to which reality was transformed in order to accord with philosophy.

Third, Marx identified Hegel as a Liberal. Philosophy was an instrument of Liberalism when it criticized reality and thereby altered the concrete. Philosophy was a Liberal endeavor when it assisted in the reconstructing of the concrete so the Idea dwelled in the concrete. When Marx defined Hegelian philosophy as Liberal he simultaneously classified Hegel as a Liberal. When Hegel asserted that philosophy was at odds with the world and thereby recognized that philosophy could only reconcile with reality if reality was modified Hegel established the propaedeutic of Hegelian Liberalism.⁶⁰

Marx refuted those accusations that Hegel was an 'accommodationist'. To those who sought to invalidate the philosophy of Hegel by tarnishing him as an 'accommodationist' to the Hohenzollern monarchy Marx pointed to the Hegelian esoteric, to the consistency of Hegelian principles. According to Marx the foundational axioms of Hegelian philosophy had persisted throughout the life of 'The Master' and this constancy disproved all claims that Hegel accommodated himself to the esoteric, to the politically powerful.⁶¹

Marx defended Hegel against accusations that the Hegel who came to lecture at the University of Berlin in 1818 was an apologist for the Prussian Crown. The term 'accommodationist' carried two imputations against Hegel: that Hegel's later writings were justifications of the Hohenzollern monarchy as a repayment for the favors and largesse he enjoyed from the Prussian King; and that this

'accommodation' was not carried out on any intellectual grounds, but rather revealed a weakness in Hegel's moral stature since Hegel's alleged movement to the Right was purely executed on the basis of his own self-interest and vanity.

Marx rebuked those who vilified Hegel for their hypocrisy, disloyalty and narrow-mindedness. In his view they were deceitful because they forgot that in the immediate past they were students of Hegel and were passionate supporters of his philosophy. They moved precipitously from being apostles of Hegel's philosophy to indictors of Hegel's morality.

Marx referred to Hegel as 'The Master' and in using this phrase alluded to the former loyalty pupils exercised toward Hegel. Marx decried the fact that the former loyalists of Hegel now admonished 'The Master', but Marx condemned the admonitions as an 'un-philosophical trend', in other words not worthy of serious consideration. Marx himself chose to remain an adherent of Hegel.

Marx also felt that these new opponents were also too subjective, that their criticisms of Hegel did not conform to sound philosophical principles. A criticism must be objective, must relate to the internal principles of a philosophic discourse, but recent opponents of Hegel eschewed the objective and relied only upon their personal judgments. Without any substantial basis to their arguments these enemies of Hegel merely revealed their opinions as 'mere ignorance' or superficiality.

In his defense of Hegel, Marx charged these who impugned Hegel as shallow. For example, these prosecutors compared Hegel to Socrates and in drawing this analogy attempted to show that just as Socrates was guilty of subverting the Athenians' gods so Hegel was guilty of undermining the Prussian Crown. To some critics he was an 'accommodationist', while to others he subverted the legitimacy of the Prussian Crown. Regarding the Socratic parallel Marx wrote: 'It is self-evident how stupid was the comparison drawn in recent times between the relation of Hegelian philosophy to the life and case of Socrates, from which the justification for condemning the Hegelian philosophy was deduced.'⁶²

His dissertation must be assessed as an indicator of the contending forces that caused the disintegration of Hegelianism. Marx offered two reasons for the disappearance of a totalizing philosophic System, historical and immanent development.

Viewed from the temporal perspective, history offers many illustrations of the disintegration of a total philosophical system. The greatness of Plato and Aristotle was followed by the decline of Roman thought. Marx's dissertation was an example of the fragmentation that follows as a total system declines. The appearance of Epicureanism, Stoicism and Scepticism were the individual systems that splintered off from Platonic and Aristotelian universality.

Previous paragraphs described Marx's analysis of the immanent development of a philosophic system, the internal dualism between the exoteric and esoteric. His dissertation also contains passages in which Marx describes the immanent development of philosophers in themselves, and these persons also suffer from an internal dualism, or 'these individual self-consciousnesses always carry a double-edged knife, one edge turned against the world and the other against philosophy in itself'. Like the duality of a total philosophic system the subjective consciousness

of an individual philosopher is also dualistic, composed of competing esoteric and exoteric gravities. Just as philosophy in-itself is exoteric, and extends itself to oppose the external, so the consciousness of an individual philosopher turns itself against the philosophy to which it was tied. In one case the immanent development of a philosophic system turns 'one edge' against reality, while in the case of the immanent development of an individual philosopher 'one edge' attempts to free itself from a total philosophic system. In the case of historic development Marx analyzes the immanent development of a total philosophic system, while in the case of an individual philosopher, a subjectivity, Marx analyzes the reaction of this subjectivity.

The dissolution of the Hegelian school followed the model of the subject. The fragmentation of the Hegelian school was an example of how subjects who desire their own freedom turn against a total philosophic system.

In 1841 Marx himself did not follow the model of subjective liberation from a total philosophic system. Marx did not seek to escape from the Hegelian Center. The preceding discussion does not show a Marx fleeing from Hegel, but rather a young doctor of philosophy who remained loyal to 'The Master'. Marx's adherence to the Hegelian Center rested upon two presuppositions; adopting the exoteric-esoteric model, the formula of immanent development, Marx would turn philosophy against the world as critique and he would use Bauer's free self-consciousness as the instrument by which to carry out this critique.

5) Marx's first evaluation of the political

The 'Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy' provide illuminating insights into Marx's understanding of the political philosophy of Hegel. In order to assess Marx's approach to Hegel's philosophy of the state in 1841 it is necessary to outline Hegel's contribution to this discipline since it is a logical requirement to first become familiar with Hegel's text, *The Philosophy of Right*, before it is possible to comprehend Marx's commentary on this text.

Deeper insight into Marx's relation to Hegel in general and the area of political philosophy in particular will be gained by drawing attention to the difference between the Marx of 1841 and 1843, and these differences occur in two contexts: between Marx himself over time and in Marx's perception of Hegel's political philosophy.

In terms of the first context, the Marx of the 1843 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' was at total variance with the Marx of the 1841 'Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy'. While the Marx of the 1843 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' vehemently repudiated Hegel's philosophy of state, the Marx of the 1841 'Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy' did not totally repudiate Hegelian political theory. In 1843 Marx absolutely rejected the Hegelian idea of substance, while in 1841 Marx only resituated this concept.

Interestingly, Epicurus did bring Marx into contact with Rousseau and the social contract theory of the state. When Marx prepared his dissertation he became aware of the Epicurean-Athenian notions of natural right and the social contract. The precursors of Rousseau lived in Athens.

In Heft I of his *exzerpte*, 'Epikur an Herodit', to his dissertation Marx copied the following two quotes from Epicurus:

- 1) Justice is not in itself a Being, but a mutual agreement, a consent upon which a contract is concluded forbidding any person from either suffering from or inflicting harm.⁶³
- 2) For all forms of life which have not concluded a contract preventing a person from either inflicting harm or suffering harm there is neither Right nor Injustice.⁶⁴

Four years later Marx confirmed that he read these political statements of Epicurus as a precursor to social contract theory. In 'The Leipzig Council' Marx acknowledged that he read Epicurus as a thousand-year-old antecedent to Rousseau when Marx wrote: '... it is sufficient to mention that the idea that a state rests on the mutual agreement of people, on a *contrat social*, is found for the first time on Epicurus.'⁶⁵

Epicurus may have introduced Rousseau and contract theory to Marx, but not to the question of ethicality and the state. In terms of the second context the Marx of 1841 and of 1843 completely overlooked the significance ethicality played in Hegelian political philosophy. Neither in the 1841 'Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy' nor in the 1843 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' does Marx ever allude to the ethical nature of the state in Hegel. Marx ignored the pre-eminent role ethics played in Hegel's concept of the state. Additionally, a difference existed between how Marx dealt with Hegel's 'Idea-as-Subject' formula in his 1843 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' and his 1841 'Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy'. Marx's denunciation of Hegel's philosophy of state in 1843 devolved directly from his complete refutation of the formula of 'Ideas-as-Subject' and therefore 'State-as-Predicate', while in 1841 the modality of 'Idea-as-Subject' played no role. In 1841 Marx remained true to the Hegelian concept of substance, but in 1843 he abandoned this logic.

In Volume II of *The History of Philosophy* Hegel refers to the state as a 'moral organism'.⁶⁶ In previous paragraphs I documented that Marx read *The History of Philosophy* because his dissertation was a revision of both that work in general and in particular of Hegel's evaluation of Epicurus.

Ethicality was the product of intersubjectivity, or ethicality could not arise before the existence of sociability. Civil society was a precondition of ethicality, because ethicality only developed from the mutual recognition of distinct individualities. Hegel passionately denounced the theory of natural rights, Rousseau in particular, because of its radical individualism and its contract theory of the state. Ethicality, for Hegel, was not the product of individual conscience, but rather the recognition of a multitude in civil society that required intersubjective respect.

Ethicality then progressed into substance and substance was the unity of universality conscience, the common presuppositions that gave rise to a culture. Substance was that universal conviction that created unity between individuals, or an inherent belief that transcended the particular and engendered a social collectivity.

Substance was a product of the evolution of Spirit as it traversed its three stages, Subjective Spirit, Objective Spirit and Absolute Spirit. Substance belonged to the stage of the Objective Spirit, the level at which Spirit organized civil society and the state. Objective Spirit advanced beyond Subjective Spirit because Subjective Spirit concerned only the atomistic behavior of the subjectivity. A conflict existed between the evolutionary stages in the teleology of Spirit, between atomism and substance. Whereas the subject was the atom, substance was the communitarian. Whereas the subject valued the particular over the collectivity, substance presumed the superiority of a political association over the isolated and self-absorbed subject obeying his own will.

The greatness of Hellenic culture derived from the Greek discovery of subjectivity. Whereas the Oriental World never recognized subjectivity because of its total immersion in metaphysics, the Hellenic world, beginning with their art and religion, was able to discover the freedom of the subject. Hegel maintained the Seven Sages, of which Solon was one, proclaimed the discovery of subjectivity, even though Greek subjectivity had not won its independence from nature.⁶⁷

In *The History of Philosophy* Hegel depicts the typology of the 'wise man' as the inauguration of radical subjectivity in Greece. Initially articulated by the Sophists, the social model of the 'wise man' extolled the search for private tranquility, the escape from any source of disquiet. This search for psychological repose entailed the withdrawal of the person from the affairs of the polis. Tranquility was the antipode to the *zoon politikon* of the polis. The 'wise man' consequently retreated from substance. The state was substance and when the 'wise man' withdrew from substance he surrendered any engagement in the affairs of state and, therefore, all involvement in the ethical life of the community. The charge that Hegel brought against the 'wise man' of the Sophists he also enlarged to include the 'wise man' of the Sceptics and Epicureans.⁶⁸

The clash between subjectivity and substance received its classical formulation in Hegel's portrayal of Socrates. Hegel agreed with the Athenian court that condemned Socrates. Since the Athenian court represented the substance of the polis, when Hegel expressed his agreement with the court he defended the sovereignty of substance over the claims of self-centered subjectivity.

The History of Philosophy recognizes the genius of Socrates. In preparing the way for Plato and Aristotle, Socrates laid the foundation for the Golden Age of Greece. In his dialogic method Socrates also introduced one element of dialectic thought. The dialogues of Plato portray Socrates as employing negation and opposition and therefore Socrates was the first to use contradiction as a dialectical tool.

But Socrates also exemplified radical self-consciousness. He carried the right of subjectivity to an extreme and this challenged the substantive principles of the Greek polis. The tragedy of Socrates illustrated the clash between a consciousness that was responsible only to the Self and the trans-individual nature of substance. A consciousness only responsive to the 'I' was singularly corrosive to the universality of substance. The 'I' of Socrates abrogated the socio-political duty of the *zoon politikon*. In this jurisdiction the Athenian court had no choice but to find Socrates guilty of subverting the young because the court had to uphold the priority of

substance over subjectivity. The decline of Greece after the trial of Socrates proved that the court acted correctly.⁶⁹ For Hegel it was justifiable that the substance of the state took precedence over the atomism of self-conscious subjectivity that led only to self-seeking and the pursuit of private interests over general well-being.

In dealing with the antithesis between substance and subjectivity, Marx, contrary to Hegel but true to Bauer, defended the priority of subjectivity. In his dissertation Marx was an acolyte of Socrates, and recognized Socrates as the apotheosis of self-consciousness. In the debate over Socrates, Marx abandoned Hegel and embraced Bauer, or Marx judged Socrates as an ancestor of Bauer.

Interestingly, in his dissertation Marx does not directly address the Hegelian Idea of the state as ethical substance. Marx read *The History of Philosophy*, *The Philosophy of History* and *The Philosophy of Right* and in all these texts Hegel defines, at length, ethicality as the substance of the state. In 1841 Marx does not discuss this issue. In 1843 Marx nullifies Hegel's philosophy of state on the grounds that it was a predicate of the Idea rather than deal with the issue of ethicality.

This omission is particularly surprising because in the 1841 dissertation Marx has a footnote that references paragraph 552 in the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* and this paragraph is located in Volume Three, or *The Philosophy of Mind*.⁷⁰ This paragraph occurs in a subdivision of the book entitled 'The Moral Life or Social Ethics' and paragraph 552 describes the evolution of the Athenian *zoon politikon*, clearly stipulating that the state was in its substance an ethical association.⁷¹ In spite of the fact that Marx was cognizant of the Hegelian Idea of the state as an ethical organism, by 1841 he ignores this issue in his dissertation and in 1843 he rejects Hegel's political theory for entirely different reasons.

But Marx is pro-Socratic. He views Socrates as a precursor to Bauer, or he sees Socrates as an exponent of subjective self-consciousness. Socrates becomes a wedge between Marx and Hegel, for whereas Hegel refuted Socrates' defense of self-consciousness, Marx applauds Socrates' espousal of free subjectivity. Marx drew a line of continuity between Socrates and Epicurus and saw them both as exponents of free self-consciousness.

The fact that Marx declared his loyalty to free self-consciousness does not mean he rejected the Spinoza–Hegel ideas of substance. In Marx substance underwent a transmutation, but this metamorphosis did not occur until the 1844 'The Manuscripts'. In these manuscripts subjectivity was defined as labor, and labor was taken as the source of substance. Marx retained the Hegelian form of substance, but he changed its content. Substance still existed, but substance was now labor, or labor was that emanation which formed the cohesiveness of reality.

Free self-consciousness was the launching pad for the critique of reality. Marx's self-definition placed him as an inheritor of the Socratic–Epicurean traditions. Whereas Hegel saw these traditions as in decline, Marx saw them as rejuvenating the philosophy of the time.

Marx's adherence to the Socratic–Epicurean–Bauerian tradition of critical self-consciousness lasted from 1841 until February 1844 when he published his 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction'. In this 1844 work Marx moves from critical self-consciousness to the class consciousness of the proletariat.

As I indicated earlier, by 1844, in his 'On the Jewish Question', Marx detached himself from Bauer. This does not mean that Marx surrendered the idea of critique, but he did surrender the idea of subjective self-consciousness. Marx kept the instrument of critique, but he changed the agent from subjectivity to the proletarian class.

6) Marx and Hegel and the philosophy of nature

Continuing in the footsteps of Hegel, the Marx of the 1841 dissertation maintained that thought provided the interpretative architecture for the understanding of nature. Sense perception in itself provided only diffuse, molecular parts without a unity and only thought bestowed a rational totality upon nature. In his 1837 letter to his father Marx had already committed himself 'to seek the Idea in the real itself'.⁷²

Further elucidation of the role that rationality played in Hegel and Marx in the interpretation of nature is necessary at this point and a distinction must be drawn between subject and essence.

Marx and Hegel disagreed over the role of subjectivity, or free self-consciousness. Although Hegel recognized that the Greeks' discovery of subjectivity supplied the energy for their greatness he also argued that radical subjectivity was a source both of political decay and moral degeneration. Radical subjectivity situated the individual over a universality and for Hegel universality was the foundation of personal and political ethicality. Contravening Hegel, Marx judged free self-consciousness as the foundation of philosophic greatness. Subjectivity led to critique and critique was the instrument for overcoming the disjuncture between thought and reality.

Although Hegel and Marx disagreed over the role of free self-consciousness they agreed over the power of reason to determine. Even though Marx valued subjectivity to a greater degree than Hegel he was in perfect accord with Hegel over the principle that thought provided meaning to reality, or thought actualized reality so it was imbued with rationality and was therefore cognizant.

Marx never claimed that Epicurus privileged sense perception over thought. One of the major differences Marx drew between Democritus and Epicurus was that Democritus was more the empiricist while Epicurus upheld the principle that thought was the immanence of subjectivity. The picture of the natural world advanced by Epicurus was photographed by the camera of thought.

In the second notebook in the 'Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy' Marx commented:

... and the modern rational outlook on nature must first raise itself to the point from which the ancient Ionian philosophy, in principle at least, begins ... the point of seeing the divine, The Idea, embodied in nature.⁷³

This was the exact same sentiment that Marx expressed in his 1837 letter when he wrote that that he was 'seeking the Idea in reality itself'.

In terms of the vantage point of reason Marx agreed with Hegel that nature or materialism could only be fathomed according to the architecture of thought.

Clearly, vast differences divided Marx's and Hegel's understanding of reason. While Hegel looked upon thought as the essence of the human, Marx interpreted labor as the essence. Marx denounced the rational ontology of Hegel. However, Marx's negation of Hegelian Speculative philosophy does not mean that Marx embraced the inductive epistemology of sense perception. Marx believed that reason made sense data comprehensible, it was the ultimate structural tool. The difference between Hegel and Marx over the nature of reason was the difference between essence and methodology. Whereas Hegel looked upon reason as essence Marx looked upon reason as a methodological device. Reason for Marx was an architect; it was not the origin of substance.⁷⁴

As I indicated previously Marx never abandons philosophy, but rather repositions its functions. Philosophy was a presence in Marx's thought throughout his life, although the meaning that Marx attributed to philosophy underwent changes in terms of the different periods of his life. However, Marx's application of philosophy was never totally Hegelian and the dissertation was Bauerian critique, but Bauerian critique was a form of philosophy. In Hegel, philosophy enjoyed an ontological independence from the external, reason was immanent emergence. For Marx, although reason was not a mere reflection of the external, as set forth by Engels in his debasement of Marx as dialectical materialism, it was not reducible to sense perception. While external phenomena supplied the content of reason the philosophical was an organizational function that supplied meaning to the external. Philosophy decided upon specific categories, methodologies, which interpreted the phenomenon. For Marx, reason was not origin, but a function that allowed the structuring of the external.

Marx welcomed the advancement of materialism since the Scientific Revolution. The bibliography to his dissertation contains a citation to Feuerbach's *Geschichte der Neuern Philosophie von Bacon von Verulam bis Benedict Spinoza* which is essentially a history of materialism since the 15th century. Marx looked upon materialism as a liberation from Medieval theology and a source of political reform for Germany in the early 19th century. Hegel, too, also embraced the emergence of modern science, although within the boundaries of his Idealism. Finally, Marx's dissertation itself studied Hellenic materialism and asserted that the 19th century must again return to the Greek dedication to and research of nature.

But this embrace of materialism was never an embrace of the inductive system of Locke and Hume, or of British empiricism. Rather, it was thoroughly Hegelian, because Marx remained true to the Hegelian principle that thought was the translator of materialism. Reality provided the data, but the reason was the shape, the code by which nature was deciphered.

Further evidence of Marx's belief that thought provided comprehensibility to nature is also to be found in the Second Notebook of his 'Notebook on Epicurean Philosophy'. At the end of this notebook Marx reflects on the nature of time:

. . . hence is relegated to outside the material principle, outside the atom itself . . . Time is rather the fate of nature of the finite. Negative unity with itself, its internal necessity.⁷⁵

The definition Marx offered of time in the above quotation is a paraphrase of Hegel's definition of time in his *The Philosophy of Nature*. In paragraph 257 of *The Philosophy of Nature* Hegel wrote: 'Negativity, thus posited for itself, is Time.'⁷⁶ In paragraph 258 Hegel wrote: 'Time as the negative unity of self-externality.'⁷⁷

Hegel initially proposed time as negation; time annulled matter in itself because matter lacked permanence. Matter changed, it had a past, present and future, or history, and so time was the force of negation making it inevitable for a material object to traverse the path from past to future. Marx reiterated the Hegelian concept of time as negativity. Marx incorporated Hegel's concept of history.⁷⁸

When Marx in the 1841 dissertation took this step he additionally demonstrated his complete agreement with Hegel's principle that reason supplied comprehensibility to nature. In the same 'Notebook on Epicurean Philosophy' Marx stated that 'as the God of Aristotle enjoys the greatest bliss, theory'.⁷⁹ He therein expressed his own conviction that theory, reason, was the demiurge rendering the world rational and therefore comprehensible to subjective mind. It is important to note that Aristotle was a significant presence in Marx's dissertation and in footnotes Marx documented that by 1841 he read, among other texts, Aristotle's 'On the Soul', Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, *On the Heavens* and *On the Generation of Animals*, and Marx equated Aristotle's position in Greek philosophy to that of Alexander the Great of Macedonia.

Marx's adherence to the Hegelian doctrine that reason supplied comprehensibility to nature is further proven by his 'Plan of Hegel's Philosophy of Nature' which was outlined in 1839. As Marx began his research for his dissertation, as he started his studies of antique materialism, he read the second volume of the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, *The Philosophy of Nature*. Marx made three outlines of *The Philosophy of Nature* and it was Hegel's writings on nature in both *The Philosophy of Nature* and *The History of Philosophy*, along with Feuerbach, that introduced Marx to the study of materialism.

It is important to point out that it is difficult to ascertain Marx's own intellectual beliefs from these summaries since it is possible that Marx was only transcribing a Hegel manuscript. A transcription does not necessarily indicate agreement with that manuscript. Recognizing this caveat I maintain that Marx's 'Plan of Hegel's Philosophy of Nature' documents Marx's agreement in 1841 with the Hegelian employment of reason to interpret nature. I base this conclusion on the fact that Marx's statements in the 'Plan' are initial statements later repeated in his dissertation. A theoretic unity connects the 'Plan' and dissertation and I take this as proof that the 'Plan' is an expression of Marx's philosophical opinions.

I refer to the 'First Version' of Marx's 'Plan'.⁸⁰ In this presentation Marx recapitulates Hegel's table of contents from *The Philosophy of Nature* and divides nature into mechanics, physics and organics. Consequently, Marx demonstrates his adoption of the logic of Hegel's interpretation of nature.

This division of nature into mechanics, physics and organics is a syllogistic interpretation of nature. According to Hegelian logic, both in *The Science of Logic* and the 'Smaller Logic', the Idea proceeds in three stages: universality, particularity and individuality. Particularity negates the universal and out of this contradiction between the universal and particular a reconciliation is reached,

and out of this reconciliation an individuality emerges. Hegel applied the 'Smaller Logic' to nature and the tripartite division of Idea into universality, particularity and individuality is mirrored in nature as mechanics, physics and organics.

I am not claiming here that Marx converted to Hegel's Idealistic syllogistic interpretation of nature. I employ Marx's 'Plan of Hegel's Philosophy of Nature' to establish Marx's awareness of the organizing capacity of thought. When Marx wrote that he looked for 'Idea' in reality he asserted his conviction that empiricism was incapable of supplying meaning. What is central to my argument is Marx's commitment to the principle that thought endowed the external world with comprehensibility. Reason was the methodology for rendering the external comprehensible.

I maintain that Hegel himself was the founder of the Hegelian Center. Gans and Michelet were the legitimate heirs of Hegel; the Hegelian essence was most closely approximated by Gans and Michelet. Obviously, there were differences between Hegel and these two epigones, but the message of Hegel was best replicated in the language of Gans and Michelet.

Phase Three: Marx and the *Rheinische Zeitung*

Part One: Hegel and Marx at the *Rheinische Zeitung*

In this Phase I will show that Marx's journalism during the period January 1842 until March 17, 1843, for the most part contained in the *Rheinische Zeitung*, both presented Hegel as a member of the Hegelian Center and defined Marx as a representative of the Hegelian Center. The first newspaper article Marx put on paper, 'Comments on the Latest Prussian Censorship Instruction', was written between January 15 and February 10, 1842, but due to censorship restrictions was not published until 1843 in Switzerland in Ruge's *Anekdoten*, and his final piece of journalism appeared on March 17, 1843, announcing his resignation from the *Rheinische Zeitung*.¹

Before proceeding to a deep probe into Marx's journalism, a sketch of the political and philosophical environments in 1842–1843 is in order. Marx began writing for the *Rheinische Zeitung* in March 1842, became editor of the newspaper in October 1842 and under pressure from the Prussian censor resigned on March 17, 1843. Frederick Wilhelm IV came to the Prussian Throne in 1840 and initiated a Hohenzollern feudal reaction and from 1840 until his departure for Paris in October 1843 Marx lived in a period of monarchic-clerical conservatism.

Frederick Wilhelm IV attacked the Hegelian Center on the basis that it was anti-monarchical. He initiated a purge of the Hegelian Center from the Prussian university system and not only was Marx himself denied a license to teach in Prussia after he received his PhD from the University of Jena, but Bauer was suspended from the University of Bonn in March 1842. Frederick Wilhelm IV not only sought to silence the Hegelian Center, but also the intellectual influence of Hegel himself. For this purpose he brought Schelling to the University of Berlin to deliver lectures which started in November 1841, negating Hegelian metaphysics. The repudiations of both the religious and political Right served to bolster the image of the 'Parmenides of Berlin' as a German Liberal. In addition to these assaults on Prussian universities Frederick Wilhelm IV succeeded in suppressing liberal newspapers throughout Prussia. Denying the principle of freedom of the press, officials in the Prussian Government repressed two journals edited by Ruge, the *Hallische Jahrbücher* in June 1841 and the *Deutsche Jahrbücher* in January 1843. Ruge, an important influence on Marx, was ultimately forced to leave Prussia and migrate to Switzerland where he launched another periodical, the short-lived *Anekdoten* in 1843. Frederick Wilhelm's emasculation of the Liberal press also victimized Marx when he was compelled to terminate his employment at the *Rheinische Zeitung* in March 1843. The two unemployed editors, Marx and Ruge, became expatriates, imitating Heinrich Heine and Ludwig Börne, and relocated to Paris where they collaborated on the publication of the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*, but the journal only printed one edition before its extinction.

Within the context of the Prussian reaction, as a riposte against the Prussian monarchy's attempt to discredit Hegel, a defense of Hegel also appeared as a defense of German Liberalism. From the perspective of the Prussian reaction, Hegel and German Liberalism were fused. When he wrote for the *Rheinische*

Zeitung Marx, for the most part, did not defend Hegel himself, as this could be a provocation to the Prussian censor, but Marx did advocate the same policies Hegel advanced. Marx championed the causes of free speech, free press, separation of Church and State, the right to divorce and emancipation of the Jews, and these were all policies supported by Hegel in *The Philosophy of Right*. Within the context of the reactionary policies of the Hohenzollern Throne and the Evangelical Church the justification of Hegelian policies was also a justification of Hegel himself and of the Hegelian Center. This stance formed the core of Marx's journalism in the *Rheinische Zeitung*.

Cologne was the center of Rhineland Liberalism and the *Rheinische Zeitung* was the mouthpiece of this Rhineland Liberal business class. Fearful of the outreach of the Prussian reaction the owners of the newspaper needed the paper to espouse moderate Liberal positions. Marx was brought to the paper to preserve its centrist position. The owners, as well as Marx, feared that an extreme Liberal posture would bring about the repression of the paper and thus the survival of the newspaper was contingent upon its moderation. Indeed, on February 10, 1842 Marx wrote a letter to Ruge requesting that an article he submitted to the *Deutsche Jahrbücher* not carry his name, his authorship not be made public.²

In addition to the politico-philosophical circumstances surrounding the Cologne newspaper Marx's approach was also conditioned by two other factors: his 1841 reading of Hegel's *The Philosophy of Right* and his relationship to Ruge.

The *Mega2* contains an extremely important document relating to Marx's knowledge of *The Philosophy of Right*. Division IV, Subdivision I (*Mega2* IV/1) contains an *exzerpte* Marx copied in 1841.³ This *exzerpte* consists of, among other references, a few brief comments Marx wrote, condensations of his impressions, of *The Philosophy of Right*. I will not evaluate this *exzerpte* here because the content is more appropriate to the later portions of this book.

However, I make reference at this point to this *exzerpte* for two reasons: first, it establishes that by 1841 Marx was already conducting an in-depth reading of Hegel's *The Philosophy of Right*; second, by 1842–1843 Marx was writing journalism on Hegelian politics for the *Rheinische Zeitung* and therefore these *exzerpte* comments are important clues concerning Marx's evaluation of both Hegelian politics and Hegelian political philosophy. In his brief impressions Marx described *The Philosophy of Right* as a form of 'logical mysticism', and as displaying a 'mystical manner of expression'.⁴ Marx felt that in Hegel's philosophy of politics 'The Idea was subject' and 'The real Subjects were reduced to mere names'.⁵ Marx's evaluation of Hegel's political philosophy in 1841 was exactly the same as his 1843 assessment in the 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' when he called Hegel's political philosophy a 'logical pantheism'.

In order to understand Marx's relation to *The Philosophy of Right* it is necessary to draw a distinction between Hegel's politics and Hegel's political philosophy. Hegelian politics concerned the theory of the state and during his involvement with the *Rheinische Zeitung* Marx concurred with Hegel's theory of the state. Marx rejected Hegelian political philosophy because he saw it as an expression of Speculative philosophy. For Hegel the Idea was the ultimate source of predication

and the external was mere names. Marx did apply philosophy, or reason, to politics, but not Idealism. Both Hegel and Marx were German Liberals and both upheld the principles of a constitutional monarchy. During the *Rheinische Zeitung* period Marx and Hegel agreed on the politics of the state, but not the philosophy of politics.

Marx's appropriation of Hegel's theory of the state is affirmed in an insightful article by Andrew Chitty, 'The Basis of the State in Marx in 1842'.⁶ Chitty correctly recognized that Marx agreed with Hegel's theory of the state throughout most of his *Rheinische Zeitung* journalism. Chitty wrote: 'Thus, echoing Hegel almost to the word, Marx can say that law "is right because it is the positive existence of freedom".'⁷ Later in the same essay Chitty reaffirmed his belief in the continuity between Hegel and Marx, writing: 'So far it looks as if Marx's conception of the essence of the state in 1842 in close to Hegel's.'⁸ Chitty's opinion is in accord with the interpretation put forth earlier by Michael Löwy in his book *The Theory of Revolution in the Young Marx*.⁹

Reiterating Hegel, Marx in 1842–1843 viewed politics and the theory of the state as branches of philosophy. In paragraph 258 of *The Philosophy of Right* Hegel wrote:

The state is absolutely rational inasmuch as it is the actuality of the substantial will which it possesses in the particular self-consciousness once that self-consciousness has been raised to consciousness of its universality. This substantial unity as an absolute unmoved end in itself, in which freedom comes into its supreme right. On the other hand this final end has supreme right against the individual, whose supreme duty is to be a member of the state.¹⁰

To fully grasp the relationship between Marx and Hegel regarding the interconnection between the state and philosophy it is necessary to divide this issue into three parts: politics, political philosophy and philosophy-in-itself.

Both Marx and Hegel assumed politics to be a synonym for the state. Politics meant the institutional structures of the state. From the vantage point of Germany Marx and Hegel were in complete accord and both were German Liberals and both sought to reform Germany in the direction of a constitutional monarchy with a representative parliament. During Marx's tenure at the *Rheinische Zeitung* he was a defender of Hegelian politics.

Marx repudiated Hegelian political philosophy. For Hegel political philosophy was the study of how Idea predicated reality. As a Speculative philosopher Hegel maintained that the Idea was subject, that the external were merely a projection of the Idea. Marx rejected both Hegelian Speculative philosophy and his political philosophy and did not think the state as creation of the Idea. Marx's negation of Speculative philosophy was already accomplished in his dissertation because his adoption of Bauerian critique was simultaneously a nullification of Speculative philosophy.

However, Marx's rebuttal of Speculative philosophy was not a refutation of philosophy-in-itself. Marx never denounced philosophy-in-itself and he did apply

philosophy-in-itself to the state, but never claimed that the Idea was either the substance, or the essence, of the state. In his journalism Marx looked upon the state as rational, as the institutionalization of rational principles, but this is vastly different than proposing that the state was solely a determination of the Idea. For Marx applying reason to the state meant designing a political organism that resulted in the self-determination of its inhabitants. Depending upon the historical circumstances of the time, adjusting to the political conditions of the epoch, the application of philosophy to the state meant creating an organization in which every branch functioned to realize the will and rights of its citizens. Marx's demolition of Hegel's Speculative philosophy did not mean that he additionally repudiated Hegelian methodology. The last pages of this Phase will itemize the exact categories of Hegelian methodology that Marx perpetuated.

Hegel's paragraph 258 in *The Philosophy of Right* quoted above defended the state as founded in reason and as a universality. When Hegel applied the concept of universality to the state he conceived of the state as an organism, as a totality, unified under a common principle. Marx concurred with Hegel's theory of rationality and universality and in 1842–1843 Marx approached the state from the perspective of these two philosophic prerequisites.

Marx's Liberal Hegelianism was also visible in his 1842–1843 correspondence with Ruge. This correspondence is indispensable to an understanding of the development of the Young Marx and Ruge's own journalism. In this regard Marx's March 5, 1842 letter to Ruge is pivotal.

First, the letter contains the following sentence: 'Another article which I also intend for the *Deutsche Jahrbücher* is a criticism of Hegelian natural law . . .'¹¹ Marx's assimilation of Bauerian critique played an enormous role in his philosophical maturation and it is impossible to correctly understand the March 5, 1842 letter to Ruge without summarizing Marx's movement toward critique. Therefore, in the following paragraphs I will briefly chart the early evolution of critique in Marx's thought.

Marx began writing for the Cologne newspaper in January 1842 after he was denied a teaching position at a Prussian university. His March 5, 1842 letter to Ruge was written in anger at the Prussian repression and did express Marx's wish to write a 'critique of Hegelian natural rights'.¹² In August, 1842 Marx wrote to Dagobert Oppenheim about a 'criticism' he planned to write about Hegel's politics.¹³ Three months after writing this letter to Oppenheim, after he was made editor of the *Rheinische Zeitung*, Marx published an article, 'A Contribution to the Debate over the Divorce Law' in the November 15, 1842 issue of the newspaper. Marx appended the following subtitle to this article, 'Critique of a Critique'.¹⁴ The subtitle used in this article was an echo of the subtitle he appended to his 1845 *The Holy Family* which read 'Critique of Critical Critique'. Marx's use of the formula of critique was perfected in his 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' which he wrote between March and October 1843, while he lived with his in-laws in Kreuznach. In terms of Marx's adoption of critique a line of continuity runs through this period from the dissertation to the 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right', and it was only in this essay that Marx declared his independence from

both Hegelian politics and the definition of the state. Critique became an indispensable instrument in Marx's definition of philosophy, allowing him to embark upon his own search for a politics and theory of the state, allowing him to overthrow the discipline of political economy as practiced by Smith, Ricardo and Jean-Baptiste Say, and establish his own method of social explanation.

Second, the March 5, 1842 letter to Ruge contains additional sentences to the one I quoted above that are crucial to an understanding of the evolution of the Hegel-Marx relationship. It is necessary to quote them in full because of their importance. After I quote them I analyze them one sentence at a time.

Another article which I also intended for the *Deutsche Jahrbücher* is a criticism of Hegelian natural law, insofar as it concerns the internal political system. (1) The central point is the struggle against constitutional monarchy as a hybrid which from beginning to end contradicts and abolishes itself. (2) Res publica is quite untranslatable into German. (3)¹⁵

Sentence (1) states that Marx's criticism of Hegel relates only to the 'internal political system'. Marx does not intend to criticize constitutional monarchy in-itself, but only the internal system.

Sentence (2) asserts the battle against constitutional monarchy is fruitless as such a confrontation only 'contradicts and abolishes itself'. It is best not to wage warfare against the monarchy in-itself.

Sentence (3) is not a demand for a German republic, or the overthrow of monarchy. It is rather a declaration that Prussia is not ready for a republic, or that Prussian socio-political conditions will not support a republican form of government.

These three sentences disavow any republican intentions on the part of Marx. They affirm his awareness that constitutional monarchy is the appropriate form of government for Prussia and any criticism of the Hohenzollern regime should be directed at its internal affairs and not at the philosophical foundations of monarchy in-itself. Marx's position was in complete compliance with Hegel and the Hegelian Center and is emblematic of Marx's adherence to the Hegelian Center.

Additional proof that Marx thought Hegel a constitutional monarchist is found in Marx's August 25, 1842 letter to Oppenheim. In that letter Marx wrote that he planned to 'give this criticism, as a supplement to my article against Hegel's theory of constitutional monarchy',¹⁶ which was the article Marx failed to write for Ruge or for the *Rheinische Zeitung*. His criticism finally made its appearance in the 1843 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right'. The sentence quoted above proves that Marx regarded Hegel as a constitutional monarchist. Furthermore, the criticisms Marx mentioned related only to the internal constitution of the monarchy, as he stated in his March 5, 1842 letter to Ruge, and not to the theoretic validation of monarchy in-itself.

This point is made abundantly clear in the last letter Marx wrote to Ruge on March 13, 1843, just four days before he announced his resignation from the *Rheinische Zeitung*. In his letter to Ruge, Marx disclaimed any desire to return to

the *Rheinische Zeitung*, but asserts that the fight against the internal policies of the Hohenzollern Throne must continue. Marx wrote: 'The theory is to make as many breaches as possible in the Christian state and to smuggle in as much as we can of what is rational.'¹⁷

This sentence does not ask for the overthrow of constitutional monarchy. It does not call out for the creation of a republic.

Rather it is a strategy of German Liberal reform within a constitutional monarchy. Marx does not call for a revolution against Frederick Wilhelm IV, but rather for 'breaches', or small reformist steps within the framework of a constitutional monarchy. Furthermore, the 'breaches' brought forth by the tactics of Liberal reform must be 'rational', and here again Marx shows his congruence with Hegel. In March 1843 Marx still adhered to the Hegelian principle that philosophy provided the rationality of the state.

Another example of Marx willingly assuming the role of advocate of Hegel and the Hegelian Center relates to Ruge's significant series of articles, 'Hegel's Philosophy of Right and the Politics of Our Time'. These articles were published in June 1842 while Marx wrote for the *Rheinische Zeitung*, but before he became editor. Although Marx at no time acknowledged reading Ruge's long essay I think it certain he did. 'Hegel's Philosophy of Right and the Politics of Our Time' was widely discussed in its time and was a defining document of Left Hegelianism. Ruge published this article in the *Deutsche Jahrbücher* and Marx kept abreast of this publication. Indeed, Marx himself submitted his own articles to this Ruge journal and Ruge himself wrote a condensation of Engels' long pamphlet 'Schelling and Revelation' and published this summary in the *Deutsche Jahrbücher* in May 1842.¹⁸

Ruge and Marx kept up an active correspondence and ultimately joined each other in exile in Paris in late 1843 and through their collaboration one issue of the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* appeared. It is reasonable to assume that all these contacts provided Marx with the interest and opportunity to read 'Hegel's Philosophy of Right and the Politics of Our Time'.

Ruge's attack on Hegel concentrated upon the metaphysics of Hegelian political theory. Hegel did not see state forms as historical products, according to Ruge, but rather as the relation between Idea and reality. For Hegel the substance of the state was the Idea and for Ruge this turned *The Philosophy of Right* into a logical exercise. Hegel's state was detached from historical determination.¹⁹

The result of Hegel's Speculative cooption of political theory was the elimination of the possibility of practical political reform. If the state was a logical projection of the Idea, change in the state could only result from philosophical transformations. Ruge maintained that philosophic speculations must be replaced by political practice because it was only through the actual engagement of subjects in political activity that political change occurred.²⁰

The formula Ruge bequeathed to Left Hegelianism was the unification of critique and practice. Critique was aimed not at metaphysics, not Kant, but at reality, and critique revealed the defects of a political system. After critique uncovered the political malignancies in a society, practice endeavored to change them.

Ruge's paradigm for Left Hegelianism was known to Marx by the summer of 1842. However, in his journalism and editorship of the *Rheinische Zeitung* he ignored it. Rather than incorporate the reformist instruments of critique and practice into his journalism, Marx continued to present the Prussian state as a determination of reason. But Marx did declare his independence from Hegelian political philosophy.

What Marx failed to do during his tenure at the Cologne newspaper he succeeded in accomplishing in the summer of 1843 when he wrote his 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right'. This essay marks Marx's departure from the Hegelian tradition of theorizing the state from the perspective of Speculative philosophy. Marx no longer viewed the state as a determination of metaphysics, but as a determination of the social.

Marx embraced Ruge's program for Left Hegelianism. It must be pointed out the 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' did not espouse Ruge's theory of practice and Marx's adoption of the theory of practice needed to wait until the Fall/Winter of 1843 when Marx wrote 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction'. By the summer of 1843 Marx fulfilled the program outlined by Ruge and divorced himself from Hegel's Speculative philosophical theory of the state. Marx's 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' reiterated the thesis of Ruge's 'Hegel's Philosophy of Right and the Politics of Our Time' that Hegel's theory of the state was a branch of metaphysics.

Not only did Marx continue the Hegelian tradition of the rational state during his association with the *Rheinische Zeitung*, but also Hegel's method of social explanation. While Marx disposed of Hegel's political philosophy of the state in 1843 his adherence and utilization of Hegelian methodology continued throughout his life. In order to substantiate these assertions I will divide the following discussion into six subdivisions: I) Defender of Hegel; II) Marx as a Hegelian Centrist: Politics; III) Marx as a Hegelian Centrist: Philosophy; IV) Characteristics of the state; V) 'The Philosophical Manifesto of the Historical School of Law'; VI) The political unity of Marx and Hegel.

I) Defender of Hegel

In the articles he published during the *Rheinische Zeitung* period Marx never criticized Hegel; rather, Marx's writings contained only praise for Hegel. 'The Leading Article in No. 179 of the *Kölnische Zeitung*', a series of editorials appearing in the *Rheinische Zeitung* from July 10 to July 14, 1842, is an extremely important statement of Marx's views. Among other opinions expressed in these editorials are statements of praise Marx made about Hegel, specifically the German Liberal desire of 'The Master' for the separation of politics and religion.²¹

Marx saw Hegel as a representative of the Enlightenment, as a descendent of Strauss, as a participant of the movement to divorce the religious from political science. The laws of the state should be deduced from 'reason' and 'experience' and not from theology. Furthermore, the picture of Hegel presented in this quote is of a man of the Center and of neither the Hegelian Right nor the theological Restorationist Right. Rather, Hegel belonged to the rationalist Enlightenment tradition and this was the position of the Hegelian Center.

Marx reiterated his defense of Hegel in his February 12, 1843 article 'Marginal Notes to the Accusations of the Ministerial Rescript'. A long quote is in order:

First of all, it is said that there prevailed in the *Rheinische Zeitung* 'the unmistakable intention to attack the basis of the state constitution'. It is well known, however, that there unmistakably prevails a great diversity of opinion on the Prussian constitution and its basis. Some deny that the basis has any constitution, others that the constitution has any basis.

One view is held by Stein, Hardenberg, Schön, another one by Rochow, Arnim and Eichhorn. Hegel in his day believed that he had laid the basis for the Prussian constitution in his philosophy of law, and the government and the German public concurred in this belief. One way by which the government proved this was the official dissemination of his writings; the public, however, did so by accusing him of being the philosopher of the Prussian state, as one read in the old Leipzig conversational dictionary. What was believed at that time, Stahl believes today. In 1831, by a special order of the government Hegel lectured on the philosophy of law.

In 1830, the *Staats-Zeitung* declared that Prussia was a monarchy surrounded by republican institutions. Today it says Prussia is a monarchy surrounded by Christian institutions.

Far from intending to attack the basis of the Prussian constitution, therefore, the '*Rh. Z.* on the contrary was convinced that it was attacking only deviations from this basis.'²²

This long quote contains five important points.

1) It documents that Marx was ignorant of any lectures on the philosophy of law Hegel gave before 1831. The editorial suggests that the only lectures given by Hegel on the philosophy of law were offered in 1831 and this is erroneous as Hegel offered classes on the philosophy of law as early as his days at the University of Heidelberg, 1816–1818.²³

2) Marx distinguishes between two periods in the constitutional history of Prussia, one in 1830 under Frederick Wilhelm III and one in 1840 under Frederick Wilhelm IV. Each of these constitutional periods rested upon different theoretic foundations. Hegel's *The Philosophy of Right* was the constitutional ground for the 1830 period and at that time the Prussian Government was a 'monarchy surrounded by republican institutions'; it embodied the principles of the Hegelian Center.

3) By 1840 the theoretical basis of the Prussian constitution changed and by the time of Frederick Wilhelm IV it was a 'monarchy surrounded by Christian institutions' and Friedrich Julius Stahl was its leading tribune. In the years between 1830 and 1840 Prussia fell victim to a religious reaction.

4) In the 'Marginal Notes to the Accusations of the Ministerial Rescript', Marx defended the justification of the Prussian Crown of 1830; that is, the basis of a

'monarchy surrounded by republican institutions'. In so doing Marx was in accord with Hegel who was the philosophic apologist of this 1830 constitution.

5) Marx judged Hegel not as a philosopher of a republic, but as the philosopher of a 'monarchy surrounded by republican institutions', and in this Hegel belonged to the Hegelian Center. In terms of politics, even though Marx planned to offer 'a critique of Hegelian natural law insofar as it concerns the internal political system', and not the monarchy in itself, both Marx and Hegel adhered to the principle that the state was a rational organism.

II) Marx as a Hegelian Centrist: Politics

The political strategy Marx executed at the *Rheinische Zeitung* reveal him to be a Hegelian Centrist.

The 'Leading Article in No. 179 of the *Kölnische Zeitung*' is a three-part series and is an important discussion of the role philosophy plays in the definition of the state. Marx made the following assertions in this article: philosophy and religion were distinct intellectual exercises; religion should not be used to either outline the structure of the state or to justify the state; and the validation of the state should solely come from philosophy. When Marx separated philosophy and religion, making philosophy the sole arbiter of the political, he not only negated both the Hegelian Right and the Prussian Restorationists, but also defined himself as an adherent of the Hegelian Center.²⁴ Marx's denunciation of the Hegelian Right was clearly articulated in his denunciation of Marheineke in his July 9, 1842 letter to Ruge: 'Old Marheineke seems to have considered it necessary to provide the whole world with documentary proof of the complete impotence of the Old Hegelianism.'²⁵

Not only did Marx move against the Right, but he also disavowed the Left, both in the form of the communist-socialist Left and in the anarchist form of 'The Free'.

In terms of the communist-socialist Left Marx's article 'Communism and the *Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung*' definitively disavowed any association with this political movement.²⁶ In another article, 'Communal Reform and the *Kölnische Zeitung*', Marx denounced communism as a 'dream'.²⁷ In addition to divorcing himself from the movement of the communist-socialist Left Marx also detached himself from individual members of this communist-socialist Left. Hess initially met Marx in Cologne in the Fall of 1841 and on September 2, 1841 sent a letter to Berthold Auerbach extolling the intellectual capacities of Marx and compared Marx to Rousseau and Hegel.²⁸ An advocate of communism since 1837, Hess became editor of the *Rheinische Zeitung* on January 1, 1842, but was dismissed shortly thereafter. Hess was too radical for the paper's Liberal publishers and Marx's gradual ascent to the editorship was a means the newspaper used to disavow the radicalism of Hess and keep the paper in the Hegelian Center. This was shown when Marx, in his article 'The Question of Centralization', which appeared on May 17, 1842, criticized an article written by Hess. Marx's attack on Hess in his May 17, 1842 article was a precursor to his frontal assault on communism and radicalism in

general contained in his article 'Communism and the *Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung*' of October 15, 1842. Marx's attitude toward Hess was ambiguous, for, on the one hand, he ridiculed him in 1842 and on the other hand in his 1844 'Preface' to 'The Manuscripts' he praised the essays by Hess published in Georg Herwegh's *Einundzwanzig Bogen aus dem Schweiz*.²⁹ Rutenberg, a member of the editorial staff under Marx, took inappropriate political stands and in order to comply with the Prussian censor Marx terminated his employment. Rutenberg, who demonstrated a 'complete lack of critical sense', created an impression that the *Rheinische Zeitung* was a mouthpiece for the 'Berlin Free', a position which drew the ire of the Prussian censor; in order to maintain the *Rheinische Zeitung* in the Center of the political debate, Marx fired Rutenberg.³⁰

In addition to disavowing any connection to the communist-socialist Left, Marx also refused to have any contact with Meyen of the 'Berlin Free'. On November 29, 1842 he published a short paragraph in the *Rheinische Zeitung* satirizing the 'rowdiness' of the 'Free'.³¹ And one day later, on November 30, 1842 he mailed a letter to Ruge admonishing 'The Free' for their defective reasoning and their inappropriate 'sans-culotte-like' exhibitionism.³²

By rejecting both the Hegelian Right and the Restorationist Right, and the communist-socialist and anarchist Left represented by 'The Free', Marx positioned himself as the voice of the Hegelian Center – a moderate constitutional monarchist position. Marx's refutation of the communist-socialist and anarchist Left of 'The Free' did not mean that Marx was not a Young Hegelian. According to Marx the Young Hegelians were different to the communist-socialist Left and 'The Free' and it was possible to be both a Young Hegelian and a member of the Hegelian Center. Within the political context of Prussia in 1842 the Hegelian Center was Liberal and the word Liberal meant the acceptance of constitutional monarchy with the desire to increase the domain of individual rights and freedom of expression. German Liberalism in 1842 did not call for the overthrow of the monarchy, but a specific form of German Liberalism existed, the Hegelian Center, and Marx saw the role of the *Rheinische Zeitung* as advancing the cause of a non-revolutionary reformist German Liberalism. In a letter he authored, but which bears the title 'Renard's Letter to Oberpräsident von Schaper', Marx wrote:

For that very reason, however, I must reject the reproach leveled at me in the rescript that the RH Z. has sought to spread French sympathies and ideas in the Rhineland. The RH Z. has, on the contrary, made its main task to direct towards Germany the glances which so many people still fastened on France, and to evoke a German instead of a French Liberalism, which can surely not be disagreeable to the government of Frederick Wilhelm IV.³³

III) Marx as a Hegelian Centrist: Philosophy

The role Marx assigned to philosophy during the *Rheinische Zeitung* period duplicated the position he took in his dissertation. Marx did not address the Idealist aspect of Hegel, but did uphold the Hegelian theory that philosophy was the entrance to the kingdom of truth.

Marx provided a non-theological approach to Hegelian thought. Philosophy was not only distinct from religion, but it was also a more accurate guide into the realm of reality. In terms of the relationship between philosophy and religion Marx adopted the position Hegel expressed in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. In his masterpiece Hegel outlines the journey of Spirit towards absolute truth; to reach this ultimate goal Spirit supersedes not only art but also religion and finalizes its quest in philosophy. The content of 'Absolute Knowing', the final chapter of *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, is philosophy.³⁴

In trying to discern Marx's definition of philosophy the 'Leading Article in No. 179 of the *Kölnische Zeitung*' is extremely important. In this article Marx presents philosophy as the highest criteria against which to judge the existent. Philosophy, not religion or empiricism, offered the surest definition upon which to construct the existent.³⁵

The role Marx ascribed to philosophy offered him a definition of non-congruence that was completely Hegelian. Philosophy's separation from the world was the architecture of non-congruence, as this long quote from the 'Leading Article in No. 179 of the *Kölnische Zeitung*' substantiates:

Since every true philosophy is the intellectual quintessence of its time, the time must come when philosophy not only internally by its content, but also externally through its form, comes into contact and interacts with the real world of its day. Philosophy then ceases to be a particular system in relation to other particular systems, it becomes philosophy in general in relation to the world, it becomes the philosophy of the contemporary world. The extinct forms which confirm that philosophy has attained this significance, that it is the living soul of culture, that philosophy has become philosophical, has been the same in all ages.³⁶

Marx's definition of philosophy in the above paragraph parallels that given by Hegel in his 'Introduction' to *The History of Philosophy*. In the section of the 'Introduction' entitled 'Philosophy as the Apprehension of the Development of the Concrete',³⁷ Hegel focused on the developmental nature of philosophy. In constant evolution, philosophy was a process that repeatedly subsumes previous stages of thought. Hegel emphasizes the historical nature of philosophy because in order to remain the highest truth it must perpetually supersede the preceding.

When Marx affirmed that reality must conflate with the rational he was in a Hegelian modality. He also accepted the basic premises of Hegel's theory of the state. In *The Philosophy of Right* Hegel claimed that the state must be rational, or that the principle upon which the state was constituted was rationality. In the *Rheinische Zeitung* period Marx agreed with these foundational principles of Hegel's *The Philosophy of Right*, foundational principles Marx attacked approximately a year later in his 1843 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right'.

IV) Characteristics of the state

Between December 11 and 31, 1842 Marx published a three-part series of articles under the title 'The Supplement to Nos. 335 and 336 of the *Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung* on the Commissions of the Estates in Prussia'.³⁸ This is another important

article by Marx because it demonstrates his incorporation both of Hegelian methodology as well as features of Hegel's theory of the state.

The subject of this series deals with the issue of estate representation within the Prussian kingdom. Like Hegel, Marx at the end of 1842 was not opposed to estates, but what Marx wanted to prevent was the decomposition of the monarchical state into particularized local estates. Marx saw estate representation as a possible threat to the unity of the Hohenzollern kingdom. However, a deeper level to these articles exists. First, there is the question of the methodology utilized by Marx in the analysis of this problem, and second the definition of the state itself offered by Marx.

In terms of methodology Marx employed the Hegelian categories of particular-universal, and Marx identified the local estates as the particular and the state in-itself as the universal. Following Hegel's logical argument Marx believed the universal was more important than the particular, or the particular was always subsumed into the universal.

Marx and Hegel were in complete agreement on the foundational definition of the state. In paragraph 271 of *The Philosophy of Right* Hegel defined the state in the following manner:

The constitution of the state is, in the first place, the organization of the state and the self-related process of its organic life, a process whereby it differentiates its moments within itself and develops them to self-subsistence.³⁹

In two articles, 'The Supplement to No. 335 and 336 of the *Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung* on the Commission of the Estates in Prussia' and in the 'Leading Article in No. 179 of the *Kölnische Zeitung*', Marx continued this Hegelian definition. In his newspaper articles he defined 'the state as the great organism',⁴⁰ and that the distinctions of the estates 'are dissolved at every moment in the unity of the whole'⁴¹ and that 'the real organic life of the state should not be suddenly abandoned' in local particularities.⁴² In 1841–1843 Marx stood in total agreement with Hegel regarding the universality of the state and like Hegel he applied an organic image to the state as a whole, a universal, which subsumed parts, particularities, into the totality.

The Hegel methodology of universal-particular exercised singular importance in the development of Marx's theory of the state. In his 1843 essay 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' Marx arrived at his own theory of the state on the basis of the universal-particular logical apparatus. The difference between 1842 and 1843 was that in 1842 Marx, imitating Hegel, still accepted the existence of the particular, the estates, but in 1843 Marx jettisoned the role of the estates and embraced only the idea of the universal. In 1843 the state became solely the universal, and the only means to attain the universal was through democracy, or universal suffrage.

V) 'The Philosophical Manifesto of the Historical School of Law'

This essay is the most definitive statement of Marx's endorsement of the major principles of Hegel's *The Philosophy of Right*.

As indicated in a previous chapter Marx took two courses from Gans while a student at the University of Berlin. A close friend and colleague of Hegel, Gans

wrote the 'Introduction' to two books of Hegel published in the first *Collected Works*, *The Philosophy of Right* and *The Philosophy of History*. In his 'Introduction' to *The Philosophy of Right*, Gans defended the Hegelian interpretation of law. For Gans, law was the Idea of right as it unfolded in history; the content of law was always the rational. Gans served as the transmission belt between Hegel and Marx and the theory of rational right flowed out of Hegel through Gans to Marx.

Marx's advocacy of the Hegel-Gans school of the philosophy of law and the state is initially expressed in Marx's rejection of natural law theory. In 'The Philosophical Manifesto of the Historical School of Law' Marx rejected the 18th-century tradition of natural law and natural rights, and even though in this essay Marx does not mention Rousseau by name it is clear his attacks on 'the other Enlighteners of the eighteenth century'⁴³ includes Rousseau as an example of incorrect political theory.

Hegel's *The Philosophy of Right* also rejected Rousseau and the natural law tradition. In addition in paragraph 258 Hegel wrote of 'the false theories, mentioned above, emanating principally from Rousseau'.⁴⁴ Although Hegel felt Rousseau was correct to ground his theory of law and the state on the basis of individual will, Hegel censured Rousseau because the French philosopher never advanced beyond individual will to will in its universal form as the Idea of will. Rousseau never stepped beyond a naturalistic exposition of a singular will to a philosophy of will as universal content.

Hegel and Marx not only agreed in their assessment of Rousseau's theory of natural rights, but also in reproaching the politics and critique of Kant. The 'Philosophical Manifesto of the Historical School of Law' demonstrated an awareness of the development of critical philosophy from Kant to Hegel. Marx disapproved of critical philosophy as exercised by Kant because when 'we cannot know what is true we consequently allow the untrue, if it exists at all, to pass as fully valid'.⁴⁵ Kant's critical philosophy was deficient according to Marx because it did not allow the concept to unify with the object. Marx annulled the critical philosophy of Kant because he had not 'arrived at the point of seeking the Idea in reality itself'.⁴⁶ This phrase, taken from Marx's 1837 letter to his father, is further verification that at the age of nineteen, following Hegel, Marx defined non-congruence as the awareness that history produces contradiction, that the retrodiction of thought is a constant sources of negating the past.

Not only did Hegel reject Kant's version of critique, but he also negated Kant's philosophy of law. According to Hegel, Kant's definition of law was deficient because it dealt with particulars, because it defined right as mutual adherence to a universal code of laws. Kant defined right as a non-aggression pact. Hegel in paragraph 29 of the 'Introduction' to *The Philosophy of Right* distinguished his definition of right from Kant's on the basis he began with the universal, the mind as absolute.⁴⁷ Right was determined by rational necessity, or the necessity of the universal to incorporate the individual. Indeed, *The Philosophy of Right* charts the course of the advancement of the Idea of right to its universal form as absolute right.

Hegel and Marx were also in agreement in 1842-1843 on the definition of right and for both men right was an expression of reason. Previous paragraphs

described both Hegel's and Marx's repudiation of Savigny's and Hugo's Historical School of Law. Savigny and Hugo defined right as customary practice while Hegel defined right as an instance of reason.⁴⁸ Kant defined right as universal moral legislation, but Hegel thought of right as the rational principle of civil society. Marx agreed with Hegel and I will juxtapose quotes from them in order to illustrate their absolute concurrence on the philosophy of law during Marx's *Rheinische Zeitung* period.

The first quote is taken from Marx's 'The Philosophical Manifesto of the Historical School of Law' and is an assault on Savigny's and Hugo's positivism as well as an assertion that reason must be taken as the foundation of right.

With self-satisfied zeal he adduces agreements from everywhere to provide additional evidence that no rational necessity is inherent in the positive institutions, e.g. property, the state constitution, marriage, etc.⁴⁹

The second quote is taken from the 1837 letter to his father evincing Marx's conversion to Hegelianism:

The concept is indeed the mediating link between form and content. In a philosophical treatment of law, therefore, the one must arise in the other; indeed, the form should only be the continuation of the content.⁵⁰

These statements of Marx absolutely concur with Hegel's definition of the philosophy of right. Quotes from paragraphs 1 and 2 from the 'Introduction' to *The Philosophy of Right* confirm this point:

The subject matter of the philosophical science of right is the Idea of Right, i.e. the concept of right together with the actualization of that concept.

The science of right is a section of philosophy. Consequently, its task is to develop the Idea . . . the Idea being, or what is the same thing, to look on at the proper immanent development of the thing itself.⁵¹

'The Philosophical Manifesto of the Historical School of Law' establishes the concurrence between the Marx of 1842 and the 1820 Hegel of *The Philosophy of Right* over the role of philosophy. The ground of all the sciences was philosophy. Law and the state were externalizations of reason and existent law and state were justified only in so far as they were congruent with reason.

The 1842 Marx promulgated the Hegelian motif that philosophy was the constitutive force in defining the social universe. In this regard, not only did Marx see Hegel as a representative of the Hegelian Center, but Marx himself declared his own Hegelian Centrism.

Marx's dedication to philosophy in 1842 was the foundation from which he later defined theory and praxis. Marx never abandoned philosophy, but in his later work defined theory and praxis as offshoots of philosophy.

VI) *The political unity of Hegel and Marx*

In order to display the political unity of Hegel and Marx I will divide this subdivision itself into the following four parts: a) Divorce law; b) Free press; c) Separation of church and state; d) Codification of the law.

a) Marx and Hegel agreed that divorce should be legalized. Marx's advocacy of divorce was articulated in two articles he wrote for the *Rheinische Zeitung*, one entitled 'The Divorce Bill', that carried the subheading 'Criticism of a Criticism', and published on November 15, 1842⁵² and the second carrying the same title and published on December 19, 1842.⁵³ Hegel's recognition that divorce must be legally recognized was described in paragraph 176 of his *The Philosophy of Right* in which he wrote: 'There can be no compulsion on people to marry: and on the other hand, there is no merely legal or positive bond which can hold the parties together once their dispositions and actions have become hostile and contrary.'⁵⁴

For Hegel marriage was a primary foundation of ethical life and in *The Philosophy of Right* Hegel discusses marriage in the section 'The Family' that immediately precedes the section on 'Civil Society'.⁵⁵ Marriage was an initial stage in the development of intersubjectivity, of the recognition of otherness, the connectivity between husband and wife and children.⁵⁶ For Marx marriage was a 'moral relationship'.⁵⁷

Nevertheless, regardless of the 'ethical' and 'moral' nature of marriage both Marx and Hegel defended the legality of divorce. Dead relationships should not be maintained and in this regard Marx and Hegel asserted religion should be separated from law and politics. They rebuked the religious opposition to divorce and did so on the ground that religion was not the criteria from which to judge human social institutions.

Marx and Hegel made philosophy the standard from which to assess the law. Just as Hegel and Marx looked upon philosophy as supplying the principle of the state so they looked upon philosophy as offering the principle of law.

In his December 19, 1842 version of the article 'The Divorce Bill' Marx wrote:

. . . according to the concept, marriage is indissoluble, but only in itself, i.e. only according to the concept . . . but no state, no marriage, no friendship corresponds fully to its concept, and like real friendship, even in the family, like the real state in world history, so, too, real marriage in the state is dissoluble.⁵⁸

Hegelian logic was used by Marx to justify the legality of divorce. The relationship between the concept and the existent was not perfect, the existent was separated from the concept; therefore since disparity existed between the existent marriage and the concept of marriage, divorce was philosophically and legally justified, that is, divorce was the recognition of the lack of commensurability between the concept and the existent.

In the December 19, 1842 form of the article of 'The Divorce Bill' Marx wrote: ' . . . that the conditions under which the existence of a moral relationship no longer corresponds to its essence'.⁵⁹ Marx used the Hegelian logical modalities of the contradiction between essence and appearance to establish the law of

divorce. The dissolution of a marriage is simply the philosophical acknowledgement that contradiction is inherent in existence.

The dissonance between essence and existence acted as the source of non-congruence, or non-congruence was the action by which mind grasped the disparity between reason and reality.

b) Free press

The *Rheinische Zeitung*, as a Liberal Reformist newspaper in the Rhineland, and Marx as its Editor, were under constant pressure from the feudal Christian monarchy of Frederick Wilhelm IV to curtail their calls for modifying the Prussian state. As an exponent of Hegel's theory of non-congruence, Marx fought off Prussian repression by defending the principle of a free press. In three articles, 'The Ban on the *Leipziger Allgemeine Zeitung*',⁶⁰ published between January 1 and 16, 1843; 'Comments on the Latest Prussian Censorship Instruction',⁶¹ published in Ruge's *Anekdoten* in 1843; and 'Debates on Freedom of the Press',⁶² published in the *Rheinische Zeitung* in May 1842, all are instances of Marx's Liberalism during this period of his life.

Marx's championing of a free press was in perfect accord with Hegel's thought on this issue. In paragraphs 314 to 320 of *The Philosophy of Right* Hegel defended the right of free speech and a free press.⁶³

Hegel's advocacy of free speech and a free press did not come without some reservations. As a representative of academic culture Hegel drew attention to the frequent distortions and simplifications of complex events and debates in the popular newspapers. He was concerned that the press popularized ideas, offered opinions rather than facts and in this manner misled public attitudes. Even with these caveats, Hegel defended the free expression of ideas because it was the major medium through which public information spread.

Hegel was also aware that the public media could often resort to 'slander, abuse and contemptuous caricature'⁶⁴ of public officials. In these instances Hegel favored some form of punishment or criminal procedures against the perpetrators of such outrageous affronts.

Nevertheless, regardless of these qualifications Marx and Hegel spoke in a single voice regarding freedom of speech and press. Their positions were commensurate with German Liberalism.

c) The separation of church and state

Both Marx and Hegel opposed all attempts to Christianize the state. In a long remark to paragraph 270 in his *The Philosophy of Right* Hegel maintained state and church should be separated⁶⁵ thereby announcing his resistance to any superimposition of theology upon the state.

Hegel was a Lutheran and abided by the principles of the Reformation. He disavowed any catholicization, any attempt to place religion above philosophy. Hegel believed the state was the embodiment of the ethical Idea and that it did not require any canonical sanction.

One instance of his desire to disestablish church and state was the defense by 'The Master' of Jewish emancipation. In 1812, during the Wars of Liberation, the Prussian

Crown issued an edict emancipating the Jews from all political and legal disabilities. In his 1820 *The Philosophy of Right* Hegel asserted that Jews should enjoy complete 'civil rights'.⁶⁶ In his article 'On The Jewish Question', which was published in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* in 1844, Marx also advocated the emancipation of the Jews. The Prussian monarchy ignored Hegel's protestations and in 1822 revoked the emancipation decree of 1812 and again excluded Jews from the exercise of full civil liberties. Hegel's championing of Jewish emancipation was manifested in his support of Gans's struggle to gain a faculty position at the University of Berlin.

d) The codification of the law

Hegel's pamphlet 'The German Constitution' was written between 1798 and 1802. This essay was not published during the lifetimes of either Hegel or Marx and it received publication only in 1893. In this essay Hegel lamented the political fragmentation of Germany. A victim of the Napoleonic conquests, Germany divided into a plurality of states and dukedoms, although the formal end of the Holy Roman Empire did not occur until 1806. Reflecting upon the irreversible dismemberment of Germany, Hegel began his essay with the sentence: 'Germany is no longer a state.'⁶⁷ A nationalist, Hegel looked to a Theseus to bring about the resurrection of Germany. He wrote the 'state requires a universal center'⁶⁸ and recognized this universal center required a unified military, foreign policy, legislation and will as juristic centralization. In 'The German Constitution' Hegel called for the national codification of German law as distinct from the particularization of legal codes within the plurality of German jurisdictions as meritorious in-itself and as a means of re-establishing the unity of German state.

Granting that Marx did not know this Hegelian text and granting that he never explicitly called for the codification of German law, enough secondary evidence exists to support the conclusion that Marx during his *Rheinische Zeitung* period and afterwards did believe in the efficacy of codifying these multiple legal codes.

The legal heritage to which Marx gave his adherence was one favoring the codification of the law. Thibaut, a good friend of Hegel, in 1814 published a highly regarded pamphlet called 'On the Necessity of a Universal Civil Code for Germany'.⁶⁹ Gans studied with Thibaut and wrote his dissertation under him and, as previously noted, Gans and Hegel became close colleagues at the University of Berlin. A legal philosophy advocating the codification of the law ran from Thibaut to Hegel to Gans and it is reasonable to assume that Marx also adhered to this legal school.

Savigny and the German Historical School of Law were opponents of the Thibaut-Hegel-Gans school. Both Marx and Hegel, as I previously pointed out, attacked Savigny and his compatriots in the German Historical School of Law. But neither Hegel in his *The Philosophy of Right*, nor Marx in his 'Philosophical Manifesto of the German Historical School of Law' specifically refer to the codification issue in these works. Nevertheless, since the assaults of both Marx and Hegel were so severe, so inclusive, it is reasonable to assume that Marx and Hegel refuted Savigny's defense of legal particularism. By rejecting the entire edifice of the German Historical School of Law both Marx and Hegel made clear that they also negated the legal theory of particularism and instead embraced legal universalism for Germany.

Even though Marx's writings in the *Rheinische Zeitung* period are free of an explicit call for a national codification of the law, his editorial 'Debates on the Law on Thefts of Wood' is an implicit call for such codification. In addition to presenting Marx as a tribune for the impoverished, the essay is also a long tirade against customary law, the foundation of the German Historical School of Law. In his long editorial Marx denounces customary law, a product of the Medieval period, because it was easily exploited by the propertied to increase their profits. In the editorial Marx distinguished between legal right and customary right and the language of legal right was not only Hegelian but also a phrase supporting codification, the establishment of a centralized code of law.

Marx wrote:

The so-called customs of the privileged classes are understood to mean customs contrary to law . . . When the privileged classes appeal from legal right to their customary rights, they are demanding instead of the human content of right, its animal form, which has now lost its reality and become a mere animal mask.⁷⁰

In this paragraph Marx drew the antithesis of custom and law and when he drew this distinction he was contrasting customary law and a national codified law. Customary law was the tool of the aristocracy, but only a codification was universal and as such applied to all of the German population equally and only a code that was equal was law.

As Liberal constitutional monarchists Marx and Hegel, recognizing those aspects of the French Revolution and Napoleon that were progressive and modernist, the Code Napoleon, favored the modernization of the German legal codes. Both recognized feudalism was dead and that a unified national state was the project of the future and that codification was one part of this historical advance.

Further proof that Marx was a member of the Hegelian Center can be culled from his writings on the poverty question. Marx's acquaintance with the problems of poverty, property and class during his months at the *Rheinische Zeitung* was enormously significant for him because they became the pivot of his future development into the realm of political economy. Marx himself recognized this and in his 1859 'Preface' to his *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* he described this period in these terms:

Although I studied jurisprudence, I pursued it as a subject subordinate to philosophy and history. In the year 1842–1843, as editor of the *Rheinische Zeitung*, I first found myself in the embarrassing position of having to discuss what is known as material interests. The deliberations of the Rhenish Landtag on forest thefts and the division of landed property; the official polemic started by Herr von Schaper, the Oberpräsident of the Rhine Province, against the *Rheinische Zeitung* about the condition of the Moselle peasantry, and finally the debates on free trade and protective tariffs caused me in the first instance to turn my attention to economic questions.⁷¹

Even though the episode at the *Rheinische Zeitung* hinted in the direction of his later concentration on political economy and social revolution Marx still remained loyal to the Hegelian Center and this is made abundantly clear if we study Marx's positions on the questions of civil society, state, property, class, proletariat, critique and the philosophy of law. At no time during the *Rheinische Zeitung* period did Marx approach these questions from the vantage point of the socialist or communist Left.

Marx mentions nothing in his journalism from January 1842 to March 1843 about 'civil society'. The idea of civil society, which was indispensable to his future theoretical development, is first mentioned in his manuscript 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right', written between March and August 1843. It was impossible for Marx to make the transition to communism without activating the concept of 'civil society' as an analytic tool, and the absence of this concept from January 1842 to March 1843 substantiates the claim that Marx stood in the Hegelian Center during his fourteen months at the *Rheinische Zeitung*.

Marx mentions nothing regarding the overthrow of the state and his first mention of the dissolution of the state takes place in his 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right'. The political change leading to the dissolution of the state was universal suffrage, or democracy. However, there is a difference between calling for universal suffrage, full democracy, and calling for the abolition of the state *sui generis*. In the 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' Marx was a democrat and it is only in 'On the Jewish Question', written in late 1843, that he called for the replacement of the state *sui generis* by civil society.

In the journalism of the January 1842 to March 1843 period Marx does extensively comment on the role of property in the affairs of state and does enumerate the control that property exerts over the state. Nevertheless, nowhere in the journalism of January 1842 to March 1843 does he call for the abolition of private property. Marx's first direct, unequivocal assertion that private property must be eradicated occurs in the essay 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction' which was written between the end of 1843 and the beginning of 1844.⁷²

Marx does use the word 'class' during the *Rheinische Zeitung* days, but the word class and the word estate are employed interchangeably. Marx did not use class as a universal sociological term, as a social grouping defining economic stratification in a capitalist world. He still did not see that capitalism had restructured social divisions and that the capitalist revolution had totally replaced estates with class. Nowhere in his *Rheinische Zeitung* journalism does Marx assert the need to abolish class, and the first time Marx articulates such a program occurs in his 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction'.⁷³

Although Marx used the word class in his *Rheinische Zeitung* journalism he does not use the term 'proletariat'. The first time he does employ this term was in his 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction'.⁷⁴

The concept of capitalism never appears in the *Rheinische Zeitung* period. The word capital appears in Marx's 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right',⁷⁵ but the generic term, the term describing the existence of a total economic system, does not appear until his summer 1844 notebook, 'On James Mill'.⁷⁶

Even though Marx does allude to the terms property, class and estate in the *Rheinische Zeitung* journalism he remained blind to Hegel's grasp of political economy in *The Philosophy of Right*. Marx focused on the political and state in his *Rheinische Zeitung* journalism and completely ignored Hegel's limited but insightful comments on political economy contained in this book. In paragraph 189 Hegel drew attention to the work of Smith, Ricardo and Say; in paragraph 204 he enters the debate on money, exchange and value, and in paragraph 203 he discusses the nature of capital. Most importantly, Marx refused to acknowledge the subsection on 'Civil Society' and just one year later this subsection became the gravitational center of the 1844 'The Manuscripts'. Marx's decision to overlook Hegelian political economy demonstrates that during the *Rheinische Zeitung* period he was totally absorbed by the issues of politics and the state.

Previous paragraphs documented that Marx did employ the term critique in the journalism of the *Rheinische Zeitung* and before. But Marx's use of critique in the 1842–1843 years did not have the same purpose as the critique employed in 'The Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right'. The critique of the *Rheinische Zeitung* journalism was synonymous with censure, or reproach. However, the critique of the 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' was synonymous with overthrow because this essay was devoted to the demolition of Hegel's definition of the state, and when Marx took this step he bade farewell to the Hegelian Center.

Marx could not make the transition to communism without activating the concepts of civil society, proletariat and revolutionary critique. The absence of these axial concepts during the 14 months from January 1842 to March 1843 substantiates the claim that Marx stood in the Hegelian Center during this time.

Additionally, in his journalism Marx was still loyal to the Hegelian concept of law. In a series of articles he wrote from October 1842 to November 1842, 'Debates on the Law on Thefts of Wood', Marx wrote:

The customary rights of the aristocracy conflict by their content with the form of universal law . . . The fact that their content is contrary to the form of law . . . universality and necessity . . . proves that they are customary wrongs . . . Right no longer depends on chance, on whether custom is rational or not, but Custom becomes rational because right is legal . . .⁷⁷

The words Marx utilized to describe law as opposed to custom – 'universality', 'rationality' and 'necessity' – are all congruent with Hegel's philosophy of law.

In his *The Philosophy of Right* Hegel traces the genesis of law from the subjective will. In paragraph 4 of *The Philosophy of Right* Hegel wrote: 'The basis of right is, in general, mind; its precise place and point of origin is the will.'⁷⁸ Law, like all other concepts in Hegel, contained a history, and the commencement of the Idea of law begins at the level of the Subjective Spirit. In order for subjective will to evolve into law it must be universalized, it must be applicable to all people in a polis, or all people in an empire, Rome, or all people in a nation, Germany.

The process of applying the concept of right from the subject to the community was termed by Hegel 'universality'. In paragraph 28 of *The Philosophy of Right* he wrote: 'The will's activity consists in annulling the contradiction between

subjectivity and objectivity and giving its aim an objective instead of a subjective character . . .⁷⁹ Right becomes law when the concept of right is extended to other external beings.

Intersubjectivity is the presupposition of law because law establishes the guidelines by which a community interrelates. Will only relates to the 'I', while law defines the relationship between the 'I' and the Other, and this is the universal. In paragraph 24 Hegel wrote: 'The will is the universal, because all restriction and all particular individuality have been absorbed with it.'⁸⁰

The development from the subjective will to the universality of law is an example of the rationality of the concept of law. Rationality is also universality, is also an attempt to unify the subjective and the universal. The inherent capacity of mind was to seek the union of subject and object, the seeking of this union was its inherent nature. The fulfillment of inherent nature was the necessity. Consequently, the rationality of law was at the same time the necessity of law, or the inner movement of subjective will to its universal form.

Right only becomes law when Subjective Spirit is transformed into Objective Spirit. Law only appears at the level of objectivity, or civil society. It is only when the particular Ego must recognize an Other, civil society, that subjectivity rises to objectivity. The Objective Spirit is the level of mutual recognition, where an 'I' and an Other must interrelate. The need to codify this mutuality is the ground out of which law emerges.

In the Third Part of *The Philosophy of Right*, the subsection dealing with 'Civil Society', Hegel inserted a subdivision entitled 'The Administration of Justice'. This contained paragraph 211: 'The principle of rightness becomes the law when in its objective existence, it is posited, i.e. when thinking makes it determinate for consciousness and makes it known what is right and valid; and in acquiring this determinate character, the right becomes positive law in general.'⁸¹

Hegel's description of the development of law, its evolution from the subjective Ego to Objective Spirit, is as an unswerving philosophical process. It proceeds totally in terms of his philosophic definition of universality, rationality and necessity.

Therefore, when Marx appropriated the logical methodology of universality, rationality and necessity he demonstrated his consonance with Hegel's theory of law. The terms by which Marx defined the law in his essay 'Debates on the Law on Thefts of Wood' were all Hegelian philosophical categories and established that Marx during his *Rheinische Zeitung* period understood law as an expression of philosophy. For Marx in 1842 the design of the real was the rational, an explicit Hegelian position.

In order to further establish Marx's concordance with Hegel's philosophy of law during Marx's *Rheinische Zeitung* period, another long quote from Marx's opinion piece 'Debates on the Law on Thefts of Wood' is called for:

If the concept of crime involves that of punishment, the actual crime calls for a measure of punishment. An actual crime has its limit. The punishment will therefore have its limit. The punishment will therefore have to be limited in order to be actual, it must be limited in accordance with a principle of law in

order to be just . . . Hence the limit of his punishment must be the limit of his act . . . In the case of property this measure is its value. Whereas personality, whatever its limits, is always a whole, property always exists only within a definite limit that is not only determinable but determined, not only measurable but measured. Value is the civil mode of existence of property, the logical expression through which it first becomes socially comprehensible and communicable.⁸²

The First Part of Hegel's *The Philosophy of Right* is divided into three sections, Property, Contract and Wrong, and it is in the subsection on Wrong that Hegel discusses the interrelated issues of crime and punishment. Paragraphs 95 to 103 form the heart of this discussion.

Relating to the question of crimes against people, in paragraph 95 Hegel defined crime as an infringement of a subjective will. The freedom to actualize the subjective will Hegel labeled a right. Any act that interferes with the actualization of a right is a crime. When the subjective will is prevented by an external power from realizing its own end a crime is committed.

Paragraph 99 analyses the Idea of punishment and asserts the aim of punishment is not vengeance, or the prevention of crime, but rather the annulment of that act of crime. The measure of punishment must be limited to the measure of the crime and only on the basis of commensurability can punishment annul the crime.

In relating to the question of crimes against property Hegel employed the concept of value. In paragraph 77 Hegel defined value as the universal measure – two objects held in equal proportion. Two objects are equal, both contain the same amounts of a desirable quality and this equality is the basis of exchange. Value is the identity of commercial objects.

In crimes involving property, the domain of a mercantile society, in paragraph 101 Hegel proposed that the punishment of the crime must be dispensed in terms of value. The punishment of a crime invading the right of property or contract must be equal to the value of the transgressed object.

The passage I quoted from Marx's 'Debates on the Law on Thefts of Wood' discusses the relationship between crime and punishment. Marx agrees with Hegel that punishment must be commensurate with the crime. The degree of punishment must equate, not exceed, the degree of the crime. On the issue of crimes against property Marx was in total agreement with Hegel that value became the standard of punishment. The value exacted as punishment for a crime against property must be equal to the value lost to the property as a result of the crime. This was exactly Hegel's equation for assessing punishment in cases regarding property. Marx's commitment to Hegel's theory of crime and punishment demonstrates that he was a proponent of Hegel's philosophy of law during the *Rheinische Zeitung* period.

Part Two: The discovery of poverty

Marx's concern for the poverty issue was first articulated in two articles, 'Debates on the Law on Thefts of Wood,' October 25 to November 3, 1842, and 'Justification

of the Correspondent from the Mosel' January 15 to 20, 1843. While both articles related to the issue of poverty each of the articles approached the problem from a different direction.

In the 'Debates on the Law on Thefts of Wood'⁸³ Marx described how the definition of theft in the Rhine Provincial Assembly was manipulated by the owners of private property, in particular the owners of forest lands. In order to reduce their economic needs poor peasants in the Rhineland area were entering forest areas claimed by landowners, taking branches fallen to the ground and bringing these dead branches to their cottages in order to kindle fires and provide warmth for their families. The landowners, who controlled the Rhine Provincial Assembly, passed laws defining the taking of dead branches from the ground as theft and thus a criminal offense. Marx's article drew a distinction between dead branches and living trees and argued the legal definition of theft could not be applied to dead limbs. By extending the definition of theft to dead limbs the landowners were perverting the law and using it as a protector of their private property.

Defending the needs of the economically deprived peasant, the 'Debates on the Law on Thefts of Wood' was Marx's first attempt at a class analysis of legal-political action. On one side stood the owners of property (for whom Marx interchangeably used the terms aristocracy, class and estate), and on the other side were the economically underprivileged. Legal-political power was always a property of the propertied and Marx showed how the law itself became a weapon in the hands of private interest; indeed, private interest ruled the administration of justice. The 'Debates on the Law on Thefts of Wood' represents Marx's early insights into the class divisions of society and the control of the state by property.

The 'Justification of the Correspondent from the Mosel'⁸⁴ did not address the issue of law, but rather bureaucratic impotence in the face of economic distress. Marx shows how the government bureaucracy, the '*polizei*' in Hegelian language, were totally incapable of responding to the economic impoverishment of the Mosel winegrowers. He also demonstrates how the organs of public opinion, the press, were under the control of the propertied estates. During a period of economic degradation, when public discourse was necessary so public solutions to this economic problem could be arrived at through public consent, the government passed laws restricting the powers of a free press. The 'Justification of the Correspondent from the Mosel' was an expression of Marx's insight into the interconnections between private property, bureaucracy and ideological manipulation. He gained insight into the division of politics between the economically downtrodden and the economically empowered.

Nevertheless, in neither the 'Debates of the Law on Thefts of Wood' nor in the 'Justification of the Correspondent from the Mosel' did Marx call for the abolition of property.

In terms of economic class the two articles concerned the agrarian populations, peasants and small winegrowers. Marx was still unacquainted with the proletariat and so the word does not appear in either of these texts.

These two articles represent the preliminary stages of Marx's insight into class struggle, even though he does not use this phrase. His sympathies were with the

poor and in 'Justification of the Correspondent from the Mosel' Marx called upon the state bureaucracy to come to the aid of the economically disadvantaged.

Part 3: The state

In order to fully explicate Marx's theory of the state it is necessary to divide this topic into the following six parts: 1) The State as the universal; 2) Private property and the state; 3) Centralization of the state; 4) The State and civil society; 5) The Liberal welfare state; 6) The acceptance of property, class and monarchy. Marx's journalism accorded perfectly with Hegel's *The Philosophy of Right*. In order to verify this assertion it is necessary to quote at length from Marx's newspaper articles.

1) The state as the universal

In his article 'The Leading Article in No. 179 of the *Kölnische Zeitung*', published between July 10 and July 14, 1842, Marx made this assertion:

Either the Christian state corresponds to the concept of the state as the realization of rational freedom and then the state only needs to be a rational state in order to be a Christian state and it suffices to derive the state from the rational character of human relations, a task which philosophy accomplishes; or the state of rational freedom cannot be derived from Christianity, and then you yourself will admit that this deviation is not intended by Christianity, since it does not want a bad state and a state that is not the realization of rational freedom is a bad state.⁸⁵

Marx's definition of the state as 'the realization of rational freedom' is in perfect alignment with Hegel's *The Philosophy of Right*.

Marx even borrowed Hegelian vocabulary. He incorporated terms like 'realization' and 'rational'. The state was a projection of the process of reason.

No social contract theory, no natural rights theory, no Rousseau, no Savigny, is present in this definition by Marx. Rather, the state is an expression of reason and the final accomplishment of reason is freedom.

The paragraph quoted above is a restatement of Hegel's famous phrase in *The Philosophy of Right*: 'What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational.'⁸⁶ Hegel did not mean that the totality of actuality was rational, rather he stated that those aspects of actuality which were rational achieved this status because reason molded them. Subjective reason constituted actuality and because of that constitution the rationality of mind was then positioned to understand the rationality of the actual. Subtracting Hegel's Speculative philosophy, Marx appropriated the basic form of this logical paradigm from Hegel. Whereas reason was constitutive for Hegel, reason was regulative for Marx. One attribute of reason was the creation of an organic institution in which every part functioned to attain a single goal. If the historical period was one which called for the extension of self-determination to the citizens of the state then that state was rational, operated in terms of reason, if every institution operated to produce that goal.

Additional evidence of Marx's adherence to the principles of Hegel's *The Philosophy of Right* can be extracted from another paragraph from 'The Leading Article in No. 179 of the *Kölnische Zeitung*':

Whereas the earlier philosophers of constitutional law proceeded in their account of the formation of the state from the instincts, either of ambition or gregariousness, or even from reason, though not social reason, but the reason of the individual, the more ideal and profound view of recent philosophy proceeds from the idea of the whole. It looks on the state as the great organism, in which legal, moral and political freedom must be realized, and in which the individual citizen in obeying the laws of his state only obeys the natural laws of his own reason, of human reason.⁸⁷

This paragraph reaffirms Marx's conviction the state in-itself was the embodiment of reason, but also pronounces 'legal, moral and political freedom' as particular expressions of reason. In his November 10–11, 1837 letter to his father Marx wrote: 'From the idealism which, by the way, I had compared and nourished with the idealism of Kant and Fichte, I arrived at the point of seeking the Idea in reality itself.' Five years after Marx wrote these words he continued to see 'the Idea in reality itself'. Marx's political writings in the *Rheinische Zeitung* were reiterations of Hegel's philosophy of state.

An additional Hegelian Idea was implanted in this paragraph, the concept of the organic. In itself the anatomical formula contained two other methodological principles, the logics of universality and the particular. Organisms were universalities in themselves, they were organizations operating in terms of a single ruling principle. Like a center of gravity, this single governing principle compelled the particular parts of the organism to gravitate toward this universality, or the particularities became expressions of the universal. The methodology of universal-particular, or whole and parts, was a dominant interpretive device in Hegel. The Mature Marx, the Marx who studied political economy at the British Museum, referred to social formations in the Hegelian formula of universality and the particular and it is impossible to understand Marx's Method of social analysis without applying these two explanatory instruments.

In order to validate the interpretation I offered in the preceding paragraphs I will quote again from Marx's journalism. This quote is taken from his series of articles entitled 'On the Commission of Estates in Prussia' which were published between December 10 and 30, 1842.

At the same time, however, one would have to demand of the author that he should make a more thorough study of nature and rise from the first sensuous perception of the various elements to a rational perception of the organic life of nature. Instead of the spectre of a chaotic unity, he would become aware of the spirit of a living unity. Even the elements do not persist in an inert separation. They are continually being transformed into one another and this transforming alone forms the first stage of the physical life of the earth, the meteorological

process. In the living organism, all trace of the different elements as such have disappeared. The difference no longer consists in the separate existence of the various elements, but in the living movement of distinct functions, which are all inspired by one and the same life, so that the very difference between them does not exist ready-made prior to this life, but, on the contrary, continually arises out of this life itself and as continually vanishes within it and becomes paralyzed.⁸⁸

In order to prove the permanence of the Hegelian-organic-universal-particular investigation it is necessary only to refer to the 'Introduction' of the 1857-1858 *Grundrisse*. In 'The Method of Political Economy' Marx uses the analogy of the ape as the strategy by which to investigate social formations. The unity of universal-particular within a total system was the basic interpretive formula and he adopted this Idea of holism from Hegel.

2) Private property and the state

The series of articles entitled 'Debates on the Law on Thefts of Wood', published in the *Rheinische Zeitung* from October 25 to November 3, 1842⁸⁹ was Marx's first explicit engagement with the question of social poverty. In a succeeding article in this newspaper, 'Justification of the Correspondent from the Mosel', published in the newspaper from January 15 to 20, 1843,⁹⁰ delves into the social poverty question more deeply.

The 'Debates on the Law on Thefts of Wood' demonstrates how private property can dominate the state. Not only does the 'Debates on the Law on Thefts of Wood' instance Marx's awareness of the poverty issue, but it also exemplifies the maturation of Marx's political consciousness. In this journalism Marx not only recognized the interconnection between private property and the state, but used the question of the theft of wood to illustrate the pre-emption of the state by private property. The vocabulary used by Marx to depict this usurpation was Hegelian and Marx painted the struggle between state and private greed as the contradiction between universality and particularity.

As I indicated in the preceding subdivision, Marx adopted the Hegelian principle that the state was the universal. The state was a holistic entity and incorporated individualities within its totality. Within the anatomy of the state each individuality received just and fair treatment. The pages of 'Debates on the Law on Thefts of Wood' depicted the interests of private property as annulling the universality of the state.

Similarly, Marx warned against the triumph of particularity. Not only did particularity sanction the rule of private property, but it also destroyed the principle of universality. If particularity was supreme then the just and fair application of law was impossible and since private property was the particular then the poor would never find equal treatment within the whole.

The domination of the particular was a sign of the irrationality of the social order. In order to be rational a social order must be universal, every particular must be treated equally before the law. The rule of private property was the signal of an irrational social order, the domination of the subjective.

Marx judged the arguments over the theft of wood using a strictly Hegelian lexicon. He placed these debates within the Hegelian methodology of universal-particular, whole-parts, and saw the danger of private property dissolving the universality. Hegel provided Marx's insight into social justice and the Hegel standing for social justice was the Liberal Hegel. The 'Debates on the Law on Thefts of Wood' was Marx's application of Liberal Hegelianism to the social question in Prussia.

3) *Centralization of the state*

The arguments Marx adduced for the centralization of the state were best represented in two articles; 'Communal Reform and the *Kölnische Zeitung*', printed in the *Rheinische Zeitung* from November 8 to 13, 1842⁹¹ and 'On the Commissions of the Estates of Prussia', printed in the same paper from December 11 to 31, 1842.⁹² Both these articles were Hegelian and nationalistic.

Marx's advocacy of the centralization of the Prussian state accorded perfectly with the Hegelian principle of universality. Marx recognized that if universality was to be the principle of the state then the state must be a unified system. The theory of the state in Marx as it was articulated in the *Rheinische Zeitung* period was a continuation of Hegel's *The Philosophy of Right*.

Hegel's advocacy of a centralized state was not only an articulation of his desire for a unified code of laws. As someone who experienced the subjugation of Germany to France during the Napoleonic Wars, Hegel was committed to the preservation of German sovereignty. The desire to preserve the political independence of Germany was a powerful element of his German nationalism and this was manifested in Hegel's defense of war as a means to sustain national sovereignty. In *The Philosophy of Right*, the section on 'World History' is a justification of war as a means of sustaining national independence. As a political realist, as an opponent of Kant's dream of a League of Nations, Hegel defended war in the interests of national preservation.

In addition, Marx also embodied German nationalism. From the perspective of 1842 the fate of Germany lay in Prussia. The hope of German unification rested upon the Hohenzollern monarchy and Marx was opposed to the continued feudal particularization of Germany. The extinction of feudalism, the final overthrow of the Middle Ages, was a necessary precursor to the achievement of a unified German state.

Marx's call for the centralization of the state confirms the thesis that Marx favored a unified legal code for Prussia and ultimately Germany. Previous sections of this study argued that both 'The Master' and Marx were in agreement on the need to codify German law into a single system. Whereas Hegel specifically supported such a codification Marx never specifically made a comment on this issue. However, Marx's championing of a centralization of government authority indirectly lends credence to the theory that he desired such a centralization of the legal code.

'On the Commission of the Estates in Prussia' is the fullest explication of Marx's political theory during the Cologne period. As merely a series of articles and therefore a sketch, 'On the Commission of the Estates in Prussia' puts forth a series of principles establishing the main principles of Marx's political theory.

In terms of a theory of government these articles represent a broadening of the Liberal Monarchism of 'The Master'. The principles of the state expressed in these articles coincide with the Hegelian theory of the state and 'On the Commission of the Estates in Prussia' is essentially the union of Hegel's *The Philosophy of Right* with the French revolution of 1830. Marx remained within the Hegelian Liberal Center, an advocate of rational rights, but expanded its parameters.

In 'On the Commission of the Estates in Prussia' Marx took Hegel's theory of the state and employed it against the remnants of feudalism in Prussia. Marx applied the Hegelian principles of universality, rationality and nationalism to the problem of political representation and demonstrated that the proper realization of these principles necessitated an expanded suffrage. The correct employment of universality, rationality and nationalism broke the limitations of representation based on estates or private property, and Marx, by following rational consistency, required the elimination of property as the deciding criterion for voting rights. 'On the Commission of the Estates in Prussia' was not a democratic document. Rather it was an illustration of Hegel's doctrine of rational rights, a demonstration of how the principle of universality could act as justification for Liberalism, as a rational proof that most members within a state should be given admission into the franchise.

The argument I advance above does not claim Marx was a democrat in December 1842. He was not. His transition to democracy occurs for the first time in his 1843 essay 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right'. The argument I expound above demonstrates how the Hegelian theory of rational rights could be expanded by a Liberal Hegelian into a call for an enlargement of the franchise.

Additionally, Marx used the prescription of universality, rationality and nationalism to establish the basis of representation. Marx's formula for political representation negated the concept of particularity. Marx's annulment of the idea of particularity was the cause of his first attacks on private property because he saw private property as the ground of the particular, or private interest in opposition to universality.

Marx understood private property as the premise of estates and that estates were merely political expressions of private interests. When provincial assemblies were represented on the basis of estates these provincial assemblies were merely tools of private interest, or personal demands of the owners of property. Similarly, the desire to have separate assemblies for cities and countryside was also a manifestation of particularity, the wish to safeguard the private property of the cities from the poverty of the countryside. According to Marx, if political representation rested on estates, which in themselves rested upon private property, then every level of the state, from countryside communes to provincial assemblies, to Prussian assemblies, were ultimately controlled by wealth.

Marx rebutted the Idea of representation based on estates, and in his 'On the Commissions of the Estates in Prussia' wrote:

Representation must not be conceived as the representation of something that is not the people itself. It must be conceived only as the people's self-representation, as a state action which . . . is distinguished from the other expressions of its state life merely by the universality of its content . . . In a

true state there is no landed property, no industry, no material thing, which as a crude element of this kind could make a bargain with the state; in it there are only spiritual forces, and only in their state form of resurrection in their political rebirth, are these natural forces entitled to a voice in the state . . . not the unfree object, but the free human being.⁹³

The final words refer to the 'free human being'. In another article, 'Communal Reform and the *Kölnische Zeitung*', Marx alluded to the concept of equality:

. . . the *Rheinische Zeitung* wants an equal communal system for town and countryside and even designates their equality expressly in the article quoted as 'equality of rights of urban and rural communities'.⁹⁴

When Marx wrote of the 'free human being' and 'equality' he did not use these terms in a radical Jacobin democratic sense, or in the communist sense of social egalitarianism, but rather in the Liberal constitutional sense of the French Revolution of 1830. The employment of the term 'equality' during the 1842 *Rheinische Zeitung* period was not presented in the context of communist social egalitarianism, the elimination of private property, but rather in the Liberal context of equality before the law. Marx wanted equality between town and country because he did not want artificial material privileges providing political advantages to the cities, but wanted both town and countryside to have a universal standard, or law, applied equally to these jurisdictions. In the Cologne period equality did not refer to the equalization of possession or social status, but rather to constitutional guarantees that laws would be universal in their application, or that laws would be applied equally to each individual. The sphere to which Marx related the concept of equality was not social, not to property, but constitutional and juridical.

In his days in Cologne Marx did not call for revolution, for the overthrow of monarchy and state, nor for democracy. In fact, Marx was still loyal to the Prussian Crown, still believed that the political reforms he advocated were achievable within the Hohenzollern dynasty and in the article 'On the Commission of the Estates in Prussia' praised the Prussian Crown because the universalism of the state was the 'free creation of the spirit of the Prussian state'.⁹⁵

Even though Marx had not yet entered his democratic stage, a stage he reached in his 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right', or his communist stage, a stage reached in his 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction', the *Rheinische Zeitung* period was a precursor to his later critique of the capitalist state. The two articles from the Cologne days, 'Communal Reform and the *Kölnische Zeitung*'⁹⁶ and 'On the Commission of the Estates in Prussia'⁹⁷ are preparatory experiments for his later critique of the capitalist state as an instrument for the socio-political domination of private property. Specifically, in 'On the Commission of the Estates in Prussia' Marx recognized the interconnection between the social and political and how the individual control of private property leads to the control of the state by private property. An insight was dawning in Marx that the political could become the slave of private property. Still a Liberal Hegelian, Marx was not yet

ready to subsume the state, the political, into the social; Marx still believed the political enjoyed an existence outside of private property.

4) The state, universality and governance

This quote from the article 'Justification of the Correspondent from the Mosel' is important in comprehending the difference Marx drew between the state and governance.

In order to solve this difficulty, therefore, the rulers and the ruled alike are in of a third element, which would be political without being, hence not based on bureaucratic premises, an element which would be of a civil nature without being bound up with private interests and their pressing needs. This supplementary element with the head of a citizen of the state and the heart of a citizen is the free press . . . It alone can make a particular interest a general one, it alone can make the distressed state of the Mosel region an object of general attention and general sympathy on the part of the Fatherland, it alone can mitigate the distress by dividing the feeling of it among All.⁹⁸

This paragraph encapsulated the vision of the 24-year-old Marx into the component parts of a government. Most importantly it expressed Marx's incipient insight that the political was one element of government. The political and government were not commensurate, but the political was a detachable component of government.

In this paragraph Marx distinguished between four 'elements' of government. One 'element' was 'bureaucracy' and a second 'element' was 'private interest', but 'bureaucracy' and 'private interest' were merely parts of a greater whole. The 'third element' was of a 'civil nature' and the phrase 'civil nature' did not mean 'civil society' but a general social realm distinct from 'bureaucracy' and 'private interest' and finding expression in a free press. The fourth 'element' was the 'political', or the sphere of government in which decisions were concluded.

Marx's division of the state, or governance, into four spheres testifies to his adherence to the Hegelian notion of universality. When Marx drew a distinction between these four spheres of the state he indicated each in-itself was not the state, that the state could only exist as a whole, as an organic assembly of these parts. Marx wrote that only the 'civil', or free press, could 'make a particular interest a general one', and the term general was a synonym for universal, that is, only when generality prevailed could a true state exist.

Marx wrote the 'Justification of the Correspondent from the Mosel' between January 15 and 20, 1843; he resigned from the *Rheinische Zeitung* only two months later on March 17 and he wrote his 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' from May to October, 1843. The 'Justification of the Correspondent from the Mosel' is an anticipation of the 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' because it adumbrates the distinction between the political – state – and governance – the universal.

When Marx isolated four particularities comprising the state, or governance, he utilized an insight detaching the 'political' particularity from the universality of

governance. The 'Justification of the Correspondent from the Mosel' was Marx's initial articulation that the 'political', the state, was a particularity separate from the universality of governance. In his 1843 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' Marx called for the 'abolition of the state', but such a call was not a demand for the abolition of all governance. Marx could only make this assertion because he knew that the state, or politics, was only a detachable particularity and to elide this particularity still left a universality in existence and that universality was governance based on a democratic suffrage. Marx was not a Jacobin or Babouvist during the *Rheinische Zeitung* period, but he acquired the insight that governance was a conglomerate of particularities and that it was possible to delete one particularity, the political, and still allow for a universality to survive.

Marx's dissection of the universality of governance into four autonomous elements was an application of the Hegelian methodology of whole and parts. Marx did not employ 'civil society' because he had not yet advanced to political economy. The journalism of the Cologne period mostly used the term 'estate' and very infrequently 'class'. The reason Marx preferred the word estate and only sparingly alluded to class was that he had not yet reached the realization that a new economic order had conquered European civilization. This was the task he actualized in the 'The Manuscripts'.

During his time in Cologne the infrequent use of the word class signals Marx's lack of awareness that an economic revolution was overtaking Europe. He was not yet cognizant that capitalism, no longer feudalism, was the new social order in Europe and that 'civil society' must now be defined in terms of the capitalist social formation. Marx's engagement with political economy started only when he and his new bride, Jenny, moved to Paris in October 1843 where he entered socialist circles which served as the stimulus for his reading of List and Mill.

Furthermore, proof that during the *Rheinische Zeitung* period the anti-feudal struggle took precedence over the anti-capitalist crusade is found in Marx's article 'Commission of the Estates in Prussia' in which Marx wrote:

What makes the press the most powerful lever for promoting culture and the intellectual education of the people is precisely the fact that it transforms the material struggle into an ideological struggle, the struggle of flesh and blood into struggle of minds, the struggle of need, desire, empiricism into a struggle of theory, of reason, of form.⁹⁹

This paragraph, written in December 1842, is extremely interesting for two reasons: it contains Marx's first use of the word 'ideological' and it indicates the apparatus Marx would use to bring about social change.

Marx's first recourse to the term 'ideological' is presented in a distinctly Hegelian framework. Marx does not employ the term in its 1845 'Leipzig Council' definition where Marx utilized the term 'ideology' in a negative sense, meaning an intellectual dogma justifying class control. In 1845 'ideology' was a class creed, a falsification of social reality in the interests of a propertied class. However, in 1842 'ideological' was presented in a positive manner. 'Ideological' was a synonym for an intellectual

interpretation and the 1842 phrase 'ideological struggle' meant a debate, a clash of two conceptual representations. When Marx used the phrase 'ideological struggle' he had in mind a Hegelian debate between two opposing philosophical positions.

This December 1843 paragraph also situates 'material struggle' in a subordinate position to 'theory' and 'reason'. The 'struggle of flesh and blood' is placed in an inferior position to 'theory' and 'reason'. In this paragraph Marx prioritizes the concept of 'struggle' but was totally silent over the issues of productive forces and the mode of production.

In the 1843 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction' Marx understood that 'practical activity' and 'revolutionary praxis' were the basic apparatus of social change. In the 1843 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction' he also made use of the idea of class, or class became the socio-economic group activating 'revolutionary praxis'. A year earlier in his December 1842 article 'Commission of the Estates in Prussia' the concepts of 'revolutionary praxis' and 'practical activity' were totally foreign to Marx. He did not even mention the word class as an instrument of social transformation.

Changes in society would be necessitated by the 'struggle of theory, of reason, of form'. This was a totally Hegelian formula. In this paragraph Marx asserted that revisions of the social would come after revisions of thought. The modification of mind was a necessary precondition for the modification of the real. In 1842 Marx continued to advocate a Hegelian prescription for change. Marx still looked upon the pneumatic power of the idea as the precondition for the transformation of social reality. These were the guidelines of the Hegelian Center.

5) The liberal monarchical welfare state

The article 'Justification of the Correspondent from the Mosel' represents an important moment in the intellectual development of Marx because it not only shows his compassion for the victims of social impoverishment, but also his advocacy of remedial action to ameliorate that distress. Clearly, Marx was not a communist when he wrote this series of articles, but they nevertheless stand as proof that by January 1843 he recognized the responsibility of government to reduce economic hardship.

This article describes the economic depression afflicting the winegrowers in the Mosel Valley and in this journalism Marx champions three measures he thought would mitigate this economic devastation. The measures Marx proposed were the 'remission of taxes in bad wine years, the advice to go over to some other cultivation, such as sericulture, and, finally, the proposal to limit parceling of landed property'.¹⁰⁰

In addition, Marx stood in favor of granting the economically destitute customary rights, that is, he wanted to ensure the impoverished maintained some guarantee from the state for physical survival. In October 1842, in the article, 'Debates on the Law on Thefts of Wood', Marx wrote:

In these customs of the poor class, therefore, there is an instinctive sense of right; their roots are positive and legitimate, and the form of customary right

here conforms all the more to nature because up to now the existence of the poor class itself has been a mere custom of civil society, a custom which has not found an appropriate place in the conscious organization of the state.¹⁰¹

Both of these quotes portray Marx in 1842 as a Liberal Monarchist exponent of the welfare state, that is, Marx supported state action in behalf of the economically expropriated. Marx did not yet call for the abolition of private property, or the abolition of class, or the abolition of the state, but he did call for state action to reduce the suffering of the poor.

As I mentioned in previous paragraphs Marx read Hegel's *The Philosophy of Right* even before his 1843 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right', and it is noteworthy that Marx made so few allusions to the idea of 'civil society' that plays such a prominent role in this book. He did not as yet in 1842 understand the full significance of this concept. Similarly, Marx makes no reference in his Cologne journalism to Hegel's championing of state action to redress the economic deprivation of the poor. Most of Hegel's comments on the responsibility of government to mitigate the sufferings of poverty are located in the 'civil society' section of *The Philosophy of Right*, specifically in the division entitled 'The Administration of Justice', paragraphs 230 to 256.¹⁰²

Later sections of this book will discuss in detail aspects of Hegel's work to which Marx did not give proper attention. Marx's approach to Hegel was tainted with biases and this myopia caused Marx to distort particular dimensions of Hegel's thought. Since I will explicate these distortions in subsequent phases of this book it is only necessary for me at this point to assert Hegel's recognition of the poverty issue during these natal stages of capitalist development in Germany and acknowledge his perception of the monarchical state as a source of amelioration of this social malignancy. I maintain that Hegel was a tribune of the Liberal Monarchical welfare state. Support for my interpretation can be found in Frederick Neuhouser's *Foundations of Hegel's Social Theory*¹⁰³ where the social legislation Hegel supported as a means to ensure the survival of the economically disadvantaged is described.¹⁰⁴ Hegel supported these welfare measures out of his awareness that the Crown was obligated to demonstrate the ethical foundations of the state, to establish objective social policies and institutions which encouraged self-determination. Hegel recognized that economic impoverishment was a deterrent to subjective freedom.

In addition, Neuhouser correctly detaches Hegel from the political philosophy of 'methodological atomism',¹⁰⁵ separating Hegel from the English tradition of 'possessive individualism'.¹⁰⁶ Neuhouser supports my presentation of Hegel's social theory as a form of sociological holism. In Chapter 4 of his book, 'The Self-Determining Social Whole'¹⁰⁷ he describes Hegel's view of the state as an organism, a self-generating whole, possessed of the teleological powers of subsuming autonomous parts into its totality. Hegelian holism, the objective structure of a society, rested upon a purpose, and the purpose of the state was to create conditions encouraging ethical behavior, to construct social institutions which were ethical. Compassion and subsistence for the poor was one example of ethicality, and the state must

create objective institutions which model, create, examples of ethical actions which a personhood can imitate. The spiritual ancestor of Hegel's political theory was the Greek polis, Aristotle's ideal of the ethical unity of the private and the public.

Liberal Hegelianism, in looking upon the state as the embodiment of right, of morality, recognized the ethical duty of the state to prevent the less fortunate from becoming economic slaves. Marx's awareness that the state must act on behalf of the poor accorded with Hegelian political principles. In 1842 Marx perpetuated the Liberal Hegelian welfare state.

6) *The acceptance of constitutional monarchy*

The *Rheinische Zeitung* was a Liberal newspaper and as such was under continuous scrutiny by the censors of the Prussian monarchy. If the newspaper hoped to stay in existence it needed to prove to the monarchical officials that its articles did not violate any of the censorship guidelines. When the newspaper was admonished by the government bureaucracy Marx, as editor, assumed the responsibility of demonstrating the loyalty of the newspaper to the Hohenzollern Throne. In two documents, in particular, although they were not published as articles in the Cologne periodical but in 1919 in an anthology dealing with the political movement in Germany from 1830 to 1850, Marx defended the newspaper by listing issues in which the newspaper acted as an advocate for the monarchy. It is possible to argue that since these documents were written to forestall the closure of the newspaper they are not reliable evidence of Marx's loyalty to the Prussian Throne, or Monarchy in general. From this point of view these documents are merely testimony for the defense and not an accurate gauge of Marx's honest opinion. I argue on the other hand that the documents do faithfully portray Marx's Liberal Monarchism, which was consonant with the Liberal Monarchism of Hegel.

In one of these documents, 'Renard's Letter to Oberpräsident von Schaper', Marx wrote the following paragraph:

Moreover, we have never gone outside the terrain proper to a newspaper, but have touched on dogmas such as church doctrines and conditions in general only insofar as other newspapers make religion into constitutional law and transfer it from its own sphere into that of politics. It will even be easy to cover each of our utterances with the similar and stronger utterances of a Prussian king, Frederick the Great, and we consider this authority to be one which Prussian publicists may very well invoke.¹⁰⁸

The most important part of this defense is Marx's allusion to Frederick the Great, who was the hero of German Liberal Monarchism. Marx's close friend, Köppen, wrote a biography of Frederick the Great and presented Frederick as the epitome of a Liberal Monarchist. Marx was influenced by Köppen's book and Marx's dissertation was dedicated to Köppen. Marx obviously shared Köppen's admiration of Frederick and when Marx noted in the above paragraph the adherence of the *Rheinische Zeitung* to the political principles of Frederick, Marx enunciated his loyalty to the theory of German Liberalism. In 1842 Marx hoped Frederick

would act as the archetype of monarchical rule. Marx did not seek an overthrow of monarchy, but rather set forth an Enlightenment model of monarchical government. In the second document, 'Marginal Notes to Accusations of Ministerial Rescript',¹⁰⁹ Marx listed ten political issues on which the *Rheinische Zeitung* supported the governance of Frederick Wilhelm IV. Rather than seeking to undermine the Hohenzollern dynasty, Marx catalogued the areas of support he extended to the Hohenzollern dynasty.

In addition, Marx drew a distinction between North German Prussian Liberalism and South German Liberalism.¹¹⁰ South German Liberalism tilted more to French culture and politics, and it was anathema to Prussia because it followed the example of French Liberalism, which still supported the anti-monarchical sentiments of the Revolution of 1830. Marx in 1842 looked upon French and South German Liberalism as potential threats to the government of Frederick Wilhelm IV.

Not only was Marx's attack on South German Liberalism a defense of North German Liberal Monarchy, but it was simultaneously an exoneration of Hegel. The intellectual spokespersons of South German Liberalism were Karl von Rotteck and Karl Theodor Welcker, who published the *Staats-Lexicon*, an annual dictionary of political theory. Rotteck and Welcker castigated Hegel as a Prussian conservative, and as an apologist for Frederick Wilhelm IV, and this view flowed into the work of Haym. For example, in *The Philosophy of Right* Hegel defended 'Notrecht', or the 'right of need'. As I indicated previously, Hegel defended the right of private property, but in the case of extreme need, a case in which a person faced starvation and death, Hegel judged it that person's right to steal from another's private property as a life-preserving action. *Notrecht* was a means of preserving will, or selfhood, over the claims of possession. Rotteck, a Liberal South German, upheld the sanctity and inviolability of private property and rejected Hegel's principle of *Notrecht*.¹¹¹ Marx denounced Rotteck and Welcker's attack on Hegel and Marx's refutation of Rotteck and Welcker was a definitive statement of his own pro-Hegelianism. Marx continued to play guardian to Hegel as late as 1870 and in a letter to Engels in that year Marx vilified 'the old Rotteck-Welcker dreck' which sought to blemish Hegel as a lackey of the Prussian dynasty. From Marx's 1841 dissertation until 1870 Marx played the role of Swiss guard to Hegel.¹¹²

In 'Renard's Letter to Oberpräsident von Schaper' Marx stated:

The Rh. Ztg. Has, on the contrary, made its main task to direct towards Germany the glances which so many people still fastened on France, and to evoke a German instead of a French liberalism, which can surely not be disagreeable to the government of Frederick Wilhelm IV.¹¹³

Marx's political self-definition in 1842 was directly in line with Hegel's form of German Liberalism. Marx's German Liberalism of 1842 recapitulated Hegel's German Liberalism as set forth in *The Philosophy of Right*. Part IV of *The Philosophy of History* is entitled 'The German World' and the last chapter of 'The German World' is called 'The Éclaircissement and Revolution' and in this chapter Hegel presents his views regarding Frederick the Great and German Liberalism. Among

their other areas of agreement, Hegel and Marx were in absolute accord on three vital issues: Frederick the Great, French Liberalism and German Liberalism.

Hegel was an admirer of Frederick the Great. In *The Philosophy of History* Hegel stated: 'Frederick II merits special notice as having comprehended the general object of the State, and as having been the first sovereign who kept the general interest of the State steadily in view, ceasing to pay any respect to particular interests when they stood in the way of the common weal.'¹¹⁴

French Liberalism was a political expression of French national culture. Hegel lived through the French Revolution and Napoleon and was aware that the French, English and German cultures were properties of unique national spirits. France was a part of the Catholic World, and the French Revolution was a defining moment in the Gallic nation's understanding of Freedom. French Liberalism exaggerated the autonomy of the individual will and, for Hegel, radical subjectivity was always a cause of decay. French Liberalism provided proof of this instability because even after the Napoleonic Wars it did not create a stable government, and this was demonstrated in the Revolution of 1830.¹¹⁵

The product of a predominantly Protestant country, German nationality differed from that of the Catholic World of France, Spain and Italy. While avoiding the radical subjectivity of French Liberalism German Liberalism did guarantee the right of private property and personal freedom. German Liberalism widened the accessibility of state employment to citizens. The government bureaucracy enjoyed areas of autonomy, but the monarch constituted its apex. One of the major differences between French and German Liberalism concerned the powers of the Throne, and whereas the French sought to strip its monarchy of any decision-making role, German Liberalism regarded the 'personal decision of the monarch' as the ultimate will of the state.¹¹⁶ According to Hegel, the Monarch embodied the Will of the State. It was the center providing cohesiveness and universality to the parts. German Liberalism retained the Monarch as a decision-making volition.¹¹⁷

Marx and Hegel were in agreement over the issues of Frederick the Great, French Liberalism and German Liberalism. When Marx wrote that he espoused German Liberalism he declared his adherence to the principles of North German Liberalism as also espoused by Hegel.

7) Methodology

A central task of *Marx's Discourse with Hegel* is to delineate the areas of continuity and discontinuity between the 'Parmenides of Berlin' and Marx. In the area of Continuity the methodological apparatus Marx appropriated from Hegel are vital. The explanatory procedures Marx employed to analyze social formations are derived from Hegelian methodology. These methodological categories Marx used in his analysis in *Das Kapital* were already activated by Marx in his dissertation and in his journalism for the *Rheinische Zeitung*. These methodologies were largely derived from the 'Book of Essence' in Hegel's *The Science of Logic*. Later sections in *Marx's Discourse with Hegel* will discuss in greater detail how these Hegelian methodological categories determined Marx's philosophy of social explanation, so at this point I will only briefly enumerate the methodological categories present in

the Cologne days. The attempt here is to establish the line of continuity because if it can be shown that Marx utilized Hegelian methodological categories both in his dissertation and the Cologne journalism then the argument that these categories were also present in the 1867 *Das Kapital* receives confirmation.

For the sake of clarity and emphasis I will single out the Hegelian methodological categories used by Marx in the *Rheinische Zeitung*: a) Organic image; b) Whole-parts; c) Universal-particular; d) Genus-species; e) Form-content; f) Essence; g) Essence-existence; h) Determination; i) Contradiction;) In-Itself

a) Organic image

In his article, 'On the Commission of the Estates in Prussia', Marx wrote: 'we demand that the real organic life of the state should not be suddenly abandoned.'¹¹⁸ Replicating Hegel, Marx learned to view social formations as organic units, that is, Marx borrowed Hegel's holistic program of explanation. Both Hegel and Marx understood explanation to mean approaching an object of study as a totality of whole and parts.

b) Whole-parts

In his article 'On the Commission of the Estates in Prussia' Marx wrote: 'the particular in its isolated activity is always the enemy of the whole.'¹¹⁹ In Marx's holistic methodology the supplement to the organic image was the division of the totality into whole and parts, that is, parts were seen as particularities that were functions of the whole.

c) Universal-particular

In his article, 'Debates on the Law on Thefts of Wood',¹²⁰ Marx repeatedly contrasts the particular interests of the landowners against the universal interests of the peasants. Every totality possessed a universality, or end, shaping that totality.

d) Genus-species

In his article, 'Debates on Freedom of the Press' Marx wrote: 'the courts are all species of one and the same genus.'¹²¹ The genus-species category continued the principle of universality, but it was used as a form of classification. The methodology of universal-particular, whole-parts, were categories defining the qualitative, whereas genus-species defined kind, or classification. Capitalism was a genus, but there were various species of capitalism, for example, agrarian or industrial.

e) Form-content

In his article, 'In Connection with the Article "Failures of the Liberal Opposition in Hanover"', Marx applied the form-content methodology. Marx wrote: 'As regards its form, it is said the opposition is not liberal . . . As regards the content, it further contended that the content of the opposition . . . is not the content of freedom.'¹²² The analytic code of form refers to a configuration, while content refers to the dynamics of that configuration. A configuration was a shape, while

the content was a power of predication. A form could be a legislature, while the content could be the power of the legislature to make law. It was possible to change the form but to retain the content. For example, a legislature could be abolished and its function of making law transferred to a different embodiment.

f) Essence

In the article, 'The Divorce Bill', Marx wrote: 'They have criticized not its essence . . .'¹²³ Essence was the implicit, the in-itself as a form. Essence was the end or purpose toward which a form aspired.

g) Essence–existence

In 'The Divorce Bill' Marx wrote: 'the existence of a moral relationship no longer corresponded to its essence.'¹²⁴ Since essence was end it must externalize itself as existence. The existent is the external upon which essence inscribes itself.

h) Determination

In 'The Divorce Bill' Marx wrote: 'and therefore puts determination from above in place of self-determination.'¹²⁵ Determination was the practical application of essence. Essence was the purpose of the subject and determination was the achievement of that purpose.

i) Contradiction

In his article, 'Debates on the Law on Thefts of Wood', Marx wrote: 'But it is not concerned about contradictions, for it never comes into contradiction with itself.'¹²⁶ Contradiction was a means to establish self-identity. The establishment of self-identity meant that an Other was a limit to a subject, an 'Other' must establish a barrier to a subject and in so doing a subject acquires a limit and an identity.

j) In-Itself

In 'The Divorce Bill' Marx wrote: 'Hegel says: In-Itself according to the concept, marriage is indissoluble, but only in-itself.'¹²⁷ The in-itself is the implicit, the immanent. The in-itself is a synonym for essence.

Phase Four: Marx's Development of Critique and His Delinking from Hegel

Marx's 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' was a revocation of his 1837 letter to his father. In that letter he described his need to find 'the Idea in reality itself', but in his 1843 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' he began his study of how reality was the constitutive element in thought. It was an inversion that determined his intellectual enterprise for the remainder of his life.

The years 1843 to 1844 are the borders of Marx's delinking from Hegel. Prior to his departure from the *Rheinische Zeitung* Marx was an exponent of Hegelian politics and theory of the state, he adhered to the principles of constitutional monarchy and was a loyalist of the Hegelian Center. After terminating his employment with the newspaper the embittered Marx was more receptive to the Hegelian Left, to Ruge and to Feuerbach, while continuing his commitment to Bauerian critique. Ruge influenced him in terms of the theory–practice equation and Feuerbach in terms of the concept of 'social being'. As his receptivity to the Hegelian Left advanced Marx divorced himself from the Hegelian Center and in his 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right', during an intense study of the French Revolution in Kreuznach, embraced democracy. But Marx's adherence to the Hegelian Left was short-lived and in his 1844 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction' he detached himself from the Hegelian Left and converted to communism and began to develop interpretative principles that helped him in the maturation of his theory of social explanation.

The year from 1843 to 1844 was thus a period of successive severances. However, when I use the term severance I use it in a fashion totally different from the manner in which Althusser employed 'epistemological break'. In his two books, *Reading Capital*¹ and *For Marx*² Althusser wrote of an 'epistemological break' erupting between Hegel and Marx in which Marx erased all contact with Hegelian philosophy. My interpretation of the Hegel–Marx relationship is divided into two categories, discontinuities and continuities. There were two areas of Hegelian thought from which Marx delinked himself – discontinuities – basically in the areas of philosophy and politics, but there were also areas of Hegelian thought that Marx preserved – continuities – and these fell essentially in the domain of methodology. Contrary to Althusser, the relationship between Marx and Hegel was not defined by a surgical amputation, but rather by a perpetuation in the thought of Marx of specific terrains of Hegelian Speculative philosophy.

The period 1843–1844 was the year of Marx's passage from Hegelian Centrist to communism. During this period Marx wrote six essays and several letters, which I designate as the works of the passage, and these were: 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right', 'Letters from the German–French Yearbook', 'On The Jewish Question', 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction', 'On James Mill', 'Critical Notes on the Article "The King of Prussia and Social Reform" by a Prussian', and 'Theses on Feuerbach'. Even though 'Theses on Feuerbach' was written in Brussels in 1845, I include it in the works of the passage because it is a continuation of the major ideas contained in the earlier five essays and letters

and because it provides insights into Marx's early conversion to and definition of communism.

This Phase, 'Marx's Development of Critique and His Delinking from Hegel' has two purposes: using the works of the passage as the primary source material to map the evolution of Marx from the Hegelian Center to communism, and also to document the Hegelianisms Marx discontinued and the Hegelianisms Marx continued. I will accomplish both these purposes by employing the categories of discontinuity and continuity as the perspectives from which to interpret the works of the passage. However, the fact that Marx changed his position from Hegelian Centrist to Left Hegelian to democrat to communist does not mean that Marx modified his positioning of Hegel. Even though Marx traversed these four philosophical positions from 1841 to 1850 he always located Hegel as belonging to the Center. Marx underwent relocations, but in his mind Hegel was always situated in the Center.

A) Discontinuities

I will apply the following categories as a means of isolating the discontinuities between Marx and Hegel on the works of the passage: 1) State, politics and democracy; 2) Philosophy; 3) Civil society.

1) State, politics and democracy

In Marx's 1843 essay 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' Marx confirmed that during his *Rheinsche Zeitung* period he regarded *The Philosophy of Right* as a defense of constitutional monarchy. In his 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' Marx wrote: 'Hegel has deduced not a patriarchal, but a modern constitutional King.'³

In 1820 Hegel defined the German state as a constitutional monarchy and the Marx of 1843 detached himself from this definition of the state. The 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right', written between March and August 1843, called for the dissolution of the state and this was to be accomplished by the installation of universal suffrage, or democracy. The 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' was the first time Marx advocated democracy, but was not Marx's final political radicalization. In his 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction', written between the end of 1843 and the beginning of 1844 in Paris, Marx embraced communism.⁴

In order to fully understand what Marx meant by the abolition of the state it is first necessary to reach a definition of politics, democracy and governance.

Politics was a more inclusive term than state. Ultimate sovereignty was the state and in a constitutional monarchy the King was the state. Politics had a broader meaning and referred to the different organs of the state that exercised some degree of sovereignty, such as the legislature, the juridical system, parliamentary parties and the bureaucracy. The state was the universal and politics were the particularities of the state organism.

But state and politics were the domains of despotism and this was true because the state and politics were divorced from civil society (I will describe Hegel and

Marx on civil society in greater detail below). The clearest exposition of the reasons and consequences of the detachment of state/politics from civil society is found in Marx's August, 1844 article 'Critical Notes on the Articles "The King of Prussia and Social Reform" by a Prussian'.⁵

Civil society was the totality of a nation, whereas the state and politics were the minority of a nation. Whether it was due to the monopolization of industry, land, or military power the state and politics were a minority in a nation. The state and politics were consequences of the separation between civil society and the state/politics. If civil society, which was the totality of a nation, was separated from the state/politics and the state/politics monopolized power, then civil society was merely the bondsman of the state/politics, or the rule of a minority over the vast majority.

Democracy enlarged the power of the majority, but it was not in itself the complete conquest of human liberation. If democracy did not totally empower civil society then democracy was not the total emancipation of humankind. It was possible for democracy to exist and at the same time still consent to the existence of state/politics and this situation would only allow money to be the authoritarian.

When Marx called for the abolition of the state this was not a summons for anarchy. Marx never called for the abolition of governance; laws were necessary. The basic problem for Marx was to account for the institutions of governance. That situation in which civil society became the universal of a nation, the institutions to make law emerged out of civil society, was governance. Civil society would provide the governmental structures of society.

Marx's redefinition of state, politics and governance was an expression of a more fundamental discontinuity with Hegel, the rejection of Hegelian Speculative philosophy. According to Hegel the state and its political subdivisions were predicates of the Idea. According to Hegelian Idealism the subject in the universe was the Idea and the state was merely an objectification of the Idea. Marx rejected Hegel's interpretation of the state/politics as manifestations of Speculative philosophy and this was the central thesis of the 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right'.

The understanding of Marx's repudiation of Speculative philosophy clarifies a sentence contained in his 1844 'Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy in General' in which Marx wrote:

There can therefore no longer be any question about an act of accommodation on Hegel's part vis-à-vis religion, the state, etc., since this lie is the lie of his principle.⁶

This sentence makes two claims. First, that Hegel as a person made no 'accommodation' to the Hohenzollern monarchy. As a person Hegel made no 'accommodation' and therefore such an imputation was a 'lie'. However, the second claim that Hegel's 'principle' did make an 'accommodation' to Prussian authoritarianism was true. In making this assertion Marx proposed that it was Hegelian philosophy, the 'principle', that led to such an 'accommodation'. By turning the state/politics into a projection of the Idea Hegelian Speculative philosophy created the foundation

for the belief that the monarchy was metaphysically justified and that therefore acceptance of the status quo was proper.

Marx's claim that philosophy could act as a tool of monarchical conservatism was given its clearest expression in his essay 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction'. This essay demonstrated that philosophy could act as a justification of reality, as certifying that the existent was rational and therefore due political loyalty and submissiveness.

2) Philosophy

The discontinuities between Marx and Hegel over the role of philosophy was composed of many categories. I will divide my discussion into the following subdivisions: A) Philosophy; B) Theory and practice; C) Subject-object; D) Form-content; E) Essence; F) Substance; G) Subjective action.

2A) Philosophy Hegel defined philosophy as recollection, as a cognitive act that 'looks back on its knowledge'.⁷ The Idea as a function of Spirit was productive, or generated cognates that were fusions of the subjective and the objective. These productions were historical, they were reflections of the historical period in which Spirit acted. The determinations generated by mind were particularities that were congruent with the historical time zone in which they were actualized. Philosophy was the observation by reason of its own history of determinations. Philosophy was the curriculum vitae of reason. Through the self-observation of its own externalizations, reason gained a knowledge of its own powers, went through a process of self-education and this education brought it to the awareness of the unity of subject and object, and this unity was Spirit.⁸

Hegelian philosophy was a theory of reconciliation between the Idea and reality. The Idea was the force that constituted reality, therefore the Idea and reality were symmetrical, although not totally. Idea was the prius and therefore reality must conform to the Idea.

In Hegel the ascent of philosophy passed through three developmental stages, subjective, objective and absolute. The subjective stage concerned the progression of mind through its anthropological, self-conscious and psychological dimensions, or the evolutionary attainment by a subject of mind. The objective stage witnessed the appearance of philosophy in its social activity. Objective philosophy was the productivity of mind as the Self became involved in a 'civil society', law, property, morality and the production of the state, which was the breeding ground of the ethical. Objective mind was philosophy in its socio-political appearance. Absolute mind was the penultimate ascent of philosophy and witnessed the emergence of art, religion and philosophy. Absolute mind was the appearance of philosophy as an in-itself, as philosophy's self-observation of its own projections.

Marx disassociated himself from the Hegelian definition of philosophy and in order to properly grasp this discontinuity it is necessary to divide philosophy into two parts, the in-itself and the purpose. Marx never nullified philosophy in-itself. Philosophy-in-itself was a powerful tool of reason and must be retained as a guide to practice.

Marx did divorce himself from the Hegelian purpose of philosophy and this divorce was performed in the 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction'. According to Marx the Germans lived their present in thought, that is, the purpose of philosophy in Germany was an increased appetite for more philosophy. The negative aspect of this addiction to philosophy was the incapacity of the Germans to deal with the truth of the historical moment. Since the purpose of Hegelian philosophy was the harmonization of the Idea and reality, the German absorption of philosophy incurred a submissiveness to the real. Philosophy was the opiate of the Germans and the hallucinations caused by this opiate made the Germans blind to the reality of their oppression.

In the 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction' Marx did not seek the abolition of philosophy, but rather the alteration of its goal. In Marx the end of philosophy was not reconciliation, but rather the exposure of a fracture. The purpose of philosophy in Marx was the revelation of how philosophy failed reality, or the disjuncture between reality and human emancipation.

2B) Theory and practice Hegel's discussion of theoretical and practical reason begins with paragraph 445 of *The Philosophy of Mind*. These discussions are both placed in the section on Psychology, or the last stage of Subjective Spirit.

The placement of theoretical and practical mind in the section on Psychology itself reveals Hegel's understanding of these terms. The theoretical and practical were functions of mind, they were the apparati of mind. Philosophy in Hegel was the culmination of the Absolute Mind and so the theoretical and practical were the apparati of psychology, stages enabling mind to finally ascend to philosophy.

Theoretical mind is driven forward by intelligence, and the purpose of intelligence is to form a cognition, or Idea, of the union of subject and object. The stages of theoretical mind pass through sense perception, or intuition, the formation of an image, or representation, and finally thought.⁹ The result of theoretical mind is the attainment of the power of thought and thought was the presupposition of a cognition, a knowledge of the finite. Theoretical mind in Hegel was separate from philosophy and a preparation for philosophy.

Marx's discussion of theoretical mind bore no resemblance to that of Hegel. Marx spoke of theory and practice and when Marx used the term theory he meant interpretation of the finite. Whereas in Hegel the theoretical referred to a capacity or ability of mind in Marx, the theoretical meant a reading, a rational reflection, of the finite. Whereas in Hegel theoretical mind was a preparation for philosophy, in Marx theory was a synonym for a particular manifestation of philosophy, or philosophy whose end was the practical. For Marx theory carried strategic implications.

The delinking of Marx and Hegel is emphasized by their contradictory ideas of theoretical mind. Hegel thought of the theoretical as a development stage of the mind. In Marx theoretical mind was not related to psychology, but was rather a particular appearance of philosophy, a philosophy aimed at exposing the disjuncture between reality and the expectations of full human emancipation.

The delinking of Marx from Hegel is most graphically indicated in their opposing attitudes to the realm of practice. Hegel's concept of practical mind concerned

the activities taken by mind to gratify the Self. The end of practical mind was directed toward the acquisition of the happiness of the subject, and by happiness Hegel meant self-gratification arising from food, shelter, to physical and emotional satisfaction.¹⁰ The means to achieve this sense of well-being included the gratification of sense and feeling¹¹ and the recognition of the contingency of impulse, inclination and passion.¹² The most significant part of practical mind in Hegel was the concept of will because will was the telos of the Self, the acquisition of property, and the foundational principles of civil society, property and right.

The discontinuity between Hegel and Marx over the issues of theory and practice were most clearly expressed in his September 1843 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction' and in his 1845 'Theses on Feuerbach'. Marx explained his approach to theory when he wrote in the 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction':

As a determined opponent of the previous forms of German political consciousness, the criticism of speculative philosophy finds its progression not within itself but in tasks which can only be solved in one way . . . through practice.¹³

This sentence serves two purposes. First, it notes that a negation of Speculative philosophy, which Marx had performed in 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right', was a necessary act before German philosophy could advance. Second, it also focuses on theory as a 'task', or as a strategy. In Marx theory did not relate to human psychology, but rather to formulas for action. If practice meant a revolution against the despotism over civil society than theory was the formula by which revolution was to unfold.

Marx realized, however, that theory in-itself would never change reality and the only weapon that could change reality was practice. The outcome of theory must be practice, because practice was the only way theory could be made an actuality.

Marx's famous 'Theses on Feuerbach' not only decouples Marx from Hegel, but also Marx from Feuerbach over the issue of practice. Although Feuerbach rebelled against Hegel and substituted materialism for Speculative philosophy Feuerbach's materialism was essentially a 'theoretical attitude'.¹⁴ Feuerbach's transformative method, of replacing theology with the human social essence was 'contemplative materialism'.¹⁵ Practice in Feuerbach was not Hegelian theoretical practice, of seeking the Idea in the real, but rather 'contemplative practice', or finding the essence of humanity in 'species being', or philosophical anthropology. Marx decoupled himself from Feuerbach because Feuerbach did not 'grasp the significance of "revolutionary", of "practical-critical activity"'.¹⁶

Marx 'Theses on Feuerbach' was also the primary site at which the dissemblance between Marx and Hegel over practice was articulated. These famous theses by Marx contain the following two sentences:

- 1) The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-changing can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice.¹⁷

- 2) The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.¹⁸

Hegel looked upon practice as activity designed to produce the self-determination of the 'I'. Marx looked upon practice as class action which revolutionized the actual. Marx's dissemblance from Hegel regarding practice arose because Hegel defined practice in the sense of Aristotle, steps taken to acquire self-gratification, while Marx, with the help of Hess and Ruge, defined practice in the sense of the French Revolution, action which overthrew a despotic monarchy.

Furthermore, in his 'Letters from the Franco-German Yearbook' Marx extended the scope of practice to the political. On his September 1843 letter to Ruge, Marx wrote: 'We have also to concern ourselves with the other side, i.e. with man's theoretical existence, and make his religion and science, etc., into the object of our criticism.'¹⁹ Marx's September 1843 letter to Ruge is crucial because it calls for a critique of religion, philosophy and politics therefore introducing the central project of the 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction'. This letter is an introduction to Marx's life-long intellectual project of widening practice to include politics and ultimately political economy. In this letter Marx wrote:

So there is nothing to stop us from making a critique of politics the starting point of our critique, from taking part in party politics and so identifying ourselves with real battles . . . So our election cry must be: reform of consciousness not through dogmas, but through the analysis of mystical consciousness that is not clear to itself, whether it appears in a religious or political form.²⁰

The September 1843 letter also reveals that Marx already differentiated between 'theoretical and practical consciousness', already saw that a critic could 'interest a great party in practice'.²¹ It must be borne in mind, however, that when Marx in his September 1843 letter to Ruge used the term 'theoretical' he used it as a synonym for philosophy and was not alluding to the section on 'Theoretical Mind' in Hegel's *The Philosophy of Mind*. Similarly, the appearance of the term practice in this September 1843 letter does not have the same meaning as the same word has in 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction'. In the September 1843 letter 'practice' meant behavior, or an activity, but in the 1844 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction' practice meant revolutionary activity. Nevertheless, by September 1843, as Marx's Kreuznach period came to an end, after the writing of 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right', the concepts of theory and practice were added to his intellectual weaponry as a preparation for the writing of a 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction'. In my analysis of a 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction' I will deal with Marx's use of the term philosophy.

At this point notice needs to be taken of the role Hess played in the formation of Marx's concept of theory and practice. Marx's notion of critique, as already indicated, derives from Bauer, but the theory–practice paradigm was influenced by Marx's knowledge of the work of Hess. In his 'Introduction' to 'The Manuscripts'

Marx refers to the interesting works contained in Herwegh's *Einundzwanzig Bogen aus dem Schweiz*, which was published in 1843. Hess published two articles in Herwegh's journal, 'Socialism and Communism' and 'The Philosophy of the Act'. Since Hess's articles were initially published in 1843 and Marx mentioned the journal a year later in 1844, it is reasonable to assume that Marx read Hess's work. In addition, Marx and Hess met personally for the first time in 1842. Hess was editor of the *Rheinische Zeitung*, but was discharged by the paper because of his socialist radicalism. Marx replaced Hess and moved the paper to the Center, but their paths crossed in Cologne. They met again in Paris in 1843–1844 and Marx published Hess's article, 'Briefe aus Paris', in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*. Hess belief in the utopianism of practice was an endemic concept in the 1830s and 1840s. In his 1838 book *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie*, August Cieszkowski acted as a tribune for a teleological view of history. Cieszkowski believed that the perfection of history could be attained by human actions.²²

In 'Socialism and Communism' Hess wrote:

If it is true that our time still suffers from the contrast between theory and practice, that the objective world, which the present has inherited from the past, is in conflict with the subjective world of our modern feelings and ideas . . .²³

In this sentence Hess related to the question of social alienation, the opposition between our ideas about reality and reality itself and the remaining parts of the essay describe how praxis can overcome this alienation. The revolutionary praxis of the proletariat will achieve communism and thereby end this bifurcation of thought and reality.

While the essay 'Socialism and Communism' was Marx's inauguration into the theory–practice linguistics, Hess's essay 'The Philosophy of the Act'²⁴ opened Marx's eyes to the theory of revolutionary practice. In 'The Philosophy of the Act' Hess refuted the Hegelian definition of Being as Idea and reinterpreted being as action toward the reconstruction of the socio-political environment. Socio-political action was a form of self-generation since the changing of social circumstances was the necessary precondition for the changing of the Self.

Another vital influence on Marx in terms of his dissemblance from Hegel's definition of philosophy was Ruge. Breaking with the stagnation of the Hohenzollern monarchy, Ruge set an example for Marx on how the critique of politics was a necessary precondition for the practice of reform.

Like Marx, Ruge himself was a victim of Prussian oppression. As editor of a reformist journal, the *Hallische Jahrbücher*, Ruge suffered his first instance of government repression when the Prussian authorities closed this publication in 1841, the year Marx completed his dissertation. Undaunted, Ruge resettled the journal in Dresden, changed the name to the *Deutsche Jahrbücher*, but his second attempt at reformist journalism was again closed by the Prussian bureaucracy in January 1843, about two months before Marx departed from the *Rheinische Zeitung*. The association of Ruge and Marx dates from Marx in 1842 when Marx, as previously noted, wrote to Ruge about his interest in writing an

article about 'constitutional monarchy' in Prussia.²⁵ Marx never wrote this article, Prussian censorship was victorious, but the friendship between Marx and Ruge continued because they both moved to Paris where they jointly published the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* for only one issue before the journal fell victim to French censorship and was shut down. Both Ruge and Marx were casualties of Hohenzollern authoritarianism.

Five months after Marx's March 5, 1842 letter to him, Ruge published a seminal article, 'Hegel's "Philosophy of Right" and the Politics of Our Times'.²⁶ This article by Ruge, published in August 1842, came into print just as Marx began writing for the *Rheinische Zeitung*. In terms of politics Ruge's article became the bible of the Hegelian Left, so Marx was cognizant of Ruge's theory of politics by August 1842.

Ruge's 'Hegel's "Philosophy of Right" and the Politics of Our Time' established three principles that were later absorbed by Marx. A philosophical interpretation of politics, like Hegel executed in his *The Philosophy of Right*, was insufficient because it did not change reality. The goal of political action must be to reform the Prussian autocracy and a philosophical approach to politics could never reach this denouement because it was caged in the prison of thought. The first step in the reform of the actual was critique, or accentuating the divergence between reality and thought. Critique must show that reality did not conflate with philosophy, but rather that reality thoroughly diverged from philosophy. In order to surmount this disparity, practical activity was necessary. Practice was an indispensable instrument in the achievement of reform because only practice could change reality. However, it is vital to remember that the reform Ruge advocated was limited to the political, or the institutional structure of the state. Reform for Ruge meant constitutional reapportionment, or the preservation of the state qua state. Ruge never called for the overthrow of private property.

In a second essay, 'A Self-Critique of Liberalism', published in early 1843, while Marx was Editor of the *Rheinische Zeitung*, Ruge continued his theme that true human freedom could never be achieved in the realm of philosophy. To demonstrate the influence Ruge exerted on Marx I will juxtapose two quotes. In 'A Self-Critique of Liberalism' Ruge wrote, 'the purpose of Theory is the practice of Theory'.²⁷ Written after the Ruge essay, Marx wrote in his 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right': Introduction' 'as the determined opponent of the previous form of German political consciousness, the criticism of the speculative philosophy of law finds its progression not within itself but in tasks which can only be solved in one way . . . through practice'.²⁸ The two quotes are remarkably similar and show the manner in which Ruge influenced Marx.

While he was editor of the *Rheinische Zeitung*, Marx ignored the Ruge program of the Hegelian Left. But when Marx suffered a second instance of Prussian oppression with the closing of the *Rheinische Zeitung* his movement toward the Hegelian Left accelerated and the material Marx wrote to Ruge now assembled as 'Letters from the Franco-German Yearbook' exemplifies his radicalization. In his September 1843 letter to Ruge, Marx reiterates the theme that critique must be applied to politics. Marx agreed with Ruge that philosophical consciousness

would leave the reality of Germany mired in the Middle Ages, or that philosophical consciousness was an extension of religion. But the letter was another stage in Marx's decoupling from Hegel because he substituted critique and practice for Hegelian philosophy. Not only did the letter advocate critique, but also attacking the state, which Marx first articulated in his 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' when he called for the abolition of the state. But in September 1843, just prior to his move to Paris, Marx was still not a communist because in that letter he referred to communism as an 'abstraction'.²⁹ It was only a few months later, in his 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction' that Marx converts to communism.

When Marx converted to communism his rupture with Ruge was assured. Written on the occasion of the Silesian Workers uprising, Marx's 'Critical Notes on the Article "The King of Prussia and Social Reform" by a Prussian' marks Marx's detachment from Ruge on the grounds that the reform of the state was not sufficient for true human emancipation. Whereas Ruge sought the enlargement of human freedom through politics and the state, Marx saw the transcendence of politics and the state as the only avenue to human freedom. In addition, Marx's conversion to practice and critique, his desire to extinguish both state and politics, also continued the process of his delinking from Hegel.

2C) Subject-object Another idea attesting to the delinking of Hegel and Marx was the idea of activity. Both Hegel and Marx agreed that activity was an inherent force of the human organism, but for Hegel activity was associated with Subjective Spirit. In Hegel Spirit as reason was the telos driving human beings to the Absolute Idea and activity was already present in the anthropological stages of Spirit, the stages which were the platform from which Spirit as reason began its ascent to the Absolute Idea.

The area of subjective activity is a complex terrain between Hegel and Marx. Hegel clearly influenced Marx regarding the inherent activity of the human organism. However, Hegel defined activity as the monopoly of mind, or it was thought which was the propellant of externalization. Whereas Hegel convinced Marx regarding the immanent activity of the human organism, Marx understood that activity as productive labor.

The divergence between Hegel and Marx over subjective activity centered on their disagreement over the nature of labor. The source of labor in Hegel was mind, whereas the source of labor in Marx was the need to provide human sustenance.

Hegel's *The Phenomenology of Spirit* offers the clearest explication of his ideas regarding activity. This massive work is a history of the evolution of consciousness to Absolute Knowledge. The energy to make this journey, the archeology of the ascent of consciousness to Absolute Knowledge, comes from the self-activity of consciousness itself.

The end of the self-education of consciousness is Absolute Knowledge, or Absolute Spirit. In order to attain Absolute Spirit, the unity of Idea and reality, Spirit must pass through an evolutionary process, or Spirit's self-perfection must

transgress intermediate stages and each intermediary stage informed Spirit of its own powers. The realization of Spirit must be grasped as an educational process in which each grade in this educational ascent informed Spirit of its own powers.

The chapter in *The Phenomenology of Spirit* called 'The Actualization of Rational Self-Consciousness Through Its Own Activity'³⁰ describes the evolutionary stage in which self-consciousness achieves an 'I'. The attainment of an 'I' is an outcome of a developmental series in which self-consciousness becomes aware of itself as an 'I', or a subject. It is necessary for Spirit to achieve a subjectivity in order to arrive at the capability of continuing its ascent to Absolute Knowledge.

The mechanism through which self-consciousness realizes itself as an 'I' is the movement from the implicit to the explicit, from the potential to the actual, from the in-itself to the for-itself. Self-consciousness is inherently objectifying, it is an outpouring of the implicit into the explicit. What is potential in self-consciousness must externalize itself in the 'Thing', or the 'Thing' must be made actual when the 'Thing' is appropriated by self-consciousness.

This mechanism by which the 'Thing' is appropriated by self-consciousness is described by 'The Master' as 'work' or 'labor'. The chapter 'The Actualization of Rational Self-Consciousness through Its Own Activity' contains the following description of 'work' and 'labor':

The labor of the individual for his own needs is just as much a satisfaction of the needs of others as of his own and by the satisfaction of his own needs he obtains only through the labor of others. As the individual in his individual work already unconsciously performs a universal work, so again he also performs the universal work as his conscious object, the whole becomes, as a whole, his own work, for which he sacrifices himself and precisely in so doing receives back from it his own self.³¹

The labor of self-consciousness is the energy by which an 'I' is reached. In Hegel, labor, work, activity are all synonyms. When Hegel writes that self-consciousness is inherently active he means that the immanence of self-consciousness is subjective activity. Labor and work were not complete in themselves but were subsumed into self-consciousness.

Since labor is the substance of self-consciousness what actualizes itself in 'Thingness' is self-consciousness. In the Hegelian world labor is immanent in the subject, labor is a necessity of self-consciousness and thus the actual is both product and embodiment of self-consciousness. In Hegel it is self-consciousness that labors and becomes universal substance. The source of activity becomes the substance of the actual.

Subjective Spirit does not remain fixed at the level of the 'I.' Spirit in-itself is a universal activity and must ascend to Absolute Spirit. Thus, Spirit in its appearance as Subjective Spirit must be transcended and the 'I' must be subsumed into the ethical, or the world of mutual recognition.

The chapter in *The Phenomenology of Spirit* which describes the evolution of the ethical is entitled 'Individuality Which Takes Itself To Be Real In and For Itself'. In this chapter 'The Master' writes:

The work produced is the reality which consciousness gives itself; it is that in which the individual is explicitly for himself what he is implicitly or in himself, and in such a manner that the consciousness, for which the individual becomes explicit in the work, is not the particular, but the universal consciousness. In his work, he has placed himself altogether in the element of universality, in the qualityless void of being.³²

This paragraph is an antecedent of the civil society chapters in both *The Philosophy of Mind* and *The Philosophy of Right*. This passage from *The Phenomenology of Spirit* describes how a product objectified by a subjectivity assumes a social existence. A singular object produced by a singular subjectivity cannot remain totally confined to the Self, but inevitably acquires a social being, an object acted upon by other subjectivities.

The chapter 'Individuality Which Takes Itself To Be Real In and For Itself' is a precursor to Hegel's later conception of the Objective Spirit. In the chapter 'The Actualization of Rational Self-Consciousness Through Its Own Activity' Hegel outlines the labor of Subjective Spirit while in the chapter 'Individuality Which Takes Itself To be Real In and For Itself' he charts Objective Spirit, and a major feature of Objective Spirit was ethicality. Ethicality related to the individual obedience to laws that made intersubjectivity the being of sociability.

In both Subjective Spirit and Objective Spirit, work and its products were solely expressions of reason. In order to fully understand Hegel's philosophy of labor it is necessary to draw a distinction between agent and result. The agent of labor in Hegel was always reason. The result of labor always became the substance of the real and this substance was reason, or reason was a self-externalizing process.

The self-externalization of reason was the ground of the unity of subject and object. In Hegel the subject was the Self, while the object was the reality that existed outside the Self. In the process of self-externalization reason entered, provided a form to this object and the occupancy of reason in this object made the object comprehensible to reason. When subjective reason recognized itself in an external object the external object became understandable to the reason of the Self. The unity of subject and object was presaged in the self-recognition of reason, or when reason acknowledged its presence in an external object this was the ground of the self-recognition, knowing Thyself.

2D) Form-content The schism between Hegel and Marx was also made apparent in their discrepancies over the form-content methodology. For Hegel the unity of subject and object was also the foundation of the unity of form and content. Idea was always content, and form, or object, which was endowed with shape by thought, was always a product of Idea.

Marx disassociated himself from this aspect of the methodology of 'The Master'. For Marx, form was a socio-material object, or form was essentially presented to individuals by their socio-material environment. Content, however, was human labor, which provided the purpose and function of the form. For example, iron ore was a form, a material object supplied by nature to the human. However, the contents of the plow, or train, was composed of human labor since it was human labor that constructed these objects from iron ore.

For Marx, labor as content was the basis of economic value. Value was equivalency for Marx and labor was the only content that would supply the universality which was the ground of equivalency.

2E) Essence Hegel defined essence in Aristotelian terms. For 'The Master', essence was telos, or it was an inherent tendency of consciousness. Essence described the properties of consciousness that were immanent, properties that compelled a human to act in terms of specific principles and goals.

The fracture between Hegel and Marx was evidenced in Marx's alteration of the content of essence. Marx made essence a sociological term, a category by which to understand how a social formation operated. Essence in Marx referred to the repetitive behavior of a social system. Essence did not relate to consciousness, but rather to the regularities of a social system.

2F) Substance Both Hegel and Marx transformed the Spinozist concept of substance. For Hegel, substance was the Idea. The Idea was the organizational principle of reality and therefore the Idea was the source of substance.

Marx's break from Hegel was also apparent in their discrepancies over substance. For Marx, human labor was substance. Since it was human labor that was the architect of reality then human labor was substance.

Marx performed a Feuerbachian maneuver in relation to Hegel. Feuerbach invented the transformative critique of Hegel, transferring the qualities Hegel attributed to Ideas to the human species. Marx adopted Feuerbach's transformative method and applied it to the productive process. Rather than Idea being the source of content and substance Marx transferred the source of content and substance to the predication of human labor.

2G) Subjective activity The fracture between Hegel and Marx was again manifested in their disagreement over subjective activity. For Hegel, subjective activity was synonymous with the activity of the Idea. To speak of subjectivity in Hegel was always to speak of the prius of thought. Conversely, subjective activity in Marx was always social labor. To speak of the activity of a subject in Marx was always to refer to economic productivity.

The decoupling between Hegel and Marx over the question of activity is more coherently grasped by dividing activity into four parts: agency, productive process, outcome and substance.

As I indicated above, agency in Hegel is synonymous with reason, but Marx disassembled this association and substituted social labor. Whereas Hegel was focused on the ascent of Spirit to Absolute Knowledge, the pantheism of reason,

Marx was primarily concerned with the agency, human labor, that formed the foundation of the process of production.

The environment in which agency functioned in Marx was the production process. Marx began his study of agency from the basis of political economy, that is, since humankind must grow food, provide shelter and warmth for survival, the environment in which agency functioned was economic. Whereas Marx was concerned with human survival, Hegel was concerned with the ascent of mind to Absolute Knowledge. Materialism was the context in which agency unfolded in Marx, and by materialism Marx meant the interchange between man and nature out of which humankind acquired its sustenance.

Not only did the question of agency adduce differences between Marx and Hegel, but also divided them over the issue of the productive process. In Hegel the productive process, or labor, resulted in the synthesis between Idea and reality, whereas in Marx the productive process, labor, resulted in a material thing that sustained or improved the existence of self and society. Marx and Hegel were in opposition over the question of end. For Marx the end toward which individuals or social classes labored was the realization of human needs. Even though Marx and Hegel took opposing positions in terms of the productive process, Marx continued the Hegelian leitmotif regarding labor. For humankind, labor, either in the Hegelian form of Idea or Marx's form of economic manufacture, was the realization process of the human organism.

The outcome of the labor process was substance for both Marx and Hegel, but whereas Hegel defined substance as the unity of Idea and reality, Marx defined substance as economic value. Marx transmuted the Hegelian Spinozist concept of substance and Marx's metamorphosis turned substance into economic value.

Primarily an attack on Hegel's *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, Marx's 'Critique of Hegel's Dialectic and Philosophy in General', the last part of 'The Manuscripts', targeted Hegel's theory of self-consciousness, of subjective activity, as agency. The proper approach to 'The Manuscripts' is to read them as critique. In 'The Manuscripts' Marx is presenting a critique of Hegel's concept of subjective action and civil society. While Marx perpetuated the Hegelian leitmotif of inherent human activity, the dissimilarity between Hegel and Marx was revealed by Marx's substitution of economic labor for the activity of mind. Marx remained an exponent of Hegel's theory of labor, but he replaced the labor of self-consciousness and Idea with social labor.

The existence of this delinking should not conceal the fact that Marx was guilty of self-deception regarding Hegel's appreciation of the metabolism between the subject and the natural environment. Hegel's awareness of the activity of the Self as it labored to acquire sustenance from the natural environment is spelled out in detail in his *The Philosophy of Mind*. Marx read this work, but closed his mind to Hegel's exposition of exchange, labor, between the human organism and its materialist surroundings. Marx did not relate to the anthropological and psychological chapters in *The Philosophy of Mind* and I will discuss this self-deception in Chapter Four.

3) *Civil society*

Another region of disassociation between Hegel and Marx was over the concept of 'civil society'. The fact that antinomies existed between Hegel and Marx in their more comprehensive interpretation of 'civil society' does not change the fact that it was Hegel who introduced the concept of 'civil society' to Marx. The idea of 'civil society' is discussed in Part III of *The Philosophy of Right*, and when Marx wrote his 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' he not only familiarized himself with this concept, but stated that he would subsequently return to this subject. 'On the Jewish Question', written in late 1843 and early 1844 and published in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*, contains Marx's first formulation of the 'civil society' debate.

I will introduce my more detailed discussion of the antinomies between Hegel and Marx on the issue of 'civil society' with a more general summary of their oppositional positions.

In Hegel 'civil society' and the state were two distinct spheres within a national community. The state reflected 'civil society'. The 'civil society' of the Medieval period was agrarian and the state structure of absolute monarchy accorded to the feudal property relations of this form of 'civil society'. After the oceanic explorations of the 15th and 16th centuries the 'civil society' of Europe became commercial and industrial, giving rise to the bourgeois class and the constitutional and parliamentary monarchies of the 18th and 19th centuries. However, in spite of the fact that Hegel conceived the state as an outgrowth of 'civil society' he was also convinced of its distinctiveness.

When Hegel defended the separation between 'civil society' and state he unknowingly exposed himself to the attacks Marx launched in his August 1844 essay 'Critical Notes on the Article "The King of Prussia and Social Reform" by a Prussian'. As I indicated earlier, in this Phase Marx proposed that the separation of 'civil society' and state was an invitation to the domination of 'civil society' by the state, or, alternatively, that the state was the cause for the impoverishment of 'civil society'. Although it is impossible to conclude that Hegel was the seed of Marx's conviction that the separation of 'civil society' and state led to the autocracy of politics, it is a fact that Hegel was the primary source of Marx's knowledge regarding these two separate spheres of socio-political existence.

For Hegel 'civil society' was an expression of Objective Spirit. It was that arena in which private wills took cognizance of an Other, or learned that intersubjectivity was the source of social cooperation. Private will, a self-determining 'I', was the foundation of moral life and as a defense of private will Hegel upheld the right of private property. According to Hegel, private property was a rampart behind which the Self could secure its preservation. Hegel's defense of individuality and private property was the basis of his defense of capitalism. Although Hegel was aware of some of the scourges of capitalism – poverty and unemployment – and although Hegel was an advocate of a monarchical welfare state, in the last analysis Hegel was an apologist for capitalism.

Hegel's embrace of capitalism meant that he accepted the major principles of English political economy. Hegel did not denounce Smith or Ricardo. Although he

was opposed to the impoverishment of the labor force he nevertheless defended capitalism because it increased the prospects of intersubjectivity. Following Smith, Hegel looked upon class divisions, the division of labor, as the ground of mutual recognition. The division of labor created the conditions for trade and trade created the conditions of mutual dependence. Mutual need was the substructure of mutual recognition and so capitalism encouraged intersubjectivity. Hegel adhered to economic Liberalism, which was based on the principles of individualism and private property.

Marx denounced Hegel's defense of private will, property and capitalism and this was the basis of his discontinuity with Hegel's vision of 'civil society'. Marx replaced Hegel's vision of economic individualism with one of economic mutual recognition. Marx believed in the existence of 'civil society', but the capitalist form of 'civil society', its content, advocated by Hegel, was anathema to him. Marx repudiated the economic Liberalism and the political economy of Smith, Ricardo and the 'Parmenides of Berlin'.

In order to understand the role 'civil society' played in the antinomy between Hegel and Marx it is necessary to apply a form-content analysis to this concept. Similarly to many other areas of the Hegel-Marx relationship Marx borrowed the form of the concept of 'civil society', but changed its content.

The content of Hegel's notion of 'civil society' was composed of two parts, will, or individuality, and property.

Will was the essence of individuality in Hegel. In paragraph 7 of the 'Introduction' to *The Philosophy of Right* Hegel wrote:

The will is the unity of both these moments. It is particularity reflected into itself and so brought back to universality, i.e. it is individuality. It is the self-determination of the ego which means that at one and the same time the ego posits itself as its own negative, i.e. as restricted and determinate, and yet remains by itself, i.e. in its self-identity and universality.³³

Will was the genesis of the personality, the substance of the Self. Will first made its appearance at the level of subjective mind, most clearly manifesting itself in practical mind. Will was a function of mind that appeared just prior to the evolution of Subjective Spirit into Objective Spirit. Will created individuality so when Subjective Spirit crossed over into 'civil society' then 'I' could enter into relationship with other 'I's.

Right was the underpinning of individuality. Right meant the philosophical justification for individuality to determine itself. Freedom meant the allowance of self-determination, within ethicality, and right was the protection of that freedom.

One expression of right was private property and property came into existence when will took possession of or occupied an object.

'Civil society' in Hegel, the opening stages of Objective Spirit, was an intersubjective space. 'Civil society' was a community and the community was constituted of personalities and families who possessed property and the interaction of these particular units acted as the transmission belt of mutual recognition.

Hegel looked upon 'civil society' as the initial stages of ethicality. Whereas morality concerned the behavior of the individual ethicality concerned the intersubjectivity of the community. Hegel glorified the Greek polis, the political instance in which private man compromised his own subjectivity for the benefit of the larger community. Ethicality was based upon mutual recognition, the respect for the Other. The polis was the most perfect example of mutual recognition because it was the community in which private interest was sacrificed in the interests of the welfare of the totality.

Marx's redesign of Hegel's concept of 'civil society' was called into being by his rejection of private property and individualism. Marx's renunciation of private property essentially begins when he moves to Paris in October 1843 and joins the discussions of communist groups in Paris, the city of François Babeuf. Marx's conversion to communism taught him that private property is not the protector of will, or Self, but the basis of social classes and consequently of social oppression.

When Marx rejected property as the content of 'civil society' he also rejected individuality as a component of his own version of 'civil society'. In this regard Hegel spoke the language of European Liberalism and Marx rejected this political ideology and chose to speak the idiom of social community, Attic democracy. Marx kept the Hegelian form, but supplied a new content, a content comprised of collective property and collective labor. The end of 'civil society' in Hegel was ethicality whereas the end of 'civil society' in Marx was the transcendence of poverty, or the satisfaction of universal human needs.

Not only did Marx perform a form-content analysis of Hegel's concept of 'civil society', but of Feuerbach's as well. In Feuerbach the content of 'civil society' was 'species being',³⁴ a natural harmony between members of the human species. Feuerbach spoke the language of an anthropological metaphysics, that cooperation between individuals was a natural expression of their biological nature.

Marx applied to Feuerbach the same strategy of critique he marshaled against Hegel. He accepted the concept that man as a social being was a foundational form of human existence, but negated the Feuerbachian content of a metaphysics of anthropology. Rather than a natural law of sociability as content Marx substituted the content of the interaction of men in the process of production. Sociability was not a human substance, but a result of social conditioning through the process of production.

Nevertheless, Feuerbach must be credited with supplying Marx with a vision of 'civil society' as essentially cooperative. Even though Marx by late 1843 was in the process of substituting political economy for anthropology, the Feuerbachian notion of 'species being' was an important factor in Marx's interpretation of 'civil society'. Feuerbach wrote of an 'I' and a 'Thou', or an immanent tendency of the 'species' toward mutual recognition and interactive fraternity. When Marx wrote of 'civil society' he meant Feuerbachian 'civil society'. Later portions of this book will refer to the disparities between Marx and Feuerbach, but in the works of the passage, Feuerbachian 'civil society' was the model in Marx's mind when he presented 'civil society' as the foundation of communism.

Marx's gradual transition from anthropology to political economy was already articulated in his 1843 'On The Jewish Question', written shortly after his arrival in Paris. 'On The Jewish Question' contained the following passage:

It regards civil society, the world of needs, of labor, of private interests and of civil law as the foundation of its existence, as a presupposition which needs no further grounding, and therefore as its natural basis. Finally, man as he is a member of civil society is taken to be real man, man as distinct from citizen, since he is man in his sensuous, individual and immediate existence . . .³⁵

In the Fall of 1843, Marx did not think of society in the anthropological terms of Feuerbach, but rather as the domain of the process of economic production. In 'On The Jewish Question' Marx disaffirmed Feuerbach's conjunction of 'species being' and 'civil society' and altered the content of 'civil society' to 'needs', 'labor' and 'private interest'. The content in 'civil society' in Marx was the Industrial Revolution.

Marx's application of a form-content critique to the idea of 'civil society' in Hegel and Feuerbach left further questions. Marx abided by the form of 'civil society', but rejected the contents of individuality, property, will and 'species being', and the question Marx was required to answer concerned the contents of his form of 'civil society'. Marx was under the obligation to put forth new contents. Since property was the major source of disharmony in 'civil society', in order to establish the mutual cooperation of 'civil society' it was first necessary to eradicate private property.

In terms of the works of the passage, two essays explicate Marx's departure from Hegel, as well as Feuerbach, in the content of civil society. These essays are 'On The Jewish Question'³⁶ and 'Critical Notes on the Article "The King of Prussia and Social Reform" by a Prussian'.³⁷

'On the Jewish Question' was written at the end of 1843. His 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction' was written after 'On The Jewish Question', between late 1843 and early 1844. Marx's transition to communism was announced in the 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction' and so 'On the Jewish Question' can be looked upon as a preparatory statement to Marx's conversion to communism.

Marx's 'On the Jewish Question' was written as a rebuttal to an essay Bauer wrote on the question of Jewish emancipation. Bauer's essay placed the possibilities of equal rights for Jews as solely a political question, and Marx rebutted Bauer's confining of the conundrum of emancipation to the political sphere alone and averred that the full overcoming of anti-Semitism could only occur within 'civil society' after 'civil society' replaced the state.

In order to understand Marx's argument in 'On the Jewish Question' it is necessary to divide his usage of 'civil society' into two parts: 'civil society'-under-capitalism and 'civil society'-after-capitalism.

Full Jewish emancipation, much less full human emancipation, was impossible in 'civil society'-under-capitalism. The existence of private property, the

domination of the state, corrupted 'civil society'-under-capitalism and rendered full human liberation, Jewish included, as unattainable. It was to the advantage of the Protestant Prussian state to repress the Jews and it was to the benefit of the propertied capitalists to impoverish the labor force.

However, 'civil society' could be cleansed of the domination of property and the state. A revolution, a permanent revolution, would abolish both property and the state and after this purification a 'civil society'-after-capitalism would become sovereign. The eradication of trade from 'civil society, the market and the conditions which give rise to it'³⁸ was the necessary condition for the freedom of humanity.

'On the Jewish Question' also provides insights into the advantages to be obtained when a cleansed 'civil society' became the infrastructure of governance. The vision that inspired Marx was set forth by Rousseau in his 1782 *The Social Contract*.³⁹ Although Marx rejected the individualism of Rousseau, as well as Rousseau's theory of the social contract, Marx was influenced by Rousseau's dream of the unity of *homme* and *citoyen*.⁴⁰ Rousseau's *homme* and *citoyen* referred to the two realms of human social existence, the private and the public, and just as Rousseau hoped his social contract would lead to the reintegration of the private and the public, and to active political involvement, so Marx expected that the governance of a cleansed 'civil society' would provide the infrastructure of this reunification. In 'On the Jewish Question' Marx again called upon Rousseau to underwrite his own beliefs. Four paragraphs from the end of 'On the Jewish Question' Marx incorporated a long quote from *The Social Contract* and in this paragraph accused political existence of alienating humankind from itself. Rousseau claimed that mere political existence led to an abstraction of the human, the portrayal of the human as purely egotistic, totally involved in the race for individual aggrandizement, an atom separated from mutual recognition and intersubjectivity. Rousseau was a guide for Marx into the phenomenon of self-estrangement, the split in the human between individual greed and involvement in the political community. The remembrance of Attic democracy lived on in Hegel, Rousseau and Marx.

In the article 'Critical Notes on the Article "The King of Prussia and Social Reform" by a Prussian' was a settling of accounts with Bauer and Ruge. Even though this article was directed at Ruge, the theories that Marx negated in this essay were theories upheld by both Bauer and Ruge. Furthermore, prior to writing this article Marx was indebted to both Bauer and Ruge. From Bauer Marx learned the liberating potential of critique, and from Ruge Marx learned to turn critique against politics and to replace a politics marooned in philosophy with practice. Marx's disassociation from Bauer and Ruge in the works of the passage is an illustration of his departure from the Hegelian Left, that is, his repudiation of Bauer and Ruge was a necessary step toward his embrace of communism.

The essay 'Critical Notes on the Article "The King of Prussia and Social Reform" by a Prussian' was a frontal refutation of Ruge's, and by inference Bauer's, concentration on political reform. According to Marx, both Ruge and Bauer did see the need to reform the Prussian monarchy, but the reforms they wished to realize were restricted to the political sphere. But for Marx, reform limited to the political

was insufficient because what survived was a 'civil society' still dominated by capitalism. When Ruge and Bauer stopped short of carrying the revolution into 'civil society', into the cleansing of 'civil society', they still left the institutions of private property and capitalism intact. Bauer and Ruge never advanced to the concept of a 'political revolution with a social soul'.⁴¹

Although the concept of 'civil society' played a vital role in the thought of both Hegel and Marx, neither of these great thinkers were originators of this social science construct. The center of research on the history and sociology of 'civil society' was the Scottish Enlightenment of the 18th century, thinkers such as Ferguson, Steuart and Smith, although the Frenchman Montesquieu in his 1748 *The Spirit of the Laws* is looked upon as one of the initial purveyors of this concept.⁴² Hegel himself expressed his own indebtedness to Montesquieu⁴³ for enlightening him about the concept of 'civil society'. When he was a tutor in Berne from 1793 to 1796 Hegel familiarized himself with the writings of the Scottish Enlightenment on 'civil society'.⁴⁴ In addition, Rousseau expounds on 'civil society' in *The Social Contract* which Hegel read and to which Marx refers in his 'On the Jewish Question'.⁴⁵

In addition to Hegel, both Montesquieu and the Scottish Enlightenment exerted independent influences on Marx. Marx made *exzerpte* from Montesquieu's *The Spirit of the Laws* in 1842 and both Ferguson and Steuart, as I will point out in Phase Six, were mentioned by Marx in the 1847 *The Poverty of Philosophy*. Marx was therefore exposed to the concept of 'civil society' from several sources, although Hegel was most important.

Marx's relation to Feuerbach was also filled with continuities and discontinuities. In terms of continuities Feuerbach was one of the theoreticians who persuaded Marx to repudiate Hegelian Speculative philosophy. The writings of Feuerbach persuaded Marx to focus on naturalism (I will describe the difference between naturalism and materialism in Phase Six), or the activity of humankind in society. Marx also continued the Feuerbachian transformative method which was based on replacing the Hegelian Idea with human social existence. Whereas Hegel saw Idea as subject, the engine of activity, Feuerbach transformed the subject into naturalistic humankind: the prius of activity for Feuerbach was 'species being'.

The discontinuities between Feuerbach and Marx arose over the nature of 'civil society'. Whereas Feuerbach looked upon humankind in 'civil society' as a 'species being', as a species with an immanent essence, Marx learned to regard 'civil society' as the area of political economy. Feuerbach was mired in an anthropological ontology and Marx substituted political economy for anthropology.

The disjuncture of Marx from Feuerbach is visible in the works of the passage. Marx perpetuated the Feuerbachian concentration on social existence as the center of gravity of human activity, but Marx replaced anthropological metaphysics with political economy. Whereas Feuerbach thought of a permanent ontology, Marx thought of historical development as driven forward by the human productive process. Nevertheless, the two currents are present in the works of the passage.

Lastly, the works of the passage disprove the Althusserian thesis regarding the temporal starting point of the supposed 'epistemological break' between

Hegel/Feuerbach and Marx. Althusser places the timing of the 'epistemological break' in 1845, with Marx's writing of the 'Theses on Feuerbach' and the Feuerbach chapter of 'The Leipzig Council'. Althusser proposed a myth of the break. Phase Six will demonstrate that Marx presents Feuerbach in a positive fashion in both *The Holy Family* and 'The Leipzig Council'. Marx's ambiguity towards Feuerbach is present in these works, but the myth of the break is false because in *The Holy Family* and 'The Leipzig Council' Marx still acknowledges his debt to Feuerbach in focusing his attention in the naturalistic aspects of social existence. Feuerbach only disappears from Marx's writing in 1847 because *The Poverty of Philosophy* is devoid of any reference to him.

The need to purge 'civil society' of its defects ultimately led Marx into the study of political economy. In the debates over 'civil society' Marx was faced with two antagonists, Hegel and Feuerbach. Whereas Hegel saw 'civil society' as objective mind, as a proto-ethicity, the mature Marx subsumed 'civil society' under political economy. Whereas Feuerbach attributed an anthropological essence to 'civil society', Marx absorbed 'civil society' into political economy. Marx believed the discovery of the social relations, the historic formations of production, that governed 'civil society' would also perform as the cooperative links of 'civil society'.

In spite of the antithesis between Marx and Hegel (leaving Feuerbach to one side) over the content of 'civil society', Marx devoted his life to uncovering the social relations by which a system of economic production functioned. He never abandoned this quest and in this pursuit demonstrated the lasting contradiction between Marx and Hegel in terms of this issue. 'Civil society' was an inheritance passed on to Marx, but an inheritance that brought about disjuncture.

B) Continuities

This discussion of the continuities between Hegel and Marx will be divided into three subdivisions: 1) Master and slave; 2) History; 3) Methodology.

1) Master and slave

The master-slave methodology clearly demonstrates Marx's form-content inversion of Hegel. It also demonstrates how Marx applied the Feuerbachian transformative tactic to the 'Parmenides of Berlin'.

In the 'Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy in General' section of 'The Manuscripts', Marx offered the following summation of Hegel's work: 'Let us take a look at the Hegelian system. One must begin with Hegel's Phenomenologie, the true point of origin and the secret of Hegelian philosophy.'⁴⁶

In the chapter of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* entitled 'Self-Consciousness', 'The Master' included a subdivision called 'Independence and Dependence of Self-consciousness: Lordship and Bondage'.⁴⁷ In this subdivision Hegel describes the eternal battle between two Selves, before it is superseded by their 'mutually recognizing one another',⁴⁸ for domination over the Other. In the Hegelian method the lordship-bondage warfare was waged in the trenches of self-consciousness. One consciousness desired to be master while the Other consciousness struggled against the incarceration of the slave.

As I previously noted, Marx had read *The Phenomenology of Spirit* by 1841 and when he, at the end of 1843, began to search for a locution to describe the relationship between capitalists he reverted to 'The Master'. In his late 1843-early 1844 *exzerpte* 'On James Mill' Marx made the following comment: 'If then our mutual thralldom to the object at the beginning of the process is now seen to be in reality the relationship between master and slave that is merely the crude and frank expression of our essential relationship.'⁴⁹ Marx's attempt to define the class warfare under capitalism within the methodology of Hegel was again documented in his 1844 'Critique of Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy in General' when he wrote a brief outline of the chapters contained in *The Phenomenology of Spirit* and described Hegel's chapter on 'Self-Consciousness' as 'The Truth of certainty of Self. A) Independence and dependence of self-consciousness; lordship and bondage'.⁵⁰

Marx used Hegelian methodology to characterize class relationships under capitalism. The struggle of the proletariat against the propertied classes was perceived by Marx in terms of the master-slave modality.

But in order to render the master-slave paradigm appropriate to the slavery of wage labor, to transfer it from the realm of self-consciousness to the political-economic battlefield of the factory, it was first necessary for Marx the change the content of the master-slave metaphor. The form remained the same, it was the struggle to overcome domination. Marx, however, transformed the content and replaced Hegelian self-consciousness with the theory of labor of Smith, Ricardo and Mill. The struggle was not over self-consciousness, but over the conditions of labor of the proletariat.

Marx's change of content was also an exercise in his adoption of the Feuerbachian transformative tactic. Whereas Hegel situated the master-slave combat in consciousness, Marx resituated the location. Rejecting master-slave warfare as unfolding in self-consciousness Marx repositioned this combat in the sphere of labor.

2) History

Historicity gave rise to three levels of philosophy: the history of philosophy, the science of philosophy and methodology.

Historicity was a foundational principle in Hegelian thought. The Idea of historical development lay at the center of his definition of philosophy. In the 'Introduction to Volume I of *The History of Philosophy*, Hegel defined philosophy as 'self-conscious reason'.⁵¹ And in order to understand this statement it is necessary to first elaborate Hegel's concept regarding the inherent activity of thought. On the first level Marx considered Hegel as the father of the history of philosophy.

Thought possessed an immanence. The process whereby thought developed from the esoteric to the exoteric involved the movement of the Idea to the objective. An Idea internal to the subject must surround itself with an external object. Hegel wrote of the objectification process of thought, and by objectification he meant the inherent energy of thought to make itself external in a material object.

The creative power of the active subject populated the world with thoughts, or great temples of thought. The great monuments of thought were the objectifications of the implicit powers of reason. In-itself philosophy was the observation of such a 'temple'⁵² of thought.

This self-observation resulted in the mind's self-knowledge. The observation of the results of active subjectivity was a form of self-knowledge, for the vision of what active subjectivity produced provided active subjectivity with a greater grasp of its own powers. Observing the product was a means to gain knowledge of the producer. When Hegel described philosophy as 'self-conscious reason' he meant that in philosophy thought became self-conscious of itself, or thought became aware, gained an insight into its own powers by recognizing itself in the objects it brought into existence, and this self-consciousness was philosophy.

The second level of Hegel's theory of historicity concerns the science of philosophy, of the various schools of philosophy that evidenced themselves in time. In terms of the science of philosophy Hegel isolated three predominant schools of thought, Greco-Roman, Medieval and Germanic, the Germanic relating to European philosophy since the Renaissance. These three schools formed the analytic framework for his three-volume *The History of Philosophy* compiled by Michelet.

Even though *The History of Philosophy* narrates the progression of philosophy in terms of brief summaries of the accomplishments of individual thinkers, Thales, Plato, Aristotle, the science of philosophy actually concerned national minds. The deepest probes of the science of philosophy were into national minds, or that part of national consciousness that concerned philosophy. Hegel's division of the science of philosophy into Greco-Roman, Medieval and Germanic schools demonstrates that he conceptualized the evolution of philosophy in terms of qualities of mind embedded in a nationality – the science of philosophy delved into the inherent characteristics of groups, or collective minds.⁵³

Collective consciousness was itself a historical phenomenon. The philosophy of a nationality was determined by its temporality, that is, a national collective consciousness was a reflection of its time. The philosophical consciousness of a nationality was a reflection of the social, economic, political and religious circumstances in which a people lived. Consequently, a philosophy of a people was always the 'spirit of its time';⁵⁴ the science of philosophy was always contemporary because it was an image of the historical moment that gave it birth.

The fact that the science of philosophy was always contemporary did not mean that philosophy was stagnant. The science of philosophy demonstrated advancement. The problems debated by the moderns were not the same problems debated by the ancients. The contemporary did not exclude advancement and the key to the superiority of modern thought over Greco-Roman speculation lies in the Idea of freedom. Freedom, or self-determination, was the distinguishing feature of modern thought. And individual freedom was a concept unfamiliar to the ancient nationalities.

In his concerns for national consciousness and freedom Hegel was a child of his times. Hegel was 18 years old when the French Revolution broke out and 45

when Napoleon was finally defeated in 1815. He lived 27 years through all the upheavals and tergiversations of the era of the French Revolution and Napoleon and concepts such as freedom inundated all of Europe. In addition, the Wars of Liberation against Napoleon not only freed Germany from French control and gave rise to the reform movement of Stein and Hardenberg, but also witnessed the incubation of nationalism throughout all ethnicities of Europe.

The third level of Hegel's theory of historicity concerned methodology. In order to grasp the presence of Hegelian methodology in Marx it is necessary to draw a distinction between System and Method. System was the universal principle of a philosophy. For Marx the Hegelian System was reducible to 'logical pantheism'; every aspect of Hegel's thought was subsumed by the Idea. Method concerned the internal functioning of a System. Method comprised those operative elements, those instruments, which permitted a System to fulfill its purpose. If System was generality, Method was the particularities which sustained the System.

The central image in understanding the Method of philosophy was the organic analogy.⁵⁵ Hegel believed that every science must be systematic. In Hegel Method and System were synonyms. Hegel meant that to understand the internal structure of a particular science it was necessary to think of that science in organic terms.

For Hegel every science was a System, or the truth of a science related to its systematization, and this systematization followed the organic model. The understanding of every science, philosophy, history, aesthetics, theology, political theory, logic, was related to its systematic organization, and the meaning of a science related to its correspondence to the anatomical image. Hegel proposed a universal methodology of the human sciences, and the core principle of this universal methodology was explanation in terms of organic structures.

In the above description of Hegel's universal methodology I selected only three features, organicism, universal-particular and whole-parts. In fact, Hegel's Method of explanation in the human sciences was composed of many more elements and many of these will be discussed in later pages of this monograph. At this point, however, in terms of Hegel's definition of philosophy it is only necessary to define these three components.

Hegel primarily mapped the historiography of Spirit and therefore his methodology focused upon the functional procedures of Spirit. Marx was absorbed with the anatomy of social formations and therefore his methodology outlined the functional procedures of social formations.

The developmental paradigm also dominated Marx's methodology, only Marx directed this theory of becoming at social formations. Marx's theory of development was not concerned with Spirit, but rather with the sequence of socio-economic formations. Each socio-economic system must be seen as an economic productive organism.

A social scientist, Marx described the relationship between the means and mode of production. Marx concentrated upon social formations and how the productive process was imbued with unique characteristics determined by how the means and mode of production interconnected. A social formation was a collectivity, for

Marx, a totality. A social formation was an organic structure and the determining telos inside the organic system was the political economy of the process of production.

These economic production formations were also determined by historicity. Change was endemic to productive formations and as the means and mode of production developed the different levels of the means and mode of production imparted unique characteristics to the social formations. Marx was one of the inventors of economic historicity, or the historiography of social formations; according to Marx, economic becoming gave rise to three periods of the process of production – agrarian, commercial and industrial. Marx invented the historiography of the productive process as determined by the means and mode of production.

Consistent with Hegel, some of the functions of Marx's organic systems were whole-parts, universal-particular and subsumption. Just as Hegel used these physiological functions to explain a culture-philosophic System, so Marx used these functions to explain a productive social formation. Although the substance by which Marx and Hegel defined an organic totality differed, the methodologies inherent in these systems were the same.

Additional methodologies that evidenced the continuity between Hegel and Marx were essence and substance. Previous paragraphs in this Phase illuminated the fracture between Hegel and Marx over the content of essence and substance. Acknowledging these contradictions, I nevertheless will use essence and substance as examples of how Marx utilized these methodologies in his analysis of capitalism. Assuming the lacuna between form and content, I will briefly illustrate how Marx was able to transplant these methodologies, lift them out of Hegel's Speculative System and use them as explanatory protocols in social explanation.

In Hegel essence is the implicit and substance is the explicit. Essence is the potentiality, the telos that propels a subjectivity forward. Essence is inherent purpose and end. In Hegel, substance is not an inherent energy, but the product of the labor of thought. Substance is the fulfillment of essence, the result produced by essence as it moves toward self-realization. Substance is the actualization of essence.

Marx employed these Hegelian methodologies in his analysis of the productive process. In terms of the capitalist system, essence was the function of capitalism for endless profit. The essence of capitalism was limitless valorization, or the ceaseless acquisition of profit.

Substance in Marx was value. If the essence of capitalism was perpetual valorization, then the outcome produced by essence was surplus-value. Substance was the end result of essence; in order to have endless acquisition there must be something to acquire and this entity was surplus-value.

Marx inherited Hegel's methodology of explanation. Marx adopted the methodology of 'The Master', but jettisoned the System.

Phase Five: *The Phenomenology of Spirit* and the Inverted World of the Bourgeoisie

The text, as I mentioned in Chapter One, of 'The Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844' no longer exists. In fact, this text never existed. Two articles, 'Marxismus–Marx–Geschichtswissenschaft' and 'Die Marxschen Manuscripte aus den Jahre 1844 in der neuen Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe' by Jürgen Rojahn proved 'The Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844' as a unified text was a fiction created by the Soviet scholars Ryazanov and Adoratski. Ryazanov first collated the individual notebooks Marx wrote in Paris in 1844 into a single monograph, translated them into Russian and published them as a cohesive book under the title 'Vorarbeiten zur "Heiligen Familie"' in the *Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe* (1), or *Mega1*. The first German edition was published in 1932 by Adoratski and was baptized with the title 'Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts'. The politicized editing of Ryazanov and Adoratski gave birth to the myth that Marx wrote a unified book called 'The Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844' and *Mega1* perpetuated this illusion. *Mega1* belonged to the history not of Marx, but of Marxism; it became an instrument in facilitating the Soviet debasement of Marx, a device in the campaign to Stalinize Marxism.

The publication of the *Mega2* launched the opportunity to escape from these distortions of Marxism and return to Marx in-himself. *Mega2* published the original materials Marx wrote when he lived in Paris in 1844; these were not a cohesive text, but a group of independent notebooks, exercises or internal debates Marx conducted as he engaged for the first time the discipline of classical political economy. *Mega2* nearly buried 'The Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844' and Rojahn correctly classifies these separate philosophical exercises as 'The Manuscripts' and this is the title I use throughout this text.

The fragmentation of the 1844 notebooks into 'The Manuscripts' does not mean that these exercises do not provide insights into Marx's thinking at that juncture of his life. In order to properly assess the meaning 'The Manuscripts' reveal regarding the development of Marx's thought in 1844 it is necessary to draw a distinction between systematic aspects and self-clarifications.

By systematic I mean a developmental stage. 'The Manuscripts' were not generalizations, they were not introductions to Marx's later system. It is a distortion of 'The Manuscripts' to read them as a totality, as a propaedeutic to his mature theory of social development.

By the term self-clarifications I mean exercises in which Marx dealt with a specific problem in classical political economy, such as ground rent, money, labor and exchange. 'The Manuscripts' must be approached as drills, as separate experiments, by which Marx dealt with these individual political economic problems. 'The Manuscripts' were internal debates concerned with independent political economic issues.

I will not approach 'The Manuscripts' as systematic, as foundational to Marx's more mature methodology. 'The Manuscripts' do have validity when they are approached as self-clarifications, as illustrations of the internal debates Marx underwent. They

have relevance when they are read as stages, as moments of self-interrogation because this approach informs us as to the particular questions Marx was asking.

When alluding to the 1844 'The Manuscripts' I will be working from *Mega2*, Abteilung (Part) One, Band (Volume) Two.¹ The translations from German into English from this edition are by the author.

'The Manuscripts', however, were not Marx's second contact with Hegel's *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. As I pointed out in Chapter Two, Marx lists *The Phenomenology of Spirit* in the bibliography to his dissertation. Marx's second contact with this text took place in the years 1842–1843, about one year before 'The Manuscripts'. In 1842–1843 Marx made about six pages of *exzerpte* from *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. (These *exzerpte* are contained in *Mega2*, Abteilung IV, Band 2, pp. 493–499.) These demonstrate that in the period between Marx's completion of his dissertation and his employment at the *Rheinische Zeitung* he was absorbed in the study of Hegel. Hegel was a continuous presence in Marx's mind and 'The Manuscripts' are Marx's third contact with Hegel; they are not the initiation of Marx into Hegel, but rather the product of years of study.

In 'The Manuscripts' Marx entered upon an extended discourse with Hegel's *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. 'The Manuscripts' are instances in which Marx experimented in applying the pneumatological model of labor found in *The Phenomenology of Spirit* to questions of classical political economy. In *The Phenomenology of Spirit* Hegel put forth a labor theory of self-consciousness.

In 'The Manuscripts' Marx integrated Hegel's theory of labor contained in *The Phenomenology of Spirit* with Feuerbach's transformative method contained in his *The Essence of Christianity*. In *The Phenomenology of Spirit* Hegel presented the world as the projection of self-consciousness; the central productive agent in the universe was Subjective Spirit. In *The Essence of Christianity* Feuerbach demonstrated that the essence of religion was the transformation of qualities of the human species. Feuerbach's transformative method illustrated that Hegel's proposition that Spirit populated the universe was the origin of religion, or that religion was merely the self-alienated anthropology of the species. Love was not Christ, but it was an essential quality of the species. In 'The Manuscripts' Marx triangulated Hegel's *The Phenomenology of Spirit* with Feuerbach's *The Essence of Christianity* and Smith's *The Wealth of Nations*.

The Phenomenology of Spirit occupied a unique role in Marx's appreciation of Hegel. In the 1845 *The Holy Family* Marx stated: 'This speculative theory of creation is almost word for word in Hegel; it can be found in his first work, *Phenomenology*.'² This statement does not mean the *The Phenomenology of Spirit* was the first book of Hegel that Marx read, but it does mean that Marx thought *The Phenomenology of Spirit* was the first book Hegel wrote. Since *The Phenomenology of Spirit* was first published in 1807, Marx's statement confirms he did not know of any Hegelian manuscript prior to 1807. All of Hegel's writings from Stuttgart, Tübingen, Berne and Frankfurt, and the Jena Manuscripts, were unknown to Marx.

Within this context, however, *The Phenomenology of Spirit* played a distinct role. As I indicated earlier Marx listed *The Phenomenology of Spirit* in the bibliography to

his 1841 dissertation. In addition, in a letter he wrote to Ruge on March 13, 1843 Marx uses the 'The Unhappy Consciousness' section of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* to satirize a work by Bauer.³

More importantly, in his early 1844 draft 'On James Mill' Marx employed two crucial concepts from *The Phenomenology of Spirit*: first, he makes reference to the master-slave⁴ relationship contained in the chapter 'Independence and Dependence of Self-consciousness: Lordship and Bondage';⁵ second, he employs the Hegelian notion of 'mutual recognition'⁶ as a means of criticizing economic relations based on private property.⁷ Prior to his exercises in 'The Manuscripts', Marx was already employing Hegelian paradigms as tools for a critique of political economy.

The year 1844 represented a fundamental change in Marx's relation to Hegel, or, rather, the content of the relationship altered. Marx and his new wife Jenny moved to Paris in October 1843 and Marx immediately entered into proletarian and socialist circles. His brief friendship with Proudhon begins in 1843. The center of gravity of Marx's intellectual interests was modified and his immersion into classical political economy began. In his 1841 dissertation Marx critiqued Hegel's *The History of Philosophy* and in 1843 he critiqued Hegel's *The Philosophy of Right*, but by late 1843 his curiosities had moved from Hegelian philosophy to economics. Smith and Ricardo replaced Speculative philosophy. 'The Manuscripts' are a demonstration of this conversion. They illustrate how Marx experimented with Hegelian methodology as an instrument of the critique of political economy.

For the purposes of this book it is necessary to divide 'The Manuscripts' as contained in *Mega2*, Section I, Volume 2 into three parts. The first part includes the manuscripts Marx wrote dealing with the issues of labor and private property, labor and rent, and labor, money, civil society and communism, while the second part consists of his 'Critique of Hegel's Dialectic and Philosophy in General', and the third part is a summary of 'The Absolute Knowledge' chapter of *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. I draw this distinction because the three parts represent three different approaches Marx took to the philosophy of The Master, because the first part concerns Marx's application of his theory of labor to English political economy, while the second is Marx's attempt at a summary of the entirety of Hegel's thought and the third is an indication of Marx's interest in Hegel's definition of the role of philosophy.

Part One comprises self-examination and includes singular examinations of the theory of 'The Profit of Capital', 'Rent of Land' and 'Private Property and Work'. Part Two, 'Critique of Hegel's Dialectic and Philosophy in General', although consisting of only approximately twenty pages, which I take as a coherent manuscript, and is Marx's summation of the philosophic enterprise of 'The Master'. Part Three contains an 'Outline to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's "Phenomenology of Spirit"' and the notation 'Absolute Knowledge' which is a summary of the concluding chapter of *The Phenomenology of Spirit*.

'The Manuscripts' represent a different period in the Hegel-Marx relationship. Marx's 1843 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' and the early-1844 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction' are emblematic of Marx's severance from Hegel's political theory and definition of philosophy, while Marx's 'The

Manuscripts' represent Marx's transformation and his continuity with Hegel's vision of the phenomenological nature of human activity. While Hegel situated the source of the phenomenology of human activity in Spirit, or mind, Marx relocated the phenomenological source to human social labor. Marx applied the transformative method of Feuerbach to Hegel, transforming the content of activity from the Hegelian Spirit to social productive labor.

This new period in the Hegel–Marx relationship constitutes a philosophic revolution in the thought of Marx. The defining characteristics, which I shall discuss in subsequent paragraphs, emerging from Marx's 1844 discourse with *The Phenomenology of Spirit* formed the line of continuity between these two giants through *Das Kapital*.

'The Manuscripts' are the fulfillment of a promise made in Marx's 1843 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right'. As I indicated earlier, Marx starts his 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' at paragraph 261, which begins Hegel's discussion of the state, but omits any reference to Hegel's previous paragraphs analyzing civil society. 'The Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' is devoid of any assessment of Hegel's concept of civil society. However, as I hinted in earlier sections of this book, Marx did make this promise in the 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right': 'Anything further regarding this is to be developed in the section of Civil Society.'⁸ Part One of 'The Manuscripts', those sketches dealing with classical political economy, are the realization of the vow made in 1843. 'The Manuscripts' Part One is the completion of the task Marx left undone in 'The Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right'. They are the section on 'civil society'.

Hegel's theory of the hydraulic force of the human Spirit is central to the understanding of his entire System. Spirit was inherent activity, a pneumatic power within the human species propelling the species to progressive stages of development. Spirit labored, and in order to grasp Marx's appropriation of Hegel's theory of labor it is necessary to outline the various forms of activity that Hegel attributed to Spirit.

Following Hegel, I will divide my discussion of the pneumatic power of Spirit into three divisions, Subjective, Objective and Absolute Spirit. Hegel related Subjective Spirit to the emergence of humanity out of nature to the point at which social life started. Subjective Spirit concerned the naturalistic needs of Spirit, the period of anthropology. By Objective Spirit Hegel meant the appearance of consciousness and of self-consciousness, or those capacities of mind which acted as the substance of the sociability of the species. Objective Spirit recorded the movement of self-consciousness from the master–slave relation to ethicality and the state. Absolute Spirit was the highest level of knowledge – art, religion and philosophy or those hierarchies in which the unity of subject and object were most completely realized.

I will divide my discussion of Hegel's concept of the inherent activity of the species in the following manner:

- 1) Under Subjective Spirit I will discuss a) The feeling soul/desire; b) Will; and c) Consciousness, self-consciousness, reason;

- 2) Under Objective Spirit I will discuss a) Subject–object and intersubjectivity; b) Work and labor; c) Substance; d) Ethicality; e) Mutual recognition; and f) Culture; alienation; the inverted world;
- 3) Under Absolute Spirit I will discuss a) Historicity; b) Philosophy; c) Method; and d) Spirit.

The Phenomenology of Spirit was published in 1807, while the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* made its appearance in 1817. A ten-year hiatus separates these works. I mention this time gap because the two works represent Hegel at different stages of his development. The structure of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* is not divided in terms of Subjective, Objective and Absolute Spirit. In *The Phenomenology of Spirit* the genealogy of consciousness, self-consciousness and reason are presented as preludes to the level of culture.⁹ Conversely, the structure of the 1817 *The Philosophy of Mind*, the third book of *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, is divided in terms of Subjective, Objective and Absolute Spirit. *The Philosophy of Mind* represents the more Mature Hegel, the Heidelberg Hegel when his system ripened, and so in discussing Hegel's ideas concerning Subjective, Objective and Absolute Spirit I will adhere to the architecture of *The Philosophy of Mind*. At this point I will begin my analysis of Hegel's theory of subjective productivity with *The Philosophy of Mind* because I first wish to call attention to Hegel's understanding of the ascent of mind out of nature. When I discuss *The Phenomenology of Spirit* I will focus on the ascent of mind in the socio-cultural world.

1) Subjective Spirit

1a) The feeling soul/desire

In Section I of *The Philosophy of Mind* the 'Parmenides of Berlin' deals with the 'Physical Soul', which deals with humankind's external relation to nature as well as the internal physiology of the human subject. Hegel entitles this section 'Anthropology. The Soul' and I will describe in succeeding pages Hegel's portrayal of 'The Physical Soul' which was derived from Aristotle's 'The Soul'.¹⁰

The primary anthropological nature of the species at this level of subjectivity was 'sentience'.¹¹ The human animal must feel hunger if it is to survive, for it must feel the need for food in order to intervene in nature to provide food for itself. I will label 'sentience' and the capacity of the species to intervene in its natural surroundings to satisfy its need for sustenance as 'desire'.

In order to satisfy its needs, its urge to sustain its existence, the species is driven outward to transform the external world to produce objects it must use its desire for self-preservation. No separation has opened between the 'I' and nature. A metabolism exists between man and nature as nature must make available to human activity those objects from which human labor produces the sustenance of the species.

1b) Will

The impulse to preserve a subject's existence leads to the development of will. Every individual organism within the species possesses a will, a self-purpose. Will

is the urge internal to the organism to achieve its own end and the ultimate end of all organisms is to continue life.¹² Will plays a vital role in the system of 'The Master' because it is a major factor in his political philosophy. Will not only appears at the subjective level but also on the objective level, because when the individual enters the social realm, will is the force seeking the maintenance and protection of individual rights, will is the foundation of right and freedom.

1c) Consciousness, self-consciousness, reason

Consciousness, self-consciousness and reason are presented as developmental stages of Subjective Spirit in *The Philosophy of Mind*. The primary features of consciousness were sense-certainty and the emergence of an 'I', or an ego. Consciousness was confined to the level of sense-perception, of the observation of the external. Consciousness in itself never advanced beyond observation, or the level of understanding, but an 'I' did appear at this stage because it was necessary to have an agent, a 'Self', who observed.¹³

In describing self-consciousness Hegel wrote: 'The formula of self-consciousness is I=I.'¹⁴ Self-consciousness was the ability of Spirit to turn the 'I' into an object of observation. Self-consciousness provided the 'I' with self-knowledge because in observing the activity of the 'I' self-consciousness was the process by which mind gained an awareness of its own capacities.

Self-consciousness is also the basis of recognition. Self-consciousness not only entails the recognition of consciousness, but also the recognition of the Other, or a negating self-consciousness.

Reason is the awareness by self-consciousness that it is all of reality.¹⁵ Reason is the maturation of self-consciousness, its self-recognition by self-consciousness that it supplies the organizational reality.

2) Objective Spirit

Whereas Subjective Spirit concerns the potentialities of the 'Self', the level of Objective Spirit concerns the productivity of reason. Objective Spirit essentially concerns the external objects reason produced. Objective Spirit relates to the process of externalization, the movement from internal reason to an external form.

In my discussion of Objective Spirit I will change the text from which I extrapolate Hegelian thought. I will work from *The Phenomenology of Spirit* because it offers far more extensive Hegelian comments on the productive powers of reason. The Objective Spirit is a universe populated by objects generated by reason.

2a) Subject-object and intersubjectivity

The subject-object relation was an axis of Hegel's philosophy. It explained the relationship between subjective mind and the world external to the Self; the subject-object relationship was constructed on the Fichtean model of 'I=I' in which the external object was molded into a shape imposed upon it by the subjective 'I'.

Subjectivity was inherently active. It possessed an immanent tendency to objectify itself. Subjectivity possessed a telos, its purpose was the movement from the implicit to the explicit.

The object, or the explicit, existed independently of the subject, but was provided a form by the subject. The object was a reflection of the subject because it carried a form bestowed upon it by the subject.

The process by which the implicit realized itself in the explicit was called objectification. The appearance of an object, sense-perception responding to an identifiable form, an identity, was objectification.

Subjective outpouring was a basic principle of Hegel's theory of Subjective, Objective and Absolute Spirit. The 'I' was an instrument of intervention. On the level of Subjective Spirit the 'I' intervened, interjected itself in the natural environment to extract sustenance from nature and on the level of Objective Spirit the 'I' intervened in the social environment to produce a community and ultimately a state. All three levels of Spirit were phenomenological expressions of the 'I', the 'I' was pneumatological.

2b) Work and labor

Hegel's awareness of the prius of subjectivity is discussed in depth in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. In the chapter 'The Truth of Self-Certainty' Hegel emphasized the pneumatic potencies of self-consciousness. He wrote: 'As self-consciousness, it is movement.'¹⁶ Later in the same paragraph he reiterates the same principle: '... self-consciousness is Desire in general.'¹⁷

The impetus of the 'I' to self-externalization, at the level of Objective Spirit, translates itself into work and labor. In the construction of community, the inherent pneumatological transforms itself into work and labor. In the chapter called 'The Actualization of Rational Self-Consciousness through Its Own Activity' in *The Phenomenology of Spirit* Hegel wrote:

The labor of the individual for his own needs is just as much a satisfaction of the needs of others as of his own, and by the satisfaction of his own needs he obtains only through the labor of others. As the individual in his individual work already unconsciously performs a universal work, so again he also performs the universal work of his conscious object . . .¹⁸

In a later chapter in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, 'Individuality Which Takes Itself To Be Real In and For Itself', Hegel returned to the theme of work and labor.

The work produced is the reality which consciousness gives itself, it is that in which the individual is explicitly for himself what he is implicitly in himself, and in such a manner that the consciousness, for which the individual becomes explicit in the work, is not the particular, but the universal, consciousness. In his work, he has placed himself altogether in the element of universality, in the qualityless void of being.¹⁹

Work and labor were the expressions of the inherent tendencies of the Self, the movement from the implicit to the explicit, or the impetus from potential to actual.

The Phenomenology of Spirit contained a theory of production. Work and labor were foundational to this theory of production. I will list below the four stages of Hegel's theory, but it must be kept in mind that the energy that labored was self-consciousness.

The first stage was *appropriation*. At this stage self-consciousness was negated by nature – an external object contradicted self-consciousness. In order to render the external rational, in order to overcome this contradiction, self-consciousness must appropriate the external object. The process of appropriation allowed self-consciousness to supply a form, shape, to this external object; the process of appropriation was the opening salvo in providing rationality to reality.

The second stage was *objectification* and this referred to the endowment of form, shape, by self-consciousness upon the external reality. Objectification was the predicative power of self-consciousness. Objectification referred to the subsumption of an external reality by self-consciousness, the taking possession of an external reality which compels that externality to mirror self-consciousness.

Alienation was the third stage of Hegel's theory of production and referred to the destiny of objectification. The tragedy of objectification related to the inevitable schism between self-consciousness and the predicated object. Alienation referred to the irreversible cleft that overtook self-consciousness and the rational object it made, because that objectification was fated to be alienated from its maker. Alienation referred to the inevitability that what the creator made it must necessarily lose.

Re-appropriation was the fourth stage of Hegel's theory of production. Re-appropriation related to the persistence of self-consciousness; even though the objectification was alienated from the subject that objectification must be re-appropriated. Creation was continuous, human practice was dominated by history and if the temporal was to move forward an objectification must be re-appropriated so their objectifications could be remade.

2c) *Substance*

In Hegel substance means universality. Substance is the ground for the unification of accidents, it is the cohesiveness which coagulates accidents into a universal.

The role of universalizing force is fulfilled by reason. The power combining the particular into a generality is reason. In Hegel substance was reason.

The labor of reason created substance. The activity of reason brings forth a whole, and totality is substance.

Ultimately,, however, substance is subject. It is subject that is the source of the outpouring of reason. Subjectivity is the origin of reason and therefore of substance as well.²⁰

2d) *Ethicality*

A major accomplishment of Objective Spirit is the construction of a society, or the progress out of the individualism of Subjective Spirit into a community. Following Aristotle, Hegel looked upon humanity as a *zoon politikon*, as political animals, or as beings who naturally gravitated toward community.

In the 1817 *The Philosophy of Mind* Hegel designated family, civil society and state as three ascending levels of ethical life.²¹ This was the same hierarchy he described in the 1821 *The Philosophy of Right*.²² A community, be it family, polis or state, was the ground of intersubjectivity, the ground compelling an 'I' to relate to an Other. Ethicality, for Hegel, was an expression of mutual respect, the awareness that the Other must be endowed with the same rights as the 'I'.

Ethicality could emerge only out of community because it was only in sociability that interdependence was universal. A community could not survive without interdependence, without the specialization of farmers, merchants, artisans, because each division of labor made the members dependent on each other for the satisfaction of needs. Economic interdependence was the basis for the universalization of rights.

2e) Mutual recognition

Social life, the creation of Objective Spirit, was grounded in mutual recognition, that is, mutual recognition was predicated on the interconnection between the 'I' and the Other. Mutual recognition, or intersubjectivity, had its ground in reciprocity, the awareness of the reciprocity between an 'I' and an Other.

The analysis in the chapter, 'Independence and Dependence of Self-consciousness: Lordship and Bondage', in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, is one of Hegel's more famous. In this chapter Hegel first addresses the concept of mutual recognition, but this chapter also deals with the social condition of humankind during its primitive existence. During this hunting and gathering stage mutual recognition is not based on recognition as a democratic act, but rather on the master-slave relationship. When humankind lived at the economic level of agricultural clans mutual recognition was grounded in domination/submission.

However, the mutual recognition which arose during the agricultural period of humankind was transformed in accordance with the advances in economic productivity. In the 18th-century age of exchange and circulation, intersubjectivity appeared as economic interdependence. In the age of exchange and circulation, mutual recognition was transformed into and patterned as economic co-dependency. Capitalist and worker were co-dependent since the capitalist required the labor of the worker and the worker required the jobs provided by the capitalist. The content of mutual recognition had changed, but the form, the essential relationship of reciprocity, remained the same.

2f) Culture; alienation; the inverted world

The world of culture is also the realm of Objective Spirit. Just as Objective Spirit created the social so it also created culture, or the self-consciousness of the social. Laying a foundation for Marx, Hegel also divided a social formation into two parts, the base, or subjective activity in the production of life, and culture, or Spirit's projections in art, religion and philosophy.

The Phenomenology of Spirit contained a chapter, 'Self-Alienated Spirit: Culture',²³ and within these pages the 'Parmenides of Berlin' explains the inevitability of alienation. In Hegel alienation meant the separation between the inherent nature

of men and women and their objectifications. Alienation meant duality, two spheres opposed to each other, or the contradiction between the nature of the human and the codes of belief and behavior created by culture.

Humankind suffered from a pan-tragic existence and this cultural schizophrenia was a result of the dualistic realms in which humanity dwelled. At one pole was the Self, the individual conscience and values, and at the other pole were the demands of the social and of religion. Humanity was always beset by an Antigone moment, the bipolarity between competing loyalties, honesty to the Self, or to the social-moral.

Culture, for Hegel, was an example of the pan-tragic, that is, culture exemplified the dualism of human existence. Culture was the inverted world. Mind gave rise to culture, to family and community and the moral, but these objectifications of mind were inevitably alienated from the subject. The fate of culture was to become an object created by self-conscious reason which was eventually alienated from the Self. Culture was an expression of stages two and three of the theory of production, the predication of the Self and the destiny of alienation. Living in culture, according to Hegel, was living in an inverted world, a world whose inception arose from the subject, but whose continuity brought about the alienation of this object.

In culture humankind is lost to itself. Hegel admired the novel *Rameau's Nephew* by Diderot. The novel describes how the main character experiences self-alienation by becoming a slave to wealth. Money is a power in culture and Rameau's Nephew, in order to gain social recognition, willingly becomes a bondsman to wealth.²⁴ Wealth becomes the lord and Rameau's Nephew the court jester.

3) Absolute Spirit

3a) Historicity

The pneumatic power of reason was the ground of Hegel's theory of historicity. The nature of reason was its continuous outpouring, its perpetual intervention into the external world, and the consequences of this intervention was the ceaseless modification of appearance. The subject-object model was central to Hegel's philosophy, it was the paradigm for understanding the relationship between the subject and the world, and because the subject unremittingly streamed outward, objectivity was in an endless current of reformulation.

The labor of reason was the basis of Hegel's productive model, the production of the external world, or an image projected on the external world by the labor of reason. The title *The Phenomenology of Spirit* was a four-word synopsis of Hegel's productive model, the cultural phenomena finding existence through reason's labors.

3b) Philosophy

Again repeating the productive model, Hegel defined philosophy as the self-knowledge of the subject. Since objectivity was the outcome of the labor of reason the knowledge of reason was best acquired through the observation of the object thereby produced.

The basic movement of philosophy was from the potential powers of reason to their actualization, or the process of realization. Philosophy observed the realization of reason in the multitude of shapes and forms this realization assumed in history. In this manner the subject gained self-knowledge, it became aware of what it was in-itself.

Hegel wrote a philosophy of identity. He recognized the unity of subject and object and therefore was cognizant of the similarity between reason and actuality. Hegel's philosophy of identity did not mean that actuality was perfectly symmetrical to reason, but rather that actuality was a reflection of reason, that actuality became recognizable to reason because reason was embedded in actuality. Hegel's philosophy of identity did not mean a perfect correspondence between reason and actuality but rather the means by which reason could comprehend actuality, the reason why actuality could be comprehended by reason.

The philosophy of identity also involved the reconciliation between reason and actuality. Hegel did not believe that the world would ever become fully rational, but he did believe that the improvement of the world would only come if the world was made more rational. The metric of the reconciliation between reason and actuality was progress, improvement, but not perfection.

Marx's idea of critical praxis was foreign to Hegel. The instrument of change for Hegel was not the practice of class opposition but rather the labor of reason upon reality. The theory of reconciliation of 'The Master' called for the harmonization between reality and philosophy while Marx's critique called for philosophy to revolutionize reality.

3c) Method

I will not discuss the question of Hegel's Method at this point. This is a vast topic and requires a chapter in itself. Chapter Five will be devoted to a discussion of Method in 'The Master' and Marx.

3d) Spirit

The preceding exegesis of Hegel's concept of Spirit into the three divisions of Subjective, Objective and Absolute was intended to highlight the developmental nature of Spirit. The purpose was to underline Spirit as ascent and as dynamics. My purpose in emphasizing the hydraulic entelechy of Spirit has two goals: 1) To focus attention upon a vital dimension of Hegel's System; 2) To emphasize the nature of Spirit as labor and productivity in Hegel as the source of Marx's definition of labor.

Spirit and mind are synonyms in Hegel, he used them interchangeably, but I will employ the term Spirit because this word accentuates the dynamic quality of this concept. Spirit was a continuous activity of thought, it was the propellant driving forward the subject's appropriation of the object. Subjectivity perpetually manifested itself; in its desire to appropriate external nature, subjectivity objectified forms that were methods of absorbing the external. The source of this prius that sustained the subject's acquisition of the object was Spirit.

In the chapter 'Spirit' in *The Phenomenology of Spirit* Hegel offered this definition of potency:

Reason is Spirit when its certainty of being all reality has been raised to truth, and it is conscious of itself as its own world, and of the world as itself. The coming-to-be of Spirit was indicated in the immediately preceding movement in which the object of consciousness, the pure category, rose to the Notion of Reason. In reason as observer, this pure unity of the I and being, of being for itself and being in itself, is determinateness as the in-itself or as being, and the consciousness of Reason finds itself.²⁵

Hegel differentiated between Spirit and reason. Whereas reason was the rational, Spirit was an ascent over the rational to self-recognition. The realization that the potentiality of reason and its actualization in the object were a unity was Spirit. The self-identity of subject and object was Spirit.

Another quote from the chapter on 'Spirit' accentuates the interconnection between labor, substance and Spirit:

Spirit, being the substance and the universal, self-identical, and abiding essence, is the unmoved solid ground and starting-point for the action of all, and it is their purpose and goal, the in-itself of every self-consciousness expressed in thought. This substance is equally the universal work produced by the action of all and each as their being-for-self, the self, action. As substance, Spirit is unshaken righteous self-identity.²⁶

In this quote Hegel demonstrates his awareness that labor and substance were self-expressions of Spirit. Work and labor were synonyms for manifestation because they drew attention to the craftsmanship of reason, to the activity of reason that produced material objects. Furthermore, the activity of reason also culminated in substance. All material objects crafted by reason shared a common identity, they were the outcomes of the practical activity of reason. Substance was reason's imprint on material objects, substance was embedded in these material products. Therefore, substance was universality.

Spirit was a perpetual emission of labor, but the comprehension of Spirit could only be won by approaching it from a historical perspective. Spirit never ceased its acts of production, and to grasp its immanence these products must be seen as parts of a developmental process. Only by placing the products of Spirit in a development chain was it possible to summarize the individual properties of Spirit's creations and thus the inherent nature of Spirit itself.²⁷

The cultural productions of Spirit, art, religion and philosophy could only be grasped as organic systems. This meant that art, religion and philosophy, and national cultures must be perceived as totalities in which the particular parts were unified inside the whole. One of Hegel's methodological categories was whole-parts and he applied this methodology to the interpretation of cultural formations. His *History of Philosophy*, *Philosophy of Art* and *The Philosophy of History*

presented Western civilization and its cultural expressions as composed of three historical totalities, Greco-Roman, Medieval and Germanic-Christian, and each of these historical organic units possessed a distinguishing universal feature that dispensed meaning to its individual parts.²⁸

Hegel's 'Introduction' to his *History Of Philosophy*²⁹ and the famous 'Preface' to *The Phenomenology of Spirit*³⁰ are in agreement on how to interpret the objective phenomena generated by Spirit. Hegel's vision of Spirit is as a pneumatic force which ceaselessly externalizes itself and has populated the world with its objectifications.

The Philosophy of Mind contains the most precise description of these three appearances of Spirit, or mind. Section One of *The Philosophy of Mind* is subtitled 'Anthropology. The Soul'.³¹ As Hegel commenced his discussion of Subjective Spirit, or soul, he acknowledged the Greek philosopher who most influenced him:

The book of Aristotle on the Soul, along with his discussions on its special aspects and states, are for this reason still by far the most admirable, perhaps, even the sole, work of philosophical value on this topic. The main aim of a philosophy of mind can only be to reintroduce unity of idea and principle into the theory of mind, and so reinterpret the lesson of those Aristotle books.³²

It adds to the general thesis of this book, the relationship between Marx and Hegel, if I momentarily interrupt my analysis of the developmental quality of Spirit in Hegel and comment on the importance of this quote.

First, Hegel's return to Aristotle's *The Soul*³³ marked a revolution in the understanding of anthropology and psychology. He rebelled against the previous metaphysical and empirical presentations of anthropology and psychology. The metaphysical method in philosophy employed the concept of the soul, but characterized the soul ontologically. In metaphysical philosophy the soul was interpreted dogmatically, as fixed, as possessing adamantine qualities.³⁴ The empirical method abandoned the concept of the soul and interpreted human psychology solely in terms of sensations. Empirical philosophy eliminated the concept of the eternal, divine soul and reduced anthropology and psychology to sense perception.³⁵ Hegel resuscitated Aristotle's concept of the soul because the Greek philosopher provided a developmental interpretation of the soul. For Aristotle the soul was the point of transition between nature and consciousness; for him soul related to the developmental process by which the human animal separated itself from nature and evolved in consciousness. Hegel borrowed the Aristotelian definition of the soul because it corresponded to his idea of historization, that the self itself was also a historical process. I offer a deeper description of the reading by 'The Master' of Aristotle's 'The Soul' in Chapter 4, 'Marx's Mis-Reading of Hegel'.

Second, Marx also read Aristotle's *The Soul*. Marx's *exzerpte* from the year 1841³⁶ contains an *exzerpte* of this text. It is impossible to ascertain if Marx read Aristotle's manuscript because of Hegel's influence, or the importance Hegel ascribed to the text, but it is important to note that Marx was also interested in this text. However, whereas Hegel understood Aristotle's soul as a stage in the evolution

toward Absolute Spirit, Marx read Aristotle as a justification for a materialist understanding of the inherent nature of humankind. Hegel and Marx read the same book but drew different conclusions from its pages.

Hegel's theory of the universality of historization necessitated that he interpret the soul beginning with humankind's separation from nature and ending with the emergence of consciousness. The soul was a term that described the history of humanity's exit from nature to the initial presuppositions of consciousness. Subjective Spirit was the first stage in the historicity of Absolute Mind and Subjective Spirit itself was composed of three subdivisions, 'Anthropology, the Soul', 'Phenomenology of Mind, Consciousness', and 'Psychology, Mind'. Subjective Spirit was the point of initiation of the evolutionary process toward Absolute Mind. Within the escalation of Subjective Spirit, at the level of the 'Phenomenology of Mind, Consciousness', the Ego, the 'I', emerged. Within the ascent of Subjective Spirit, at the conclusion of 'Phenomenology of Mind, Consciousness', reason pronounces itself. In the final period of Subjective Spirit, at the level of 'Psychology, Mind', theoretical and practical mind have evolved and will is also born.

Hegel's presentation of anthropology, the phenomenology of mind and psychology in *The Philosophy of Mind* is a precursor of 20th-century developmental psychology. Breaking with metaphysical and empirical psychology, Hegel put forth a view of psychology as the historization of human development.

Subjective Spirit, and its three subdivisions, anthropology, the phenomenology of mind, psychology, was Spirit prior to its metamorphosis into Objective Spirit. The terms in which Hegel described Subjective Spirit were naturalistic. In his analysis of Subjective Spirit as body, consciousness and psychology, Hegel discussed such features as childhood, youth, old age, feeling, sense perception, appetite, desire and memory. All these features were attributes of Subjective Spirit as it ascended to Objective Spirit, but they were naturalistic endowments and as such were demonstrations of Hegel's intense interest in the sciences. In Hegel, Speculative philosophy did not commence until the level of Objective Spirit.

Hegel's analysis of the naturalistic properties of human existence was presented within the context of the individual. Subjective Spirit focused upon the temporal maturation of the singular person. The individual was antecedent to the social.

Marx ignored Hegel's Subjective Spirit. Marx's focus was on social labor.

Hegel used the analogy of circles to define this search for truth. The quest for truth unfolded within historical ages and each historical age was an organic totality. The totality of each historical age was a circle; Greco-Roman philosophy and art, however, was not final but a moment of transition. Each historical cycle was subsumed within a succeeding circle and so history was a spectacle of a spiral of circles. Spirit in the form of the absolute appeared as a supersession of circles, each circle a totality within itself, and each circle emitting its own definition of truth. The Absolute was the self-knowledge of Spirit and this self-knowledge of Spirit was achieved by objectifications in time.

In the chapter on 'Spirit' in *The Phenomenology of Spirit* Hegel refers to these cultural formations as 'shapes of consciousness' and went on to define them in the following terms: 'They result from Spirit analyzing itself, distinguishing its movements and dwelling for a while in each.'³⁷

In the same chapter on 'Spirit', Hegel commented again on the cultural formations, the 'shapes of consciousness'³⁸ and the self-education of Spirit and wrote: '... and by passing through a series of shapes attain to a knowledge of itself. These shapes, however, are distinguished from the previous ones by the fact that they are real Spirits, actualities in the strict meaning of the word and instead of being shapes merely of consciousness, are shapes of the world.'³⁹

Marx described Hegel as a combination of Spinoza and Fichte. From Fichte Hegel took the idea of the 'I', the subject, as a hydraulic force. Hegel also took Spinoza's idea of substance and recalculated it. Whereas Spinoza thought of substance as metaphysics Hegel reformulated substance as a projection of mind. Substance for Hegel was a projection of subjective mind into external objects, the taking of possession of external objects.

The previous discussion of Hegel's concept of Spirit provides an insight into Marx's approach to the corpus of Hegel's work. The tactic Marx took in evaluating the thought of 'The Master' was to divide it into System and Method.

The term System relates to Hegelian panlogicism which claimed that all actuality was the manifestation of mind, or Speculative philosophy. In my discussion of Marx's 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' I pointed out that Marx criticized Hegel for his 'logical pantheism'. Since this 'logical pantheism' was the pillar of the Hegelian System Marx rejected this System.

Within the System, however, a methodology functioned. The methodology was explanatory procedures, forms, Hegel used to explain the operations of reason. Marx took these methodologies and divorced them from Hegelian panlogicism. Marx believed it was possible to sever the methodology from the System and still defend the explanatory viability of the methodology.

In the enterprise of divorcing System and Method, Marx followed the example of Michelet. As a leading member of the Hegelian Center, Michelet attempted to maintain the viability of Hegel by limiting the System while promoting the Method. While Michelet remained in the Hegelian Center, Marx journeyed to the Hegelian Left and one of the distinguishing features Marx gifted to the Hegelian Left was the preservation of the Hegelian Method. Panlogicism was extinguished, but the methodology was applied to Marx's theory of socio-economic formations.

Chapter Five will demonstrate the methodological categories of Hegel that Marx appropriated.

Marx's continuation of the Hegelian project

In Part II of 'The Manuscripts', the 'Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy in General', Marx asserted that *The Phenomenology of Spirit* contained 'genuine criticism'. He wrote: '... despite its thoroughly negative and critical appearance ... genuine criticism lies in it as a seed, as a potency ...'⁴⁰ He also recognized that *The*

Phenomenology of Spirit contained a 'critical form' when he commented about the 'the critical form of this is Hegel's still uncritical process'.⁴¹ My interpretation of the 'Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy in General' is that Marx did not intend a total rejection of Hegelian philosophy, but rather the recognition that *The Phenomenology of Spirit* possessed the correct 'method of criticizing' and that it was Marx's task to extract and rescue this correct 'method of criticizing' from all the Idealist wrappings in which this 'correct method' was encased.

Many previous commentators interpret the 'Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy in General' as representing Marx's 'break' with both the System and Method of Hegel. The traditional interpretation took Marx's rejection of Hegelian Speculative philosophy as evidence that the 'Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy in General' represented his conclusive farewell to Hegel. This traditional interpretation took Marx's goodbye to the Hegelian System as sufficient evidence for confirming a total schism with Hegel.

I reject the schism thesis. Assuming a difference between System and Method, I maintain that Marx did reject the Hegelian System, Speculative philosophy, but perpetuated parts of Hegelian methodology. Marx's purpose in the 'Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy in General' was an attempt to distinguish the obscurantist Idealist aspects of Hegel from the productive aspects of critique, Method, that lay hidden in the text. Once he discovered the methodologies of Hegelian 'genuine criticism' he understood his future mission as placing the correct Hegelian 'genuine criticism with a materialist (I define Marx's understanding of materialism in Phase Six) system. Marx's task was to make Hegelian methodology compatible with materialism.

The proper interpretation of the 'Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy in General' is to see it as Marx's attempt to establish a proper discipline of critique. Marx rejected Bauer and Strauss because this form of criticism remained imprisoned in Idealism, the power of reason and self-consciousness. Marx detached himself from the Young Hegelian movement in general because its members were also addicted to the narcotic of reason.⁴²

One of the principal elements of the school of critique Marx aspired to establish was the inclusion of those forms of the proper 'method of criticizing' to be found in Hegel's *The Phenomenology of Spirit*.⁴³ The central thrust of Marx's essay is the location, isolation and detachment of the 'method of criticizing' from its Speculative entrapment in Hegelian thought. Hegel himself was a dialectical figure. The Idealist system must be negated, replaced with materialism, while the Hegelian denunciation of the bourgeoisie order must be reaffirmed and ways sought to overcome bourgeois decadence.

'The Critique of Hegel's Dialectic and Philosophy in General' was a prolegomena to Marx's own form of critique. It should be read as a foundation of a Marx school of critique. By incorporating elements of the proper 'method of criticizing' from Hegel, Marx laid claim to be the propagator of these methodological categories of Hegel. Marx extended the career of Hegelian non-congruence and in so doing made Hegelian non-congruence a vital part of his thought. Marx turned Hegelian philosophy from German Liberalism into revolutionary theory.

Hegel's *The Phenomenology of Spirit* plays an indispensable role in the formation of Marx's Method. Marx understood this work as the core of Centrist Hegelianism. In *The Holy Family*, Marx asserted that the Speculative principle that Idea was the womb of creation received its definitive expression in Hegel's *The Phenomenology of Spirit*.⁴⁴ Marx's knowledge of Hegel started with *The Phenomenology of Spirit*; Marx was unaware of any of Hegel's writings prior to this masterpiece of 'The Master'.

Not only did Marx consider *The Phenomenology of Spirit* the 'first work' of Hegel, but he also regarded it as the center of Centrist Hegelianism. In his essay 'Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy in General', Marx penned the following two sentences:

- 1) Let us take a look at the Hegelian system. One must begin with Hegel's *Phenomenology*, the true point of origin and the secret of the Hegelian philosophy.⁴⁵
- 2) The first emerges most clearly in the *Phenomenology*, the birthplace of the Hegelian philosophy.⁴⁶

Marx looked upon the *The Phenomenology of Spirit* as an indispensable text because it contained the key to the proper 'method of criticizing'.⁴⁷ In order to arrive at a proper 'method of criticizing' it was necessary to answer the following question: 'what is our position in relation to the Hegelian dialectic? This lack of understanding about the relationship of modern criticism to the Hegelian philosophy generally and to the Hegelian dialectic specifically has been so great that critics like Strauss and Bruno Bauer . . . still remain trapped within the confines of Hegelian Logic . . .'⁴⁸

'The Critique of Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy in General' is additionally a struggle for the Hegelian heritage against Bauer and the Young, or Left, Hegelians. Marx's attack on the Young Hegelians, his break with the Young Hegelians, did not wait until the 1845 *The Holy Family*, or the 1846–1847 'The Leipzig Council', but was already asserted in 'The Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy in General', which was written in 1844. In it Marx wrote:

. . . even now, after all these delightful antics of idealism expiring in the guise of criticism [i.e. of Young Hegelianism] . . . has Feuerbach not once expressed the suspicion that it is time to become critical of the origins of his own thought, to introduce a dialogue, but Feuerbach has not begun any form of self-criticism. Feuerbach still maintains a complete uncritical attitude to his own thought.⁴⁹

In the 1845–1846 'The Leipzig Council' Marx lumped the 'Old Hegelians' and the 'Young Hegelians' together because both deflected their attention away from the materiality of life. For the Old Hegelians reality was shrouded in logical categories, while for the Young Hegelians the world was buried beneath religious fantasies. Both the Old Hegelians and the Young Hegelians were united by the fact that they

lost contact with materiality even though they achieved their blindness coming from different directions.⁵⁰

Marx attacked both the Young Hegelians and the Old Hegelians because they were still tainted by Hegelian Speculative philosophy. They had not conducted a critique of Hegel in order to elicit a valid 'method of criticism' which was contained in Hegel. Marx's program was clear: he would criticize Hegel not in order to abandon him, but to tease out of Hegel the most constructive part of Hegel, a creative form of non-congruence. When Marx wrote the 'Critique of Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy in General' he was no longer a Young Hegelian, but he embarked on the process of bringing his own form of Hegelianism into existence. Marx claimed the Hegelian legacy for himself: Hegel lived on in him. Marx did battle against the preemption of Hegel by Bauer.

If one were to penetrate to the 'genuine criticism' of Centrist Hegelianism then it was necessary to comprehend the 'genuine criticism' in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. It was necessary to detach Centrist Hegelianism's 'genuine criticism' from the Old Hegelian 'uncritical idealism' and this process of constructing the major procedures of 'genuine criticism' could only be conducted within the pages of *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. The structures of 'genuine criticism' could only be retrieved from the book which presented the perfect exposition of 'genuine criticism', and this source was *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. In 'The Leipzig Council' Marx referred to *The Phenomenology of Spirit* as 'the Hegelian Bible'.⁵¹

The pages of the 'Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy in General' contain many passages in which Marx emphasized the creative and liberating aspects of Hegel's 'method of criticizing', and in which he specified his design for his critique of Centrist Hegelianism.

The stages of Marx's program can be summarized in the following manner:

- 1) A critique of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* in order to extract the 'genuine criticism' in it;
- 2) A critique of Centrist Hegelianism in order to establish Marx's own statement on the formulation of Critical Hegelianism;
- 3) After recovering the 'genuine criticism', to use this as the foundation of a Marx's own 'method of critique'.

The process I will employ 'to grasp the positive aspects of the Hegelian dialectic within the realm of estrangement' is to analyze Marx's commentary on specific sections of *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. In 'The Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy in General' for the most part, as well as in other writings, Marx refers to singular sections in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, and it is only by scrutinizing these particular passages that it is possible to mine the 'genuine criticism' out of *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. In the following paragraphs I will define what Marx regarded as 'genuine criticism' in these particular sections from Hegel: 1) Substance; 2) Form-content; 3) Hegel's Theory of Production; 4) Labor as the self-creation of humankind; 5) History as the production of spiritual totalities; 6) The inverted world; 7) 'Unhappy Consciousness'; 8) 'Noble and Base Consciousness'; 9) Supersession and

subsumption; 10) 'Absolute Knowledge'; 11) 'The Struggle of Enlightenment with Superstition'; 12) The French Revolution; 13) 'Lordship and Bondage'.

It is possible to be exact in relation to the specific pages of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* that Marx commented upon for two reasons: 1) In the 'Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy in General', Marx pointed to exact passages from *The Phenomenology of Spirit*; 2) At the beginning of 'The Critique of Hegel's Dialectic and Philosophy in General', Marx wrote a précis of the internal structure of *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, and an outline of its divisions and chapters, and so Marx's general appreciation of this book, especially the sections he found most interesting, is clear.

In general Marx found 'genuine criticism' in *The Phenomenology of Spirit* when Hegel attacked the bourgeois-capitalist world. 'Genuine criticism' arose when Hegel uncovered the sources of human alienation in the bourgeois world. Marx identified himself with Centrist Hegelianism when Hegel located the sources of human self-estrangement in bourgeois society.

1) Substance

In order to understand Hegel's definition of content it is first necessary to fathom his concept of substance. Particularities were connected by substance into a whole; substance was a product which amalgamated particularities into a whole. Substance was generality, substance was the adhesive, the link that bound particularities together. It was the universal.

For Hegel the substance of an object, art, religion, ethics, was Spirit, or the content of a form was Spirit. Content was always the result of the pneumatology of Spirit.

Marx executed a Feuerbachian transformative critique of the Hegelian idea of substance. Whereas Hegel thought of substance as the product of Spirit Marx redefined substance as labor. For Hegel, substance was a product of Spirit, but for Marx substance became human labor.

2) Form–Content

Marx thus performed a form-content dissection of Hegel's theory of the labor of Spirit. Applying the transformative strategy of Feuerbach, Marx accepted the Hegelian concept of form – material or social appearance – but he refuted the Hegelian content. Marx performed a theoretical amputation by replacing labor for Hegel's Spirit.

Marx appropriated the Hegelian methodology of form and content. He was a practitioner of this aspect, and others, of Hegelian methodological forms. Marx borrowed the form–content methodological paradigm but replaced the Hegelian content of Spirit with the economic content of labor.

3) Hegel's Theory of Production

Marx absorbed Hegel's four-stage theory of production.

Appropriation began the production process for Marx. Appropriation meant that it was necessary for humans to access products from nature in order to sustain their lives. The preservation of human existence required that humans

appropriate objects existing in nature so that these objects could be transformed by human labor into the products needed to sustain life. The stage of appropriation signaled the dependency of humanity upon the fecundity of nature.

Objectification was a synonym for human externalization. During the process of objectification, natural objects were shaped by human instruments into objects beneficial to human sustenance. Objectification was the process by which human labor entered a natural form; human labor was objectified because it entered an object and sculpted that object into an instrument that sustained human social existence. Objectification was that stage of the labor process that produced the unity between subject and object.

As soon as an object became an outcome, as soon as an object was completed by the labor process, it was alienated from social man. Alienation referred to the conclusion, the finality, or the end of an act of productive labor. When an act of productive labor came to an end, when an objectified object gained its separate existence, this act of separation was also an act of alienation. The object in-itself, for example, a rug, could be traded; the object in-itself entered into the circulation process and out of this circulation process profit ensued. The creator of the object was not the recipient of the profit of the object; alienation led to expropriation.

The end of expropriation only occurred by means of re-appropriation. If the producer wished to terminate his loss he must re-appropriate the object – he must take full ownership of the labor materialized in the object. Re-appropriation was the pathway to ending expropriation because only when the laborer became the sole proprietor of his labor was he protected from expropriation. Communism was re-appropriation.

This discussion of Marx's theory of production accomplished two purposes. First, it was an illustration of how Marx perpetuated Hegelian methodology. It demonstrated how Marx's form-content redefinition, his substitution of labor for Spirit, allowed him to apply Hegelian methodology to political economy. Without Marx's critique of the form-content formula of Hegel, without Marx's indebtedness to the Feuerbachian transformative critique of Hegel, he could not have applied this instance of Hegelian methodology of political economy.

This discussion also pinpointed Hegelian Speculative philosophy as the major theoretic opponent of Marx. Before it was possible for Marx to incorporate Hegelian methodology it was necessary for him to jettison Hegelian Idealism. Only when Hegelian methodologies reflected social energies and social properties was it possible for Marx to utilize them.

Marx read *The Phenomenology of Spirit* through the eyes of Smith and Ricardo. 'Hegel's standpoint is that of modern political economy. He conceives labor as the essence of man . . . as the true essence of man; he only sees the positive side of labor and not the negative side.'⁵²

'Genuine criticism' existed in Hegel when he recognized human productivity, labor, as the generative power of the human universe. When Hegel incorporated the socio-political he also drew closer to 'genuine criticism'.

The Hegelian Center was that form of Hegelianism that was similar to 'genuine criticism'. The parts of Centrist Hegelianism which were productive were those

parts which concentrated on the sociological or political reasons for the alienation of man. Certain aspects of Hegel carried out this program, but in the last analysis Centrist Hegelianism had recourse to spiritual powers or entities. When Centrist Hegelianism abandoned the socio-political and embraced the spiritual and Speculative it ceased being both destructive and therefore productive. Although Hegel pointed to certain socio-political factors which led to human estrangement, in the last analysis Hegel judged mind, self-consciousness, as the source of human estrangement.

4) *Labor as the self-creation of humankind*

In 'The Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy in General' Marx wrote:

The outstanding achievement of Hegel's *Phenomenology* and its end result . . . the dialectic of negativity as the propelling and generating principle . . . is thus first that Hegel conceives the self-creation of man as a process, conceives the objective as self-objectification, alienation as transcendence of this alienation; that he thus grasps the essence of labor and the objectification of man . . . as the outcome of man's own labor.⁵³

Marx continued the Hegelian theme that history was the process through which humankind created itself. The Hegelian theory of creation was itself a product of the transformative method. In the Western religious tradition God was the creator of the universe, but Hegel took the creative energy out of the divine and repositioned it in Subjective Spirit. Following the Hegelian initiative Marx also applied the transformative method, this time in the Feuerbachian mode, to Hegel, resulting in the following proposition: the evolutionary force was not Spirit, but rather social labor.

Marx's conversion to the Hegelian idea that labor, Spiritual or social, was the source of the autogenesis of humankind also led Marx to redefine the relationship between nature and the human species. A son of the 18th century, Hegel defined nature in terms of Locke and Hume, as an object external to Spirit, but as an object emitting sense impressions stimulating mind into thought. For Marx, however, nature was an extension of the body of humanity. Nature was the objective form of human labor, it was the objective body of species labor and consequently species labor endowed nature with a history. Nature was not stationary, but species labor made it historical. Historicity emerged from the metabolic relation between social humankind and nature

5) *History as the production of spiritual totalities*

The Phenomenology of Spirit provided a syllabus for the forms of consciousness created over time. In the famous 'Introduction' to this work Hegel wrote: 'But the actuality of this simple whole consists in those various shapes and forms which have become its moments, and which will now develop and take shape afresh, this time in their new element, in their newly acquired meaning.'⁵⁴ In this sentence,

when Hegel uses the terms 'shapes and forms' he means cultural expressions such as Greco-Roman philosophy, the Enlightenment and Absolute Monarchy.

Hegel iterates a similar theme in the 'Preface' to his *The History of Philosophy*.⁵⁵ In that 'Preface' Hegel divides the history of Western philosophy into three forms, Greco-Roman, Medieval and Germanic-Christian. Each of these forms possessed a unique essence, a cultural in-itself, and depicted a specific period in the self-education of philosophy.

In order to provide a foundation for the self-manifestation of Spirit Hegel required the presupposition of history. Spirit could not develop, could not transcend previous objectification, could not learn from its previous incarnations unless history existed. A past and a future was necessary if Spirit was to retrospect, to reflect on its previous manifestations. This past and future was time and time made history possible thus satisfying the needs of Spirit. Retrospection was the basis of the self-knowledge of Spirit.

The history that Hegel studied was the movement of cultural totalities. Even though Hegel did not believe that China and India gave rise to philosophy, his *The History of Philosophy* traverses the development of human thought from Confucius and the Vedas through Plato and the Roman Stoics until Kant and Schelling.

Marx adopted the Hegelian concept of historicity, but here again Marx transformed the form-content method. The forms whose historicity Marx studied were socio-economic formations. Whereas Hegel concentrated upon spiritual expressivism, Marx concentrated upon socio-economic organic systems. Marx wrote of the historicity of social formations.

In addition, whereas Hegel conceived of the content of these cultural structures as Spirit, Marx conceived of the content as social labor.

6) *The inverted world*

Earlier in this book, in order to characterize the distinction Hegel drew between thought and actuality, I used the phrase non-congruence. I did this in order to separate Bauer and Marx's idea of critique from Hegel's understanding of the relation between philosophy and actuality.

I repeat this distinction here because Hegel attacked bourgeois society vehemently. But his attacks on bourgeois society were not critiques in the sense of Bauer or Marx. Hegel denounced bourgeois actuality because of its non-congruence with philosophy, but he did not denounce bourgeois society from the perspective of Bauer, as an advocate of free individuality, or from the perspective of Marx, as a social formation which must be overthrown through Marx's 'revolutionary praxis'.⁵⁶

The title Hegel used to describe, for the most part, 17th and 18th-century European culture was 'Self-Alienated Spirit: Culture'.⁵⁷ In paragraph 521 of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* he offered a fuller definition of inversion and alienation. He wrote:

It is thus absolute and universal inversion and alienation of the actual world and of thought; it is pure culture. What is learnt in this world is that neither

the actuality of power, wealth, nor their specific Notions, 'good' and 'bad', or the consciousness of 'good' and 'bad'(the noble and ignoble consciousness) possesses truth; on the contrary, all these moments become inverted, one changing into the other, and each is the opposite of the other.⁵⁸

In the section 'Self-Alienated Spirit: Culture' Hegel addresses culture as a universal phenomenon. It includes the Athenian polis, which he admired, and even uses Sophocles' play *Antigone* as an example of the moral contradictions of all cultures. Nevertheless, it is clear that the center of Hegel's attention was monarchical Europe since the Renaissance and the inception of capitalism. In the above-quoted paragraph Hegel singled out 'wealth' as a paramount form of alienation and inversion, and the 'wealth' that arose in monarchical Europe was due to overseas imperialism and the rise of commercialism. The culture that Hegel denounced in 'Self-Alienated Spirit: Culture' was early capitalist society.

Hegel ridiculed the bourgeois universe in its infancy, because it was a reservoir of philistinism, vanity and greed. Hegel's excoriations of the bourgeois universe were incorporated by Marx, as paradigms Marx used in his own critique of bourgeois society. When Marx wrote that *The Phenomenology of Spirit* contained examples of the proper 'method of criticism', one such example was Hegel's strictures against capitalist culture. Marx renounced Idealism, the systematic aspect of Hegelianism, but he found, extracted and incorporated correct models of the 'method of criticizing', such as Hegel's demolition of capitalist culture, and employed them in his own critique.

The inverted world originated when humankind exited from natural life. During the period of natural existence alienation did not exist because the existential needs of the species were met in the immediacy of nature. Spirit existed only as a potential in primitive species life – it was still asleep in the species. Only when the species separated itself from natural existence did Spirit undergo its birth as the hydraulic force of life.

The first creation of Spirit was human social life, or the ethical, and this was Spirit as objectifying itself. Social life was ethical life because an 'I' was a forced to relate to an Other. Ethics were behavioral codes through which an 'I' extended mutual recognition to the Other.

Out of the need to develop codes of behavior based upon mutual recognition, a system of 'good' and 'bad' was originated and it was as a result of these moral categories that alienation arose. The unforeseen result of morality was the coming to be of alienation because no 'I' could forever realize the 'good'. Alienation referred to the fact that the ethical was impossible to achieve throughout a lifetime; ethical existence as such brought about conditions in which the species must somehow violate its own natural inclinations. Alienation was the contradiction between the natural existence, the instinctive-emotional proclivities of the species, and the sociological norms created by Spirit on which the ethical rested.

As an example of alienation and the inverted world, Hegel had recourse to Sophocles' *Antigone*. The Greek heroine was the perfect example of the self-contradiction of the Self as she was torn between burying her two dead brothers,

in accordance with either the laws of the family or of the state. The laws of the family and state were in strict opposition regarding burial procedures and no matter which law Antigone chose she would have to leave one brother without a proper burial. The plight of Antigone, a human being caught in a self-contradiction due to her desire to obey the law, was a model of inversion. Antigone's desire to do justice to her brothers was thwarted by the bipolarity of law in the socio-political. The 'Parmenides of Berlin' did not believe in a universal divine morality, but rather in moral ambiguity, the sadness that in the social world people were torn between equally binding but contradictory loyalties.

The ethical universe for Hegel was the pan-tragic. Commenting on the role of tragedy within the ethical Jean Hyppolite wrote: 'This divergence between the original aim of the heart and actual action in the universal element of being expresses the tragedy of human action.'⁵⁹ The pan-tragic served as a rubric for Hegel's negative evaluation of capitalist civil society. The themes of the pan-tragic, of self-contradiction, were also applied to the commercial society of the bourgeoisie.

Early European capitalist societies were bifurcated in terms of state and wealth. The monarchies of Western Europe that ruled over the commercial societies of the bourgeoisie extolled state and wealth, or what Hegel referred to as the 'noble' and 'base', the politico-economic expressions of the 'good' and the 'bad'.

During the early centuries of the rise of the monarchical order, nobility was an honored virtue, a 'good' ethic. As monarchies evolved out of the chaos of the medieval period nobility stood for service, honor, sacrifice and loyalty. These were virtues voluntarily given and were social ideals. However, by the 18th century, in the decades prior to the French Revolution, nobility had decayed and it was now associated with obsequiousness to the Crown and currying favor and status at the Court. The nobility of the early bourgeois era was alienated from the heroism and duty of the medieval knighthood and in pre-revolutionary France had been inverted to mere followers of custom and manners. Along with his condemnation of the 18th-century nobility and state Hegel outspokenly ridiculed the worship of wealth by the bourgeoisie of nascent capitalism. While the state was reduced to the worship of grandiose palaces, Hegel referred to the deification of wealth on the part of bourgeois culture as the 'base', a civilization of the 'bad'. Hegel condemned wealth because it encouraged self-indulgence. Wealth led to the cultivation of extreme egoism.

Sensitive to the use of language, Hegel recognized how it contributed to the degeneration of state and wealth. The language of the obsequious nobility and the narcissistic commercial classes was reduced to flattery. In order to maintain its position at court the de-nobled aristocracy deployed flattery to gain continued entrance into the Royal Palace while the greedy merchants used it as a means of improving profits. Language also became the slave of personal aggrandizement.⁶⁰

Hegel's repudiation of the bourgeois world of culture also included the Enlightenment. Although Hegel recognized that the Enlightenment liberated reason from enslavement to religion he looked upon the Enlightenment as also possessing a 'base' aspect, and for Hegel the nadir of the Enlightenment was its

excessive individualism. A chief protagonist of Enlightenment individualism was Jeremy Bentham, originator of the theory of Utilitarianism. For Hegel, the veneration expressed towards individualism by Enlightenment thought served to buttress the self-gratification of bourgeois wealth and the jostling for social position by the debased aristocracy.

Hegel attributed the Jacobin 'Reign of Terror' to the excessive individualism of the Enlightenment. In his famous chapter in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, 'Absolute Freedom and Terror', Hegel accused Robespierre of the 'absolute Freedom' of self-certainty. The Robespierrean ego was so absolutely convinced of its own correctness, absolute self-certainty allied to individualism, that Robespierre felt justified in marching people to the guillotine. The 'Reign of Terror' was the product of an individual's absolute certainty of his/her own judgment and belief system for them to provide justification for mass extermination.⁶¹ Marx did not agree with Hegel's assessment of the Enlightenment as presented in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, but I present Hegel's view here as a demonstration of the dangers he saw in the individualism of the bourgeois world. Hegel's attack on the supremacy of the 'Self' was another example of his deploring the negative aspect of bourgeois values.

As a literary expression of the rejection of bourgeois culture, Hegel turned to Diderot's *Rameau's Nephew*.⁶² In the chapter 'Self-Alienated Spirit: Culture', Hegel refers to Diderot's work on three occasions, demonstrating the high regard with which Hegel viewed this book.⁶³

Rameau's Nephew is a parody of the personality types generated by early capitalist society. The stage design for Diderot's parody is burlesque in style. It depicts a corrupted culture which extols greed, vanity and self-indulgence. It is a society which prides itself on deception, the cultivation of facades in order to gain applause. The stage design for *Rameau's Nephew* is vaudeville-like, in which characters indulge in every deceit in order to win the applause of the audience.

Rameau is the personification of all these acts of deception, a clown who turns himself into any role which pleases his audience. Rameau has no Self, he is merely a impersonator who adopts any persona the audience prefers. *Rameau's Nephew* is a study of how the deception and deceit sanctioned by a society can find their personification in an unquestioning, eager-to-be-accepted denizen of bourgeois society. The readers laugh at Rameau, but in reality they are laughing at the social conditions that created both this impersonator and themselves.

For Marx, however, 'Self-Alienated Spirit: Culture' was an instrument of the proper 'method of criticism'. Marx understood that Hegel had revealed most of the malignancies of commercial society. Regardless of the general Idealism of *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, the chapter 'Self-Alienated Spirit: Culture' stood by itself as a correct example of criticism. There was an inherent contradiction between Idealism as a philosophical system and a 'genuine criticism' which revealed the 'base'.

This is not to say that Hegel himself practiced 'critique'. He did not. Previous paragraphs indicated that Hegel adhered to a theory of non-congruence and not to a theory of 'critique'. Nevertheless, Hegel made a vast contribution to Marx

because he illustrated how his concepts of the inverted world could shed light on the shallowness of the bourgeois world. Looking at the bourgeois world from the perspective of alienation, Hegel did not hesitate to uncover the vacuity of bourgeois existence.

In 1844, as Marx moved toward communism, he attacked the bourgeois world. He agreed with Hegel's criticisms of bourgeois existence. When Marx spoke of the proper 'method of criticizing' he meant that Hegel had perceptively saw, and illustrated, the superficiality of bourgeois being. Marx did not mean that Hegel practiced critique, but did mean that Hegel had uncovered the exact target, for anyone, like himself, who wished to engage the 'method of critique'.

Marx was part of the history of critique. The opening chapter of this history was written by Kant in his critiques of pure, practical reason and judgment. The next chapters were written by Strauss and his criticism of religion. As we have seen Hegel was not part of the 'method of critique' but identified the subject of critique. Bauer saw critique as a method for enlarging individual autonomy. Marx understood critique as a philosophical weapon in the struggle against capitalism.

7) *'The Unhappy Consciousness'*

Marx's specific reference to the next three subheadings, 'The Unhappy Consciousness', the 'Honest Consciousness', and 'Noble and Base Consciousness' are contained in this sentence from the 'Critique of Hegel's Dialectic and Philosophy in General: "The Unhappy Consciousness", "The Honest Consciousness", the struggle of the "Noble and Base Consciousness", etc., etc. . . . these individual sections contain the critical elements of whole spheres such as religion, the state, civil life, etc., but still in an estranged form of criticism.'⁶⁴ Furthermore, in his outline of *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, Marx included at the beginning of the 'Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy in General' the following summary: 'Self-Consciousness. The Truth of Certainty of Self. a) The Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness. Lordship and Bondage. b) Freedom of Self-Consciousness: Stoicism, Scepticism, the Unhappy Consciousness.'⁶⁵

In *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel defines the 'unhappy consciousness' as a 'self-consciousness' that 'is imprisoned in its own individuality. It is a form of self-consciousness that is unable or unwilling to recognize another self-consciousness'.⁶⁶ *The Phenomenology of Spirit* branded excessive individuality as isolating, as rendering the subject as unproductive.

Hegel's *The History of Philosophy* continues the ideas contained in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. In *The History of Philosophy*, Hegel interprets the Greek Stoics and Sceptics as beginning the decline of Greek philosophy. Hegel was extremely critical of the Stoic idolization of the 'wise man' because it was predicated on human isolation, the withdrawal from active engagement in ethical life.⁶⁷

For Hegel the proper attitude of self-consciousness to activity was active engagement. The ascent of man from particularization to the proper involvement in morality is portrayed in his *The Philosophy of Right*. In that work Hegel describes the passage of the person from subjective will to participation in the moral Idea and this passage encompassed the following stages: individual will and right, family,

civil society and the state, in which the state was presented as the embodiment of the ethical Idea.⁶⁸ Human fulfillment arose when the individual was joined with the universal and this was accomplished in the realm of actuality when the private subject involved himself in the public activities of the state – the Objective Spirit.

Marx's approach to Hegel's concept of the 'unhappy consciousness' must be divided into two parts: a) 'genuine criticism'; and b) 'estranged form'.

a) According to Marx, the concept of 'The Master' of the 'unhappy consciousness' contained 'genuine criticism' because it displayed the estrangement of humankind in a capitalist society. Marx read the 'unhappy consciousness' as social criticism, as a portrayal of humankind when their labor was expropriated from them. The isolation and atomization of the 'unhappy consciousness' stemmed from capitalist exploitation.

b) The 'estranged form' of this 'genuine criticism' derived from Hegel's assumption that it was possible to overcome this 'unhappy consciousness' in the higher stages of the activity of consciousness. The 'estranged form' of Hegelian 'genuine criticism' flowed from Hegel's insistence that the 'unhappy consciousness' could overcome its atomization in Objective Spirit.

'Genuine criticism' for Marx meant that the solution to the 'unhappy consciousness' entailed the overthrow of capitalism. 'Genuine criticism' must always refer to the material, or sociological, causes of an individual's sociological malaise and this meant that only changes in the material or sociological conditions were capable of surmounting the individual's exploitation and estrangement.

The 'genuine criticism' of Hegel related to the form, or 'the unhappy consciousness'. Marx meant that there were particular forms, types, classes, of alienation. When Marx used the phrase 'estranged form' he meant that Hegel had properly penetrated to a specific form of exploitation in capitalist society, but was encumbered with an improper content to overcome this form of exploitation. The content that Hegel put forward as a cure for 'the unhappy consciousness' was Idealism. This was a content Marx rejected. Marx borrowed the form of 'the unhappy consciousness', a minimal Self in capitalist social relations, but rejected the Hegelian content, Idealism, and replaced Speculative philosophy with sociological content, capitalist social relations.

8) 'Noble and Base Consciousness'

The category of 'noble and base consciousness' illustrated how culture produced different forms of self-consciousness. Hegel published *The Phenomenology of Spirit* in 1807, a time when monarchy still existed in Europe and a time of burgeoning capitalism. The division of self-consciousness reflected these two different communities of early 19th-century European culture. In his description of 'noble and base consciousness' Hegel displayed his awareness that the social environment determined the social configuration of self-consciousness, or the sociological conditioning of self-consciousness.

Hegel defined 'noble consciousness' in feudal-aristocratic terms. It was that form of self-consciousness represented by a person who swore obedience and duty to a monarchy or state. It characterized those who sought the feudal definition of honor, either in the form of military duty or government service.

Conversely, 'base consciousness' was that of those who worshipped wealth. Those who worshipped wealth fell into two categories, those who possessed wealth in themselves and those who worked in the service of wealth, the sycophants of wealth.

Marx judged the divided consciousness of 'noble' and 'base' as 'genuine criticism' for two reasons: 1) it partially supported the idea of the sociological conditioning of personality; 2) it attacked bourgeois capitalist values.

Hegel recognized two dimensions to reason, the inherent, or esoteric, and the sociologically determined, the exoteric. For Hegel the most important parts of self-consciousness were the inherent, immanent and teleological aspects: reason as essence, as the esoteric. On the other hand, Hegel was aware that self-consciousness was also conditioned by sociological factors, the exoteric. Hegel possessed an organic interpretation of societies and understood that individual consciousness reflected the ethos of the social organism.

For Marx, Hegel's 'genuine criticism' lay in his recognition of the sociological conditioning of reason: an individual's reason was molded by his surrounding environment. There were no inherent ideas, but values reflected societal conditioning, as the French materialists Claude Helvétius and Paul Henri d'Holbach had argued.

Furthermore, Hegel's 'genuine criticism' was most penetratingly expressed in his attack on 'base consciousness'. In his assault on wealth Hegel was dismissive of the bourgeois capitalist world. Marx found that Hegel exercised 'genuine criticism' when he ridiculed capitalist values and cognitive structures. The 'base' consciousness was an illustration of the servility of self-consciousness and the power of wealth over the less fortunate: lordship (wealth) and bondage (the working class.)

The 'estranged labor' of the 'noble' and 'base' dimorphism derived from Hegel's willingness to resolve this contradiction in Speculative terms. Only in Spirit, an Idealist concept, could the division between self-consciousness and the sociological be overcome. Since this supersession only occurred in the world of Idea it remained an 'estranged form' of supersession because it allowed the material conditions for the divided consciousness to persist.

For Marx in 1844 'genuine criticism' has to eventuate in political activism which changes the content. An altered content, an altered political economy or political structure, was the only way for 'genuine criticism' to reach a superseding result. The Hegelian form of supersession, to seek to overcome a divided self-consciousness in Spirit, was to perpetuate the content, the material conditions, and therefore leave the form, estrangement, intact.

From the point of view of 'genuine criticism' Marx read portions of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* as an attack on capitalism, specifically those portions that Marx found contained 'genuine criticism' and were those that were destructive,

that ridiculed capitalism. The Centrist Hegelianism Marx embraced was destructive, that is, made public the horrors of capitalism.

Marx felt closest to the Young Hegel, the Hegel of *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, who attacked bourgeois capitalist society. Marx looked upon *The Phenomenology of Spirit* as the first book Hegel wrote; it was the book from which Marx began his study of Hegel and because the Young Hegel exposed the malignancies of capitalism in its pages it was the Hegel manuscript that exerted the greatest influence on Marx.

9) Supersession and subsumption

Marx looked upon the Hegelian concept of supersession as an instance of 'genuine criticism' because in itself it was a statement of the need to transcend alienation. The concept of supersession called attention to the fact that estrangement was a condition that must be overcome. As a call to surmount estrangement the idea of supersession was positive, and in the 'Critique of Hegel's Dialectic and Philosophy in General' Marx characterized it as 'genuine criticism'. 'Within the realm of estrangement, is now time to single out the positive aspects of the Hegelian dialectic.'⁶⁹

Although Hegel saw the need to supersede alienation, Marx was quick to point out that Hegel's remedy only recapitulated estrangement. Marx drew a distinction between Hegelian diagnostics and Hegelian remedies; whereas Hegelian diagnostics were correct – alienation existed and should be superseded – his remedies were wrong because they ended only in re-submerging humankind again in an 'estranged form'. Put another way, his prescriptions only re-established the original conditions of estrangement. Marx wrote: 'The act of superseding is a contradictory process because it is only through the process of destroying the object that the subject can win its preservation . . . or destruction means self-affirmation . . . and these opposites exist together.'⁷⁰

The basic failure of Hegel was that although he identified the origins of alienation he never succeeded in removing the causes of alienation. In Hegel humankind was always presented as a manifestation of self-consciousness, of Spirit, and this was the exact cause of its alienation. By subsuming the activity of humankind under Spirit, Hegel perpetuated the exact conditions which brought alienation into existence: in the last analysis his philosophy preserved the 'estranged form' because he never superseded the content, Spirit.

Marx did not accept Spirit as content and therefore did not accept alienation in Hegel's terms. Alienation could be overcome by changing the material conditions of human life.

10) 'Absolute Knowledge'

Among the ten categories so far discussed, Hegel's theory of Production, the Unhappy Consciousness, Noble and Base Consciousness, and Supersession, isolated specific aspects of Centrist Hegelianism which contained 'genuine criticism'. The discussion now moves into a different phase, a completely negative phase, in my analysis of the 'Absolute Knowledge' chapter of *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. For Marx

this was the epitome of the 'estranged form' in Hegel: it was a primary source of the 'uncritical positivism and equally uncritical idealism of Hegel's later works'. It was a dividing line between two eras in the life of the Centrist Hegel, the Young anti-bourgeois Hegel and the more Mature Hegel of Speculative philosophy.

Marx wrote: 'We shall now demonstrate in detail Hegel's one-sidedness and limitations as they are displayed in the final chapter of the *Phenomenology*, 'Absolute Knowledge' . . . a chapter which contains the concentrated Spirit of the *Phenomenology*, the relationship of the *Phenomenology* to speculative dialectic, and also Hegel's consciousness concerning both of their relationship to one another.'⁷¹

In this last chapter of *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel presented a definition of 'Absolute Knowledge', or the knowledge of Spirit. According to Hegel, three forms of knowledge existed, empirical, religious and philosophical, and 'Absolute Knowledge' was the comprehension of Spirit.

'Absolute Knowledge' was the recognition of the final unity of subject and object, the awareness that Mind was the creative force of all historical appearances. 'Absolute Knowledge' was the final recognition that 'I=I', the phenomenon brought forth in history, were products of the Self. 'Absolute Knowledge' taught that the Self was the in-itself of history, that history was merely the self-recognition of the Self and this identity was Spirit.

The 'Absolute Knowledge' chapter also epitomized the Hegelian System and Method. The chapter was a synopsis of the Hegelian System because it enshrined Speculative philosophy. The Hegelian System was constructed on the belief that mind was ultimately the prius of all creativity and the 'Absolute Knowledge' chapter confirmed this axiom of the System. The Hegelian System was predicated on the presupposition that knowledge was mind's knowledge of itself, the ground of the identity between subject and object.

Marx's attitude toward the chapter on 'Absolute Knowledge' summarized his general evaluation of *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. In his 'Critique of Hegel's Dialectic and Philosophy in General' he wrote:

The outstanding achievement of Hegel's *Phenomenology* and its final outcome, the dialectic of negativity as the moving and generating principle, is thus first that Hegel conceives the self-creation of man as a process, conceives objectification as loss of the object, as alienation; that he thus grasps the essence of labor and comprehends objective man . . . true, because real man . . . as the outcome of man's labor.⁷²

The 'outstanding achievement' of Hegel was his theory of creation. According to Marx, Hegel recognized that the creation of actuality was solely the accomplishment of humankind: the human species was promethean in its productive energies. Marx borrowed this form, a form that corresponded to the labor theory of value of classical British political economy.

However, the content of Hegel's theory of creation was Speculative philosophy. The subject of Hegel's theory of creation was Spirit; reason was content. Marx

rejected the content of Hegel's theory of creation. Rather than Spirit acting as content and subject Marx made human social labor the content and subject.

Marx saw *The Phenomenology of Spirit* as the birthplace of Centrist Hegelianism because he thought of it as symmetrical to political economy. *The Phenomenology of Spirit* and English political economy were complementary because they both assumed human labor as the dynamics of creation; there was only disagreement over content and subjectivity. Smith, Ricardo and Hegel shared a corresponding vision of human productivity.

The books of Hegel which exemplified his Speculative philosophy were *The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, in particular *The Philosophy of Nature* and *The Philosophy of Religion*. In addition, *The Philosophy of Right* was another illustration of the Mature 'Parmenides of Berlin'.

The books by Hegel which were the clearest expositions of Centrist Hegelianism, the early Hegel who was opposed to bourgeois society, were *The Phenomenology of Spirit* and *The Science of Logic*, as Marx mentioned in the 'Introduction' to the 'Critique of Hegel's Dialectic and Philosophy in General'.⁷³ Later portions of this chapter will provide the justification for looking upon these works as the epicenter of Centrist Hegelianism.

Marx looked upon Hegel as a German Liberal. The seeds of Liberal Hegelianism were the theories of creativity and the dialectic of negativity. The failure of Liberal Hegelianism was its Speculative philosophy, Hegel's assumption that Spirit was both content and subject.

The Marxist revision of Liberal Hegelianism stemmed from Marx's substitution of content and subject. Marx replaced Hegel's Speculative content and subject with human social labor and he also relocated the negative dialectic from Spirit to the transformation of political economic conditions. By performing this substitution Marx transformed Liberal Hegelianism into Marxist critique.

Marx never believed that Liberal Hegelianism was accommodationist, that Liberal Hegelianism was merely an apology for Prussian conservatism. In his 'Critique of Hegel's Dialectic and Philosophy in General' Marx wrote: 'There can therefore no longer be any question about an act of accommodation on Hegel's part vis-à-vis religion, the state, etc, since this lie is the lie of his principle.'⁷⁴ As I pointed out in previous paragraphs Marx attributed the 'lie' to the Hegelian System of Speculative philosophy. Hegel in-himself was not an 'accommodationist'; rather the Hegelian System in-itself served to support the Prussian autocracy.

11) 'The Struggle of Enlightenment with Superstition'

Marx did not specifically mention 'The Struggle of Enlightenment with Superstition' in his essay 'Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy in General'. It is clear, however, that Marx knew this chapter because he does specifically comment on this chapter in the 1845-1846 'The Leipzig Council'.⁷⁵

The section that Marx referred to as 'Mind in Self-Estrangement . . . Culture' was composed of three subdivisions and these were: I) The World of Self-alienated Spirit; II) The Enlightenment; III) Absolute Freedom and Terror. Subdivision II, The Enlightenment, was itself divided into two parts; a) The Struggle of Enlightenment

with Superstition; b) The Truth of Enlightenment. Marx's reference to 'Mind in Self-Estrangement . . . Culture' allows for no other conclusion than he read part a) of subdivision II, 'The Struggle of Enlightenment with Superstition'.

A long quote from 'The Leipzig Council' is in order at this point because it is best to let Marx speak for himself on the issue of the Enlightenment:

Hegel has already proved in his *Phenomenology* how this theory of mutual exploitation, which Bentham expounded ad nauseam, could already at the beginning of the present century have been considered a phase of the previous one. Look at his chapter on 'The Struggle of the Enlightenment with Superstition', when the theory of usefulness is depicted as the final result of enlightenment. The apparent stupidity of merging all the manifold relationships of people in the one relationship of usefulness, this apparently metaphysical abstraction, arises from the fact that, in modern bourgeois society all relations are subordinated in practice to the one abstract monetary-commercial relation . . .⁷⁶

Marx interpreted 'The Master' correctly. Hegel's chapter 'The Struggle of Enlightenment with Superstition' is an attack on utilitarianism as a theory of human exploitation. To evaluate a person solely in terms of their usefulness served as a justification for expropriating their labor: if the utility of a person resided solely in his labor then a manufacturer was legally permitted to use that labor, even in an unpaid form, for his own advantage. In addition to rejecting utilitarianism because it provided the rationale for exploitation, Hegel also repudiated the Enlightenment because it was the birthplace of excessive individualism. Enlightenment philosophy brought utilitarianism into existence and therefore Enlightenment philosophy in itself was corrupt: the product inherited the seeds of corruption from the cause.⁷⁷

Marx's commentary on 'The Struggle of Enlightenment with Superstition' demonstrates that he read *The Phenomenology of Spirit* as a attack on capitalist culture. Since utilitarianism acted as the theoretic ground for English political economy then Hegel's negation of utilitarianism was simultaneously a rebuttal of classical political economy. Marx saw *The Phenomenology of Spirit* as the 'bible' of Hegelianism and his attachment to this book stemmed from the fact that he evaluated it as a critique of capitalist capital. Capitalism was a form of the inverted world.

The Phenomenology of Spirit was the 'bible' of Liberal Hegelianism and Liberal Hegelianism as it existed in 1807 was a condemnation of capitalist culture. A symmetry existed between certain parts of the Hegelian tradition and the intent of Marx: those parts of Hegel that assaulted the bourgeois world corresponded to Marx's intention to uncover the exploitative nature of capitalist practice.

12) *The French Revolution*

In *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel discussed the French Revolution in the third subdivision of the chapter 'Mind in Self-Estrangement . . . Culture', entitled 'Absolute Freedom and Terror'. Nowhere in Marx's writings does he ever mention 'Absolute Freedom and Terror', but it is clear that Marx knew this chapter because

Marx's outline of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* makes note of the 'Mind in Self-Estrangement . . . Culture' chapter and 'Absolute Freedom and Terror' is the final subdivision of that chapter.

Even though the Young Hegel supported the early stages of the French Revolution when he was at Tübingen, as it evolved into the Terror Hegel saw it as an extension of the excessive individualism of the Enlightenment. Just as Hegel looked upon Utilitarianism as an expression of the Enlightenment, so he saw the Terror as the culmination of the excessive individualism championed by the Enlightenment.

In particular, the Enlightenment gave rise to the absolute self-certainty of individualism. Similar to the Greco-Roman Stoics and Epicureans, the Enlightenment accorded the individual the highest value.

The Enlightenment set the stage for the Terror because it allowed individuality to represent itself as the supreme embodiment of truth. The Enlightenment not only enthroned individuality but endowed individuality with a supreme conceit – absolute faith in its own convictions.

It was Robespierre's certainty of his own infallibility that laid the foundation of the Terror, and Hegel condemned this attitude.

The Terror was thus the lie of the Enlightenment. The misjudgment about the supremacy of individual self-certainty brought forth the rule of the guillotine. The Enlightenment figuratively beheaded itself.

Fundamental disagreements over the Enlightenment and the French Revolution separated Marx and Hegel. Marx was generally an acolyte of the Enlightenment because of its opposition to religion. Most importantly, Marx embraced the materialism and social-scientific outlook of the Enlightenment. The materialism of the Enlightenment drew attention to social labor while the rise of the social sciences, the development of political economy and the Scottish Enlightenment's explorations of the history of civil society illuminated the rise and decline of social formations. While Hegel disapproved of excessive individualism, embodied in Robespierre, he nevertheless saw the necessity of an autonomous Self; Marx wished for the elimination of economic individualism and the emergence of communitarian mutual recognition.

Marx's embrace of the French Revolution began during his Kreuznach period. Marx read deeply about the French Revolution during these months and as a result converted to democracy. In Marx's 1843 essay 'A Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction' his conversion to communism took place. 'The Manuscripts' further evidenced his commitment to communism.⁷⁸

Three of Marx's clearest interpretations of the French Revolution were made in 1844 and 1845 and these were all post-Kreuznach articulations. In 1844 Marx wrote 'Critical Notes on the Article "The King of Prussia and Social Reform" by a Prussian', and in 1845 he wrote the 'Theses on Feuerbach' and *The Holy Family*, which contains the chapter 'Critical Battle against the French Revolution',⁷⁹ which is Marx's most extensive commentary on Robespierre and the Jacobins.

Not only were all these works the expressions of Marx post-Kreuznach, but they were also written after Marx's conversion to becoming a revolutionary and a communist and these transitions took place when Marx moved to Paris.

Therefore, Marx's clearest expositions regarding the French Revolution and the Jacobins were formulated after his conversion to communism, or from the perspective of a revolution with a social soul.

Marx's evaluation of the Jacobins must be divided into two parts: in relation to politics and to civil society. From the point of view of politics Marx saw Robespierre as a re-invention of the Roman plebeians. Marx applauded Robespierre for the resurrection of plebeian democracy, but from the perspective of 1844 he also saw its limitations. The Jacobin revolution was trapped inside the political; Robespierre made no call to abolish the state, nor to abolish private property. The Jacobin Revolution was an insurrection of the petite bourgeoisie. It continued the reign of private property by seeking to universalize property ownership among the petite bourgeoisie and it consequently perpetuated the state, the political.

The failure of Robespierre was in relation to civil society. The Jacobins were neither communists, nor did they wish to replace the state with civil society. Encased at the level of petit-bourgeois demands, Robespierre never grasped true emancipation in terms of the end of both private property and the state. Robespierre did not invent a new form of revolution, or a revolution with a social soul.⁸⁰

13) 'Lordship and Bondage'

Definitive proof exists that Marx read the 'Lordship and Bondage' chapter of *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. In the précis Marx included in his 'Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy in General', he penned the following sentences:

II. Self-consciousness. The truth of Certainty of Self. a) Independence and dependence of Self-Consciousness, Lordship and Bondage.⁸¹

In addition, as I pointed out previously, Marx does allude to 'Lordship and Bondage' in his *exzerpte* 'On James Mill'. Marx's reading of this section of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* became the prototype through which he grasped the relationship between capitalist and proletariat, between master and slave.

Within *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, the chapter on 'Self-Consciousness' relates to a developmental stage in Absolute Knowledge. In order for Absolute Knowledge to come into existence, reason is a necessary precondition and in order for reason to exist, self-consciousness is a necessary precondition. It is necessary for subjectivity to exist before reason can evolve, that is, self-awareness is required as the basis of reason. A Self must first come on the scene before reason can operate within that Self. 'Lordship and Bondage' assisted in the construction of self-consciousness because the struggle between a master and a slave served to define the subjectivity of each. The 'I' was a product of combat: out of a struggle over domination a concept of the 'I' emerged and after the 'I' was established then reason found a site it could enter.

It is my contention that Marx eliminated the Speculative substance from the 'Lordship and Bondage' chapter. He did not look upon 'Lordship and Bondage' as an evolutionary stage in the achievement of 'Absolute Knowledge', but repositioned their relationship into a politico-economic content. Within the structure

of Marx's thought the combat between 'Lordship and Bondage' was not over consciousness, but over labor: the capitalist, the lord, sought to expropriate the labor of those in 'bondage', or the proletariat.

Marx's reading of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* must be divided into two parts; as a condemnation of capitalist society and as a rejection of the System of Hegel.

Marx read *Phenomenology of Spirit* as a condemnation of bourgeois society and capitalism. He rejected the Speculative integument of Hegel and read *The Phenomenology of Spirit* as an uncovering of the dehumanization of capitalist exploitation.

In commenting on Marx's rejection of the System of Hegel, I remind the reader to draw a distinction between System and Method. Although the 'Critique of Hegel's Dialectic and Philosophy in General' negates the Hegelian System, it defends the Hegelian Method.

Marx's rejection of the Hegelian System is contained in his attacks on the 'Absolute Knowledge' chapter of *The Phenomenology of Mind*.⁸² According to Marx, in the 'Absolute Knowledge' chapter Hegel subsumes the history of self-consciousness into Spirit. 'Absolute Knowledge' is a demonstration of the supersession of the multifarious expressions of self-consciousness, the self-education of mind, into Speculative philosophy. The Hegelian System was merely a projection of Speculative philosophy. The System was the universal, the System was the teleological principle and since Speculative philosophy was the teleological propellant, then System was synonymous with Speculative philosophy. Marx's fear was that the Hegelian System would crowd out Hegelian revelations about the decadence of bourgeois society.

Phase Six: In Defense of Hegel

In this Phase I will discuss the following three texts of Marx, *The Holy Family*, 'The Leipzig Council' and *The Poverty of Philosophy*. A common theme connects all three books and so it is best to discuss them as a unit. However, before I begin my exegesis it is necessary that I first outline the structure of this chapter.

As I previously stated I will not become entangled in the philological disputes surrounding the 'I. Feuerbach' chapter, but I do think 'The Leipzig Council' displays a consistent theme, is a text, and I will refer to it extensively in this Phase.¹

In addition, before discussing *The Holy Family*, 'The Leipzig Council' and *The Poverty of Philosophy* in themselves, I will introduce these works with a more general interpretation of the philosophical background of these books. As a preparation for a more comprehensive understanding of these works I will introduce my discussion with three prefaces: A) The Evolution of critique; B) The Meaning of emancipation; C) Marx and philosophy. I will situate them at the beginning to provide the theoretic presuppositions of these works as a way of clarifying the particular meaning of each of these monographs.

A) The Evolution of critique

In my commentary on Marx's dissertation I affirmed that it was in part a critique of Hegel's *The Philosophy of History* as well as illustrating the influence Bauer's theory of critique exerted on Marx. Bauer's program of critique consisted of four main points: the freedom of self-consciousness; freedom as an inherent right of the subject; the centrality of the individual; the primacy of the realm of philosophy, or emancipation achieved through the realm of the theoretic. For Bauer, the freedom of the individual was primary and this freedom was exercised when self-consciousness criticized any theoretic position on the presupposition that such critique would liberate the individual from false philosophic principles and thus expand the area of individual freedom. When dealing with the dissertation I pointed out how Marx defended the exercise of free self-consciousness on the part of Epicurus.

Bauer's position became the program of the Left Hegelians, who included Edgar Bauer, Bruno's brother, and Stirner. Marx remained informed about the Left Hegelian position, but a rupture occurred between Marx and Bauer in 'On the Jewish Question' in late 1843. In this essay Marx attacked Bauer over the meaning of emancipation and 'On the Jewish Question' marked the beginning of Marx's detachment from Left Hegelianism and from the definition of critique as expounded by Bauer.

Marx's transformation of critique, beginning with 'On the Jewish Question' was composed of seven features and they were: 1) Critique as a project of class; 2) Individuality; 3) Critique and philosophy; 4) Materialism; 5) Defender of Feuerbach; 6) Practice; 7) Political economy. I will discuss each of these categories below.

1) Critique as a project of class

Bauer confined critique to the self-consciousness of the individual. For Bauer, the questioning of culturo-philosophical doxology was a project to be carried out by

individuals. In his 'A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction', Marx substituted class for the person. The ruthless examination of the social and economic codes that governed social existence was to be executed by the proletarian class.

2) Individuality

Bauer, and after him Stirner, were primarily concerned with the freedom of the individual. For Bauer, freedom was symmetrical with individuality and critique was directed at achieving the maximum freedom for self-consciousness. Bauer reduced the role of the social to a minimum, and he was a critic of Feuerbach's species being.

Marx rejected Bauer's reliance on individual autonomy. In 1845–1846, still influenced by Feuerbach's concept of species being, Marx saw humankind as inherently social beings. Humankind was not an autonomous subjectivity, but rather a class, group, community that was determined by the social environment. Sociological conditioning was a major principle of Marx's critique.

In addition, Marx was not concerned with individual freedom, but with class freedom. Since humankind was by nature social, freedom must be defined in terms of the social. Humankind was free when all of the productive forces of a social totality was administered mutually by every member of that society, when nature was merely the metabolic other of the human body.

3) Critique and philosophy

The targets of Bauer's critique were the systems of thought shaping the consciousness of humanity. These systems of thought were the universal cultural doxology of Europe and America, art, religion, philosophy, political ideologies or the territories that Hegel referred to as Absolute Spirit. A critique of these cultural traditions by self-consciousness would allow the individual to claim a maximum degree of freedom.

4) Materialism

An analysis of the different aspects of materialism is necessary before I proceed to a further discussion of Marx's relation to Bauer and Feuerbach.

Materialism and naturalism Although both materialism and naturalism concern humankind's relation to the physical environment they do so in significantly divergent forms.

Materialism concentrates on humankind's relation to nature as external to humanity. In general, materialism focuses in two dimensions of humanity's interchange with external nature, the extraction of sustenance from nature and the social aspects of human existence. As the mining of sustenance from external nature, materialism focuses on such processes as hunting, fishing, agriculture and productive activities in factories. With its emphasis on the social aspect of human existence, materialism investigates how the sociological environment conditions the behavior of humankind, the social learning process of humanity. Human nature can be conditioned.

Conversely, naturalism is predominantly concerned with the internal nature of humankind. Rather than social conditioning, naturalism believes in an inherent anthropological basis to human life. Naturalism is an anthropological metaphysics, the belief that physiology regulates human behavior. For example, Feuerbach's naturalism maintained that the instincts were a universal throughout the species, that one such instinct was love, and therefore that love was an emotion that created an inherent linkage between members of the species.

Different kinds of materialism Materialism in-itself was divided into two schools, materialism-as-positivism and materialism-as-sociology.

Materialism-as-positivism was mostly concerned with the genesis of ideas. Materialism-as-positivism concentrated upon the process by which sense stimulation acted as the foundation for human thoughts. It was a positivism because it assumed that sense-sensation was the absolute determinate.

As a separate disciplines, materialism-as-sociology comprised two components, labor and sociological conditioning. Marx is most definitively associated with materialism-as-labor and this component analyzed the human labor process. Materialism-as-labor was the study of how the productive capacities of the human were the pivotal force in the creation of the social universe. While materialism-as-labor concerned the externalization of human labor, materialism-as-sociology concerned the influence the social environment exerted on humanity. Materialism-as-sociology was directed at the social conditioning of humankind, or how environmental forces, such as family, community, education and employment, shaped human thought. Materialism-as-sociology did not believe in an adamant human anthropology, but in a humanity whose conduct was conditioned by the environment. Marx's materialism-as-sociology was an early form of behavioralism.

When I speak of Marx's materialism I will, for the most part, presuppose that Marx synthesized materialism-as-labor and materialism-as-sociology. Materialism-as-positivism was the province of Engels.

Marx's basic critique of Bauer was over the issue of materialism. For Marx critique was not primarily directed toward art, religion, philosophy, but over the material determinants of life. For Marx freedom was not won by proving that Hegelian Speculative philosophy restrained individuality, but by changing the conditions of labor so that the wages of a factory worker could provide a humane existence for his family. Critique was destroyed if confined to the theoretical level and could only be realized on the practical level.

The chapter in *The Holy Family* entitled 'Critical Battle against French Materialism' is vital for three reasons: it continued Marx's attack on the Old Hegelianism of Bauer; it attacked Hegel's presentation of 18th-century materialism as contained in the third volume of *The History of Philosophy*; and it documented Marx's congruence with Feuerbach in 1845 over the issue of materialism, although Marx was moving away from Feuerbach's anthropological naturalism and embracing the sociological materialism of Etienne Bonnot de Condillac, Helvétius and d'Holbach.

Marx proposed that Bauer's understanding of 18th-century French materialism was erroneous because Bauer followed Hegel's *The History of Philosophy*, Volume III. In his treatment of the development of Western philosophy beginning with Bacon in the 16th century, Hegel primarily focused on two trends, the emergence of empiricism and sense perception as embodied in Bacon and the liberation of reason from theology as articulated by Descartes and Spinoza.² Although he recognized the advances of empiricism attained by English materialism, Locke and Hume, Hegel promoted the work of Descartes and Spinoza as having greater significance because these two philosophers recognized the preeminence of reason. Both Descartes and Spinoza applauded the materialist progress of the Enlightenment, but Hegel emphasized that the French and Dutch philosophers predicated their thought on the unity of thought and being.³ Descartes and Spinoza were among the originators of Hegel's philosophy because they focused upon reason as the prius of the development of philosophy; Descartes and Spinoza articulated one aspect of Hegelian Speculative philosophy by asserting the in-itself of reason and for it-self of reason.

Marx asserted that Bauer's interpretation of French 18th-century materialism was fallacious because 'Herr Bauer read French materialism out of Hegel's history as the Spinoza school'.⁴ According to Marx, Bauer's reading of Enlightenment materialism was distorted because Bauer followed Hegel's Speculative philosophy, that is, because Bauer agreed with Hegel in establishing reason as the phenomenological force in the universe. In the paragraphs of *The Holy Family* in which Marx admonishes Bauer, Marx also directs Bauer to Paragraph 578 in *The Phenomenology of Spirit* in which Hegel deals with the conflict between empiricism and reason.⁵ In this paragraph Hegel relates to the contradiction between thought and thinghood and concludes by finalizing the Speculative principles that 'thought is thinghood or thinghood is thought'.⁶

Marx again defined Bauer and his followers as Old Hegelians. In *The Holy Family*, Marx described Bauer as 'the extreme representative of old Hegelianism'⁷ and as someone who still 'chews the old Hegelian cud'.⁸ The Old Hegelian Bauer continued the Hegelian legacy of Speculative thought and remained blind to the possibilities of liberation contained in materialism. Marx's attack on Bauer was simultaneously an attack on the Speculative dimensions of Hegel's thought.

Marx used two epithets to attack those who claimed to be descendents of 'The Master', but with whom Marx disagreed. The term 'Left Hegelian' referred to those like Feuerbach, 'Theses on Feuerbach', and Bauer who never totally grasped the power of emancipation of political practice. The term 'Old Hegelian' was targeted at Bauer and his cohorts and was an attempt to discredit Bauer and Co. by classifying them as heirs of the theological Marheineke.

5) Defender of Feuerbach

Marx's attack on the Hegelian system mirrored Feuerbach's attack on Hegelian Speculative metaphysics. *The Holy Family* contains this important statement:

Philosophy was opposed to metaphysics as Feuerbach, in his first decisive attack on Hegel, opposed sober philosophy to drunken speculation.

Seventeenth-century metaphysics beaten off the field by the French Enlightenment, to be precise, by French materialism of the 18th century, was given a victorious and solid restoration in German philosophy, particularly in Speculative German philosophy of the 19th century after Hegel linked it in so masterly a fashion with all subsequent metaphysics with German idealism and founded a metaphysical universal kingdom, the attack on Speculative metaphysics and metaphysics in general again corresponded, in the 18th century, to the attack on theology.⁹

Even though it is impossible to state with exactitude what book of Feuerbach Marx was identifying when he wrote about Feuerbach's 'first decisive attack on Hegel',¹⁰ I maintain that Marx was alluding to Feuerbach's 1839 essay 'Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Philosophie'.¹¹ Actually, there are three works of Feuerbach I have not previously discussed which exerted a great influence on the development of Marx's materialism: 'Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Philosophie', the 1833 *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie von Bacon von Verulam bis Benedict Spinoza*, which is contained in the bibliography of Marx's dissertation, and the 1842 'Vorläufiger Thesen zur Reform der Philosophie'. In my analysis of 'The Manuscripts' I discussed Feuerbach's *The Essence of Christianity* and his 1843 'Principles of the Philosophy of the Future' but this is the first time that I interpret these three works.

I maintain that Feuerbach's 'Kritik der Hegelschen Philosophie' was an announcement of Feuerbach's break from Hegel and therefore was Feuerbach's 'first decisive attack on Hegel'. In this essay Feuerbach attacked Hegelian Speculative philosophy as a form of theology. Feuerbach maintained that Hegelian thought remained mired in religion and still represented a pursuit of God. Hegelian thought still carried out the same mission as Spinoza and whereas Spinoza defined substance as God, Hegel defined Spirit as God. Furthermore, the 'Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Philosophie' was a signal of Feuerbach's turn to materialism, which presaged his ultimate conversion to naturalism in his 1841 *The Essence of Christianity* and the 1842 'Vorläufiger Thesen zur Reform der Philosophie'. Feuerbach separated himself from the 'logical pantheism' of Hegel and asserted that the 'return to nature is alone the source of salvation',¹² and began to write of the species, claiming that 'individual reflection in-itself carried the consciousness of the species'.¹³

Feuerbach's 1842 'Vorläufige Thesen zur Reform der Philosophie' continued Feuerbach's program of replacing Hegelian theology with naturalism. In Marx's opening paragraphs to 'The Manuscripts' he wrote:

The positive critique was the source of the critique of national economy and Feuerbach was the true discoverer of this critique. From Feuerbach there emerged the first positive humanistic and naturalistic critique. Even though reserved, the effect of Feuerbach's critique was more certain, deeper, inclusive and lasting was the effect of Feuerbach's writing, the only writing . . . since Hegel's *Phänomenologie* and Logic . . . in which a true theoretic revolution is contained.¹⁴

I take the 'Vorläufige Theses zur Reform der Philosophie' as the more important source because it was published earlier and contains all the innovative ideas that were simply repeated in the 1843 'Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft'. In his 'Vorläufige Theses zur Reform der Philosophie', Feuerbach continued his attack on Old Hegelianism and speculative philosophy. He claimed that Spinoza 'was the originator of speculative philosophy'¹⁵ and that the Hegelian system was simply a form of theology. The salvation of philosophy lay in the abandonment of Old Hegelianism and the embrace of the Fichtean 'I' and naturalism.

Feuerbach was instrumental in turning Marx's attention to materialism. Indeed, Feuerbach's 1833 *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie von Bacon von Verulam bis Benedict Spinoza* was read by Marx in the preparation of his 1841 dissertation, but lacked a nullification of Hegelian Speculative philosophy as well as any presentiment of Feuerbach's conversion to materialism. But Volume III of Hegel's *The History of Philosophy* devotes only a short single paragraph to Gassendi,¹⁶ while Feuerbach's *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie von Bacon von Verulam bis Benedict Spinoza* devotes 15 pages to a discussion of Gassendi.¹⁷ Gassendi was an important figure in the history of Western philosophy, particularly in regard to the rebirth of Greek atomism during the Renaissance. Gassendi was a scholar of antique atomism, specifically of the work of Epicurus, Leucippus and Democritus. The resurrection of atomism in early 17th-century Europe was indebted to Gassendi. Marx read Feuerbach's summary of Gassendi and through Feuerbach's Gassendi comments on Epicurus and Democritus gained insight into Gassendi's assessment of these Greek scientific titans. The 'Parmenides of Berlin' also dealt with Greek atomism in Volume I of *The History of Philosophy*, and although it is impossible to determine if Marx followed Gassendi's interpretation of antique atomism certainly Feuerbach's own interest in Gassendi and the onset of Renaissance materialism in Bacon and Gassendi was a factor that cemented Marx's interest in materialism.

The chapter 'Critical Battle against French Materialism' was part of Marx's strategy of disqualification against Bauer because it presented a history of European materialism that contradicted the view of both the Speculative Bauer and Hegel. For Bauer, Spinozism was the dominant influence on French 18th-century materialism¹⁸ and by privileging Spinoza, Bauer replicated the mistake committed by Hegel in Volume III of *The History Of Philosophy*. Speculative philosophy in its Hegelian and Bauerian form was simply incapable of presenting an accurate history of the development of materialism.

Marx's detachment from Hegelian Speculative theory was additionally manifested in his negation of Volume III of Hegel's *The History of Philosophy*. In this volume Hegel offered an account of modern philosophy from Bacon to Schelling. However, Hegel's account of modern philosophy was not a history, but rather a demonstration of the contradictions between Thought and Being, or of the metaphysics of Hegel's dialectics. Section Two of Part Three is entitled 'The Metaphysics of the Understanding' and a subsection of Chapter Two is entitled 'Opposition between Sensation and Thought'. Rather than narrating the evolution of Enlightenment materialism, Volume III of Hegel's *The History of Philosophy* was an exhibition of the contradiction between Thought and Being. 'The Master'

used *The History of Philosophy* to provide proof of the basic foundations of his 'logical pantheism'.

Rejecting the Speculative side of Hegelian philosophy, Marx carried out the mission Feuerbach intimated in his 'Vorläufige Theses zur der Reform der Philosophie' and his 'Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft' and replaced 'logical pantheism' with materialism. However, Feuerbach articulated an anthropological naturalism and Marx rejected Feuerbach's anthropological naturalism and substituted sociological materialism. Even though Marx also divorced himself from Feuerbach's brand of naturalism he did, nevertheless, see materialism as the philosophy of the future, the path he chose to explore.

In the chapter 'Critical Battle against French Materialism', Marx showed his adherence to Feuerbach's *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie von Bacon von Verulam bis Benedict Spinoza*, particularly Feuerbach's regard for Gassendi's and Epicurean materialism. The battle in the 18th century was between metaphysics and materialism, and Marx demonstrated his adherence to the Gassendi-Epicurean tradition. He wrote:

Metaphysics of the seventeenth century, represented in France by Descartes, had materialism as its antagonist from its very birth. It personally opposed Descartes in Gassendi, the restorer of Epicurean materialism. French and English materialism was always closely related to Democritus and Epicurus. Cartesian metaphysics has another opponent in the English materialist Hobbes . . .¹⁹

The chapter 'Critical Battle against French Materialism' is actually a prolegomena to the philosophical basis of Marx's communism. The line of materialism that Marx adopted ran from Gassendi to Bacon to Locke to Condillac to Helvétius and d'Holbach. This heritage eventuated in Theodor Dezamy and Jules Gay, early founders of communism.

The Gassendi-Dezamy line of evolution was a form of sociological materialism and this emphasized sociological conditioning. Human life was not determined by an essence, but was instead sociologically conditioned, meaning that the proper form of society could condition a human behavior that was cooperative and mutual. Communism was a possibility because it was materialistically possible to create a social psychology that privileged intersubjective recognition.

Marx's predilection for materialism did not mean his detachment from Hegelian methodology, although it did mean his rupture with Hegelian Speculation. Marx's rejection of the Speculative aspects of Hegelianism amounted to a cleansing of the methodological. Marx extracted the methodological forms from their Speculative encasement and relocated these methodological forms inside a paradigm of social explanation whose data was derived from materialistic sources.

In *The Holy Family* and 'The Leipzig Council', Marx recognized that Feuerbach separated himself from the Old Hegelian Bauer's embrace of Hegelian Speculative theory. Marx did criticize Feuerbach on different issues, but ultimately applauded Feuerbach for recognizing that humankind in the last analysis was a product of the realities of existence, be they natural or material.

From the perspective of Marx's materialism freedom must be defined in terms of class and a critique of the social was the only way to reveal those productive relations which denied the freedom of humankind and had to be changed.

6) Practice

Marx's commitment to the change of socio-productive relationships, the method of labor and the ownership of property, as the only means by which to re-appropriate the human essence, inclined him to embrace practical philosophy. Following Aristotle, Kant and Hegel, Marx divided philosophy into two divisions, theoretical and practical. While theoretical philosophy was the exclusive preserve of thought, for Marx the domain of practical philosophy concerned the subjective actions of individuals or classes in changing their material environment.

Bauer's critique was theoretical. Lacking an appreciation of the importance of materialism, the only target to which Bauer could direct his critique was the theoretical. Since it was, according to Bauer, the theoretical that dominated humankind, then the only way to expand the kingdom of individual freedom was through a critique of the theoretical.

7) Political economy

Marx's commitment to materialism cemented his interest in political economy. Marx's recognition that human freedom could increase only through the transformation of social conditions led him to the study of the forces shaping society – and these were the forces of political economy. While 'The Manuscripts' of 1844 were an imaginative blend of philosophy and political economy, as Marx moved to the 1845 *The Holy Family*, the 1845–1846 'Leipzig Council' and the 1847 *The Poverty of Philosophy*, his writing showed an increasing concentration on political economy. The period 1845–1847 was one of transition, the time of Marx's movement away from philosophy to political economy as the major focus of his interests. When Marx reached London in 1849 he was intellectually ready for his vast study in political economy as a preparation for the writing of *Das Kapital*.

Marx's movement toward political economy allowed him to see how economic doctrine could become an 'ideology'. The first person to use the term 'ideology' was the Frenchman Destutt de Tracy, who in 1817 published a book called *The Elements of Ideology*. A psychologist, de Tracy gathered a small group of thinkers around himself to study the human mind; they became known as 'Ideologues'. The goal of the 'Ideologues' was to study the origin of ideas. De Tracy and his circle studied the brain and nerve functions and the connection between the senses of a person and his ideas. The 'Ideology' of de Tracy was positivist, with its attempt to reduce ideas to sense perception, a radical version of British empiricism. In the hands of de Tracy 'ideology' concerned the neurological genesis of thought.

Marx redefined the term 'ideology' when he detached it from its neurological origins and located it in a political context. For Marx, 'ideology' was still concerned with ideas, but with ideas that served a political or class function. In the political sense an 'ideology' was not concerned with an idea's correspondence to reality, but rather when used in a political framework 'ideology' meant ideas

which served the interests of a class, or party. 'Ideologies' were instruments of either economic or political power.

Applying this definition of 'ideology', Marx branded that part of Hegelian thought which was Speculative as 'ideological'. Marx's strategic design in *The Holy Family*, 'The Leipzig Council' and *The Poverty of Philosophy* was to conflate Bauer, his brother Edgar and Stirner with that part of Hegelian philosophy which was 'ideology'. Hegelian Speculative theory defended private property, capitalism and the division of society into classes, and in this sense Speculative philosophy defended the established order. Speculative philosophy offered no opening, no strategy for the overturning of the domination of capitalism and so Marx labeled Speculative philosophy an 'ideological', meaning that it was an intellectual weapon which acted to perpetuate the hegemony of the German philistines.

Marx's strategic design in *The Holy Family*, 'The Leipzig Council' and *The Poverty of Philosophy* had three parts: 1) to nullify Hegelian Speculative philosophy; 2) to demonstrate that Bauer and Stirner were simply continuations of the Speculative dimensions of Hegel; and 3) to negate the form of critique practised by these three authors. Marx sought to refute Hegelian Speculative thought and his strategy was based on the calculation that if he could prove that the Bauers and Stirner merely were extensions of Hegelian Speculative thought he could also discredit them and reveal them as 'ideologues' of the German philistines.

In order to execute his strategy it was necessary for Marx to prove that the critiques of the Bauers and Stirner were simply forms of Speculative philosophy, and this was the mission of *The Holy Family*, and 'The Leipzig Council'. Marx's 'critique of critical critique' had two purposes: 1) to prove that Bauer and Co. perpetuated the Speculative bias of Hegel; and 2) to demonstrate that because Bauer and Co. continued that aspect of Hegel that was Speculative, Bauer and Co. could not practice any genuine form of critique and they were simply Idealists.

The reason that the critique of the Old Hegelians by Bauer and Co. was vacuous was because it remained confined to the domain of self-consciousness and reason. The critique of Bauer and Co. was solely directed at the realm of theory and thereby left the territory of materialism untouched. In Chapter VI of *The Holy Family* Marx added the following subtitle, 'a) Spirit and Mass',²⁰ and denounced Bauer and Co. because of their total preoccupation with the 'Spirit', the realm of the Speculative. Bauer and Co. did not reflect on the 'Mass' and by the 'Mass' Marx meant the economic-material aspects of social existence. For the Old Hegelians, Marheineke maintained that 'the history of mankind becomes the history of the abstract spirit of mankind, a spirit beyond all men'.²¹ Marx drew the line of descent from the Speculative dimensions of Hegel's thought through the Old Hegelians to its culmination in Bauer and Co.

Left Hegelianism, as represented by Bauer and Co., was merely the descendant of the Speculative Hegel and the Old Hegelians. Marx's *The Holy Family*, 'The Leipzig Council' and *The Poverty of Philosophy* signify Marx's break with Left Hegelianism. When Marx broke with Left Hegelianism as a form of Speculative abstraction he entered upon a search for a new form of critique.

Marx's liberation from Speculative Hegelianism opened space for him to redefine the nature of critique. Marx wrote *The Holy Family* in 1845, the same year that he wrote the 'Theses on Feuerbach', only the 'Theses on Feuerbach' was not published until 1885 by Engels. In fact, Marx's project for the redefinition of critique was composed of five literary endeavors, 'On the Jewish Question', published in 1844, a 'Contribution to a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law: Introduction', published in 1844, *The Holy Family*, 'The Leipzig Council' and the 'Theses on Feuerbach'.

B) The Meaning of emancipation

The final result of the critique practiced by the proletarian class was the abolition of 'civil society' based on private property and the genesis of social humanity. True emancipation entailed the being of social humankind, or a historical form of humanity built on the principle of mutual recognition and the interdependence of need gratification.

In order to achieve this goal, the purpose of philosophy must be altered. Marx never called for the end or abolition of philosophy, but he did call for changing the purpose of philosophy. Philosophy would continue, but not as an examination of self-consciousness or reason. Philosophy would become practical, a force to discover and illuminate those material aspects in 'civil society' that perpetuated any form of social hegemony in order to eradicate it.

C) Marx and philosophy

In order to demonstrate the commensurability of Hegelian and Marxist methodology I will juxtapose two short quotes. The first is Hegel's famous quote from *The Philosophy of Right*:

What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational²²

In his 'Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction', Marx wrote:

In a word . . . you cannot supersede philosophy without making it a reality.²³

Hegel stated that rationality was the basic force in the sculpting of actuality, that rationality was an instrument in the realization process of Spirit. Marx stated that human emancipation would be achieved only when reality became a realization of philosophy. For both Hegel and Marx reason and philosophy penetrated into the external and for Hegel this penetration led to the Spirit while for Marx this penetration led to reality becoming philosophical, or to the actualization of human freedom.

In Marx, however, in distinction to Hegel, this intervention of philosophy into reality could be accomplished only by a class. Marx again demonstrated an understanding of praxis since he was aware that the philosophical remodeling of society could be accomplished only by class action, or specifically by the proletarian

revolution. In the 'Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction', Marx wrote: 'The head of the emancipation is philosophy, its heart is the proletariat.'²⁴

Marx did not call for the termination of philosophy per se, but rather called for the termination of philosophy in its Speculative form. He refashioned the goal of philosophy as the revelation of the material causes of oppression; the agent of this realization of the end of philosophy was not an individual sage, but a class that was capable of using the tool of revolution.

My preceding discussion of the three vital concepts of Marx – the evolution of critique, the meaning of emancipation and Marx and philosophy – I hope will provide insightful perspectives from which to better understand three vital Marx manuscripts – *The Holy Family*, 'The Leipzig Council' and *The Poverty of Philosophy*. It is impossible to grasp Marx's relationship to Hegel during his First Appropriation of Hegel, 1836–1848, without fathoming how this discourse presented itself in the above mentioned works.

The previous paragraphs outlining Marx's strategy in *The Holy Family* concentrated on two points: 1) By proving Bauer to be an exponent of Old Hegelian Speculative philosophy, a continuation of the Speculative side of Hegelian thought, Marx intended to discredit the form of critique practiced by Bauer and Co. as well as the Speculative side of Hegel; 2) By proving that the methodological aspects of Hegelian philosophy remained separate from and untainted by Speculative philosophy Marx aimed to preserve these methodological aspects and to declare his allegiance to them. Included in the term 'methodological aspects' will be references to instances of Hegel's materialism, or instances in which Hegel brought to light the economic emiseration caused by capitalism. As I pointed out in Phase Five of this chapter, dealing with *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, the early Hegel denounced the utilitarianism, greed and vanity of pre-1789 life. Marx frequently referred to these moments in which Hegel denounced the master–slave structures of early capitalism as an indication of Hegel's awareness of the cancerous aspects of nascent capitalism and as a substantiation that these aspects of Hegelian thought, the materialist and methodological, must become the source of a critique of bourgeois society and of the construction of a new formula of social explanation.

I will begin my discussion of *The Holy Family* with four quotes and I will subsequently analyze these quotes as sources of keys to Marx's continuation of Hegelian methodology.

- 1) Finally, it goes without saying that if Hegel's *Phenomenology*, in spite of its speculative original sin, gives in many instances the elements of a true description of human relations, Herr Bruno and Co., on the other hand, provide only an empty caricature . . .²⁵
- 2) Besides, Hegel very often gives a real presentation, embracing the thing itself, within the speculative presentation. This real reasoning within the speculative reasoning . . . misleading the reader into considering the speculative reasoning as real and the real as speculative.²⁶

- 3) In the words of Hegel, the class of the proletariat is in abasement, indignation at that abasement, an indignation to which it is necessarily driven by the contradiction between its human nature and its condition of life, which is the outright, decisive and comprehensive negation of that nature.²⁷
- 4) In Hegel's *Phenomenology* the material, perceptible, objective basis of the various estranged forms of human self-consciousness are left as they are. Thus the whole destructive work results in the most conservative philosophy because it thinks it has overcome the objective world, by merely transforming it into a thing of thought . . .²⁸

I begin my interpretation of these quotes by first reminding the reader that Marx considered *The Phenomenology of Spirit* and *The Science of Logic* as the two most important texts of Hegel, texts that contained 'a real theoretical revolution'.²⁹ Of these two texts, the former was primary, it was, as I previously mentioned, the 'Bible' of Hegelian thought.

The first three quotations are connected by common themes. All point to the fact that one aspect of Hegel's thought was his awareness of the material conditions of capitalist 'civil society'. In my previous Phase on *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, I discussed Hegel's denunciation of Benthamite Utilitarianism and the domination of greed and self-indulgence in capitalist society as portrayed by Diderot in *Rameau's Nephew*. In the third quotation listed above, Marx made reference to *The Philosophy of Right*, specifically paragraphs 242–247, in which Hegel discusses the problem of poverty, or 'the rabble'. All three quotes establish beyond a doubt that Marx saw in Hegel a side that was aware that the problems of 'civil society' were materialistic, or arose from the socio-economic conditions of 'civil society' and not Speculation. Hegel was not Bauer; for him all problems of 'civil society' were not reducible to self-consciousness or reason.

Hegel's mission was the empowerment of Speculative thought with the highest capability, but this does not mean he was totally blind to the materialistic aspects of human existence. There is no inherent contradiction in believing that mind was the ultimate determination of reality and an awareness of the materialist contribution to existence prior to the final cooption of materialism in thought. Hegelian materialism existed and *The Philosophy of Nature*, *The Philosophy of Mind* and *The Philosophy of History* were encyclopedias regarding the mechanistic, chemical, organic and geographic influences on the development of human societies, as well as commentaries on anthropology, on Aristotle's 'The Soul', sensuous consciousness, and sense perception and psychology. Hegel never denied his materialism, but he obscured it in the integument of Speculative theory and his arcane language. Hegel was cognizant of the 'massy', but this 'massy' aspect of Hegel must be extracted from its Speculative imprisonment.

This extraction was Marx's task. This extraction was the core of Marx's appropriation of Hegel and the basis of his continuation of Hegelian methodology. Even though Hegel himself never engaged in critique, it was Marx's belief that the hidden nuggets of the 'massy' Hegel, the Hegel aware of the reality of the

socio-economic, could become a contributing factor to critique and also to the changing of actual circumstances.

Marx took on the role of philosophical excavator. Marx's final summation of 'The Master' was of a genius who indentured himself to theory, but this did not mean that Marx was not able to salvage nuggets of materialism from Hegel's works. Marx's high respect for Hegel was shown by the intensity and care by which he read the 'Parmenides of Berlin' and how his perceptivity allowed him to reclaim nuggets of 'massy' materialism from Hegel's linguistic obscurity. These nuggets of materialism threw light upon aspects of the thought of Hegel that otherwise might have gone undetected.

However, the fact that Marx was a perspicacious student of Hegel did not preclude that Marx also mis-read certain parts of the 'Parmenides of Berlin'. Hegel was complex and Marx's reading of Hegel divided into three parts: the discontinuity over 'logical pantheism'; the continuity over methodology; and mis-reading, such as over the questions of ethics and the state. The assigned task of Chapter Four is to describe in detail those parts of Hegelian thought that Marx misconstrued.

In the fourth quote Marx is alluding to the two periods of Hegel's life. The first period, the period of *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, was 'destructive' and by the word 'destructive' Marx wished to highlight Hegel's opposition to capitalist society. 'Destructive' meant those chapters of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* which attacked wealth and excessive individualism and ridiculed the moral bankruptcy of the bourgeois society that dehumanized and alienated humankind.

But Marx was also aware of the Mature Hegel, the Hegel of *The Philosophy of Right*, the Hegel who offered a 'conservative philosophy'. Marx did not claim that even the Mature Hegel abandoned the Center, but did claim that this 'conservative philosophy' was a result of Speculative philosophy. Speculative philosophy was a distraction from the 'massy' class domination that enchained the proletariat.

Marx recognized the bifurcation of Hegel, the Young Hegelian methodologico-materialist and the later Speculative conservative. The Hegelian methodologico-materialist was personified in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. The Hegelian methodologico-materialist was 'destructive', in other words he called for a change in the material circumstances that produced reification. The conservative Hegel saw no escape from reification, while the 'destructive' Hegel, the methodologico-materialist, called for the modification of the bourgeois order.

Another reason for Marx's detachment from the Left Hegelianism of Bauer and Co. was over the definition of emancipation. However, in discussing this question it is necessary to separate Marx's 1847 *The Poverty of Philosophy* from the 1845 *The Holy Family* and the 1845–1846 'The Leipzig Council'. When I discuss the meaning of emancipation in Bauer and Co. and Marx I will only be referring to *The Holy Family* and to 'The Leipzig Council' because the definition of emancipation was the central task of both these works. In *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Marx began to explore new issues and I will present *The Poverty of Philosophy* as Marx's first notebook in the preparation of *Das Kapital*.

In an extremely perceptive book, *The Philosophy and Politics of Bruno Bauer*, Douglas Moggach³⁰ has brought new insights into the philosophy of Bauer and

specifically over the confrontation between Marx and Bauer over the question of the emancipation of the Jews. In order to grasp the essentials of Bauer's thought it is best to divide it into two dominions, philosophy and politics. In both dominions Bauer radicalized the philosophy and politics of Hegel.

Philosophically, Bauer radicalized the Hegelian ideas of self-consciousness, individuality and the unity of the particular and the universal. Bauer remained loyal, or so he maintained, to Hegel throughout his entire life and the radical interpretation he attributed to Hegel became the foundation, excluding Feuerbach, of Left Hegelianism.

Bauer's radicalization of Hegel was most prominently displayed on his *Die Posaune des jüngsten Gerichts über Hegel, den Atheisten und Antichristen*.³¹ In this work Bauer presented Hegel as a prophet of free self-consciousness. Hegel was the evangelical who announced the conjunction of self-consciousness and individuality, or a personality entitled to exercise individual critique against any normative principle. Bauer's Hegelianism accentuated the freedom of self-consciousness.

However, Bauer was not an anarchist in the style of Stirner. Like Hegel, Bauer recognized Thought as Being. Like Hegel, Bauer recognized that particularity must eventually be subsumed into a universality. Nevertheless, Bauer accentuated the role of self-conscious free choice in the selection of the universal into which the individual would be sublated.

Politically, Bauer's radicalization of Hegel was manifested in his rejection of *The Philosophy of Right*. Hegel's program of constitutional monarchy was rejected by Bauer in favor of a democratic republic. Hegel was fearful of totally free self-consciousness and attacked Socrates as a cause of the decline of the Athenian polis, and consequently in *The Philosophy of Right* confined free self-consciousness within the boundaries of corporative institutions. Bauer rejected this confinement and advocated the replacement of constitutional monarchy by a democratic republic, a form of government which corresponded to the universal exercise of free consciousness. In *Vormärz* Germany Bauer was a voice of political emancipation.

The definition of political emancipation constituted the line of battle between Bauer and Marx. For Bauer emancipation was associated with the Hegelian principle of a universality. Members of a society were emancipated if they all adopted the universal principles of that nation. In terms of religion the appeal to universality meant that every denomination must surrender its doctrinal particularity and accede to the political universality of a nation. Bauer did not think Jewish emancipation was possible because Jews could not be treated according to a universal standard since they insisted on retaining their particularity and thereby excluded themselves from the universal.³²

Marx's 'On the Jewish Question' was a denunciation of Bauer's definition of emancipation. For Marx emancipation did not mean adherence to a universal principle, but rather a revolution in social conditions. Bauer's definition of freedom, Marx argued, remained confined to the political realm. True liberation, for Marx, could only result from a social revolution, the eradication of capitalism.

In a series of articles published in the *Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung* in 1843–1844, Bauer defined Jewish emancipation almost totally in terms of the political and

failed to address the issue of social emancipation. In his response to Bauer's articles in his 1844 'On the Jewish Question', Marx criticized Bauer for not understanding that full emancipation could be achieved only when implemented on both levels, political and social, or with the overthrow of capitalist 'civil society'. Starting with 'On the Jewish Question', Marx continued his engagement with this issue in the 1845 'Theses on Feuerbach', and arrived at a final determination of this problematic in the 1845 *The Holy Family* and the 1845–1846 'The Leipzig Council'.³³

'Civil society' was that stage of historical development in which private property was the pre-eminent controlling factor. 'Civil society' derived from private property and as long as private property existed so would 'civil society', and the enslavement caused by 'civil society'. The viewpoint that private property was the cause of enslavement was an idea borrowed from Proudhon's 1841 *What Is Property?*. For Marx emancipation was impossible within 'civil society'; the 'massy' circumstances of 'civil society' were the cause of bondage.

In order to postulate a social situation in which emancipation could be realized Marx needed a vision of social life possessing the conditions productive of emancipation and in this quest he relied upon Proudhon and Feuerbach. From Proudhon he learned of the necessity to abolish private property and that the extinction of private property would be the basis of a new social man, and from Feuerbach he learned that social man was inherently a cooperative social being. Marx called for the overthrow of 'civil society' and the construction of a 'human society'. The tenth of the 'Theses on Feuerbach' read: 'The standpoint of the old materialism is 'civil society'; the standpoint of the new is human society, or socialized humanity.'³⁴

Marx's final rupture with Proudhon occurred in his 1847 *The Poverty of Philosophy*, but Marx recognized his indebtedness to Proudhon in both *The Holy Family* and 'The Leipzig Council'. In both these books Marx acted as a defender of Proudhon.

The Holy Family was a screed against Bauer. The book was a continuation of Bauer's and Marx's view of the question of liberation, specifically over that of Jewish liberation, and was devoted totally to invalidating Bauer's Old Hegelianism. In his journalistic articles Bauer attacked Proudhon and in *The Holy Family* Marx defended Proudhon. Marx recognized that Proudhon was not a communist, that Proudhon drew a distinction between property and possession, but, nevertheless, praised Proudhon because he made the issue of equality a central concern of social liberation. By focusing on the material, on the 'massy' presence of property, Proudhon added a dimension to the question of liberation to which the Old Hegelianism of Bauer remained blind. In praise of Proudhon vis-à-vis Bauer, Marx called attention to the fact that the Frenchman made two vital changes to the dialogue of the Hegelian Left. First, he moved the discourse away from Bauer's Old Hegelian Speculative philosophy toward the 'massy' issue of private property as the primary cause of human enslavement. Second, Proudhon revolutionized the perspective from which the social question was addressed. Bauer's perspective was that of a Professor of German Idealism, while Proudhon's viewpoint was that of a proletarian. Proudhon was epochal because he inserted the language of the French proletariat into the political debates of the time.³⁵

In addition to his defense of Proudhon Marx also praised Feuerbach in *The Holy Family* against the assaults Bauer launched. Before I begin to document Marx's defense of Feuerbach vis-à-vis Bauer, a few lines of introduction are necessary. Feuerbach was a major figure in the early development of Marx and both positive and negative aspects existed in this intellectual relationship. At this point, although I will have more to say about this contradictory relationship in later portions of this book, I will limit my remarks to the Feuerbach as presented in *The Holy Family*, even though the reader should be aware that this is only a partial interpretation. It is worth repeating here that the complexity of the Marx–Feuerbach connection is the major reason that I forgo becoming mired in analyzing the Ryazanov 'I. Feuerbach' chapter of 'The Leipzig Council'. It would lead *Marx's Discourse with Hegel* astray.

As a way of clearly outlining Marx's defense of Feuerbach I will oversimplify Feuerbach's thought into three categories: 1) naturalism as anthropological essence or communitarian humanism; 2) naturalism as sensuousness; 3) naturalism as social humankind.

Category 1, naturalism as anthropological essence and communitarian humanism, related to the terrain of Feuerbachian thought that privileges the idea of a human substance that is inherently social. The term 'anthropological essence' refers to Feuerbach's assertion that the human species was characterized by an immanent tendency toward cooperation and mutual understanding. Feuerbach encapsulated this belief in the phrase 'I=I'.

Category 2, naturalism as sensuousness, related to Feuerbach's awareness and receptivity to human sensuousness, including sexuality. Investigating the physiological aspects of human existence, Feuerbach looked upon sensuality as a source of human bonding, and desire not as conflict but as a basis of love. In this respect Feuerbach was a naturalist because he positioned nature as a major determinant of the behavior of the species.

Category 3, naturalism as social man, understood that the species was not only determined by nature but also by social existence. One of the major areas of confrontation between Marx and Feuerbach concerned the presupposition of social existence as Marx accentuated the socio-economic, the learned responses of the species, while Feuerbach highlighted the naturalistic, the physiological inherency of the species. Putting that issue aside, Feuerbach at least shifted attention away from Speculative philosophy's absorption into self-consciousness to the awareness that the anthropological was the major determinant of the behavior of the species.

Within the context of *The Holy Family*, Marx did not address Category 1, naturalism as anthropological essence and communitarian humanism, and these were the problematics with which he deals in the 'Theses on Feuerbach'. But within *The Holy Family* Marx does address Categories 2 and 3, naturalism as sensuousness and naturalism as social humankind, and praises Feuerbach's championing of these categories. Naturalism as sensuousness and naturalism as social humankind strengthened critique because they drew attention to the 'massy' dimensions of human liberation. By drawing attention to the fact that the enslavement of the species was caused by material social conditions, naturalism opened up the possibility that practice by reconstructing social conditions could liberate the species.

Marx's defended Feuerbach in *The Holy Family* on the grounds of his advocacy of naturalism 2 and naturalism 3 because these principles negated the form of critique advocated by Bauer. The form of critique espoused by Bauer was imprisoned in self-consciousness,³⁶ but Feuerbach's principles 2 and 3 expanded critique beyond mind to the material world. Feuerbach's principles 2 and 3 remained theoretical, were devoid of practice, but they prepared the way for French and English socialism and communism by demonstrating that the material world must be the foundation of true humanism.³⁷

As I indicated previously, Marx's relation to Hegel was composed of continuities and discontinuities, and the fact that Marx disavowed Hegel's presentation of the history of materialism did not mean that Marx was unaware that there were areas of Hegel's thought that were in themselves materialistic. Marx recognized that his preference for Feuerbach's history of materialism did not preclude that materialism did exist in certain domains of Hegelian thought and it was these domains to which Marx wished to defend and establish his continuity. Marx's defense of Hegel consisted of two levels: a direct defense of the materialist dimensions of Hegel's thought as opposed to the Speculative in the work of Hegel himself; and an indirect defense of Hegelian materialism by defending writers who perpetuated the 'massy' aspects of Hegel. By demonstrating that writers who were influenced by Hegel continued the 'massy' Hegel, Marx indirectly hoped to confirm that a 'massy' Hegel was indeed a fact. This was Marx's strategy in relation to Proudhon and Feuerbach, but Marx's tactic stretched beyond Proudhon and Feuerbach and included such figures as Hinrichs, Rotteck and Welcker and, as I will point out when I discuss 'The Leipzig Council', also Michelet and Bayrhammer.

In the realization of this purpose Marx would rebuff the Speculative philosophy of Hegel, but champion Hegelian materialism. *The Holy Family* still presents Hegel as a member of the Hegelian Center. In addition, Marx would defend other members of the Hegelian Center, such as Hinrichs, Michelet and Bayrhammer. The Holy Family and 'The Leipzig Council' must also be read as justification of the Hegelian Center, pivoting around Hegel but including his subordinates.

In Chapter Three, Phase One, 'Hegel and Marx in the Center', I introduced the works of Hinrichs and placed him in the Hegelian Center along with Gans and Michelet. Interestingly, Hinrichs reappears in *The Holy Family*, but as a foil for Bauer. Readers of *The Holy Family* will recall that on several occasions Marx either wrote 'Help Hinrichs!'³⁸ or 'Hinrichs! Hinrichs!'³⁹ What is the meaning of this satirical appeal for help?

In the articles in the *Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung*, Bauer asserted that Hinrichs, in his book *Politische Vorlesungen*, omitted reference to the social dimensions of human liberation. According to Bauer, Hinrichs in this book focused totally on the political aspects, whereas Bauer had discerned the vital social horizon.

Marx's riposte to Bauer consisted of three tactics: aa) Nullification of Bauer's claim; bb) Bauer's entrapment; and cc) The salvation of the Hegelian Center.

aa) Marx's defense of Hinrichs rested on the repudiation of Bauer, and throughout the text of *The Holy Family*, Marx refers repeatedly to Bauer's lack of understanding

of the social space of liberation. Marx repeated the claims he first made in 'On the Jewish Question'. In short, without concretely repudiating the claims of Bauer regarding Hinrichs, Marx sought to redirect the accusations on to Bauer himself.

bb) Assuming that he had to exonerate Hinrichs, Marx felt he should call upon Hinrichs for 'Help'. The appeals Marx makes to Hinrichs in *The Holy Family* are attempts to use the supposedly exonerated Hinrichs as a voice to rectify the errors of Bauer. Marx calls upon Hinrichs for 'Help' because he wants the exonerated Hinrichs to reveal that Bauer-in-himself was entrapped within the Speculative philosophy of Old Hegelianism.

cc) By employing Hinrichs as the annulment of Bauer, Marx upheld the correctness of the Hegelian Center. The subterranean battle in *The Holy Family* was between Old Hegelianism and the Hegelian Center, which included both Hegel and Hinrichs. The Hegelian Center, both in terms of methodology and materialism, opened up practical ways to alter politics and society and thus increase the social extent of liberation.

Marx's defense of Hegel extended beyond his advocacy of the methodological-materialist Hegel-in-himself and the adherents to the Hegelian Center, but also to attacks on those who were critics of the 'Parmenides of Berlin'. Two such critics were Rotteck and Welcker. Rotteck and Welcker were South German Liberals, a form of German Liberalism most influenced by the French and therefore averse to North German Liberalism, of the Liberalism represented in Prussia. In *The Holy Family* Marx came to the defense of Hegel by seeking to invalidate Rotteck and Welcker as reliable politico-historical scholars. Marx did this by pointing out that Rotteck and Welcker wrongly interpreted Napoleon Bonaparte's actions on the 18th Brumaire and thereby simultaneously brought into question their assessment of Hegel and North German Liberalism.⁴⁰

In the following discussion of 'The Leipzig Council' I will demonstrate that Marx extended his strategy of disqualification from Bauer to Stirner by portraying Stirner as a Speculative philosopher and an Old Hegelian. Speculative philosophy formed the substance of Stirner's thought and since Speculative philosophy in-itself was invalid so the philosophy that arose from it, in this case Stirner's, was also fallacious. Bauer and Stirner differed, for whereas Bauer was focused on self-consciousness, Stirner focused on Egoism. Nevertheless, they both were representatives of the Old Hegelianism because of their concentration on thought and subjectivity and so Marx grouped them together under the rubric of Old Hegelian Speculative philosophy. Like Bauer, Stirner was spiritual and not 'massy'.

Not only did Marx extend his strategy of disqualification to include Stirner but the word 'ideology' carried the same connotation in 'The Leipzig Council' as it did in *The Holy Family*. 'Ideology' was not philosophy, but rather a political weapon aligning a political program with class. Marx defined 'ideology' as a tool in the class struggle and made out the thought of Bauer and Stirner to be weapons in the interests of German philistines. The phrase the 'German Ideology' was intended to identify the thought of Bauer and Stirner as a political weapon in the armory

of the German philistines, or rather the German bourgeoisie would use Bauer and Stirner to refute the claims of socialism or communism.

When Marx included in his strategy of disqualification both Bauer and Stirner he was guilty of mis-reading Stirner. Marx's central concern, the operational axis of 'The Leipzig Council', was to portray Bauer and Stirner as personifications of Old Hegelianism, and so he mis-read Stirner as being in total agreement with Bauer. This was, in fact, not the case because there were instances in 'The Leipzig Council' in which Stirner criticized Bauer, but Marx remained blind to or chose to remain silent about them.

However, in 'The Leipzig Council', Marx continued to act as a defender of Hegel. This role that Marx took upon himself as advocate of the Hegelian Center is most clearly demonstrated in the following three quotes, although there are many others, but the remit of this book restricts me to three:

- 1) The prototype of the entire structure of human age groups has already been depicted in the third part of Hegel's *Encyclopedia* and in various transformations in other passages in Hegel as well . . . Whereas Hegel, for example, takes so much account of the empirical world that he portrays the German burgher as the slave of the world around him.⁴¹
- 2) Hegel has already proved in his *Phenomenology* how this theory of mutual exploitation, which Bentham expounded ad nauseam, could already at the beginning of the present century have been considered a phase of the previous one. Look at his chapter on 'The Struggle of Enlightenment with Superstition', where the theory of usefulness is depicted as the final result of enlightenment. The apparent stupidity of merging all the manifold relationships of people in one relation of usefulness, this apparently metaphysical abstraction, arises from the fact that, in modern bourgeois society, all relations are subordinated in practice to the one abstract monetary-commercial relation.⁴²
- 3) So says Hegel (*Philosophy of Right*. Para. 209 Addition) from whom our saint derived the hierarchy of concepts in the modern world. Hegel, therefore, explains the existence of right from the empirical requirements of individuals and rescues the concept only by means of a simple assertion. One can see how infinitely more materialistically Hegel proceeds than our 'corporeal ego' Saint Sancho.⁴³

In all three quotations Marx draws attention to Hegel's methodologico-materialism. All three quotations demand recognition that a materialistic side of Hegel existed, that this materialism was frequently hidden as golden nuggets in the surrounding Speculative imprisonment, but assert that the quest for truth demands that the materialistic nuggets be mined, brought to the surface, and used as compasses to all aspects of Hegelian thought.

In quote 1, Marx alludes to Hegel's *The Philosophy of Mind*. When Marx notes that Hegel wrote about 'human age groups' Marx was referring to paragraphs 396

to 400. These paragraphs are located in Section I, 'Mind Subjective: Subsection A. Anthropology. The Soul'. In paragraphs 396 to 400 Hegel gave an account of the four stages of life, childhood, youth, manhood and Old Age. In these paragraphs he described the development of human sentience, sleeping and waking, the emergence of will and the human sex drive.⁴⁴ In brief, under the heading of 'The Soul', Hegel provided a graph of 'human age groups', or an outline of early developmental psychology. As proven by the passages from *The Philosophy Of Mind*, Hegel's approach to human development was not Speculative but, as Marx stated, 'empirical'. One of the nuggets clouded over by his general Speculation was that when Hegel offered an account of the evolutionary stages of life he did so strictly in 'empirical' materialist terms, drawing his information from the science of psychology as it existed in the early 19th century.

In quote 2 Marx draws on material from *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, in particular the chapter 'The Struggle of Enlightenment with Superstition'. For the sake of clarity I will divide my analysis of this quote into two parts: a) Excessive individualism; b) Social relations.

a) Excessive individualism

Marx demonstrates how excessive individualism, initially identified by Hegel, can be manipulated by capitalism into an instrument for the furtherance of commerce and exchange. Marx not only defends Hegel, but applauds Hegel for identifying how Benthamite individualism could be programmed by capitalism into an argument for 'possessive individualism'.⁴⁵

b) Social relations

In this paragraph Marx begins to make use of the concept of 'social relations', and in this paragraph he wrote: 'this apparently metaphysical abstraction arises from the fact that, in modern bourgeois society, all relations are subordinate in practice to the abstract money-commercial relation.' 'The Leipzig Council' is important in the evolution of Marx's thought because it identifies a new stage in the development of Marx's thought, the awareness that 'social relations' determine individual and social behavior.

Furthermore, Marx gave credit to 'The Master' for his consciousness that social practices were determining influences on personality. Hegel did not invent the idea of social relations and, indeed, Marx acquired this idea from other authors. Nevertheless, Hegel did recognize how the universal value of a society, consumerism, could mold the beliefs and actions of individuals in that society. In Hegel societies were universalities that conditioned human behavior and Marx praised Hegel for this insight.

In quote 3 Marx commended Hegel in three areas: a) 'empirical requirement'; b) 'infinitely more materialistically'; and c) Hegel's paragraph 209 in *The Philosophy of Right*.

3a) Marx asserted that Hegel explained the 'existence of right', law, by reference to 'empirical requirements'. Marx claimed that Hegel did not account for the

development of law in terms of 'the concept' but only by means of 'empirical requirements', or 'materialistically'.

3b) Marx specifically affirmed that 'One can see how infinitely more materialistically Hegel proceeds'. By making this affirmation Marx wanted to emphasize the materialistic dimension of Hegel's thought.

3c) Marx refers to paragraph 209 in *The Philosophy of Right* in order to invalidate Stirner's description of the genesis of law. In other words, Marx uses Hegelian materialism to nullify Stirnerian egoism and self-consciousness.

In addition, the actual paragraph 209 highlights Hegelian materialism. Paragraph 209 introduces the section in *The Philosophy of Right* entitled 'The Administration of Justice' which immediately precedes the section on 'The State'. In the section 'The Administration of Justice' Hegel deals with the question of the derivation of law from right, the functioning of law courts, the administration of social welfare, 'polizei', and the activities of civil officials. Paragraph 209 is vital because it is Hegel's initial statement regarding the content and policies of all these programs.

The first sentence of paragraph 209 reads: 'The relatedness arising from the reciprocal bearing on one another of needs and work to satisfy these is first of all reflected into itself as infinite personality, as abstract right.'⁴⁷ In this sentence Hegel affirms that 'abstract right' arises from the 'reciprocal bearing on one another of needs and work'. Hegel asserts that the mutual interdependence arising out of 'needs and work' provides the substructure of 'abstract right'.

The fact that Marx selected this paragraph to prove that 'abstract right' was an expression of the materialism of 'need and work' offers a guide as to how Marx read Hegel. As I indicated earlier, Marx read almost all of the Visible Bibliography of Hegel and interpreted him as primarily a Speculative philosopher. However, reading Hegel as a 'logical pantheist' did not preclude Marx from discovering instances of Hegelian materialism.

Interestingly, in Marx's 1843 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' that begins from paragraph 261 of that work, Marx does not mention paragraph 206. As I stated earlier, the 'Critique of the Philosophy of Right' is a nullification of Hegel's 'logical pantheism', but Marx retained his familiarity with Hegelian materialism and he brought it back in the 1845–1846 'The Leipzig Council'.

In addition to Marx's defense of Hegelian materialism, 'The Leipzig Council' also confirms that Marx regarded Hegel as a Liberal. 'The Leipzig Council' contains this vital sentence: 'Hence if one is indeed so unfortunate as to know even this bourgeoisified liberalism only in the sublimated form given it by Hegel and the school-masters who depend on him . . .'⁴⁸

Marx maintains that Hegel supplied Liberalism with a 'sublimated form'. Two conclusions can be drawn from Marx's statement: 1) Hegel was a Liberal; 2) Hegel's Liberalism, however, assumed an imperfect form. Marx meant that Hegel's Liberalism was imprisoned within Speculative philosophy, but even in its impure form it was Liberalism.

'The Leipzig Council' was not only a defense of Hegel, but of Hegel's cohorts in the Hegelian Center. The grand design of Marx was intended to prove that Old Hegelianism ran from the Speculative aspects of Hegel himself through Marheineke into Bauer and Stirner, an inheritance of decay. The grand design was also intended to establish that Hegel-in-himself and the Hegelian Center retained the materialistic viewpoints of Hegelian thought and this Hegelian Center included Michelet, Bayrhoffer and Hinrichs, among others.

Chapter Three, Phase One discussed the work of the Hegelian Centrists Gans and Michelet. Gans's work in the philosophy of law, his co-editorship with Hegel of *The Journal of Scientific Criticism* and the leading role he took in the organization of the first collected works of Hegel, bestowed the role of successor of Hegel upon him. Gans's death in 1839 left a vacuum in the Hegelian Center, but Michelet subsequently filled the role as chief spokesperson of this school.

In three quotes in 'The Leipzig Council', Marx demonstrated both his respect for Michelet and his belief that the Hegelian Center was the true heir of the legacy of Hegel.

- 1) The youth who thus 'deports' himself, instead of chasing after young women and other earthly things, is no other the young 'Stirner', the studious Berlin youth, busy with Hegel's logic and gazing admiringly at the great Michelet.⁴⁹
- 2) The 'cornerstone of the magnificent cathedral' . . . as the great Michelet puts it . . . of hierarchy is 'sometimes' the work of 'One'.⁵⁰
- 3) Here, therefore, we find ourselves in the realm of spirits of Hegelian philosophy, which stretches from Berlin to Halle and Tübingen, of the great spirits whose history was written by Herr Bayrhoffer and for which the great Michelet collected the statistical data.⁵¹

The first two quotes are illustrations of Marx's high regard for Michelet. To Marx, Michelet was 'great' and this appellation shows both Marx's respect for Michelet as well as his belief that the Hegelian Center was the true heir of Hegel.

The third quote accomplishes two objectives. First, Marx repeats his assertion that Michelet was 'great'. Second, Marx also praises Bayrhoffer for his history of Hegelian philosophy. As I indicated in Chapter Three, Phase One, Bayrhoffer was a member of the Hegelian Center and the commendations Marx extended to Bayrhoffer were also meant as support for the role of the entire Hegelian Center.

Not only did Marx come to the defense of Michelet and Bayrhoffer but also of Hinrichs. In 'The Leipzig Council' Marx championed Hinrichs' embrace of political awareness as opposed to the sterility of Bauer's addiction to self-consciousness.⁵²

In order to understand this assertion it is necessary to first understand that it was constructed by Marx, but that Marx included a quote from Stirner against Bauer. Even though Stirner and Bauer were in agreement in their opposition to Marx, and to socialism or communism, Stirner and Bauer disagreed amongst

themselves over the role of self-consciousness. Bauer defended subjective self-consciousness and Bauer was a Left Hegelian. Conversely, Stirner rejected the role of self-consciousness, extolled the Ego and therefore Stirner was not a Left Hegelian but rather an exponent of anarchism. Based on these three differences, in this paragraph Marx is exploiting the antinomies between Stirner and Bauer by showing how Stirner ridiculed Bauer's excessive reliance upon self-consciousness.

When dealing with *The Holy Family*, I have already discussed the confrontation between Hinrichs and Bauer. In that discussion I proved that Bauer lost his battle against Hinrichs and that, contrary to Bauer, Hinrichs did understand the 'social' dimension of liberalism. In the paragraph quoted above from 'The Leipzig Council', Marx is using Stirner as confirmation that Bauer lost his engagement with Hinrichs. Marx took Stirner's words: 'See that is how Bauer had to end . . .' as a declaration of Bauer's defeat. Marx then took this statement of Bauer's defeat and applied it to the 'struggle of the *Literatur-Zeitung* against Herr Hinrichs'. Marx's writing in 'The Leipzig Council' is filled with irony and in this paragraph Marx is using the literary device of irony, Stirner as the mouthpiece of irony, to emphasize Bauer's failures against Hinrichs and strengthen Hinrichs' position in the Hegelian Center.

It is also important to draw attention to the fact that in 'The Leipzig Council' Marx continued his defense of Feuerbach and Proudhon. Marx parodied Bauer's enslavement to self-consciousness and Stirner's imprisonment in the Ego of the individual. In contrast to Bauer and Stirner, Feuerbach's spoke to the issue of intersubjectivity as it evolved out of the anthropological essence of the species.⁵³

In his defense of Proudhon in 'The Leipzig Council', Marx allied himself with Proudhon against Stirner. 'The Leipzig Council' is a reproach to Stirner's *The Ego and Its Own*. According to Marx, Stirner was also a representative of Speculative philosophy. The form of critique carried out by Stirner focused on Spirit and was totally void of any 'massy' content. Although differences existed between Bauer and Stirner, nevertheless Stirner joined Bauer in ridiculing Proudhon. In particular, Stirner was appalled by Proudhon's attack on private property. For Stirner the ego was supreme, Stirner was one of the founders of anarchism, and every ego had a right to claim property; property was merely a projection of the ego.⁵⁴ 'The Leipzig Council' is a long refutation of Stirner, and in a footnote that was crossed out in the manuscript, Marx wrote in praise of Proudhon:

Proudhon, who as early as 1841 strongly criticized the communist workers' journal *La Fraternité* for advocating equal wages, general labor and also the other economic prejudices which can be found in the works of this outstanding writer, from whom, apart from his critique of property, the communists have accepted nothing.⁵⁵

It is important to take account of Marx's defense of Feuerbach and Proudhon in 'The Leipzig Council' because this is the last time he would play the role of apologist. Feuerbach is not even mentioned in the 1847 *The Poverty of Philosophy* while Proudhon's *The Philosophy of Poverty* is severely criticized. 'The Leipzig Council'

marks a departure in the thought of Marx, as I shall discuss when I analyze this work in later pages of this Phase. At this point I want only to alert the reader to the fact that in *The Poverty of Philosophy* Marx abandons his direct assaults on the Speculative philosophy of Bauer and Stirner and immerses himself in questions regarding the forces and relations of production.

The strategy in *The Holy Family* was the negation of the Speculative philosophy of Bauer and the strategy in 'The Leipzig Council' was the discrediting of Stirner.

It is important to recall the differences separating Bauer and Stirner. Bauer was a continuation of the Speculative philosophical side of Hegel, with its conviction that the projection of self-consciousness was the foundation of the unity of the subject and object. Stirner was not a Speculative philosopher; indeed, in *The Ego and Its Own* he criticized the Speculative thought of Hegel. Rather than the unity of subject and object, Stirner extolled the total freedom of the Self. It was not thought that defined humankind for Stirner but the 'I', which knew no constraints. In spite of these differences, Bauer and Stirner did not give sufficient weight to materiality. Bauer and Stirner, although one believed in the predicating power of self-consciousness and the other in the boundless acquisitiveness of the Self, both agreed that materiality did not play a decisive role in the sculpting of actuality.

Marx executed his assault on Stirner's intellectual abilities in two ways: 1) by showing that Stirner's account of the early history of mankind derived from Hegel; and 2) by showing that Stirner distorted, misrepresented, Hegel's narrative of the early history of mankind. Marx sought to undermine the intellectual competence of Stirner by proving that Stirner misconstrued the sources of 'The Master' that he relied upon.

In his attempt to prove Stirner's intellectual incapacities, Marx was simultaneously asserting Hegel's superiority to Stirner. Marx was indirectly claiming that Hegel was superior to the picture of Hegel presented by Stirner. In adopting this stance Marx also assumed the role of Hegelian advocate. He rescued Hegel from the simplicities attributed to the 'Parmenides of Berlin' by Stirner.

Finally, even though divergences separated Stirner and Bauer, Marx's negation of Stirner was also an attack on Old Hegelianism and the resurrection of Old Hegelianism in the Left Hegelianism of Stirner and Bauer. The point of agreement between Stirner and Bauer was that the Self was supreme, either as critical self-consciousness or as the Ego without boundaries. In Bauer and Stirner materiality was evaporated. Marx identified the invisibility of materiality in Bauer and Stirner as a perpetuation of Old Hegelianism and he denounced both of these men on this score. Both Bauer and Stirner, regardless of their differences, were Speculative philosophers.

In order to clearly follow Marx's strategy of disqualification against Stirner it is necessary to divide it into two parts: I) Establish Stirner's dependency upon Hegel; II) Demonstrate Hegel's superiority to Stirner.

I) Establish Stirner's dependency upon Hegel

The first part of *The Ego and Its Own* is entitled 'Man' and the second chapter in this part is entitled 'Men of the Old Time and the New'. A subsection of 'Men of

the Old Time and the New' is called 'The Hierarchy' and it is in this subsection that Marx's strategy of proving Stirner's insufficiency as an interpreter of Hegel is concentrated.

Attention needs to be directed to the fact that *The Ego and Its Own* contains refutations of Hegel. Stirner attacked Hegel as one of the originators of Speculative philosophy, which reduced existence to the Idea. Stirner was opposed to Speculative philosophy because it presented the Idea as the pneumatic force in the universe, whereas Stirner wished to privilege the ego. *The Ego and Its Own* was intended as a nullification of Speculative philosophy and in Marx's critique of Stirner in 'The Leipzig Council' Marx overlooked this fact.

Furthermore, in the subsection on 'The Hierarchy', Stirner advances his idea that human history has passed through three periods, the Negroid, the Mongolian and the Caucasian. Stirner advanced a racial interpretation of world history. Stirner does not allude to Hegel anywhere in his manuscript, and nowhere in *The Ego and Its Own* does Stirner acknowledge that he incorporated the three-stage racial interpretation of world history from Hegel. The writer who claims that Stirner derived this ethnic historiography from Hegel is Marx.

In the section in 'The Leipzig Council' entitled 'The Impurely Impure History of Spirit: a) Negroes and Mongols'⁵⁶ Marx asserted that Stirner borrowed the principle of ethnic historiography from Hegel's *The Philosophy of History*.

In terms of the thesis of the racial genesis of civilizations, Marx referred to the chapter in Hegel's *The Philosophy of History* called 'The Geographical Basis of History'.⁵⁷ In this chapter Hegel divides global history into three eras, the African or Negro, the Mongolian (the Chinese were included in the Mongolian race) and the Caucasian, which included Greek, Roman and Germanic. Hegel's *The Philosophy of History* was the source of Stirner's racial interpretation of global history.

In this regard it is surprising that Marx did not allude to Hegel's *The Philosophy of Mind*, the third volume of *The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*. This work was published as a part of Hegel's *Collected Works* and Marx included *The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* in the bibliography to his dissertation. In paragraphs 393 and 394 Hegel set forth a brief description of the various racial components of the human species and divides the three largest racial groupings into Negroid, Mongol and Caucasian. Hegel wrote of the Negro race: 'Negroes are to be regarded as a race of children who remain immersed in their state of uninterested naiveté'.⁵⁸ Stirner had the same view of the Negro and in *The Ego and Its Own* he wrote: 'Negroidity represents antiquity, the time of dependence on things (on cocks eating, birds flight, on sneezing, on thunder and lightning, on the rustling of sacred trees and so forth)'.⁵⁹ Regardless of these forays by Hegel into anthropology, Marx omits any reference to *The Philosophy of Mind* in 'The Leipzig Council'.

Marx's aim was to show that Stirner copied Hegel. This does not exclude the fact that Stirner in certain cases descended to the level of misrepresenting Hegel.

Marx's subdivision 'The Impurely Pure History of Spirits: a) 'Negroes and Mongols' contains eight 'historical reflections'. In each of these Marx quotes

a statement from Stirner and then shows, by referring to the corresponding passages from Hegel, how Stirner used Hegel as a textbook from which to copy. One such non-factual replication occurred in the area of attributing morality to the North Americans and Chinese. On page 63 of *The Ego and Its Own*, Stirner wrote that 'pure moral action, clear, unadulterated morality, is most straitforwardly practiced in China'.⁶⁰ In the 'Fourth Historical Reflection' Marx again quoted Stirner as maintaining that 'pure, moral behavior in the plainest form is practiced in China'.⁶¹

However, in the following paragraph from 'The Leipzig Council', Marx demonstrated that Stirner misinterpreted Hegel. Marx's refutation of Stirner was intended not only to prove Stirner's dependency of Hegel, but also Stirner's distortion of Hegel. The paragraph I am referring to reads:

Saint Max is unfortunate in his examples. On page 116 in just the same way he attributes to the North Americans the 'religion of uprightness'. He regards the two most scoundrelly nations on earth, the patriarchal swindlers . . . the Chinese and the civilized swindlers . . . the Yankees, as 'plain', 'moral' and 'upright'. If he looked up his crib he could have found the North Americans classed as swindlers on page 81 of the *Philosophie der Geschichte* and the Chinese ditto on page 130.⁶²

Marx was correct. *The Philosophy of History* contains the following two paragraphs relating to the dishonesty of the North Americans and the Chinese.

- 1) We find, certainly, legal relation . . . a formal code of laws; but respect for law exists apart from genuine probity, and the American merchants commonly lie under the imputation of dishonest dealings under legal protection.⁶³
- 2) With this abandonment is connected the great immorality of the Chinese. They are notorious for deceiving wherever they can. Friend deceives friend, and no one resents the attempt at deception on the part of another, if the deceit has not succeeded in its object, or comes to the knowledge of the person sought to be deceived.⁶⁴

Contrary to the impression given by Stirner, the references supplied by Marx portray a Hegel in opposition to Stirner, a Hegel who was cognizant of the immorality of the North Americans and Chinese.

Marx's 'The Leipzig Council' was dedicated to an invalidation of Stirner; on another occasion Marx illustrates how Stirner set forth an erroneous portrait of Hegel's comprehension of Bacon. In *The Ego and Its Own* Stirner wrote:

On this ground Bacon was turned out of the realm of philosophers. And certainly what is called English philosophy seems to have got no further than to the discoveries of so-called clear heads such as Bacon and Hume.⁶⁵

It is clear that in this quote Stirner is drawing upon Hegel's *The History of Philosophy*. On page 78 of *The Ego and Its Own*, Stirner quotes from Hegel's *The Philosophy of Right* that 'the rational is the actual and what is actual is rational'.⁶⁶ In addition, this entire section in *The Ego and Its Own* is an attack on Hegelian rationalism, an attempt to show Hegel's Speculative philosophy as another ecclesiastical form of domination over the Ego. Stirner wrote in *The Ego and Its Own*:

This is the religious world to which Hegel gave systematic expression, bringing method into the nonsense, and completing the conceptual precepts into a rounded, firmly based dogmatic.⁶⁷

In contradiction to Stirner, Marx in 'The Leipzig Council' gives the relevant quote from Hegel's *The History Of Philosophy*, Volume III:

Since Bacon has ever been esteemed as the man who directed knowledge to its true source, to experience, he is, in part, the special leader and representative of what is in England called Philosophy, and beyond which the English have not advanced.⁶⁸

Contrary to Stirner's implication, Hegel never claimed that 'Bacon was turned out of the realm of philosophers'. Indeed, unlike in Stirner's denigration of Bacon, Hegel noted that 'Bacon has ever been esteemed as the man who directed knowledge to its true source, experience'. Although Hegel was aware of the limits of Baconian empiricism, Hegel also recognized that knowledge began from sense perception and credited Bacon with leading a revolution in the history of philosophy.⁶⁹

As I stated previously, one of Marx's aims in 'The Leipzig Council' was to 'establish Stirner's dependency on Hegel'. The proof of this claim did not exclude the fact that Stirner frequently misrepresented Hegel, it only showed that Stirner had a need for recourse to Hegel in either an honest or dishonest fashion. Marx accused Stirner of plagiarizing Hegel,⁷⁰ of ignoring the factual depth of Hegel's writing on history⁷¹ and of a superficial reading of Hegel's *The Philosophy of History* which turned Stirner into a mere imitator of the 'Parmenides of Berlin'.⁷²

Marx portrayed Stirner as a 'copier' of Hegel. Furthermore, Hegel was the 'crib' from which Stirner drew his information, honestly or dishonestly. Stirner was guilty of 'glancing over', or in 'clumsy' iteration of Hegel's thought. With these evaluations of Stirner, Marx wished to characterize Stirner as an Old Hegelian, and aver that Stirner, although negating Hegel in the areas of Speculative thought, was still perpetuating Old Hegelianism.

In addition, one of the central points of Marx's strategy of disqualification was to document Stirner's failure to recognize the materialist aspects of Hegel. In this regard Stirner continued the mission of Bauer. By choice Stirner remained ignorant of the historic-materialist aspects of Hegel's thought and he was then free to project a Hegel who was prisoner to philosophy. In this area as well Stirner, like Bauer, was a descendent of Old Hegelianism.

II) Demonstrate Hegel's superiority to Stirner

'The Hierarchy' subdivision of Stirner's book is the center of gravity of the entire manuscript.⁷³ It is also the axis of Marx's criticism of Stirner since 'The Leipzig Council' devotes an extensive refutation of its contents.⁷⁴

In 'The Hierarchy' subdivision Stirner attacked any system of thought that claimed superiority to the Ego. In general he sketched three systems of thought, religion, church and philosophy, he accused of extinguishing the Ego.

Stirner looked upon the Catholic Church of the Middle Ages as the penultimate model in the campaign to subordinate the Ego. Through the control of education, the political power of the Papacy, the religious world view that controlled intellectual inquiry from the fall of Rome to the Renaissance, the Catholic Church controlled the crucial instruments enabling the subordination of the Ego. By placing the Divine above the Ego and controlling the means by which to propagate theological supremacy, by controlling the entrance to eternal life, the Catholic Church succeeded for a millennium in its campaign to subordinate the Ego.

Stirner used the term 'Hierarchy' to characterize all campaigns whose aim was to subordinate the Ego. 'Hierarchy' was a synonym for domination over the 'I', or any intellectual construction to which the Ego must be obedient. The mechanism to subordinate the Ego extended beyond the Catholic Church to all forms of religion, to philosophy and to political ideologies such as Liberalism and Socialism.

All these belief systems, church, religion, philosophy, Liberalism, Socialism and Communism, were merely forms of clericalism, mere modern ecclesiastical canons intended to subordinate the Ego. Stirner attacked Hegel on the grounds of his Speculative philosophy, because reason was also a source of the enslavement of the 'I'. Hegel's Spirit was simply a rationalization of medieval clericalism, the imposition of philosophical ecclesiasticism over the Ego.

Marx was open to Stirner's claims regarding 'Hierarchy'. I have already pointed out that Marx accepted the concept of 'ideology' as a political tool, as propaganda by the owners of property to persuade the industrial serfs, the working class, that capitalism was the best economic form. For Marx, 'Hierarchy' was simply a synonym for superstructure. By the time he wrote 'The Leipzig Council' he was already aware that societal belief systems were constructions of the capitalist, clerico-ecclesiastical, class.

The task for Marx in the 'Hierarchy' section was not to show that Stirner was correct, but rather that Hegel was superior to Stirner. In the 'Hierarchy' section in 'The Leipzig Council'⁷⁵ Marx copied out 12 quotes from the works of Hegel. Six of these quotes were taken from *The History of Philosophy*, five from *The Philosophy of Religion*, and one from *The Philosophy of History*. All twelve quotes expressed the same theme, Hegel's awareness of clericalism, or Hegel's cognizance of the superstructure. All twelve quotes were intended to prove Hegel's awareness of philosophical ecclesiasticism, both in its religious manifestation as well as in its philosophical, Platonic, guise.

The twelve quotes from the works of 'The Master' were intended to certify Stirner's dependency on Hegel and therefore the superiority of 'The Master' to

Stirner. The twelve quotes were intended to prove that Hegel was aware of the nature of cultural hierarchies far in advance of Stirner and that Hegel was the source from which Stirner borrowed. The intent of the use of these citations was affirmed by Marx himself when he made this comment in 'The Leipzig Council': '. . . and here again we will "include" a brief "historical reflection" on the origin of Stirner's "hierarchy".'⁷⁶

In addition, Hegel was also the teacher of Marx and this tutorship took two forms. First, Hegel acquainted Marx with the concept of superstructure. Hegel taught Marx that every society constructed a system of belief, canonical belief that not only embodied the values of that society, but also sustained the functioning of that society.

Second, the last quote that Marx copied from Hegel was from *The Philosophy of History*:

Consciousness of the spiritual is now essentially the foundation, and thereby domination has passed to philosophy.⁷⁷

In his response to Stirner, Marx set out to show that Hegel was both the source of Stirner's ideas and also intellectually the superior to Stirner. In addition, the above quotes reveal Marx's relation to Hegel in 1845–1846 and these quotes reveal two attitudes Marx held toward Hegel at this time.

First, Hegel helped Marx see that Speculative philosophy was the ecclesiastical dogma of the Left Hegelians, of Bauer and Stirner. This part of Hegelianism, Old Hegelianism, the part of the Hegelian tradition that embraced Speculative philosophy, was the new 'Hierarchy'.

Second, that all the advancement of human emancipation required the replacement of philosophy as metaphysics-in-general with critique and praxis. The overthrow of the re-created Middle Ages could only be achieved through the substitution of philosophy by praxis.

Not only was 'The Leipzig Council' a defense of Hegelian methodology, but it was also a work in transition. Faintly, merely a presence, concepts such as 'relations of production' and 'productive forces' began to surface in Marx's texts. 'The Leipzig Council' was a signal of the transference of Marx's major concern away from philosophy to political economy.

In 'The Leipzig Council' the concepts of property, the division of labor, the relations and mode of production were frequent presences. Increasingly, Marx became aware that consciousness was partially shaped by the relations of production,⁷⁸ that juridical decisions were the outcome of the division of labor as well as those who controlled the forces of production,⁷⁹ that will was not the sole source of human motivation, but the mode of production also determined human action, and that the mode of production was the real basis of the state,⁸⁰ and that property was not an eternal feature of human history, but rather a projection of the relations of production.⁸¹

Marx's use of such terms as 'material forces', 'social relations', 'modes of production', 'relations of production', 'civil society' and 'ideology' is evidence that by the

time he wrote 'The Leipzig Council', Marx was at the preliminary stage of commencing a study of political economy. Marx already recognized that the system of political economy as developed by Smith and Ricardo was merely an 'ideology' of the capitalist class and he was at the initial stages of awareness that the proletariat must be provided with its own form of political economy.

In particular, the phrases 'relations of production' and 'mode of production' are conjoined by Marx in the famous 1859 'Preface' to his *Critique of Political Economy*. In this 'Preface', Marx presented the dialectic of the 'relations of production' and the 'mode of production' as the driving force of history, the engine that propelled human history through its four-stage development – tribal life, antique, feudal and bourgeois. I am not saying that Marx had arrived at his mature 1859 view of historical evolution in 1845–1846. I am saying that he had acquired the conceptual methodologies in 1845–1846 which later, after his deep immersion in political economy, did form the basis of his view of social explanation.

However, the above paragraphs still leave open the question of when and who precipitated this transformation. At what period did Marx's materialism become political economy?

The transition begins in the 1844–1845 time period. Paris and Brussels were the sites of his transition and the agents that gave rise to Marx's shift of interest were List, Ferguson and Steuart. My intent at this point is just to identify the moment at which Marx began to acquire some of the intellectual building blocks for his later proletarian system of political economy and not to excavate the deeper meanings of List, Ferguson and Steuart. This book is about Hegel and Marx and not about Marx, List, Ferguson or Steuart.

While in Paris Marx read List's book *The National System of Political Economy*, published in 1841, and he and Engels thought that a thorough critique of this book was required. Both Marx and Engels advocated free trade while List was a Mercantilist, a defender of protectionist tariffs. Marx was expelled by the French government in February 1845 and resettled in Brussels. While in the Belgian capital in March 1845 he outlined an attack on List entitled 'An Article on Friedrich List's book *The National System of Political Economy*' which was never published.⁸²

From the perspective of the present discussion, List was important to Marx's development because he drew attention to 'productive forces'. The central debate in Marx's incomplete article concerned the economic priority between 'exchange value' and 'productive forces'. List favored the 'productive forces' and Marx's familiarity with List drew Marx's attention to the importance of 'productive forces'.⁸³

Ferguson's *An Essay on the History of Civil Society* exerted a tremendous influence on Marx because it was from Ferguson primarily that Marx first came into contact with the four-stage theory of historical evolution. It was Ferguson who taught Marx that social evolution progressed through the social formations of tribalism, the antique, feudal and bourgeois. In *The Philosophy of Mind* and *The Philosophy of History* Hegel also sketched a four-stage theory of historical development. The primary voice in alerting Marx to the fact that historicity was a determining factor

in the course of human existence was Hegel's. Marx did not learn historicity from Ferguson, but what he did learn from Ferguson were the actual social formations, the four basic social morphologies, through which the course of economic evolution passed.

Danga Vileisis, in an excellent article that opened new horizons in the study of the Young Marx,⁸⁴ surmises that Marx purchased a copy of Ferguson's book in Paris in the summer of 1844 prior to his departure to Brussels. The document upon which Vileisis bases her dating is Marx's Notizbuch 1844–1847 (which is contained in *Mega2*, Abteilung IV, Band 3) in which Marx made notations regarding Ferguson's book. The notation simply states Ferguson's name, when he purchased Ferguson's book, but offers no information as to when Marx actually read the book, although it was before he wrote *The Poverty of Philosophy* in Brussels in 1847 because Ferguson is quoted in this manuscript. *The Poverty of Philosophy* fulfills the transition initiated in 'The Leipzig Council'.

By 1847 Marx had realized that classical English political economy, personified by Smith and Ricardo, was merely an 'ideology' of the capitalist class. By 1847 Marx matured into his own self-consciousness and defined his personal mission as providing the proletariat with a political economy articulating the interests of this exploited class. In the 1844 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction' Marx stated that the emancipation of the proletariat required a theory, and that such a theory would provide the proletariat with a weapon that legitimized the impoverished working class in its struggle against capitalism. In the years 1846–1847, from 'The Leipzig Council' to *The Poverty of Philosophy*, to Marx's letter to Annenkov and to his 1847 speeches to the German Workers Association in Brussels, Marx fulfilled the program he initially outlined in his 1844 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction'.

The ideas contained in Marx's 1846 letter to Annenkov, the 1845–1846 'The Leipzig Council', the 1847 *The Poverty of Philosophy* and the 1847 lectures to the German Workers Association in Brussels formed the basis of his 1859 'Preface' to *The Critique of Political Economy*. The 1859 'Preface' contained no idea that had not already been formulated in the above mentioned writings and these writings are early exercises for this renowned 'Preface'.

The abovementioned writings indicate that Marx was ready to leave for London and his studies at the British Museum in 1849. Marx had made his transition to political economy, had embarked upon his transformation as a theorist for the proletariat, but needed to acquire expertise in the science of political economy. Marx's exile in London, his self-imprisonment in the British Museum, offered him the time and resources to attain that expertise needed to write *Das Kapital*.

The main work of the 1845–1847 period of transition was *The Poverty of Philosophy* and this book can be conceived as Marx's farewell to Hegel. By the phrase farewell to Hegel, I do not mean that Hegel ceases to be a vital influence on the methodology of Marx. I mean that the center of Marx's preoccupations shifts to political economy. The last time that Hegel plays a significant role in Marx's thought is in *The Poverty of Philosophy*, in which Hegel plays a supportive role to the main character Proudhon. After *The Poverty of Philosophy* the attacks

on that dimension of Hegel's thought comprising Speculative philosophy essentially disappears. However, the preservation of Hegelian methodology continues in Marx. The justification of Hegelian methodology was no longer a necessity for Marx, but rather the necessity now became the practice and implementation of that methodology.

That *The Poverty of Philosophy* is a work of the transition period is evidenced by the disappearance of Feuerbach from the text. As I indicated earlier, in prior works, *The Holy Family* and 'The Leipzig Council', Marx thought it imperative to defend Feuerbachian naturalism, but this need evaporated in *The Poverty of Philosophy* because Marx had already defined materialism as political economy. When Marx recognized political economy as the theology of the bourgeoisie the defense of Feuerbach was no longer called for because materialism was sanctified in political economy. Feuerbach became paleontology.

However, although the battle over Proudhon continued to be vital, Marx's attitude to Proudhon reversed itself. In *The Holy Family* and 'The Leipzig Council' Marx defended Proudhon as a voice of economic equality and as a denunciator of private property. In *The Poverty of Philosophy* Marx not only denounced private property, but also Proudhon, and Marx's emergence as an opponent of Proudhon sprung from Proudhon's adherence to Speculative philosophy.

In terms of textual sources, Marx's crusade against Proudhon in *The Poverty of Philosophy* was directed against Proudhon's *The Philosophy Of Poverty*. However, Marx's defense of Proudhon in *The Holy Family* and 'The Leipzig Council' was related to an earlier Proudhon book, *What Is Property?*.

Nevertheless, Marx's crusade against the Proudhon of *The Philosophy of Poverty* recapitulated the arguments Marx had previously leveled against Bauer and Stirner. In 1847 Proudhon emerged in Marx's writing as a perpetuation of Old Hegelianism, as someone who accounted for the functions of political economy in terms of eternal logical categories. According to Marx, Proudhon was a metaphysician who viewed logical categories as supplying the laws by which political economy operated.

In *The Philosophy of Poverty* Proudhon appeared as a Speculative philosopher, as an imitator of the method of Bauer and Stirner. Marx presented Proudhon as prolonging the heritage of Old Hegelianism, as making logical categories the predicative forces in the economic universe. Marx's interpretation of Proudhon is summarized in the title of Chapter Two of *The Poverty of Philosophy*: 'The Metaphysics of Political Economy: The Method.'⁸⁵ Metaphysics was embedded in Hegelian Speculative philosophy and this led to the impoverishment of philosophy.

Marx's rejection of Speculative philosophy was made absolutely clear in this paragraph from *The Poverty of Philosophy*:

'It is the absolute method that Hegel speaks in these terms: 'Method is the absolute, unique, supreme infinite force, which no object can resist: it is the tendency of reason to find itself again, to recognize itself in every object.' (Logic. Vol. III) All things being being reduced to a logical category, and every

movement, every act of production to method, it follows naturally that every aggregate of products and production of objects of movement, can be reduced to a form of applied metaphysics. What Hegel has done for religion, law, etc., Proudhon seeks to do for political economy.⁸⁶

The origins of Marx's theory of historical explanation lay in his elimination of 'logical pantheism' as the driving force of social development. The basis of Marx's theory of historical explanation could surface only after Marx dissolved metaphysics and substituted materialism. Marx's act of replacement is made clear in the following two quotes from *The Poverty of Philosophy*:

- 1) Thus, these ideas, these categories, are as little eternal as the relations they express. They are historical and transitory products. There is a continual movement of growth in productive forces, of destruction in social relations, of formation in ideas; the only immutable thing is the abstraction of movement . . . 'immortal death hath taken away mortal life'.⁸⁷
- 2) Is not this as good as saying that the mode of production, the relations in which productive forces are developed, are everything but eternal law, but that they correspond to a definite development of men and their productive forces, and that a change of these productive forces necessarily brings about a change in their relations of production.⁸⁸

Three concepts which were foundational to Marx's theory of social explanation are located in these two paragraphs. The three foundational concepts were 'relations of production', the 'mode of production' and 'productive forces'. Indeed, Marx's historical dialectic was also present in these paragraphs because Marx specifically comments on how the coming to be of new productive forces will shatter the 'mode of production' and thereby create new 'relations of production'.

The basic idea of the 1859 'Preface' already existed in *The Poverty of Philosophy* and, as I will indicate in following paragraphs, were also already present in Marx's 1846 letter to Annenkov and his 1847 speeches to the German Workers Association in Brussels. The period 1845–1847 was the birthplace of Marx's theory of historical explanation.

Marx's construction of a theory of historical explanation was a reflection of Hegelian methodology. In order to follow the full implications of this statement it is necessary to divide Hegelian methodology into two parts, Speculative and material. In other words, Hegelian methodology served two purposes and these purposes were dependent upon content and form.

One part of Hegelian methodology supported Speculative philosophy, and Marx invalidated panlogicism, beginning with the 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right'. The content of this methodology was that Idea was the predicative force in the universe. This content allowed Hegel to argue that Idea was the prius of the universe.

A second part of Hegelian methodology was form. This methodology was absent of Idea. It was merely an explanatory device. It was free of panlogicism and was a means of organizing data. Since this methodology had no presupposed content, a content could be injected within it. This is what Marx did when he injected materialism inside the Hegelian methodological forms. This meant that these Hegelian methodological forms could be used to explain the movement of social formations. Marx supplied a materialist content to these forms and consequently produced a theory with which to explain the mutations of social systems over time.

One such materialist methodology was the idea of history. Previous chapters in *Marx's Discourse with Hegel* have discussed the centrality of the concept of history in the thought of Hegel. The modern discipline of the history of philosophy was an invention of Hegel. Indeed, Hegel maintained that philosophy itself was a product of history because philosophy was the self-observation of reason, the self-knowledge of reason gained by understanding its past objectifications, and a before-now was necessary if this retrodiction was to take place. Furthermore, Hegel himself was aware of the historicity of social formations and in, as I have already mentioned, the section on 'The Geographical Basis of History' in *The Philosophy of History* and the 'Anthropology' section in *The Philosophy of Mind* drew attention to the economic development of human society and divided that development into four stages – tribal, antique, feudal and commercial.

Although the work of Hegel did outline the historicity of economic formations, the conclusive influence on Marx came from the Scottish Enlightenment, particularly the works of Ferguson and Steuart. Marx took the Hegelian concept of historicity and applied it to economic systems. Marx's application of historicity to economic totalities was solidified by his reading of Ferguson and Steuart.

In this regard Ferguson's *An Essay on the History of Civil Society* took priority. Among its many original insights I will only select two as a means of demonstrating the influence of the Scots on Marx, the four-stage theory of economic development, and the idea that the emergence of private property was the cause of social 'subordination', or class domination.

Part II of *An Essay on the History of Civil Society* is entitled 'Of the History of Rude Nations' and is itself divided into three sections. These three sections contain the main outlines of Ferguson's overall thesis and so in the following paragraphs I will briefly summarize their content.⁸⁹

Within these pages Ferguson enumerated a four-stage theory of economic development. The stages were: tribal (savagery); antique (Greece-Rome); Medieval; and commercial. Human life in the tribal stage was sustained by the production process of hunting and fishing; in the antique stage the Greeks and Romans developed agriculture and trade; the Medieval period was confined to agriculture as trade became extinct before the European explorations, beginning in the 15th century on a global scale, gave rise to commercialism. Ferguson was one of the earliest commentators to hypothesize that economic structure was the propellant force in history. Indeed, Ferguson was one of the first to use the term

'superstructure' to describe the artistic, religious and philosophical levels that were the outgrowths of the economic base.⁹⁰ Ferguson was a clear antecedent of Marx.

According to Ferguson, private property was a historical product; it did not exist in the tribal hunting and fishing stage. Ferguson was therefore one of the first (Rousseau preceded him) to advance the idea of a primitive communism. Not only did Ferguson speculate about a tribal communism, but also a familial communism, or gens. Ferguson's ruminations on the history of private property influenced Marx in two ways. First, it drew Marx's attention to the fact that private property was not eternal, that a stage in human history existed during which communism was practiced. Second, Ferguson's allusion to the gens was a precursor of later work by Lewis Henry Morgan, who published a book in 1877 called *Ancient Society*. The subtitle of Morgan's book was 'Researches in the Lines of Human Progress from Savagery through Barbarism to Civilization', and in this book Morgan, who did his own research among the North American Iroquois, documented the existence of the gens among these tribes. Marx read Morgan's book, agreed with Morgan's historicity of social formations and Engels' 1884 *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* was based primarily on the anthropological findings of Morgan. However, more than 100 years before the publication of Morgan's book, Ferguson had provided the materials for Marx to become familiar with the notion of primitive communism and the gens. In *The Philosophy of Right*, Hegel also calls attention to the gens.⁹¹

Ferguson averred that communism corresponded to the original tribal (savage) stage of social development, that private property was a product of subsequent history and that social 'subordination' was a result of private property. Part Three of *An Essay on the History of Civil Society* contains Section Two, entitled 'The History of Subordination' and it was in this section that Ferguson connected private property and the hierarchy of social power, or inequality.⁹²

By the term 'subordination' Ferguson meant class rule. Those who acquired private property became a class and because of its economic power the class could subordinate others. Private property thus witnessed the inception of class domination and inequality.

By means of his engagement with Ferguson, Marx was persuaded that the economic basis formed the scaffolding upon which the artistic, religious and philosophic 'superstructure' rested. According to Ferguson this economic foundation was 'civil society', a concept Marx first learned from Hegel and following Hegel, Ferguson and Stuart. Marx identified 'civil society' with the economic substructure. The economic productive relations were the dynamics which advanced the historicity of social formations.

That Marx was acquainted with the work of Ferguson and Stuart by 1847 is beyond dispute. In *The Poverty of Philosophy* he cites both these men as authorities. *The Poverty of Philosophy* contains a quote from the 1783 version of *An Essay on the History of Civil Society*⁹³ as well as a reference to Stuart's *An Enquiry into the Principles of Political Economy*.⁹⁴

Steuart's *An Enquiry into the Principles of Political Economy* has a vastly different purpose than Ferguson's *An Essay on the History of Civil Society*. Steuart's book is essentially a catechism for good political economic government. Written in the 18th century at the beginning of the capitalist revolution, Steuart's book is the political-economic equivalent to Machiavelli's *The Prince*. In its pages Steuart lauds the governance of Lycurgus of Sparta because his understanding of political economy created a society of 'reciprocal obligation', or an economics of what Hegel referred to as 'mutual obligation'. Steuart's work is not primarily a study of the laws of economics in the genre of Smith and Ricardo, but rather a study of how the correct manipulation of economics serves as the basis of political reconciliation. From this perspective Steuart himself was an 18th-century Lycurgus of political economy.⁹⁵

This Scottish Lycurgus looked upon Sparta as a social model to be emulated. Private property existed in Sparta, so it was not communist, and inequality existed in Sparta so it did not meet the Rousseau–Proudhon ideal of complete equality. The historical Lycurgus of Sparta supervised the economy so it produced a society of equivalence, of economic balance, which served to encourage social cooperation and, in the words of Hegel, 'mutual recognition'. Steuart's research was clearly driven by moral aspirations.

Regardless of his moral goals, Steuart was aware of the historicity of social formations. Steuart's work outlined the evolution of social formations from agriculture to capitalism and in this regard replicated the insights of Ferguson.

An Enquiry into the Principles of Political Economy described the evolution of European social formations from agriculture to the 18th-century commercial revolution. Abetting this economic transformation was the advancement of industry and the growth of population. Barter and handicrafts were supplanted by international trade and factories. The greater productivity of industry meant that more needs could be satisfied, more wants gratified but, concomitantly, self-interest and the love of luxury emerged as engines of decay.⁹⁶

For the Lycurgus of political economy the remedy for decay entailed the return to the morality of Sparta, the resurrection of the catechism of 'reciprocal obligation'.⁹⁷ Capitalism had produced the multiplication of wants,⁹⁸ the sanctioning of self-indulgence, and to Steuart the only escape from the threat of moral decline was the renewal of the ethics of the antique world.

In the section entitled 'Seventh and Last Observation' Marx is already employing concepts which were to become the architecture of his Method of social explanation brought to fruition in *Das Kapital*. Central to his Method of social explanation was his jettisoning of the eternal economic laws of Smith and Ricardo and his awareness that historical 'relations of . . . production'⁹⁹ were the decisive factors in social evolution. By 1847 Marx not only thought in terms of 'relations of production' but also of the 'mode of production'¹⁰⁰ and he was also aware that he had to develop a 'method'¹⁰¹ of social analysis.

Later in *The Poverty of Philosophy*, in the section entitled 'Division of Labor', Marx commented on the work of Ferguson.¹⁰² He also observed that 'a social

production relation' was the determinant force in historical evolution.¹⁰³ He wrote extensively about the 'division of labor'¹⁰⁴ and how this division of labor in the factory system created the proletariat that had become 'revolutionary'.¹⁰⁵ By 1847 Marx had also adopted Ferguson's four-stage theory of social progression: 'Under the patriarchal system, under the caste system, under the feudal and corporative system, there was division of labor in the whole of society according to fixed rules.'¹⁰⁶

A year before publishing *The Poverty of Philosophy*, on December 28, 1846, Marx wrote a letter to the Russian Annenkov which already anticipated the 'Preface' of 1857. In it Marx wrote: 'Assume particular stages of development in production, commerce and consumption, and you will have a corresponding social constitution, a corresponding organization of the family, of orders or of classes, in a word a corresponding civil society.'¹⁰⁷ In this letter Marx had already arrived at the concept of the base and superstructure.

In another paragraph in the 1846 letter to Annenkov, Marx wrote: 'In place of the great historical movement arising from the conflict between productive forces already by men and the social relations, which no longer correspond to the productive forces . . .'¹⁰⁸ In this sentence Marx had already outlined his 1857 concept of the clash between the means and mode of production.

A year after Marx published *The Poverty of Philosophy* he wrote a series of articles for the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*. Marx was living in Brussels and in the article, 'Wage-Labour and Capital', he wrote:

Thus the social relations within which individuals produce, the social relations of production change, are transformed, with the change and development of the material means of production, the productive forces. The relations of production in their totality constitute what are called the social relations, society, and, specifically, a society at a definite stage of historical development, a society with a peculiar distinctive character. Ancient society, feudal society, bourgeois society are such totalities of production relations, each of which at the same time denoted a special stage of development in the history of mankind.¹⁰⁹

I present the 1859 'Preface' as Marx's clearest abbreviation of the theory of historical explanation. Based on the data I have presented in my discussion of *The Poverty of Philosophy*, the Letter to Annenkov and his 1847 lectures I take the 1859 'Preface' as a copy, a replication, of the general principles contained in the works of 1845–1847.

From the point of view of interpretation Marx was equipped to move on to the Second Period, 1848–1883, of his appropriation of 'The Master' and in this second period he would apply these methodologies as interpretative devices by which to understand the functioning of social formations. This is the Marx of *Das Kapital*, using the application of Hegelian methodologies as a means to grasp the history and functioning of capitalism.

In this process Marx also re-defined materialism. Initially influenced by Feuerbach, and although he continued to defend Feuerbach in 'The Leipzig Council', Marx was already in the process of casting off the anthropological naturalism of Feuerbach and replacing it with materialism-as-labor and materialism-as-sociology. The task facing Marx in 1849 was how to apply the methodology of the Parmenides of Berlin to explain materialism-as-labor, which encompassed the relations of production and productive forces, and materialism-as-sociology.

Chapter Four

Marx's Mis-reading of Hegel

A major theme of *Marx's Discourse with Hegel* concerned the distinction Marx drew between the System and Method of Hegel. I defend the thesis that whereas Marx negated the System he appropriated the Method.

Marx associated the Hegelian System with Speculative philosophy. When Marx attacked Hegelian philosophy as 'logical pantheism' he meant both Hegelian Idealism and System. The Hegelian System was deficient because it was entrapped in the limitations of Speculative philosophy, that is, Hegel sought to explain the total phenomenon of human creativity as essentially projections of mind. In his 'Critique of Hegel's Dialectic and Philosophy in General' Marx referred to *The Phenomenology of Spirit* as Hegel's greatest work, but claimed that the final chapter, 'Absolute Knowledge', summarized Hegel's vast achievements.¹ The 'Absolute Knowledge' chapter was the epitome of Hegelian Speculative philosophy.

This present chapter does not deal with the problematic of methodology, but rather with the topic of subjective activity. I have a strategic goal in shifting the focus of 'Marx's Mis-reading of Hegel' to the question of subjective activity and the purpose is to present the reader with a full overview of Marx's relation to Hegel. Although Marx appropriated Hegelian methodology he evaded the theme of subjective activity in 'The Master'. In order to be in a position to make a well-informed evaluation of the intellectual interchange between these two giants it is necessary to have recourse to all the factual evidence.

By the terms subjective activity and materio-practice, which I use interchangeably in this chapter, I mean those aspects of Hegel's writings in which he detailed the metabolism between the human species and nature. Hegel possessed substantial knowledge of the empirical, anthropological, psychological and subjective activities of humanity. Empirically, Hegel agreed that sense perception was the origin of mind, anthropologically Hegel recognized the evolution of the species from hunters to the imperialistic lords of the globe, psychologically he was convinced that the human mind developed from drive, urge, instinct to rational self-consciousness, and in terms of subjective action Hegel was cognizant that human work and labor was the source of economic productivity. Marx's mis-reading of Hegel stemmed from the fact that he remained blind to the materio-practical aspects of Hegelian philosophy.²

Marx's misconception of Hegel opened a schism between himself and Michelet, Bayrhammer and Hinrichs of the Hegelian Center. As I indicated in Chapter Three, Phase One, Michelet, Bayrhammer and Hinrichs accentuated the role of subjective activity in their reading of Hegel. Marx knew the work of all these Hegelian tribunes and referred to Michelet as 'great', positioned Bayrhammer as a student of Michelet and appealed to Hinrichs for 'help' in 'The Leipzig Council'. Nevertheless, Marx was either ignorant of, or chose to ignore, the emphasis placed by Michelet, Bayrhammer and Hinrichs on the role of subjective activity in Hegel. This was a great loss to Marx and contributed to his mis-reading of Hegel.

The Hegelian Center was composed of two parts, Hegel-as-Founder and Michelet-Bayrhammer-Hinrichs-as-Interpreters. In terms of subjective activity Marx did not follow the Hegelian Center as represented by Michelet-Bayrhammer-Hinrichs-as-Interpreters. However, Marx still continued to place Hegel-as-Founder in the Hegelian Center. Even though Marx remained ignorant or unconvinced by one school of interpretation within the Hegelian Center this still permitted Marx to judge Hegel-as-Founder as belonging to the Hegelian Center.

The clearest way to grasp Marx's approach to the issues of subjective activity and the materio-practical in Hegel is to divide the problem into two parts, reality and potential.

In reality Marx did not attribute Hegel with an appropriate recognition of the importance of subjective activity. This is a question of emphasis. While Marx was aware that there were seeds of materio-practical critique in Hegel, Marx's own writing on Hegel underestimated, appeared to deny, this aspect of Hegelian thought. In reality the materio-practical of Hegel were dimmed, almost disappeared, in Marx's expositions of The Master.

Potentially, however, the embryo of the materio-practical in Hegel could be expanded. Marx was aware of 'The outstanding achievement of Hegel's Phenomenology',³ or that 'It was now time to formulate the positive aspects of the Hegelian dialectic within the realm of estrangement',⁴ but Marx never offered a comprehensive reiteration of the extent of the materio-practical in Hegel. Marx knew that the philosophy of 'The Master' did contain cells for materio-practical critique and Marx took the enlargement of the potential as his calling. The potential in Hegel must be made into the reality of social explanation.

The remaining parts of this chapter will demonstrate Marx's myopia regarding the content of subjective activity and the ethics of the political in the 'Parmenides of Berlin'. In my discussion of the invisibility of Hegel in Marx I will limit myself to two areas, 'subjective activity' and 'the ethical nature of the state', although it should be recognized that many other sites of Marx's evasion of Hegel exist. In addition, I impose this limitation on myself since other sections of this book have drawn attention to other instances in which Hegel became invisible to Marx.

Subjective activity

In discussing subjectivity activity I will concentrate on Hegel's *The Philosophy of Nature*, *The Philosophy of Mind*, the second and third volumes of his *The*

Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, as well as Volume Three, 'Medieval and Modern Philosophy,' in his *The History of Philosophy*, and *The Philosophy of History*. I documented that Marx read all these works and therefore was exposed to Hegel's approach to the materio-practical dimensions of the philosophic sciences. When Marx read all these works he became informed of Hegel's approach to the subjective basis of the philosophical sciences, but when he came to make an assessment of Hegel, specifically in his 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right', he made a conscious decision to evade the Hegelian materio-practical and subjective activity.

In discussing 'the ethical nature of the state' I will center upon Hegel's *The Philosophy of Right* and the first and second volumes of his *The History of Philosophy*, as well as his *The Philosophy of History*. As I previously verified Marx read these works, but when he evaluated Hegel's political philosophy in the 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' he allowed Hegel's definition of the state as an ethical entity to disappear.

An indication of Hegel's materialism was his adoption of Aristotle's theory of the soul. Aristotle was a formative influence upon Hegelian Speculative philosophy and Hegel reverts to Aristotle's doctrine of the soul when he describes the phylogeny of Spirit. However, the first step in the phylogeny of Spirit is the acquisition of subjectivity and Aristotle's theory of the soul is a statement about the naturalistic elements of Selfhood. In *The Philosophy of Mind*, The Master expressed his indebtedness to Aristotle in the following sentences:

The book of Aristotle on the Soul, along with his discussion on its special aspects and states, are for this reason still by far the most admirable, perhaps even the sole, work of philosophical value on this topic.⁵

In *De Anima* ('On the Soul') Aristotle describes the soul as the 'actualization of a body'.⁶ The soul is the essence of a body, or it is the energy that sustains the body. In order to survive the body must eat, receive sensations and think, and the soul is the dynamic that propels the body to perform all these functions. Aristotle's definition of the soul is a naturalistic one and he divides the operations of the soul into four parts, 'by the powers of self-nutrition, sensation, thinking and motivity'⁷ and in *The Philosophy of Mind* Hegel copies Aristotle's paradigm. Although in greater detail and with the purpose of grafting his concept of Spirit onto Aristotle's characterization of soul, Hegel's enumeration of the phylogeny of Absolute Spirit in *The Philosophy of Mind* copies in broad outline Aristotle's model.

It is important to note that Hegel's reference to Aristotle's 'On The Soul' in *The Philosophy of Mind* is not his only allusion to this manuscript. Hegel's discussion of Aristotle in Volume II of his *The History of Philosophy* and the third division of 'The Philosophy of Aristotle' is entitled 'The Philosophy of Mind' and this division is almost totally devoted to a summary of 'On the Soul'. The title Hegel assigned to this subdivision, 'The Philosophy of Mind', is exactly the same title Hegel assigned to the third volume of *The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*. Hegel's description of mind in the section 'The Philosophy of Mind',

an analysis of Aristotle's 'On The Soul', corresponds exactly to his analysis of mind in the book *The Philosophy of Mind*; Aristotle inspired Hegel's philosophy of mind. In 'The Philosophy of Mind' in *The History of Philosophy*, Hegel depicts soul as 'entelechy', or the movement from potential to actual, or Hegel learned from Aristotle that soul was a force, a potential, that evolved into a subject with reason. The initial stages of the self-conscious 'I' were the naturalistic levels of nutrition and sensation.⁸

It is vital to my argument to note that Marx read Hegel's *The History of Philosophy* and that Marx knew this extended commentary by Hegel on Aristotle. Marx at least read, although he later overlooked, Hegel's respect for Aristotle's materialism.

No contradiction existed between Hegelian Speculative philosophy and Hegel's respect for subjective activity. The Hegelian materio-practical was the Other of Hegelian Idealism, or the external provided the outer that the materio-practical must conquer. The Hegelian dialectic emerged out of the opposition between thought and the external. Hegelian materialism was a presupposition of dialectical advancement because it provided the outer, the external, that must be sublated by thought.

Hegel's indebtedness to Aristotelian materialism and naturalism is additionally evidenced in the construction of Hegel's System. The principles of Hegel's definition of a scientific System were initially articulated in Aristotle's study of zoology. For Hegel, in order for a science, the study of a particular branch of knowledge, history, political science, logic, to be truthful it must be systematic and the basic features of a System were to be found in Aristotle. In Hegel science meant a System.

In *The Philosophy of Nature*, in Section Three, dealing with the 'Organic', Hegel states that 'the ancient classifications of animals belong to Aristotle' and Hegel singled out Aristotle's *History of Animals* as initiating the investigation into animal types.⁹ Aristotle's study of the animal world set forth the model of explanation as a System. The model of explanation that Aristotle advances for the animal world was the model Hegel was to apply to the historical universe. Every science Hegel studies was set forth as a systematic totality.

Hegel's conviction that the animal world could be grasped only in terms of types was confirmed through his acquaintance with botany and in this regard he was beholden to Goethe and C. H. Schultz. Hegel praised Goethe for his investigations of plant life in the *Metamorphosis of Plants* and was particularly gracious to Schultz, a colleague of his at the University of Berlin, who he acknowledged as the discoverer of ideas that Hegel incorporated in *The Philosophy of Nature*.¹⁰ Both Goethe and Schultz applied the Aristotelian concept of types to botanical studies.

From the point of view of Marx's awareness of Hegelian subjective activity it is productive to illustrate Hegel's study of the botanical, zoological and biological sciences of his day. In the extensive *Zusatz* to paragraph 370 of the *Philosophy of Nature* refers to the work of Carolus Linnaeus, Jean-Baptiste de Lamarck and Antoine Laurent de Jussieu in the field of zoology.¹¹ Hegel also comments on the work of Ludolf Christian Treviranus in the field of botany.¹²

After Aristotle the scientist who exerted the greatest impact on Hegel was the Frenchman Georges Cuvier. A zoologist, Cuvier was the originator of comparative anatomy. Hegel depicted Cuvier's genius in the following words:

In addition, the habit of individual animals, as a coherent whole determining the construction of every part, has been made the main point, so that Cuvier, the great founder of comparative anatomy, could boast that from a single bone, he could learn the essential nature of the whole animal . . . so that in this way the animal has been raised above and out of its particularity into its universality.¹³

Hegel's reading of Aristotle, zoology, his familiarity with Goethe's study of plants, his knowledge of Schultz, Linnaeus, Lamarck, Jussieu, Treviranus and particularly Cuvier formed the basis of his interpretation of the organic world. From his immersion into the organic world Hegel embraced the theory of comparative anatomy which then acted as the inspiration for his methodology of explanation.

Comparative anatomy persuaded Hegel that the study of universal types was the best method by which to understand the sciences. As a means of explicating the meaning of a universal type Hegel reverted to the language of Cuvier:

Every organized creature forms a whole, a unified and closed system, all the parts of which mutually correspond, and by reciprocal action on one another contribute to the same purposive action. None of these parts can alter without the others altering too, and consequently each of them, takes in its own, suggests and gives all the others.¹⁴

Hegel's view of the natural world provided him with a model, the dissection of socio-historico-philosophical actualities onto organic units of whole and parts, that he applied to historic-philosophical analysis.

Hegel's study of the organic world also provided him with a theory of production. At the phylogenetic level of 'Organics' Hegel's paradigm of production only related to the animal world.

In the animal world the preservation of life unfolded in the opposition between the organic and the inorganic. In order to survive the organic portion of nature seized the inorganic portion and sublated, or turned the inorganic into material it could digest.¹⁵ Whereas the inorganic was the object the organic was the subject. Hegel called this seizure of the inorganic 'digestion', or 'assimilation',¹⁶ but synonyms for 'digestion' and 'assimilation' are consumption and appropriation. Hegel was aware that in order to complete this consumption and appropriation the organic must turn itself against the inorganic, the organic must become 'actively hostile to the non-organic'.¹⁷

The productive model outlined at the level of the organic was not as advanced as the one contained in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. In *The Philosophy of Nature* the 'Parmenides of Berlin' wrote only of the stage of consumption. But he did grasp the metabolic relation between the organic and the inorganic. He did appreciate

that the natural subject must be active, that its activity must be directed outside itself in order to acquire the necessities of existence.

The model of animal activity that Hegel outlined in the 'Organics' section of *The Philosophy of Nature* became the model for his paradigm of self-conscious subjective production in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*.

The ascent to Absolute Spirit begins with the particularization of an 'I'. The history of the Self is also developmental ascent and this ascent can only commence when the animal is transcended. The phenomenology of the Self can only appear when subjectivity presents itself and this stage is only reached when the evolutionary process is liberated from nature.

The origination of the subject requires a materialist foundation. Hegel was aware that subjectivity was a response to materialist surroundings. The first level of Spirit was subjectivity and subjectivity itself was a configuration of geographical, racial, cultural and political factors. According to Hegel's *The History of Philosophy*, *The Philosophy of History*, *The Philosophy of Art* and *The Philosophy of Religion* subjectivity made its appearance in Greece, and in order to account for the qualities of subjectivity Hegel set forth the materialist precondition of subjectivity.

In *The Philosophy of Mind* Hegel depicts geography as one of the determinants of subjectivity. In paragraph 392 of this work Hegel wrote:

While still a substance (i.e. a physical soul) the mind takes part in the general planetary life, feels the difference of climate, the changes of the seasons, and the periods of the days, etc.¹⁸

The references to geography are brief in *The Philosophy of Nature* and it was in *The Philosophy of History* that Hegel put forth a fuller description of how geography contributes to the development of human culture. In the 'Introduction' to *The Philosophy of History* he included a subdivision entitled 'Geographical Basis of History' and there declared his awareness of the materialist basis of subjective activity and the politico-cultural world:

. . . the natural connection that helps to produce the Spirit of a People appears an intrinsic element; but in as much as we must regard it as the ground on which that Spirit plays its part, it is an essential and necessary basis.¹⁹

Hegel begins his geographical description of the earth by dividing the globe into Frigid, Torrid and Temperate Zones. The severity of cold and heat in the Frigid and Torrid Zones proved to be insurmountable barriers to the advancement of the human species in these areas and consequently it was only in the Temperate Zone that civilization began. Hegel divided the Temperate Zone into two parts, the New World, the Western Hemisphere and the Old World, stretching from China to the Mediterranean. Hegel divided the Old World into three geographic typologies, The Elevated Land, The Valley Plains and the Coastal Land.

The Elevated Land spanned the lands from the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea and this geography was the condition that supported Genghis Khan and Tamerlane.

The Valley Plains were the Indus and Ganges in India, the Tigris–Euphrates in Babylonia and the Nile in Egypt. The Valley Plains were the geographical supports for the beginning of human civilization. The Coastal Lands were also those earthly regions that enjoyed access to the seas and in this regard the Mediterranean was crucial. The Old World, Southern Europe, Greece and Italy enjoyed the benefits offered by the Mediterranean Sea because it permitted them to come into contact with North Africa and Spain. The Mediterranean was a geographical blessing to Greece and Italy because it opened the possibilities of communication and trade with lands far from their centers, Athens and Rome. Geography was a primary reason for the cultural greatness of Greece and the Athenian invention of subjectivity. The natural environment was one of the factors that gave rise to the culture of subjectivity.²⁰

Into the geographical domains Hegel inserted what he referred to as ‘races’, and in order to follow his genealogy of ‘races’ it is necessary to leave *The Philosophy of History* and turn to the subsection on ‘Anthropology’ in *The Philosophy of Mind*. In paragraph 393 Hegel listed five distinct ‘races’, Negro, Mongol, Asiatic, Caucasian and the natives of the New World. However, he divided the Caucasians into two parts, the Western Asians and the Europeans. Each of these ‘races’ inhabited a specific geographical location: the Negro ‘race’ was situated in sub-Saharan Africa, the Mongol ‘race’ in the elevated lands of Middle Asia, the Asiatic peoples in China, India and Central Asia, the Natives in North and South America, the Western Asians were composed of Islamic peoples and the Europeans, particularly the Athenians and Romans in which the philosophy of the subjective activity was born.²¹

Each of these ‘races’ displayed specific intellectual abilities. A child of his time, mirroring the ideas of anthropological science in the early 19th century, Hegel judged the Negro as ‘childish’, the Mongol as impetuous, the Asiatic as sunken in nature, the aborigines of the New World as inferior, the Islamic peoples as clinging to the ‘limited principle’ the Jews attributed to God as the ‘Abstract One’, and the Europeans as those who first gave recognition to the development of Spirit.²²

In *The Philosophy of Mind* Hegel displayed a more refined understanding of ethnological groups and passed from the ‘racial’ to the national. Hegel’s ethnology began with five global ‘races’, but *The Philosophy of Mind* advanced to a discussion of ‘local minds’²³ by which Hegel meant the various national minds within the European demography. In particular, he singled out the national mind of the ancient Athenians, who, abetted by their geography, racial composition and political structure, were the discoverers of subjective activity.²⁴ The national mind of the Italians was characterized by a feminine attribute and this culture glorified the beauty of the female.²⁵ The French national mind was noted for the acuteness of its intellect and in the political sphere the French because of their revolution engendered a new political age in Europe. The English national mind devoted itself to empirical research, its politics emphasized individuality and political economy was also a product of the English type of self-consciousness. The Germans were the nation of inwardness and Speculative philosophy was an invention of the German type of self-consciousness.²⁶ Hegel’s depiction of French, English and

German national minds corresponded exactly with the characterizations outlined by Heinrich Heine in his book *Religion and Philosophy in Germany*.²⁷

Hegel's writings on geography, 'racial' classifications and national minds were early studies in the etiology of cultural morphologies. The previous paragraphs described the geographical, racial and national factors that served as preconditions for cultural and philosophic development, but one other factor must be added to this list and this was political configurations. The traditional political structure in the Asiatic World was despotism and this was an important reason why the Chinese and Indian minds remained imprisoned in obedience, acceptance of authority and the absence of free subjectivity. Conversely, the political structure of Athens advanced to a democracy and since citizens were required to vote and participate in civil decisions the impetus to free subjectivity was generated. Democracy is the political form that encourages individuality and therefore acted as an additional encouragement for the blossoming of subjectivity activity.

Hegel's interest in the material foundations of culture and philosophy compelled him to research the geographical, racial and political substructures of these theoretical developments. In his pursuit of intellectual superstructures Hegel learned to be aware of the materialistic substructure, the materialistic grounds out of which culture arose. Theory did not spring *ex nihilo* from the mind of humankind. Rather, geographical, 'racial' and national substructures were preconditions if culture and philosophy were to arise.

In his approach to the history of mind Hegel offered Marx crucial insights into the evolution of mind. Hegel sensitized Marx to the difference between sub- and superstructures and made Marx aware that it was first necessary to look at material foundations in order to properly understand the origin of ideas.

The materialism of 'The Master' was accentuated in the 'Anthropology' section of *The Philosophy of Mind* which was almost totally dedicated to a discussion of sensibility. Sentience was a crucial factor in the odyssey of the subject since individual sensation acted as a confirmation of the Self. In his discussion of the feeling soul, which was the second layer of the Aristotelian soul, Hegel's analysis ranged from waking and dreaming, to habit, to clairvoyance and insanity.²⁸ The sentient soul for Hegel established the actuality of the Self; sensibility acted as recognition that an individual corporality existed. Before an 'I' could be it was necessary for feeling to confirm the 'I'.

However, it was in subsection B of the section 'Mind Subjective' in the 'Phenomenology of Mind' in *The Philosophy of Mind* that the attainment of subjectivity is finalized. The conquest of subjectivity unfolds in three stages, the 'I', the will and practice.

In stage one, the 'I', the awareness of individuality is fueled by the force of opposition. A sentient Self gains awareness of its opposition to the Other. Sensibility provides contradiction, for feelings of individuality provide the boundary between an Ego and the Other.

The consciousness that an 'I' and an 'Other' exist is the foundation of sociability. The subject recognizes that it lives within the horizon of multitudinous 'Others'

and that it must relate to these subjective Others. The 'I' learns to define itself as an intersubjective being, its 'I'-ness is a reflection of the multiplicity of 'I's.

The second stage in the odyssey of subjectivity is the attainment of a will. The will is the prius of the subject, it is the determining energy of the subject. To extinguish the will is to extinguish the subject. The anatomical expression of the will is instinct and desire. Will is the basis of freedom. In order for a subject to be free it must be allowed to express its will.

The third stage in the odyssey of the subject is practical mind. A difference exists between theoretical and practical mind for whereas theoretical mind is absorbed in thought, the inner, practical mind concentrates on the external. Practical mind relates to the subject's involvement with the material, external world. Whereas the will is defined as end or purpose, practical mind is the instrumentality of the will.

The power of determination by practical mind brings subjectivity to the domain of labor, or work. In Hegel labor was a property of the subject, or the subject labored in order to determine a material environment that sustained the life of the subject. Activity was inherent in the subject, or an immanent quality of the subject was activity.²⁹

The laboring subject plays a predominant role in Hegelian philosophy because it is the seed of his vision of family and civil society. The vision of 'The Master' of civil society is constructed upon the paradigm of a laboring subject who is compelled into sociability because of its need to provide for sustenance and survival and this imposed sociability is the sinew of the social and eventually the political. Hegel's theory of the state finds its origins in subjective activity and the materio-practical.

Since my main purpose in discussing the Hegelian materio-practical was to document the importance of the empirical world in Hegel's Speculative philosophy I will end my analysis on this issue at this point. Even though I did not isolate every dimension of the materio-practical in Hegel, I feel that I did illuminate the importance that sentience played in Hegel's view of the evolution of the subject. In order to reach the rational it was necessary to turn to mind's determinative abilities. Truth was a result of the faculties of mind, but the starting point of Speculative thought was the materio-practical and subjective activity.

The ethical nature of the state

The conclusions that I made regarding Marx's ignoring subjective activity in Hegel are also valid in regard to the ethical nature of the state. Just as Marx was blind to the materio-practical in Hegel so he evaded the ethical nature of Hegel's theory of the state. Just as Marx viewed Hegel's philosophy of nature as a projection of 'logical pantheism' so he perceived Hegel's political philosophy as an expression of 'logical pantheism'.

The ethical for Hegel was a result of the union of the universal and particular, or the action of an individual must reflect the end of the universality, or community. Hegelian ethics disavowed Kantian ethics, for whereas the prophet of Königsberg understood ethical acts as an adherence to universal legal principles,

the 'Parmenides of Berlin' understood ethics as the connection between personality and community.

The methodological category of universal-particular formed the underpinning of Hegelian ethics. In the political sphere particularity was equal to atomism, or the self-interest of the individual. Political atomism was a cultural disease, according to Hegel, because it eroded culture as a collective substance. In order to contain the corrosive influence of egoistic atomism it was essential that the political individual act in accordance with the universal interest of the state.

The state was an ethical substance and Hegel's political theory derived from his dedication to the Greek polis. Hegel was a product of the glorification of Greek culture that had been prevalent in Germany since Johann Winckelmann, and his political project was to fit the polis ideal into the historical conditions of the early 19th century.

In order to more accurately grasp Hegel's political Aristotelianism it is necessary to discuss in greater detail Hegel's theory of ethicality. The theory of ethicality is the foundation of *The Philosophy of Right* and Marx when focusing upon Hegel's theory of the state completely overlooked the ethical presuppositions of the politics of the Parmenides of Berlin. In my analysis of Hegel's theory of ethicality I will draw not only on the pages of *The Philosophy of Right*, but also *The Philosophy of History*, *The Philosophy of Mind* and *The History of Philosophy*.

Insight into Hegel's theory of ethicality is won when the idea of historicity is applied. Historicity was a primary factor in Hegel's Speculative philosophy. Every aspect of that System was approached from a historical vantage point, be it the evolution of art, religion, philosophy or political thought.

Hegel's *The Philosophy of Right* confirmed his own predisposition toward historicity. In its pages Hegel acknowledges that private property has a history and in the *Zusatz* to paragraph 62 he referred to 'the history of the right of property'.³⁰ In addition to this phrase the *Zusatz* to paragraph 62 briefly comments on different Roman definitions of property and asserts that it was only with the rise of Christianity, a religion that discovered the divinity of the free personality, that private property was also sanctified. The catechism of private property was the equivalent, the legal commensurability to, the revelation of the godliness of personality. Hegel wrote: 'But it was only yesterday, we might say, that the principle of the freedom of property became recognized in some places.'³¹ Similarly, the state also displayed a history. In the *Zusatz* to paragraph 170 Hegel wrote: 'In the sages of the founding states, or at least of a social and orderly life, the introduction of permanent property is linked with the introduction of marriage.'³²

The Philosophy of Right not only alludes to the historicity of property and the state, but to the historicity of right itself. Like everything else in the Hegelian universe right underwent an evolutionary process and *The Philosophy of Right* narrates the phylogeny of right. *The Philosophy of Right* can only be understood if it is read as a history of right, and the state is only a result of that history. The essence is right and the state is the protector of that essence. When Marx in the 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' isolated the state, ignored the historicity of right, he distorted the meaning of Hegel's political theory.

It is also impossible to understand Hegel's theory of right, ethicality and the state without taking into account his concept of subjectivity. Personhood was the first level of subjective activity. In the historicity of Spirit, in its ascent from Subjective Spirit to Objective Spirit to Absolute Spirit personhood initiated this evolutionary process.

Hegel was a reflection of Lutheran Protestantism. In *The Philosophy of History* Hegel describes how Luther broke the ecclesiastical state of the Papacy, the domination of a priestly class over individual piety. Luther liberated private sanctity from the imprisonment to an authoritarian clerical class. The Lutheran Reformation was the beginning of individual piety and the commencement of Western European individualism.³³ As I pointed out previously, Hegel was not a defender of egoistic atomism, but he also recognized that personhood was the beginning of humankind's ascent to universality. Subjective activity was not the consummation of Spirit, but rather the launching pad for Spirit's ascent to Absolute Spirit.

Hegel espoused a philosophy of identity. The task of philosophy was to reconcile the particular and the universal. The initiation of the philosophy of identity was found in subjective activity, but its culmination took place when the Self was allied with a universal. *The Philosophy of Right* was an exemplification of the philosophy of identity. The opening stanza was subjective activity, and its realization was the unity of individuality within the state. This was the paradigm of ethicality.

This transmutation from subjective activity to ethicality passed through the following eleven stages: 1) Will; 2) Personhood; 3) Right; 4) Freedom; 5) Private property; 6) Mutual recognition and intersubjectivity; 7) Morality; 8) Sociability; 9) Ethicality; 10) Nationalism; 11) the state.

1) Will was the foundation of individuality. Will was the Self's self-identity. As the foundation of a personhood will was the inception of subjective activity.

2) Personhood needed to be created and it was brought into existence when will took possession of the body. Personhood was the result of the act of occupancy, the will claiming possession of the body.

3) Right was an entitlement of personhood. Right was the license for the Self's expression of its activities. Right was the basis of the freedom of the subject.

Hegel's advocacy of right did not mean he believed in the theory of natural rights. Natural right theory proposed that nature endowed all of humanity with certain rights. Hegel's approach to rights was psychological as opposed to metaphysical. A right was due to the Self so that the Self was free to express its individuality. For Hegel right belonged to individual psychology and not to natural law.

The title of Hegel's foray into political theory, *The Philosophy of Right*, describes his intellectual intent. The primary purpose of *The Philosophy of Right* was not the design of the structure of a state constitution, but rather how best to protect freedom of the will. Displaying his understanding of historicity, Hegel was aware that the protection of individual rights varied in terms of the historical conditions in which a Selfhood found itself, but the goal of the philosophy of the political was the defense of individual subjective activity.

4) Freedom meant the guarantee for right to be expressed. If right was to be actualized, if it were to enter the external world, freedom must exist; freedom was the necessary passageway for the realization of right.

5) Private property. In order to grasp Hegel's advocacy of private property it is first necessary to grasp his definition of possession.

Possession was a stage that preceded private property. In order for possession to occur it was first necessary for a 'thing', an external object, to be occupied. The substance that occupied a 'thing' was will.

This occupation established private property; a 'thing' became the property of a personhood when the will of the personhood occupied an external object.

Private property was also protector of the Self. Private property was a defensive perimeter against unsolicited invasion of the Self by an external infringement. Hegel was a champion of private property because he saw it as sustaining and enabling the will and also right. The developmental stages were will, right, subjective activity and private property.

6) Mutual recognition and intersubjectivity. As the will penetrated into the external world, as it acquired possessions, it also discovered the Other. This discovery of the 'Other' was the process of mutual recognition and intersubjectivity. As the will as a singular Ego announced itself into the external world it invariably collided with the will of the 'Other' and this collision was mutual recognition and intersubjectivity.

7) Morality was the result of this learning process. Morality was the application of reciprocity, it was the granting of the same rights to the 'Other' that the Self claimed for itself. Morality was thus a stage in the developmental process leading to the state and it was the grade at which mutuality was accepted as the safeguard of right and freedom. Right and freedom could not exist without the recognizing of the rights of the 'Other', otherwise the relation between Selves would capitulate to Thomas Hobbes and the war of all against all.

8) Sociability. The historicity of ethicality and the state advances through the grade of sociability. In the phylogeny of ethics the awareness of human sociability is a necessary prelude to society.

Sociability was the result of mutual recognition and intersubjectivity. Sociability was the outgrowth of the acceptance that the Other possessed rights.

Hegel was not Feuerbach; Feuerbach maintained that humankind was inherently social. For Feuerbach the species as social being was an anthropological ontology. Feuerbach did not need to account for morality or ethicality because he postulated the inherent social being of humankind and this inherent social being in itself contained the love of the Other. The ontology of social being in Feuerbach, love as the natural condition of the species, obviated any need to put forth ethics.

9) Ethicality. The family, springing out of marriage, was the training ground out of which the social proceeded. The family was the primary learning process

out of which intersubjectivity and morality were acknowledged as the rules of behavior.

Ethicality was the readiness of individuality to respect the right of the Other. Ethicality was the disposition of the multiplicity of 'I's to confirm the right of the Other.

When the disposition of ethicality emerged in the historical process civil society could appear. Civil society was merely the projection of ethicality, or civil society could only exist because ethicality was a universal practice in the social.

10) Nationalism. Another antecedent to the state was a sense of nationalism. Hegel's life spanned the French Revolution, the Napoleonic Empire and the Wars of Liberation against Bonaparte and he was a witness to the rise of nationalism throughout Europe.

Furthermore, Hegel believed in the existence of national minds. Just as Hegel believed in 'racial' mentalities so he also advocated the existence of national mentalities. In *The Philosophy of History* he states: 'The German Nation was characterized by the sense of Natural Totality . . . an idiosyncrasy which we may call Heart.'³⁴ National mentalities referred to characteristics of mind, or a collective consciousness. The German collective consciousness displayed the inclination to totality and inwardness, the English collective consciousness revealed a penchant for the empirical and the practical while the French collective consciousness displayed a tendency toward abstract rationalism in the style of Descartes and the concepts of liberty and equality in the idiom of the Jacobins during the French Revolution.

The national minds contributed to the form a state was to assume. However, the psychological was not the ethical; the manifestations of national minds were not ethical potencies, but rather anthropological factors. Even though nationalism was not an example of the ethical it did contribute to the eventual configuration of the state.

11) The state. The consummation of the historicity of ethicality was the state. Beginning with will, ethicality progressed through an ascending series of stages and the ultimate actualization of the ethical was the state. In paragraph 257 of *The Philosophy of Right* Hegel wrote: 'The state is the actuality of the ethical Idea.'³⁵ The purpose of the state was to protect right and ethical behavior and in the fulfillment of these goals the state also rose to an ethical organism.

Just as ethicality was a historical product so the forms of state were also historical products. States were reflections of the historical stage in which they arose, they mirrored the evolutionary grade in which they were formed.

Hegel articulated the historicity of the state in his *Zusatz* to paragraph 273 in *The Philosophy of Right*:

The development of the state to constitutional monarchy is the achievement of the modern world, a world in which the substantial Idea has won the infinite form . . . The history of this inner deepening of the world mind . . . or

in other words this free maturation in course of which the Idea realizing rationality in the external, releases its moments (and they are only its moments) from itself as totalities, and just for that reason still retains them in the ideal unity of the concept . . . the history of this genuine formation of ethical life is the content of the whole course of world history.³⁶

The purpose of *The Philosophy of Right* was not to outline the historicity of the state, but rather to map the progressivity of the ethical. Nevertheless, the pages of *The Philosophy of Right* are rife with comments, although condensed, about various state forms that were exhibited in history. In particular, paragraphs 273 to 279 contain perceptive observations on the varieties of state forms that surfaced in the course of time.

Hegel's regard for subjective activity required him to discourse on ethics. Subjective activity was the source of historical creativity; the dynamic of the modifications of the external found its origins in the materio-practical. But subjective activity must accept interdependence. Its own knowledge of itself was a result of its negation of an Other. Ethics were necessary to the Hegelian System because the System was based on the mutual interaction of independent subjects.

Rather than draw his inspiration from the theory of natural rights and the Enlightenment, which he rejected because of their excessive concentration on individualism, Hegel drew his political spirit from Plato and Aristotle. Hegel's approach to Plato and Aristotle comprised areas of refutation and areas of affirmation.

In relation to Plato, specifically *The Republic*, Hegel refuted the Platonic idea of communism. As I previously noted, Hegel considered private property as an indispensable safeguard of individuality. In the area of refutation Hegel also rejected the Platonic idea of the destruction of the family. Hegel considered the family as an educational prelude to civil society.

The domain of subjectivity was a perplexing issue for Hegel. On the one hand he defended the Ego because the Self represented the beginning of Spirit. Individualism, Luther, were a historic product of the Germanic World. On the other hand, Hegel denounced excessive egoism on the grounds that total obedience to self-gratification was destructive. In the area of refutation Hegel attacked Plato's complete negation of subjectivity. One of the faults of *The Republic*, in his view, was its complete erasure of personality.³⁷

Relating to Aristotle, the area of refutation lay in his tripartite typology of governments into democracy, aristocracy and monarchy. In his refutation of this Aristotelian typology Hegel made a profound comment:

. . . for us, respecting the inward elements of a state, and a description of its various constitutions . . . the latter, however, has no longer the same interest, on account of the different principles at the base of the ancient and modern states . . . but the Greeks were still unacquainted with the abstract right of our modern states, that isolates the individual, allows of his acting as such, and yet as an invisible spirit, holds all its parts together.³⁸

In the above paragraph Hegel not only claimed that Aristotle's typology of democracy–aristocracy–monarchy no longer carried any historical relevance, but that this atavism was caused by the socio-economic changes within civil society. He advanced the idea that sociological forces determined political philosophy. The changes in socio-economic forces operative in civil society were not only the basic propellants of historical evolution, but were also the substructure of the theories of the state.

In the area of affirmation Hegel adopted the Platonic and Aristotelian principle that universality took precedence over personhood. The Platonic and Aristotelian visions of the state embodied the ethical because both upheld the privileges of the universal over the Ego. Hegel's *The Philosophy of Right* was an attempt to resurrect the Greek ethical vision of the state within the social conditions of the German restoration. Community must limit the self-indulgence of personhood.

Hegel was a critic of the abstract subjectivity unleashed by the Enlightenment. He condemned excessive individuality because 'it proved itself to be what had wrought ruin to Greece'.³⁹ Abstract subjectivity was also the cause of some of the malignancies of pan-European society. Borrowing from Rousseau, Hegel was of the opinion that abstract subjectivity de-politicized the members of the state: '... in modern times the individual is only free for himself as such, and enjoys citizen freedom alone ... in the sense that of a bourgeois and not a citizen.'⁴⁰ In this sentence Hegel drew attention to the de-politicization of the constituents of the state due to their total fixation on their private interests. Whereas the member of the Athenian polis was a citizen, was an active political participant, the member of modern European society was amputated into a bourgeois who was severed from political life and addicted to self-aggrandizement. Hegel drew a distinction between the Self and the citizen.

Hegel sought to resurrect modern political life through a rebirth of the polis ideal within the content of 19th-century European society. The polis ideal was built on an organic principle, the sublimation of the individual into the universal. The linking of the individual and the community, the recreation of the conditions by which the individual could again assume the practice of politics, would subsume abstract subjectivity into the universal and such a subsumption was the condition of ethicality. *The Philosophy of Right* was a 19th-century version of the ethics and the polis definition of citizenship as the active participation in the affairs of the community.

Preoccupied with the 'logical pantheism' of Hegel, Marx remained blind to the Hegelian enterprise of reconstructing Athens under the political-economic conditions of Germany in the 1820s. It is obvious that Marx read the entirety of *The Philosophy of Right* including the early chapters dealing with the issues of right, will, individuality, property and freedom. He was familiar with Hegel's thinking on these problems relating to practical philosophy and ethics and made the decision to ignore them and limit his interpretation to the question of the state. In order to document beyond question that Marx was familiar with Hegel's presentation of the historicity of ethicality I will single out citations from *On the Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature* and the 'Critique of

Hegel's Philosophy of Right' in which Marx himself alludes to specific paragraphs in *The Philosophy of Right* as well as *The Philosophy of Mind* dealing with will, right, individuality, property and freedom.

In the Sixth Notebook of *On the Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature* Marx wrote:

If Hegel's pronouncement, which Baur accepts, is correct, that in his Republic Plato asserts Greek substantiality against the corrupting principle of subjectivity, then Plato is diametrically opposed to Christ, since Christ asserted this element of subjectivity against the existing state, which he characterized as only worldly.⁴¹

In this sentence Marx inserted a footnote and the footnote reads: 'G. E. Hegel, System der Philosophy. Dritter Teil. "Die Philosophie des Geistes" paragraph 552.'⁴² The paragraph that Marx refers to appears in the third volume of *The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, The Philosophy of Mind*. Section II of *The Philosophy of Mind* is entitled 'Mind Objective', and it contains a subsection called 'The Moral Life, or Social Ethics'. Paragraph 552 not only shows 'The Master' as a student of Plato, asserting the superiority of universality over particularity, the community over subjective wantonness, but also briefly comments on the reciprocity between religion and philosophy and how the state receives the sanction of the religio-philosophical. Marx completed his dissertation in 1841, two years before writing his 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' and by 1841 Marx was in contact with Hegel's convictions regarding ethics and politics.

In addition, the 1843 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right'⁴³ Marx made note of paragraph 12 in *The Philosophy of Right*. Paragraph 12 is located in the 'Introduction' to *The Philosophy of Right* and in itself is a part of Hegel's discussion of will. This citation to paragraph 12 is definitive regarding Marx's knowledge of Hegel's theory of will, but it also confirms that Marx read the entire 'Introduction' which summarizes the thinking of 'The Master' on the evolution of ethicality from will to personhood to right to property and to civil society. Marx's knowledge of the 'Introduction' informed him that Hegel's *The Philosophy of Right* was basically an exposition on ethics and that the state was one form, although the highest form, of ethical realization.

Furthermore, the 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' mentions paragraphs 65 and 66.⁴⁴ These paragraphs appear in the First Part of *The Philosophy of Right*, 'Abstract Right'. They occur in division one of 'Abstract Right', the division given over to a discussion of 'Property'; the 'Property' division is itself subdivided into three parts, 'Taking Possession,' 'Use of the Thing,' and 'Alienation of Property', and paragraphs 65 and 66 are in the part on 'Alienation of Property'.

The fact that Marx singled out these paragraphs verifies that he was acquainted with the complete section on 'Abstract Right' and consequently he was knowledgeable regarding Hegel's view of the practical activity of will as it moved from establishing personality to the acquisition of property and its realization of the

indispensability of freedom if it were to be allowed to express itself. All these steps were preparations for ethical behavior.⁴⁵

Lastly, Marx's 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' calls attention to paragraph 71 of *The Philosophy of Right*. This paragraph is the last paragraph in the section on 'Property' in the 'Abstract Right' part of Hegel's manuscript. Hegel's history of ethicality will be illuminated by quoting two sentences from paragraph 71:

But it is also an existent as an embodiment of the will, and from this point of view the 'other' for which it exists can only be the will of another person. This relation of will to will is the true and proper ground on which freedom can exist.⁴⁶

These two sentences are a condensation of the phylogeny of the ethical in the *Parmenides* of Berlin. It began with will, calls attention to intersubjectivity and realizes that it is only through mutual respect of individuality that freedom is guaranteed. Freedom is a constituent of Hegelian ethics because only in freedom can a will actualize itself and this actualization is a right that must be reciprocated by an 'Other'.

All three references certify beyond doubt that Marx was aware of the ethical theory of Hegel, but he made a conscious decision to overlook it and so he remained blind to the ethical content of the Hegelian state. Marx chose to regard 'logical pantheism' as the substance of Hegelian Speculative philosophy and so he totally undervalued the importance of materio-practical philosophy in Hegel. Marx disabled the Hegelian subject. For Hegel ethics was an emanation from materio-practical activity, the will taking control of personality, and when Marx devalued the materio-practical he also crippled the importance of subjectivity activity in Hegel. In Marx's interpretation of Hegel the subject, for the most part, did not act, materio-practical intervention into the external did not take place and the source of intervention into reality was omitted by Speculative logic.

Marx's insistence on seeing *The Philosophy of Right* as an extension of Hegel's *The Science of Logic* is made explicitly clear in his 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' in which he repeatedly draws this association. To prove this point I will list four short quotes from the 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' in which Marx comments on the Hegelian idea of the state:

- 1) On the contrary, their realization is predestined by the nature of the concept, sealed in the holy register of the Santa Casa (the Logic)⁴⁷
- 2) With the exclusion of these concrete determinations, which can just as well be exchanged for those of another sphere such as physics which has other concrete determinations, and which are accordingly unessential, we have before us a chapter from the Logic.⁴⁸
- 3) Hegel's true interest is not the philosophy of right, but logic. The philosophical task is not the embodiment of thought in Determinate political realities,

but the evaporation of these realities in abstract thought. The philosophical moment is not the logic of fact but the fact of logic; Logic is not used to prove the nature of the state, but the state is used to prove Logic.⁴⁹

- 4) Hegel gives his logic a political body; he does not give the logic of the political body.⁵⁰

Even though this section, 'The Ethical Nature of the State', was primarily devoted to Marx's neglect of the ethical content of the political philosophy of 'The Master' this is the place to re-affirm that in 1843 Marx still looked upon Hegel as a constitutional monarchist. In the 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' Marx identified Hegel as a constitutional monarchist and two quotes from the text itself prove this:

- 1) Hegel makes all attributes of the contemporary European constitutional monarchy into absolute self-determination of will.⁵¹
- 2) Regarding the monarch's position by birth, Hegel has not developed a patriarchal but rather a modern constitutional king.⁵²

* * * * *

The invisible Hegel made his appearance in the 1836–1848 writings of Marx.

The disappearance of the Hegel who wrote extensively on subjective activity and the materio-practical took place during Marx's First Appropriation of Hegel.

Marx was conscious that the proper 'method of criticizing' was indebted 'to the Hegelian philosophy as a whole and especially to the Hegelian dialectic'⁵³ and 'that it was now time to grasp the positive aspects of the Hegelian dialectic',⁵⁴ but, nevertheless, in the final analysis Marx cloaked the subjective activity and the materio-practical aspects of Hegel in invisibility.

During his First Appropriation of Hegel Marx summarized the 'Parmenides of Berlin' as the epitome of Speculative philosophy. According to Marx, Hegel's *The Science of Logic* was the point of origination for all the post-1807 writings of 'The Master'. For example, Marx looked upon *The Philosophy of Right* as a predication of *The Science of Logic*⁵⁵ and Marx also concluded that Hegel's Speculative philosophy was also the founding presupposition for all of Hegel's post-1806 authorship.

Uninformed of the writing of Michelet, Rosenkranz, Bayrhafer and Hinrichs, Marx remained blind to the importance of subjectivity in Hegel. Distorting Hegel, Marx believed that the true subject was the Idea.

Marx remained a prisoner to the distortion of Hegel as a Speculative philosopher and this blindness first became apparent in the 1841 *exzerpte* when he wrote that Hegel believed that the 'Idea was Subject' and that 'The real subjects are reduced to empty words'.⁵⁶ Marx wrote this *exzerpte* in 1841 approximately two years before he wrote the 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' and the *exzerpte* was the first articulation of the vision of Hegel contained in the 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right.' Furthermore, the misperception to which he fell victim in

the *exzerpte*, when Hegel was an invisibility, was the myopia that inflicted Marx throughout his entire life.

It is necessary to pursue two lines of investigation into the question of Hegel and political ethics in order to properly grasp Marx's comprehension of this issue: 1) Marx's myopia; 2) The continuation of the polis ideal.

1) Marx's myopia

Marx totally ignored the role of the ethical in Hegel and therefore distorted his presentation of 'The Master'. The disappearance of Hegel is most apparent in Marx's refusal to deal with the ethical dimensions of Hegelian thought, particularly in the area of political philosophy.

2) The continuation of the polis ideal

Regardless of the fact that Marx allowed the ethical to evaporate from his assessment of Hegel, he unknowingly shared a common purpose with the 'Parmenides of Berlin' in regard to the definition of the state. This common purpose was the re-creation of the polis ideal. Although Hegel and Marx embarked on different approaches to the attainment of this goal, Hegel took the path of Speculative philosophy while Marx took the path of communism, both wished to resurrect the unity of the private and public man they believed was the principle of the Athenian polis.

The Aristotelian dream of the unity of the *zoon oikonikon* and the *zoon politikon* was the political goal Hegel hoped to attain in the state. Aristotle sought to ensure that political existence was based on the unity of personhood, the co-existence of the private and the public Self. In the conditions of the Athenian polis Aristotle understood that the psychologico-ethical well-being of the Self evolved from the co-existence of the private and public Selves. The bifurcation of the Self, the antinomy between economic gain and political engagement, was the source of the dismemberment of the unity of the Self.

Even though Hegel opposed the natural rights of Rousseau, even though he repudiated the social contract theory of Rousseau, he agreed with the attempt of Rousseau to bring about the unity of *homme* and *citoyen*. Rousseau continued the Aristotelian dream of uniting the two halves of the human condition, one half absorbed in the private world of family and economics and the other half as the citizen who actively participated in political decision-making. Rousseau assumed that his republic would create the conditions for the oneness of *homme* and *citoyen*, where the Self could be simultaneously an economic subject and a political subject who helped determine the nature of the state.⁵⁷

The radical part of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* were those sections that revealed the moral bipolarity of the bourgeois world. Following Diderot, Hegel attacked the bourgeois environment because it made the unity of *homme* and *citoyen* impossible. The bourgeois world turned the human into an economic animal, a personhood who never ventured beyond self-indulgence. The bourgeois world was the burial site of Aristotle's dream. One part of Hegel that Marx embraced was the denunciation by 'The Master' of capitalist society. The radical Hegel was the godfather of Marx.

For Hegel, however, the journey back to Aristotle and the polis was through ethics; Hegel saw ethics as the most effective means to re-establish the unity of *zoon oikonikon* and *zoon politikon*. The state as an ethical organism was the only possible instrument in the 19th century to reconstruct man as the oneness of the private and public.

For Hegel the links that would reconnect the private and public were mutual recognition and the reciprocal nature of need. Although Hegel defended private property and capitalism he hoped that an ethic based on mutual recognition and the reciprocity of need would provide the ethical canons for social cooperation.

Another source of Marx's mis-reading of Hegel was that Marx allowed Hegelian political ethics to fall into a black hole. Marx's mis-reading of Hegel arose because he allowed for an Invisible Hegel. When Marx permitted the disappearance of aspects of The Master's philosophy he created the conditions for his own distorted reading of Hegel.

The fact that Marx distorted Hegel is no reason for modern students to distort Marx. Aristotle was a presence in Marx's wish for the extinction of private property. Marx's theory presupposed that the end of capitalism would render Aristotelian ethics an actuality.⁵⁸

Communism, for Marx, was not economic egalitarianism. Communism, for Marx, was based on the principles of the reciprocity of needs and how this reciprocity laid the foundation for mutual recognition. Private property was the basic deterrence to mutual recognition and when this deterrence was eliminated the reciprocity of need would act as the breeding ground for the re-unification of *homme* and *citoyen*.⁵⁹

Chapter Five

Marx's Method

In Marx's January 24, 1873 – ten years before his death – 'Postface' to the Second Edition of *Das Kapital*, he wrote:

The mystification which the dialectic suffers in Hegel's hands by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of motion in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be inverted, in order to discover the rational kernel within its mystical shell.¹

Marx did exactly what this statement said should be done with Hegelian thought. This statement is a guide to how Marx used Hegelian philosophy.

I take these three sentences as Marx's self-declaration that he discontinued the Hegelian System, but continued the Hegelian methodology. Marx states that in his relationship with Hegel he repudiated the 'mystical shell', or Speculative philosophy. He then confirms that his continuity with Hegel was the maintenance of the 'rational kernel', its methodology. He self-confesses that he 'inverted' Hegel, moved its main principles from thought to a methodology by which to comprehend social formations. Marx understood his relation to 'The Master' perfectly and in *Das Kapital* he fulfilled his mission of demonstrating how the 'rational kernel' was a methodology of social explanation.

In order to definitively understand Marx's use of Hegelian methodology it is first necessary to grasp the revolution Hegel effected upon traditional Western logic. Hegel initiated a dual revolution and I will now indicate how these reconstructions formed the basis of Marx's methodology of social explanation.

In Volume One, 'Logic,' of *The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, Hegel rejected four previous schools of philosophy and logic; metaphysics, empiricism, critical philosophy and intuition.

Metaphysics, the belief that the external, the thing-in-itself, could be known, spanned Western philosophy from Plato through medieval Scholasticism to the mathematical ruminations of Isaac Newton and Descartes. Metaphysics asserted the existence of an eternal substance, be it Idea, God or Physics, and affirmed mind's ability to know these substances. Metaphysics was static, ahistorical, devoid

of movement and Hegel denigrated this centuries-old philosophical school by classifying it as 'dogmatism'.²

Empiricism, the school of English philosophy represented by Locke and Hume, also maintained that the external world, the thing-in-itself, could be known. Hegel referred to this school as pictorial, the belief that sense-perception imprinted accurate images of the objective world into the mind of the subject. Hegel relegated European empiricism to the level of the understanding, or the level anterior to self-consciousness and reason.³ For Hegel sense-perception was only capable of grasping appearance and actuality lay beyond its reach.

Critical philosophy, the giant advances made by Kant, suffered from the defect of preserving the separation between subject and object. Hegel recognized that Kant initiated modern philosophy by examining the cognitive powers of mind and frequently expressed his indebtedness to this titan. The defect of critical philosophy was its acquiescence in the split between subject and object, the unbridgeable cleft between the external and the faculties of mind, between the object and the 'I'. In order to overcome this schism Hegel turned to Fichte who supplied Hegel with a logic supporting the unity of subject and object. Critical philosophy as articulated by Kant assumed that exact knowledge of the thing-in-itself was unattainable, but Fichte opened the way to the reunification of subject and object by interpreting thought as a dynamic force, as an outpouring which shaped the object thus establishing the fusion between object and Self's thought.⁴

Intuitive knowledge, as represented in the work of F. H. Jacobi, drew heavily upon the Cartesian theorem that 'I think, therefore, I am'. Jacobi maintained that the idea of God was in-itself proof of the existence of God. According to Hegel the assumption that the idea of an external object was simultaneously proof of the objective existence of that object was fallacious. Influenced by the physical sciences of the 17th and 18th-century Enlightenment, Jacobi was impressed by the power of reason to ascertain the natural forces of the universe and took this success as proof that internal idea was the guarantee of immediacy, the presence of an external object. Hegel considered the theory of intuitive knowledge as a return to metaphysics.

After rejecting the metaphysical, empirical, critical and intuitive schools of philosophy, Hegel substituted the Speculative and identified himself as one of the originators of this school. The distinguishing feature of Speculative philosophy was the reunification of the subject and the object. Mind's inherent objectification became a presence in the shaping of actuality and thus a study of actuality was the self-recognition of mind. The dialectic, as represented in the syllogism, was the major logical apparatus of Speculative philosophy. Historical, immanent development, Speculative philosophy required a dialectic of negativity because it needed to supersede.

Based on these principles of Speculative philosophy Hegel reconfigured the definition of philosophy itself. Philosophy was a phenomenology, or it was a product of mind. Philosophy was an objectification of mind in accord with the historical period in which mind was embedded.

Development was an axial principle in Hegel's definition of philosophy because it captured the inherent tendency of mind to progress from the in-itself, potential,

to the for-itself, actual. Following Aristotle Hegel understood mind as dynamic, as an agency that moved outward from the implicit to the explicit. Proceeding along the pathway from potentiality to actuality mind produced shapes, contours, by which to interpret its historical environment.⁵

Philosophy was the 'Know Thyself'. Philosophy was a form of self-recognition, the learning of the nature of mind through an understanding of the products of mind. Philosophy was an instance of self-knowledge, the mind's self-education of itself through the study of the results of its own labor.

The consciousness of the unity of subject and object was Spirit. The highest attainment of the human endeavor was the entrance into Spirit; Spirit was the insight that the world was merely a projection of mind. The human was the divine; it was the Self that was the creator of the world and Spirit was the Self's self-knowledge that it generated this world.

Hegel's conception of mind as prius emphasized mind's activity. Mind labored to produce objectifications and mind labored to reach its end. The ultimate labor of mind was to attain the reconciliation between reason and reality, the in-itself with the for-itself; the actualization of mind was only reached when reason and reality were conjoined.⁶

A difference existed between philosophy and the history of philosophy. Up until this point my discussion has focused on philosophy, but the history of philosophy was a different exercise and was concerned with mind's self-manifestations in time. For Hegel philosophy was theodicy.⁷ The history of philosophy was embedded in temporality. For Hegel there was only one philosophy, but this one philosophy was divided into several historical periods.⁸

In his *The History of Philosophy* Hegel isolated four general historical periods: Oriental, Greco-Roman, Medieval and Modern (or Modern-Germanic). The Oriental period was devoid of philosophy and that reduced the civilizations within which philosophy flourished to three, the Greco-Roman, Medieval and Modern. Whereas in his *The History of Philosophy* Hegel began the period of Modern Philosophy with the Scientific Revolution initiated by Bacon and discussed the contributions of the Scottish Enlightenment and the French from Descartes to Rousseau, in his *The Philosophy of History* he synthesized all of Western history since the fall of Rome as 'the Germanic World'.⁹

Within the chronological boundaries of the Greco-Roman, Medieval and Modern civilizations the history of philosophy essentially produced three forms of thought. Two important accomplishments of the history of philosophy during the Greco-Roman age was the discovery of subjectivity and the understanding that 'thought', *nous*, was the substance of the world. The Chinese never developed philosophy because they never achieved a concept of the free 'Self' and it was the Greek Anaxagoras who established the notion of philosophy when he asserted that 'thought' was the substance of the world.¹⁰ The history of philosophy during the Medieval epoch was entombed under theology. The Renaissance witnessed the rebirth of philosophy and this period of civilization witnessed the liberation of philosophy from theology, the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment which gave rise to empirical philosophy and the 'Metaphysics of Understanding'

of Locke and Hume,¹¹ French materialism of the 17th and 18th centuries, culminating in German 18th and 19th-century philosophy, which was the breeding ground of Kant's critical philosophy as an emancipation from metaphysics, thus setting the stage for the thought of Speculative philosophy.

The history of philosophy rested upon the notion of organic units. Each of these systems of thought, Greco-Roman, Medieval and Modern-Germanic, were organic structures composed in terms of biological entities. In the 'Preface' to *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel refers to the history of philosophy as a museum of 'shapes', 'forms', meaning that the Greco-Roman, Medieval and Modern-Germanic were configurations produced by thought in its drive to unify subject and object in terms of the time-zone in which it was located.¹²

Further proof of Hegel's adoption of the organic Method of explanation is found in the chapter on 'Reason' in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. In a subsection 'Observing Reason', Hegel as early as 1806 looked upon holistic explanation as putting forth the most accurate account of nature. *The Phenomenology of Spirit* is the curriculum vitae of the career of mind and in the early grades of this career reason can best appropriate the truth of nature by applying the organic Method.¹³

The organic units of the history of philosophy corresponded to a biological prototype. Hegel belonged to generation of German thinkers who rebelled against the mechanistic model of explanation found in the works of Newton and Descartes. Living during a period which witnessed the explosion of the biological and zoological sciences, the work of Cuvier, Linnaeus and Buffon, Hegel, like Goethe, replaced the mechanistic paradigm with the model of organism.

In this regard Hegel was influenced by the work of Kant. In his *The Critique of Judgement*, Kant also saw the advantages of organic explanation over the mechanistic. *The Critique of Judgement* provided logical support for organic explanation and Hegel built on this tradition.¹⁴

Hegel's employment of the organic Method of explanation is not only demonstrated in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, *The History of Philosophy* and *The Philosophy of History* but also in *The Philosophy of Nature*. Hegel divides nature into three parts, mechanics, physics and organics, and presents each of these divisions as parts of a holism. Nature itself is a cosmic organism, it is possessed of three parts, it is not static and it develops from the mechanical through physics to the organic.¹⁵

The clearest expression of Hegel's embrace of organism is found in Section Three of *The Philosophy of Nature*, 'Organics'. In the preceding sections Hegel dealt with physics and chemistry, but in Organics Hegel deals with the appearance of life. The inherent development in this section is from the earth to plants to animals and to human life. Hegel's design is Aristotelian; the purpose of the organic sphere is to reach its end in the human genus. Hegel was not Charles Darwin, he did not believe in the evolution of the human genus from the animal genus. Each genera was separate and distinct, a part of the whole of the organic sphere.¹⁶

The organic Method was central to the Hegelian definition of science. In this domain, as well, Hegel broke with the empirical definition of science. Rather than characterize science as a Method to achieve the correspondence between the external world and the internal ideas by means of sense perception, Hegel thought of

science as System. For Hegel System was a holism, or a universality in which all particulars were unified. Hegel not only revolutionized the ideas of philosophy and logic but also the idea of science. Hegel's *The Science of Logic* was really the enthronement of systematic explanation, a demonstration that the Absolute Idea was the whole, the synthesis of the particular determinations of mind into a holism.

Hegel's *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* offers a clear articulation of his understanding of science. It is an ontological syllogism. It begins with a notion of logic which experiences dialectical negation in the notion of nature and concludes with a dialectical synthesis in mind. Logic is ultimately subsumed in mind. Paragraphs 575, 576 and 577 of volume three of the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, The Philosophy of Mind*, presents the syllogism as the ontology of mind.¹⁷ The syllogism is the ontological form followed by mind, nature's negation of logic and mind's negation of nature, which brings forth a holism. The movement from logic to nature and then to mind demonstrates the inherent developmental prius of mind and how teleological movement ultimately results in a universal System, the Absolute Idea.

The revolutions Hegel effected in the definitions of philosophy, the history of philosophy and science he extended to the meaning of logic. Overthrowing all past characterizations, Hegel did not understand logic as correspondence, either in the empiricist sense of the congruence between sense perception and Idea or in the metaphysical sense of an eternal external Idea Platonically imaged in the human mind. For Hegel logic was the function, the method, the determinations of thought.

It is necessary, at this point, to distinguish between System and Method. As I indicated above, System relates to an organic unit, a whole. Conversely, Method relates to the procedures of mind which sustain the whole. While System relates to the universality, Method deals with the functions of thought which preserve the totality. Method is those patterns of thought which give rise to a System.

Regardless of the distinction between these two categories both System and Method are reflections of thought. Hegel began his *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* with a volume on logic because he wanted to show how the methods of thought determine the understanding of nature, ethics, morality, art and religion. Method was the procedures of thought, while System was the result of this Method.

The 'Preface' to *The Phenomenology of Spirit* is one of the great documents in philosophical literature. It is a prelude to Hegel's later mature System. In the 'Preface' Hegel abjured acting as a revolutionary, but, in fact, *The Phenomenology of Spirit* was the source of a revolution in the discipline of philosophy. One aspect of this upheaval was Hegel's reformulation of the rules of logic. Hegel replaced logic with Method. He nullified all previous forms of logic, empirical, mathematical, metaphysical and theological, and substituted Method for all these moribund forms. The new Method of philosophical inquiry promised to open new continents of knowledge that the dead logic was incapable of exploring. Amongst other innovations Hegel believed that his new pneumatology required a new methodology to organize the new objectifications of Spirit.¹⁸

The concept of Method was critical to Hegel's reformulation of the notion of logic. The revolution in the meaning of logic executed by Hegel was most clearly articulated in the 'Small Logic' of the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* published in 1817 and in *The Science of Logic* published in three installments in 1812, 1813 and 1816. The insurrection Hegel carried out against traditional interpretations of logic was based on the principle that logic was not based on an eternal *modus operandi* for attaining a knowledge of the thing-in-itself. Just as philosophy itself experienced historical transformations so logic also experienced temporal modifications. Rather than speak of logic within the Hegelian System it is more appropriate to employ the term Method, or content. In the 'Small Logic' Hegel demonstrated how every philosophical system – metaphysics, empiricism, intuition, critical theory and Speculative philosophy – was supported by a Method that was the substructure of the universal idea of that system, or form. Just as there were three philosophical totalities in the Western world, Greco-Roman, Medieval and Modern-Germanic, so there were three methodological formats which corresponded to them. Historicity was a definitive notion within the Hegelian Speculative System and within this Speculative System not only was philosophy shaped by historical change but also methodology itself underwent historical metamorphosis.

In paragraph 243 of the 'Logic' of the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* Hegel wrote:

It thus appears that the Method is not an extraneous form, but the soul and notion of the content, from which it is only distinguished, so far as the dynamic elements of the notion even on their own part come in their own specific character to appear as the totality of the notion. This specific character, or the content, leads itself with the form back to the idea; and thus the idea is presented as a systematic totality which is only one idea, of which the several elements are each implicitly the idea, which they equally by the dialectic of the notion produce the simple independence of the idea.¹⁹

Hegel's conviction that every idea was the outcome of a particular method was repeated consistently throughout the 'Logic' of the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*. One function of thought was to arrive at the concrete and this form of comprehension was analytical thought. But the attainment of the concrete would only be achieved by an analytical *modus operandi* and in paragraph 227 Hegel called this function 'the analytical method'.²⁰ However, in the attainment of the Idea it was necessary to move from the concrete to universality and in paragraph 222 Hegel referred to this universalizing function as the 'synthetic method'.²¹ As the advance of thought continued beyond the analytic and the synthetic stages it ultimately arrived at the Absolute Idea, and the Absolute Idea itself was a product of Method. In paragraph 237 Hegel wrote: 'All that is at this stage left as form for the idea is the Method of this content . . . the specific consciousness of the value and currency of the "moments" of its development.'²² In distinction to the metaphysical, empirical, critical and intuitive System, Speculative philosophy

had its own Method. In paragraph 238 Hegel wrote: 'The several steps or stages of the Speculative Method are first of all (a) the Beginning, which is Being, or immediacy . . .'²³

It is in the pages of *The Science of Logic* that Hegel offers his most complete discussion of methodology. However, I propose that it is necessary to change the title of this revolutionary treatise. It is necessary to keep in mind that Hegel redefined the term science to mean a System, or a totality. In addition it is also necessary to recall that Hegel redefined the term logic to mean methodology, or the functional regime of the Idea. With these two redefinitions in mind I propose it is necessary to change the title of *The Science of Logic* to 'The System of Methodology of the Idea'. Hegel's discourse on methodology was a transforming moment in the history of the discipline of logic.

Hegel announced his reconstruction of logic in the 'Introduction' to his 'The System of Methodology of the Idea'. In this 'Introduction' he notes that the need to reformulate logic was a long-standing conviction among philosophic practitioners.²⁴ He claimed that until the publication of 'The System of Methodology of the Idea', philosophy was estranged from its proper Method.²⁵ He then proceeds to express his own revolutionary goal.

I could not pretend that the Method which I follow in this system of logic . . . or rather which this system in its own self follows . . . is not capable of greater completeness, if much elaboration in detail; but at the same time I know that it is the only true Method.²⁶

It would give to mind the picture of a methodologically ordered whole, although the soul of the structure, the Method (which dwells in the dialectic aspect). Would not itself appear in it.²⁷

The culmination of Hegel's rebellion against traditional logic occurs in the second volume of 'The System of Methodology of the Idea', 'Subjective Logic, the Doctrine of Reason'. In 'Subjective Logic' Hegel distinguishes between the methodology of mechanism, or physics, and the methodology of Subjective Spirit, or the activity of the human mind as it attains the Idea. As Hegel makes the transition from the mechanistic-chemical to the subjective he designates the teleological Method as the distinguishing feature of subjectivity as it evolves the Idea. Only subjectivity is capable of achieving the Idea.

Hegel's insurrection against traditional mechanistic-chemical versions of logic was mostly demonstrated by his inclusion of a chapter on 'Life' in his 'The System of Methodology of the Idea'. Hegel included this chapter to accentuate the dynamic aspect of methodology, the constant outpouring of thought in the attempt of mind to infiltrate reality.

The consummation of 'The System of Methodology of the Idea' was the Absolute Idea. However, the Absolute Idea was not eternal, not immobile, but rather was result, the outcome of the previous stages of methodology. The Absolute Idea

was the product of the stages of thought, the forms of thought out of which the Absolute Idea was an effect.²⁸

Hegel captured his belief in the impermanence of the Absolute Idea by referring to it as cyclic. The Absolute Idea was not Platonic, but rather a cycle, and this meant that after the methodological construction of the Absolute Idea it re-submerged itself again in nature. Like philosophy, Method was a cycle. Philosophy must be reconstructed depending upon the period of history in which it was situated and the Absolute Idea, after its completion, returned to reality and again began its cyclic construction as a new Absolute Idea. The Absolute Idea experienced constant rebirth and the instrument of its reincarnation was the Method. For Hegel, methodology was the law of eternal return.²⁹

Within the organic holism of the Hegelian System the primary methodology was the dialectic, or the determining influence of negativity. Influenced by the Greek Sceptics and Spinoza's proposition that to negate was to define, Hegel maintained there could be no specificity without the power of negation. Specificity only arose when negation, or limitation, the separation from the Other, acted to create a boundary, or identity.

The syllogism was Hegel's major dialectical instrument. The formula of the syllogism, the negation of universality by particularity, which found a synthesis in the individual, was the syllogism's core methodological procedure. In 'The System of Methodology of the Idea' Hegel devoted Chapter Three of the 'Subjective Logic', or 'The Doctrine of the Notion', to a discussion of the syllogism and claimed that rationality in-itself was reducible to the syllogism.³⁰ The notion was the outcome of the mediation between the universal and the particular.

However, the methodology of the Hegelian System was restricted to thought. 'The Master' wrote a methodology of Speculative Idealism. The functional patterns, the dialectic of the syllogism as the axial one, were descriptions of the behavior of thought.

My assessment of Marx's relationship to Hegel was divided into two parts, discontinuities and continuities. As I proceed to finalize this assessment I will start with the discontinuities.

Marx rejected the Hegelian System because in his reading of 'The Master' he believed it to be a 'logical pantheism'. The dynamic of the Hegelian System was mind and Marx rebuffed this presupposition. A tribune of materialism, Marx's goal was to locate the sources of human alienation in political economy and sociology. Hegel's point of origination was mind, he carried on the tradition of Kant and Fichte in ascertaining the operational modes of thought.

Marx divided Hegelian Speculative philosophy in two parts, System and Method. He rejected the systematic aspects of Hegelian Speculative philosophy, but Continued the methodological aspects.

However, it is necessary to draw a distinction between the purposes of methodology in Hegel and Marx. As I mentioned previously the primary methodology of the 'Parmenides of Berlin' was the dialectic; the goal of methodology in Hegel was to discover the genesis of the Absolute Idea. Encased inside a Speculative

Idealist framework, the basic purpose of methodology was to map the procedural determinism of thought.

As I will point out below Marx did appropriate many of the procedural categories of Hegel and this appropriation was the basis of his continuity with the 'Parmenides of Berlin'. But the end toward which this methodology was directed differed from that of Hegel. Whereas the purpose of methodology in Hegel was the description of the procedural determinism of thought, a rational teleology, the purpose of methodology in Marx was the construction of a model by which to explain social systems.

Marx's grand design of creating a new methodology for the explanations of social formations entailed that he borrow specific methodological categories from Hegel. Marx's continuity with Hegel lies in the fact that he utilized Hegelian categories, but it must be remembered that the purpose to which he put these Hegelian categories differed from the Hegelian purpose and in this disparity lay one of the reasons for the discontinuity between Marx and Hegel.

In order to establish the methodological continuity between Hegel and Marx I will discuss eight categories Marx borrowed from Hegel, although Marx incorporated more than eight methodological categories from Hegel. Even though I have discussed some of these categories in previous parts of this book I will repeat them in this chapter on Marx's Method as a means of definitively outlining his methodology. The categories I will analyze are: 1) The productive model; 2) Historicity; 3) Organism; 4) Universal-particular; 5) Essence; 6) Immanent development; 7) Relation; 8) Abstract-concrete.

1) The productive model

Hegel wrote an encyclopedia of the labor of human Spirit. Marx invented a political economy whose foundational category was human labor. Both Hegel and Marx agreed that the dynamic of the genesis of the world was labor. However, they disagreed over the source of this labor.

Hegel wrote a phenomenology of the human Spirit. Marx wrote a phenomenology of the labor of the species. The separation between Hegel and Marx did not concern the issue of labor but the issues of source and goals. Hegel and Marx agreed that humanity was a force of predication, but they disagreed over the goal of this pneumatology. The end for Hegel was the development of Spirit, while the end for Marx was the creation of an economic formation.

2) Historicity

Historicity was an indispensable category in the Hegelian System. Retrospection was required if mind was to 'Know Thyself'. Marx's methodology of social explanation was predicated on the principle of historicity. The idea of perpetual development was a necessity as Marx sought to explain the movement of social formations.

The force that propelled the movement of social formations was the metabolism between man and nature. Marx viewed nature as an extension of human labor, as

a member of the human body. Humankind and nature were interactive agencies. The history of human labor, its advancement to higher forms of productivity, was the ground upon which social formations were transformed over time. In a parallel fashion, nature itself became historical as human productivity modified the resources nature made available to labor.

3) Organism

The Phenomenology of Spirit contains an early articulation of Hegel's belief that explanation in the natural, historical and philosophical sciences should be conducted in terms of the organic model.

Hegel's magnum opus established new criteria for the philosophical enterprise. In the magnificent 'Preface' to *The Phenomenology of Spirit* the organic image was presented as a part of a new criterion; the understanding of the history of philosophy, or the development of a specific philosophic system, could only be gained by viewing these constructions in organic terms. Organic explanation was an irreplaceable instrument of Hegelian methodology. The history of philosophy, or a specific philosophic system, could only be grasped if the organic Method was applied to it, if its parts were unified into a whole, if the System was perceived as a totality.³¹

Rejecting the mathematical-mechanical view of explanation as espoused by Descartes and Newton, Hegel looked upon 'anatomy' as the form of explanation unifying the universal and particular.³²

Marx borrowed the anatomical model of explanation from Hegel. Even though the 1857–1858 *Grundrisse* lies beyond the temporal boundaries of this book; in order to provide validation for this assertion I will have recourse to this indispensable text in understanding Marx's methodology. The 'Introduction' to the *Grundrisse* contains a section entitled 'The Method of Political Economy' and in this section Marx wrote:

Human anatomy contains a key to the anatomy of the ape. The intimations of the higher development among subordinate animal species, however, can be understood only after the development is already known. The bourgeois economy thus supplies the key to the ancient, etc.³³

Even though Marx embraced the anatomical category of Hegel he applied that model to a different realm. Whereas Hegel applied the organic image to philosophy, art and religion, Marx applied the organic model to the realm of political economy. In Marx the term social formation was a synonym for the organic.

In the course of human history four social formations make their appearance, the tribal gens, the agrarian, the feudal and the capitalist as represented in 17th and 18th-century commercialism and the early 19th-century Industrial Revolution. Each of the social formations was organized on the organic model. For Marx a social formation, arising out of the ground of political economy, was a holism. In addition to the universal an anatomical totality was also composed of

particularities and these particularities sustained the universal because they replicated, performed in coordination, with the universal mode of operation.

4) Universal-particular

Major categories of Marx's Method of social explanation are drawn from Book Two of Hegel's, *The Science of Logic*, 'The Doctrine of Essence'. *The Science of Logic* was a necessary prerequisite for Marx's Method of social explanation; Hegel was the originator of most of the methodological categories adopted by Marx. 'The Doctrine of Essence' was the primary source of the categories incorporated by Marx into his Method of social explanation.

'The Doctrine of Essence' is divided into three sections, 'Essence as Reflection within Itself', 'Appearance' and 'Actuality'. The third chapter of section two, 'Appearance' is entitled 'The Essential Relation' and includes the following paragraph:

The relation thus contains the subsistence of the sides and equally their sublatedness, and it contains both simply in one relation. The whole is the self-subsistent, the parts are only moments of this unity; but equally they, too, are the self-subsistent and their reflected unity only a moment; and each is, in itself subsistence, simply the relative of an other. This relation is therefore in its own self immediate contradiction, and sublates itself.³⁴

Marx appropriated the methodology of universal-particular and applied it as an explanatory tool to social relations. Every organic totality possessed a universal; universality was the sinew that bound the holism together. The particularities of an organic totality were localized functions within the holism that reflected the universality.

In relation to the capitalist social formation the universal was the unquenchable thirst for valorization. The universal principle that rendered a social formation a capitalist organism was the directing of every function within the organism to the production of relative surplus value.

In parallel fashion every particularity within a capitalist organism was a reflection of the universality. Every particularity within a capitalist organism was supportive of the universal, acting in such a fashion as to assist in the process of valorization. The dominant drive within a capitalist anatomy was endless valorization. Money, a particularity within a capitalist universality, was a reflection of this drive and acted as the basis of exchange value and thereby was a stimulus to the process of valorization.

5) Essence

Marx was introduced to the notion of essence in his reading of Hegel's *The Science of Logic*. Book Two of *The Science of Logic* is entitled 'The Doctrine of Essence' and is an in-depth discussion of this pivotal Hegelian concept.³⁵

In Hegel essence was the in-itself, it was the universal quality of an organic totality. Continuing an Aristotelian tradition, essence was the quality that produced the identity of the holism.

Marx borrowed the concept of essence from Hegel and relocated the domain of its operations. Whereas Hegel located essence as a methodology of the logic, Marx transplanted essence to the domain of political economy.

For Marx the essence of capitalism was the drive toward valorization. Capitalism was the limitless quest for relative surplus value and as long as capitalism functioned according to this principle it functioned in terms of its essence. Marx was the first to utilize the concept of essence as an explanatory methodology in political economy and Marx thereby revolutionized the nature of political economy.

6) Immanent development

Again following Aristotle, Hegel's 'The Doctrine of Essence' charts the movement from essence to actuality.³⁶ Within the realm of the methodology of the Idea, Hegel maintained that the movement of the in-itself, the identity of a notion, developed into actuality. The coming to be of actuality was the immanent development of the essence.

Another way to describe immanent development was the movement from the potential to the actual. Essence was also potential, it was the in-itself that possessed the potential to expand. Actuality was the realization of this potential.

Marx related to the Aristotelian-Hegelian formula of political economy. Since the essence of capitalism was the continuous appropriation of relative surplus value then the immanent development of capitalism meant that every new frontier that the capitalist social formation encountered would be transformed into a reflection of that capitalist organism.

Imperialism was an example of immanent development. The economic crisis of 1857 validated Marx's belief that Western European capitalism required colonial markets as a means of expanding its acquisition of relative surplus value. Focusing on British India as reported in London newspapers, Marx learned that the ancient Indian gens based on collective property was demolished by English capitalism which found a greater profit in the collection of rent from private property owners. The immanent development of capitalism planted the seeds of capitalism in British colonial possessions and the gens was being replaced by individual ownership.

7) Relations

In Hegel relationship was a means of definition. Just as negation was a means of establishing individuality or identity so relationship was an avenue by which to postulate a self-subsistence.³⁷

For Hegel identity was established through opposition. Although they were antinomies, whole and parts were dependent on each other. The self-subsistence of the whole was dependent upon the opposition of the parts, while the identity of the parts was determined by the negative of the whole.

To relate was to determine an in-itself. The antinomies were reflections of each other. The whole was a reflection of the parts because the parts negated the whole and thereby imposed on the whole its identity as a whole. Relationship was the establishment of identity and the identity changed in terms of the relationship in which it was located.

Marx also defined identity as a reflection of a relationship. However, for Marx the relationship existed in the realm of political economy. An identity was established by the political economic ambience in which it was rooted.

Precious metals, notably gold, existed from the earliest stages of human civilization, but it was only in the organism of capitalism that gold became money. The essence of capitalism was commodity production and an identity was needed to facilitate commodity exchange whose purpose was profit. The relationship of commodity exchange created the condition in which gold could be transformed into money.

One of the axial ideas in Marx's Method of social explanation was the relations of production. These relations of production were not eternal but changed in terms of the social formations of which they were part. The relations of production of agriculture were constructed on a different pattern than the social relations of overseas commercialism and of capitalism. Identities, particularities, were supplied a determination by the alternative production relations of a social formation.

Lenin's insights into Marx's methodology were frequently insightful. Although this is not the place to detour into an analysis of Lenin it is also true that his contributions should not be overlooked; an attempt should be made to detach Lenin from Stalinism. Perceptive and penetrating, Lenin was aware of the centrality of the concept of social relations in Marx. In his 'Conspectus of the Book *The Holy Family* by Marx and Engels' Lenin wrote:

This passage is highly characteristic for it shows how Marx approached the basic idea of his entire 'system' . . . namely the concept of the social relations of production.³⁸

8) Abstract-concrete

In Hegel the abstract was a universal which was assembled from a perceptible reality. Hegel discussed his notion of the abstract in his subsection on Identity in Chapter Two, 'The Essentialities or Determinations of Reflection' in *The Science of Logic*.³⁹

The practice of abstraction entailed the redaction of difference. The exercise of abstraction is simultaneously the achievement of identity, or sameness. By eliminating difference, by redacting the inconsistent, the universal can be attained. In the practice of abstraction the universal was the generality, the universal transcended all distinctiveness and separateness and established an identity.

Abstraction was an initial process and it unfolded in thought. In order to reach the universal it was necessary that the process of transcending difference

operate in the realm of thought. The creation of the concrete entailed an inversion of this process. The delineation of the concrete meant the re-submergence into reality.

The concrete was the achievement by reality of an identity. The concrete did not exist in the world of thought like the abstract, but the concrete was the application of the abstract to reality. The concrete was the reversal of abstraction, the entrance of thought into reality and the endowment of reality with an identity which because it was a generalizing definition was also a universality.

The 'Introduction' to The Master's *The History of Philosophy* contains a subsection entitled 'The Notion of the Concrete' and in this subsection Hegel defined the concrete in the following terms:

In-itself the Idea is really concrete, for it is the union of the different determinations. It is here that reasoned knowledge differs from mere knowledge of the understanding, and it is the business of Philosophy as opposed to understanding, to show that the truth or the Idea does not consist in empty generalities, but in the universal; and that is within itself the particular of the determined. If the Truth is abstract it must be untrue . . . philosophy is what is most antagonistic to abstraction and it leads back to the concrete.⁴⁰

Philosophy was the eternal process, with the infinite obligation to 'Know Thyself', but philosophy could only gain self-knowledge in the concrete. The Greek discovery of the power of subjectivity was an instance of the concrete. Subjectivity was a moment of identity, the determinations of philosophy into an in-itself thereby defining Greek culture and also educating philosophy as to an irreplaceable quality of its own education.

Marx borrowed the Hegelian methodology of abstract and concrete and applied it as an instrument of social explanation. In his analysis of social formations Marx began his inquiry with a search for the abstract. By comparing alternatives, Marx was able to abstract the universality within each of these forms.

By comparing agricultural, commercial and capitalist social formations, Marx abstracted the essence of capitalism. Unlike agrarian societies capitalist societies were defined by the universality of valorization. Abstraction, the comparison of divergent social organisms as a means to uncover the in-itself of each social organism, provided Marx with the intellectual tools to discover the essential determination of that social anatomy.

The movement to the concrete required that Marx detail how the abstract realized itself inside a social formation. The abstract of capitalism, valorization, found its concrete reality in money. If valorization was the determinate essence of capitalism, then money, relative surplus value, labor time, were concretes within the System. The concrete was the realization of the abstract, it was the abstract fulfilling itself in a social formation.

Marx's Method was constructed upon the methodological categories he borrowed from the Parmenides of Berlin. Marx's Method was a formula for social explanation, a procedure for understanding how a social formation functioned.

Marx's work as a methodology of explanation is radically different from previous interpretations of his work as dialectical materialism and historical materialism. As formulated by Engels in his *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, *Anti-Dühring* and *The Dialectics of Nature*, dialectical materialism was a metaphysics of nature. I am aware that Engels himself never used the phrase dialectical materialism and that the first person to employ it was Georgii Plekhanov. Nevertheless, in the three works mentioned above Engels set forth all the major principles of this metaphysics of nature and therefore he can legitimately be ascribed as the founder of dialectical materialism.

Dialectical materialism was composed of four major theses. In *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* Engels claimed that a 'progressive development' asserted itself in both nature and history.⁴¹ In *Anti-Dühring* Engels for the first time avowed that the dialectical principles of contradiction and negation were operative laws both in the physical universe and history.⁴² The fourth dialectical law, the interpenetration of opposites, was first stated in his *The Dialectics of Nature*.⁴³

Dialectical materialism subsumed human history under the laws of nature. The same laws that governed nature also dictated the movement of history. Dialectical materialism was a form of historical determinism in which the controlling law devolved from the metaphysical principles of nature.

Historical materialism jettisoned the positivism of dialectical materialism and substituted the clash between the means and relations of production. Historical materialism enjoyed the advantage of freeing human history from its subsumption under the metaphysics of nature. The 'progressive development' of history was explained solely in terms of the dialectical clash between means and relations of production, the substructure and superstructure. The reliance on the dialectic of the substructure and superstructure predisposed historical materialism to a linear view of history. Historical materialism defended the position of a transhistorical development of history, from the primitive gens to agrarianism to commercialism to the Industrial Revolution and fully developed capitalism and to the transcendence of capitalism by socialism and communism. History was guided by necessitarian stages. A linear view of history was a malignancy within historical materialism.⁴⁴

My definition of Marx's theory as a methodology of social explanation is a refutation of both dialectical and historical materialism. In terms of dialectical materialism my definition is a total rejection of metaphysics both as a metaphysics of nature and as a metaphysics of society. In terms of historical materialism my definition abandons any attempt to construct sociological laws as a device to predict the future movement of a social formation. It denies that the attempt to arrive at social laws that determined the development of history was the goal toward which Marx aspired.

Rather, Marx espoused a methodology of social explanation. He maintained that it was possible to ascertain the functioning of a social organism through the application of the methodological categories I outlined above. Marx searched for a knowledge of the concrete. He did not search for the linear law of historical evolution. Marx's methodology was designed to comprehend the procedures of

a social anatomy, to comprehend the functional regularities of a singular social formation, and not to frame laws regarding the general movement of history.

The thought of Marx has a history and one interpretation was imposed upon Marx by Stalinist Russia, Maoist China or the Marxism that developed in Europe and America in the 1960s and 1970s. Stalinist Russia and Maoist China created a Marxism based on dialectical materialism. They were the heirs of Engels. They used dialectical materialism in order to legitimate their revolutions and exercise political party power. In Europe and America in the 1960s and 1970s historical materialism was the prevalent form of Marxism. Anti-Stalinist, historical materialism rejected the dictatorship of the communist party and ceased being a source of legitimation for authoritarian governments in the Soviet Union and Maoist China.

My claim is that a new age in the thought of Marx has been inaugurated. The collapse of Soviet Marxism removed a vast impediment to the proper assessment of the thought of Marx. The reforms of Deng Xiaoping not only reformed the economic structure of China but opened Chinese Marxism to a dialogue with the United States and Western Europe; it is no longer imprisoned in Mao's Sovietism.

In addition, the publication of *Mega2* has brought to light a multitude of documents by Marx that were previously unknown and that have revolutionized the interpretation of his thought. The reception of *Mega2* has inaugurated a new age in the comprehension of Marx. It is now possible to draw closer to the true intent of Marx's theory than at any other time. The contemporary moment brought about by *Mega2* has revealed a Marx, and disclosed the content of this thought, that previously, for reasons mentioned above, was impossible to access.

Das Kapital was not a prediction regarding the future demise of capitalism, but rather an example of Marx's Method. The sub-title of *Das Kapital* was a 'Critique of Political Economy' and Marx overthrew the positivism of Classical Political Economy and replaced it with his own methodological principles.

The meaning of *Das Kapital* was the establishment of a new social science discipline. Marx used capitalism as the subject upon which to test his new social science propaedeutic. The essence of *Das Kapital* was not the prognosis of the ultimate decline of capitalism, but rather the exhibition of his new methodology of the social sciences. *Das Kapital* must be re-interpreted. It was not an attempt to set forth the positivist laws of economics that supposedly forecast the doom of capitalism, but rather as a presentation of the practice of Marx's new social science in explaining the functioning of a social formation. The revolution introduced by Marx was in the methodology. He founded a new discipline of socio-historical explanation and fulfilled the legacy of Kant–Goethe–'The Master'.

Notes

Chapter One

1. *Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe* (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1975) (henceforth *Mega2*). The publication of the *Mega2* started in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) before the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union. The citation listed above relates to the appearance of the first volume of this vast publishing project, which, fortunately, is still in process. Dr Manfred Neuhaus, the former Director of the *Mega2* project at the International Marx-Engels Stiftung, Berlin, recently retired and his place has been taken by Gerald Hubmann.
2. In relation to *The Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (hereafter referred to as 'The Manuscripts'), see the following essays by Jürgen Rojahn. a) 'Marxismus-Marx-Geschichtswissenschaft-1844', *International Review of Social History*, Vol. 28 (1983), pp. 2–49; b) 'Die Marxschen Manuscript aus dem Jahre 1844 in der Neuen Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe', *Archive für Sozialgeschichte*, Vol. 25 (1985), pp. 647–663.
3. In relation to the 'I. Feuerbach' chapter of *The German Ideology* see the essay co-authored by Inge Taubert, Hans Pelger and Jacques Grandjón, 'Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Joseph Weydemeyer: *Die Deutsche Ideologie*. Manuscript und Drucke', *Mega-Studien*, Vol. 2 (1997). Also see the illuminating comments on *Die Deutsche Ideologie* (hereafter referred to as 'The Leipzig Council') contained in the *Marx-Engels Jahrbücher* 2003 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2003) published in cooperation with the International Marx-Engels Stiftung, Amsterdam. On the issue of the 'I. Feuerbach' chapter attention should also be brought to the work of Terrell Carver, particularly 'The German Ideology Never Took Place', *History of Political Thought*, Vol. XXXI, No. 1, Spring 2010, pp. 107–127.
4. Gisela Schüler, 'Zum Chronologie von Hegels Jugendschriften', *Hegel-Studien*, Vol. 2, 1963, pp. 11–159.
5. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *The History of Philosophy*, trans. E. S. Haldane (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), Vol. I, p. 253.
6. Karl Marx *On the Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature*, *Marx-Engels Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975) (henceforth *MECW*), Vol. I, p. 438.
7. Norman Levine, *Divergent Paths: Hegel in Marx and Engelsism* (Lanham; Rowman and Littlefield, 2006). See also the anthology edited by Tony Burns and Ian Fraser, *The Hegel-Marx Connection* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 2000). This collection of essays represents the continuity theses and is one of the earliest assemblages of essays to advance and defend the School of Hegelian Marxism. The contributions of the participating scholars are all of high quality. The reader's attention is drawn to the following four essays because they offer penetrating insights into specific aspects of the Hegel-Marx relationship: 1) Joseph McCarney's 'Hegel's Legacy', focusing on the aporia between Hegel's Spirit and Marx's anthropology and economic sociology; 2) Andrew Chitty's 'Recognition and Social Relations of Production', which emphasizes the priority Marx ascribed to social relations, a viewpoint with which I concur; 3) Christopher Arthur's 'From the Critique of Hegel's to the Critique of Capital', which is an introduction to the School of Hegelianized Marxism; 4) Howard Williams' 'The End of History in Hegel and Marx', a discussion of how the Enlightenment theory of progress continued on in Hegel and Marx.
8. Levine op. cit., pp. 153–234.
9. Ibid., pp. 127–128.

10. Earlier research looked upon Marx's *exzerpte* 'On James Mill' as his earliest expression of interest in political economy. But more recent studies establish that Marx read List in late 1843 a short time before his study of Mill. Gareth Stedman Jones and Eric Hobsbawm both claim that Engels' essay 'Outline of a Critique of Political Economy' was the initial impetus for Marx's turn to political economy. But Engels' 'Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy' was published in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* in early 1844. Engels arrived after List and the fact that Marx had already read List in late 1843 indicates his interest in political economy blossomed before the arrival of Engels. Marx's involvement in political economy preceded the advent of Engels and was independent of the influence of Engels. See Engels' own recognition that Marx's interest in political economy began in 1843, prior to the publication of his article 'Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy', in his 'Foreword' to his publication of the second volume of *Das Kapital*: Engels, 'Vorwort', *Das Kapital, Marx-Engels Werke* (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1985) (henceforth *MEW*), Vol. 40, Part 2, p. 14.
- Gareth Stedman Jones and Eric Hobsbawm both propose that Engels' article 'Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy' supplied the impetus for Marx's involvement in political economy. I dispute this assertion. Engels' article 'Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy' was published in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* in early 1844. However, the documents I listed in the text, one by Engels himself, certify that Marx's turn to political economy began in the Fall of 1843, or after his arrival in Paris. Therefore, Marx's study of political economy predated the arrival of Engels' essay. It is true, as Marx himself states in the 'Preface' to 'The Manuscripts', that Engels' article served as a demonstration as to how critique could be applied to political economy, but this is vastly different than claiming that Engels was the first to ignite Marx's involvement this subject. Additionally, the form of the critique of political economy employed by Engels was totally different than the form of critique of political economy applied by Marx. Engels showed Marx that critique was applicable to political economy and Marx acknowledged this debt, but Marx's methodology of critique bore no resemblance to Engels' methodology.
11. Marx, 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction', *MECW*, Vol. 3, p. 179.
12. Marx, *Zur Kritik der politischen Oekonomie: Vorwort*, *MEW*, Vol. 13, p. 8.
13. Hegel, *Gesammelte Werke* (Berlin: Verlag Duncker und Humblot, 1832–1845). In addition to the *Gesammelte Werke*, the two-volume work by Carl Ludwig Michelet, *Geschichte der Letzten System der Philosophie in Deutschland von Kant bis Hegel*, was extremely helpful in assembling these Hegel essays that appeared in Volume One of Hegel's *Gesammelte Werke* which Michelet edited. In his *Geschichte der Letzten* Michelet discussed Hegel's early essays from the Jena period. I followed Michelet's compilation because I did not think he would select an essay for analysis unless he thought it important enough to include in the volume for which he was responsible. I accepted Michelet's listings of the essays because I did not think he would discuss material he had not already included in Volume One.
14. Marx, *MECW*, Vol. 1.
15. Karl Rosenkranz, *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Leben* (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1844).
16. *Ibid*, p. 206.
17. Friedrich Engels, 'Schelling and Revelation', *MECW*, Vol. 2, pp. 195.
18. Engels, 'Schelling on Hegel', *MECW*, Vol. 2, pp. 181–188.
19. Engels, 'Schelling and Revelation', *MECW*, Vol. 2, pp. 189–240.
20. Engels, 'Schelling, Philosopher in Christ', *MECW*, Vol. 2, pp. 241–246.
21. Marx, *On the Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature*, *MECW*, Vol. 1, pp. 103–105.
22. Marx, 'The Leipzig Council', ed. S. Ryazanskaya (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1965), pp. 141, 208, 552.

23. Arnold Ruge 'Die Hegelsche Rechtsphilosophie und die Politik unsrer Zeit', in Heinz and Ingrid Pepperle (eds), *Die Hegelsche Linke* (Leipzig: Verlag Philipp Reclam, 1985), pp. 443–471.
24. Karl Löwith, *From Hegel to Nietzsche*, trans. David E. Green (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964).
25. John Toews, *Hegelianism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).
26. Löwith, op. cit., p. 10.
27. Toews, op. cit., p. 301.
28. Marx, 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction', *MECW*, Vol. 3, pp. 175–187. For a different perspective on the relationship between philosophy and praxis in Marx, see Harold Mah, *The End of Philosophy, the Origin of Ideology* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1966). I fundamentally disagree with Mah's thesis that Marx sought to abolish philosophy. I agree that Marx broke with the Hegelian definition of philosophy as retrospection, but I maintain, contrary to Mah, that Marx still saw the need for philosophical thinking to establish social goals, as a basis of critique, and to project strategies for praxis. Philosophy set the purpose of praxis and without philosophy praxis would be errant and random.
29. Georg Lukács, *The Young Hegel*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1966).
30. Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960).
31. Warren Breckmann, *Marx, the Young Hegelians and the Origins of Radical Social Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). An interesting book written after all the Hegel and Marx manuscripts were discovered and made known, but Breckman does not deal with how Marx's ignorance of the Jena manuscripts may have influenced Marx's perception of Hegel.
32. Stathis Kouvelakis, *Philosophy and Revolution; From Kant to Marx* (London: Verso, 2003).
33. Marx, *The Holy Family*, trans. R. Dixon (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1956), pp. 167–178.
34. David Leopold, *The Young Karl Marx* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
35. Refer to previous footnote 2. For the German edition of 'The Manuscripts' see *Mega2* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2009) Abteilung I, Band II, pp. 323–464. For the 'Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts', see *Mega2*, Abteilung I, Band II, pp. 3–138.
36. I have written two articles concerning the influence of the Scottish School of Historiography on Marx. See Norman Levine, 'The German Historical School of Law and the Origins of Historical Materialism', *The Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 48, No. 3, July–Sept. 1987, pp. 431–452. Also see Norman Levine, 'The Myth of the Asiatic Restoration', *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 1, Nov. 1977, pp. 73–85.
37. Norbert Waszek, *The Scottish Enlightenment and Hegel's Account of Civil Society* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Publishers, 1988). Professor Waszek is not only an internationally recognized scholar on Hegel and the Scottish Enlightenment but also on the work of Eduard Gans. Anyone writing on German intellectual history in the first half of the 19th century will gain enormously by reading his work. See his *Eduard Gans* (New York: Peter Lang, 1991).
38. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, trans. J. Sibree (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1991), pp. 250–255, 258–265).
39. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, ed. Peter Hodgson (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983–1987), 3 Vols.
40. Christopher J. Arthur, *Engels Today* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996).
41. See the following two works by Georg Lasson: 1) *Schriften zur Politik und Rechtsphilosophie* (Leipzig: 1923); 2) *Jenenser Logik, Metaphysik und Naturphilosophie* (Leipzig: 1923). In addition see the following two works by Johannes Hoffmeister: 1) *Jenaer Realphilosophie* (Leipzig: 1931); 2) *Dokumente zu Hegels Entwicklung* (Stuttgart: 1936).
42. Levine, *Divergent Paths*, pp. 190–240.

43. Christopher J. Arthur, *The New Dialectic and Marx's Capital* (Boston: Brill, 2004), pp. 118–119. I draw attention to an early essay by Terrell Carver which contributed to the discussion of the relationship between Hegel and Marx. Carver was an early pioneer in this field and his work should be recognized. See his 'Marx and Hegel's Logic', *Political Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (1976), pp. 57–67.
44. Arthur, *ibid.*, pp. 108–109. Those who wish additional explications of the School of Systematic Dialectic are encouraged to read the work of Tony Smith. See his *The Logic of Marx's Capital* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990) as well as his *Dialectical Social Theory and Its Critics* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993).
45. Christopher J. Arthur, *The Dialectics of Labor* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).
46. Marx, *The Holy Family*, p. 50.
47. Marx, 'The Leipzig Council', pp. 101, 110.
48. Douglas Moggach, *The Philosophy and Politics of Bruno Bauer* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
49. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 218.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 219.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 362.
52. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Mind*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 257.
53. *Ibid.*
54. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, p. 39.
55. Hegel, *The History of Philosophy*, pp. 90–91.
56. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 315.
57. *Ibid.*, pp. 298, 318.
58. Marx, *The Holy Family*, p. 175.
59. Marx to Engels, 15 April 1869, *MEW*, Vol. 32, pp. 302–303.
60. Norman Levine, *Dialogue within the Dialectic* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984), pp. 257–316. In addition to this chapter on Leninist Bolshevism this work also contains a chapter on the revolutionary theory of Mao Zedong. Furthermore, in additional essays I have written on the philosophical presuppositions of the politics of Marx. See Norman Levine, 'Toward the Repotentialization of a Marxist Theory of Politics', *Praxis International*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (July 1988), pp. 237–249. See also Norman Levine, 'Jacobinism and the European Revolutionary Tradition', *History of European Ideas*, Vol. II (1989), pp. 157–180.
61. I have written extensively on the continuity between Hegel and Marx and this book is the culmination of long years of study in this topic. For these prior essays see Norman Levine, 'Hegel and the 1861–63 Manuscripts of *Das Kapital*', *Rethinking Marxism*, Vol. 14, No. 4 (2002), pp. 47–58; 'Marx's First Appropriation of Hegel', *Critique*, No. 36–37 (March 2005), pp. 125–156; 'Corruption and Fate of Left-Wing Hegelianism', *Critique*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (April 2007), pp. 79–102; 'Hegelian Continuities in Marx', *Critique*, Vol. 37, No. 3 (August 2009), pp. 345–370. An excellent discussion of Marx's methodology of social explanation is Heinz-Dieter Kittsteiner's *Natur-Absicht und Unsichtbar Hand* (Frankfurt-am-Main: Ullstein, 1980). Kittsteiner's book makes a clear distinction between synchronic and diachronic explanation and correctly understands Marx as a practitioner of the synchronic model. In addition, Kittsteiner offers an extremely perceptive explication of the development of the science of history in the 18th century, the line running from Herder to Hegel to Kant and correctly assesses Marx's position in this evolution. In the historiography of history Marx is an extension of the Enlightenment.

Chapter Two

1. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Hegel's Werke* (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker und Humblot, 1832–1845).

2. Karl Marx, 'Hegel Epigramme', *MEW*, Volume 40, pp. 607–608.
3. Marx, 'Briefe an den Vater', Nov. 10, 1837, *MEW*, p. 10.
4. Marx, *On the Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature*, *MECW*, Vol. I.
5. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 510–515.
6. Marx, *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, trans. Annette Jolin and Joseph O'Malley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).
7. Marx, 'On The Jewish Question', *MECW*, Vol. 3, pp. 153 and 163.
8. Marx, 'Ökonomische-philosophische Manuskripte', *Mega2*, Abteilung I, Band II, pp. 187–438.
9. Marx, *The Holy Family*, trans. R. Dixon (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1956), p. 185.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 288.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 187.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 188.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 135.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 187.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 136.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 460.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 365.
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 294–295.
19. Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy* (New York: International Publishers, 1963), pp. 107–108.
20. For a complete listing of books by Hegel found in Marx's private library see 'Die Bibliotheken von Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels', *Mega2*, Abteilung IV, Band II, pp. 315–321.
21. Terry Pinkard, *Hegel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 109.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 110.
23. I thank Professor Rolf-Peter Horstmann of the University of Berlin for the guidance he offered in relation to the Hegel essays contained in Volumes 1, 16, 17 and 18 of Hegel's *Collected Works*. In the conversations I held with Professor Horstmann I was alerted to the fact that the Hegel essays from the *Critical Journal of Philosophy* were available to Marx but he did not read this material.
24. Pinkard, *Hegel*, p. 498.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 577.
26. Nohl, Hermann, *Theologische Jugendschriften* (Tübingen: 1907). I do not intend that the works I listed above is a complete recounting of all the Hegel works recovered in the 20th century. That is certainly not true. In terms of the retrieval of the work of Hegel, the 20th century has been an archeologists' dream. The unearthing of the previously unknown manuscripts, material that far exceeded what was available to Lukács in the 1930s, has revolutionized the study of Hegel. At this point I simply want to list several indispensable published works of Hegel to fill out the picture of the Invisible Hegel, to recognize the enormous scholarly efforts that has given rebirth to these manuscripts, to give proper acknowledgement to the persons involved in this effort and to inform the reader as to what is available currently: Karl Heinz Ilting, *Vorlesungen über Rechtsphilosophie* (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt; Friedrich Frommann Verlag, 1973, 6 Vols); Dieter Henrich, *Philosophie des Rechts: Die Vorlesungen von 1819/1820* (Frankfurt-am-Main; Suhrkamp, 1983); Hans-George Hoppe, *Die Philosophie des Rechts: Vorlesungen Von 1821/1822* (Frankfurt-am-Main; Suhrkamp, 2005); Otto Pöggeler, *Vorlesungen über Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1983). All of these collections are assembled from the lectures Hegel gave while he taught at the University of Heidelberg and the University of Berlin. They are harvested from the lecture notes taken by students as they listened to the lectures of 'The Master'. The 20th-century scholars have retrieved these student lecture notes and published them in book form. For those who may be interested in the notebooks of Hegel during his time in Jena,

- see Rolf-Peter Horstmann, *Jenaer Systementwürfe*, Volume 8, in the *Gesammelte Werke* (Hamburg, 1978).
27. Hegel, 'On The Scientific Method of Treating Natural Law', trans. T. M. Knox (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1975).
 28. *Ibid.*, p. 109.
 29. *Ibid.*, p. 113.
 30. *Ibid.*, p. 94.
 31. *Ibid.*, pp. 99–103.
 32. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon Press; 1942), p. 208.
 33. *Ibid.*, pp. 213–214.
 34. Hegel, 'On the Scientific Method of Treating Natural Law', pp. 128–129.
 35. *Ibid.*, pp. 131–132.
 36. Marx, 'Das philosophische Manifest der historischen Rechtsschule', *MEW*, Vol. I, pp. 78–85.
 37. See my article, 'The German Historical School of Law and the Origins of Historical Materialism', *Journal of the History of Ideas* (July–Sept. 1985), pp. 31–45.
 38. *Divergent Paths: Hegel in Marxism and Engelsism* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), pp. 205–206.
 39. Marx, *MECW*, Vol. 3, p. 81.
 40. Hegel, *The History of Philosophy*, trans. E. S. Haldane (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), Vol. 3, p. 399.
 41. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, pp. 177–180.
 42. Marx, 'Debatten über der Pressfreiheit', *MEW*, Vol. I, p. 57.
 43. Marx, 'Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrecht', *MEW*, Vol. I, p. 203.
 44. Marx, 'Debatten über des Holzdiebstahlgesetz', *MEW*, Vol. I, p. 112.
 45. Marx, 'The Spirit of the Law', *Mega2*, Abteilung IV, Band I, pp. 51–66.
 46. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, trans. J. Sibree (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1991), pp. 253–254, 265.
 47. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Mind*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 3.
 48. Hegel, *The History of Philosophy*, Vol. II, pp. 180–202.
 49. Marx, 'Brief an den Vater', *MEW*, Vol. 40, p. 9.
 50. Marx, *Mega2*, Abteilung IV, Band I, pp. 151–182.
 51. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, pp. 225–262.
 52. Hegel, *The History of Philosophy*, Vol. II, pp. 202–209.
 53. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, pp. 155–175.
 54. Readers who are interested in pursuing the Marx–Aristotle connection are encouraged to read the following two anthologies by George E. McCarthy: *Marx and Aristotle* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield; 1992) and *Marx and the Ancients* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1990). Both these books are collections of essays dealing with the influence the ancients exerted on Marx in various subject areas. McCarthy is to be complimented because he was one of the first scholars to investigate Marx's attempt to construct a theory of the state that continued the spirit of the Athenian polis, an area of research that was innovative in its time. I am indebted to McCarthy for providing me with better insight into the Marx–Greek connection.
 55. Marx, *MECW*, Vol. 3, p. 108.
 56. *Ibid.*, p. 122.
 57. Karl Rosenkranz, *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Leben* (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1844).
 58. Rosenkranz, *Philosophische Propädeutik, Hegels Werke*, Vol. 18.
 59. Rosenkranz, *Psychologie oder die Wissenschaft vom subjectiven Geist* (Königsberg: Verlag der Gebrüder Bornträger, 1837).
 60. Rosenkranz, *Hegels Leben*, pp. 236–239.

61. Ibid., p. xxi.
62. Ibid., p. 301.
63. Ibid., p. xxiii.
64. Ibid., pp. 288–289.
65. Laurence Dickey, *Hegel: Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. vii–xlii. The picture of Hegel as a Liberal Monarchist is also presented in three studies of Hegel's political philosophy: Dominico Losordo, *Hegel and the Freedom of the Moderns*, trans. Marietta and Jon Morris (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004); Frederick Neuhouser, *Foundations of Hegel's Social Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Paul Franco, *Hegel's Philosophy of Freedom* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999).
66. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, pp. 37–40.
67. Ibid., p. 196.
68. H. S. Harris, *Hegel's Development: Toward the Sunlight* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972). Harris debunks the idea that Hegel, Hölderlin and Schelling planted a 'Tree of Liberty' in the spring of 1793. See p. 63.
69. Rosenkranz, *Hegels Leben*, p. 230.
70. Harris, *Hegel's Development*, pp. 114–116.
71. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, pp. 355–363.
72. Rosenkranz, *Hegels Leben*, p. 305.
73. Paul Franco, *Hegel's Philosophy of Freedom* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), p. 128.
74. Rosenkranz, *Hegels Leben*, p. 310.
75. Marx, 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right', *MECW*, Vol. 3, p. 94.
76. Rosenkranz, *Hegels Leben*, p. xxvii.
77. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Mind*, pp. 228–238.
78. Harris, *Hegel's Development*, p. 154. The influence of the Scottish Enlightenment on the thought of Hegel is comprehensively analyzed in Norbert Waszek, *The Scottish Enlightenment and Hegel's Account of 'Civil Society'* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Publishers, 1988). Waszek is a leading authority on the influence the Scots exerted on Hegel. Another excellent work on the relation between the Scots and Hegel is Laurence Dickey, *Hegel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
79. For a more complete discussion of the importance of the Scottish Enlightenment to Marx see my above-mentioned essay (note 37), 'The German Historical School of Law and the Origins of Historical Materialism'. Another essay I wrote on the Scottish Enlightenment is 'The Myth of the Asiatic Restoration', *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Nov. 1977, pp. 73–85.
80. Harris, *Hegel's Development*, p. 434.
81. James Steuart, *An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), Vol. 1, pp. 322–338.
82. Waszek, *The Scottish Enlightenment and Hegel's Account of 'Civil Society'*, pp. 110–115.
83. Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, p. 153.
84. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, p. 120.
85. Ibid., pp. 16, 161, 177–178, n292.
86. Pinkard, *Hegel*, p. 240.
87. Ibid., pp. 403–408.
88. Ibid.
89. T. M. Knox, *Hegel's Political Writings* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 265.
90. Ibid., p. 282.
91. Franco, *Hegel's Philosophy of Freedom*, pp. 177–185.
92. T. M. Knox, *Hegel's Political Writings*, p. 267.
93. Ibid., p. 246.
94. Ibid., p. 257.
95. Dickey, *Hegel: Political Writings*, pp. 234–270.
96. Rosenkranz, *Hegels Leben*, p. 320.

97. Dickey, *Hegel: Political Writings*, p. 244.
98. *Ibid.*, p. 247.
99. *Ibid.*, p. 257.
98. *Ibid.*, p. 255.
99. *Ibid.*, p. 254.
100. *Ibid.*, p. 255.
101. *Ibid.*, p. 254.
102. *Ibid.*, pp. 258, 260.
103. *Ibid.*, p. 253.
104. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, pp. 191–193.
105. Dickey, *Hegel: Political Writings*, p. 250.
106. *Ibid.*, p. 255.
107. *Ibid.*, p. 258.
108. Pepperle, Heinz and Ingrid (eds), *Die Hegelsche Linke* (Leipzig: Verlag Philipp Reclam, 1985), p. 842.
109. 'Arnold Ruge an Karl Rosenkranz', *Ibid.*, 16 December, 1837, pp. 757–761.
110. Pepperle (eds), *Die Hegelsche Linke*, pp. 443–472.
111. Engels, 'Letter to Friedrich Graeber', Dec. 9, 1839–Feb. 5, 1840', *MECW*, Vol. 2, p. 491.
112. Engels, 'Marginalia to Texts of Our Time', *MECW*, Vol. 2, p. 277.
113. Dickey, *Hegel's Political Writings*, p. 6.
114. *Ibid.*, p. 273.
115. Rosenkranz, *Philosophische Propädeutik, Hegels Werke*, Vol. 18.
116. Rosenkranz, *Psychologie oder die Wissenschaft vom subjectiven Geist*, pp. xxiv–xxv.
117. *Ibid.*, pp. 338–340.
118. Rosenkranz, *Hegels Leben*, p. vii.
119. Harris, *Hegel's Development*, pp. 47–52.
120. Rudolf Haym, *Hegel und seine Zeit* (Berlin: Rudolph Gaertner, 1857).
121. *Ibid.*, p. 359.
122. *Ibid.*, p. 373.
123. *Ibid.*, p. 390.
124. *Ibid.*, pp. 70–73.
125. *Ibid.*, p. 458.
126. *Ibid.*, p. 73.
127. J. Gustav Thaulow, *Hegel's Ansichten über Erziehung und Unterricht* (Kiel, 1854). For further information on Thaulow's book see H. S. Harris, 'Hegel: Toward the Sunlight', pp. 45–52, which contains a comprehensive listing of the material contained in Thaulow's book.
128. Harris, *Hegel's Development*, pp. 158–159. Published in 1798 by Jaeger Verlag in Frankfurt, its full title was *Vertrauliche Briefe über das vormalige staatsrechtliche Verhältnis des Waadtlandes zur Stadt Bern. Eine völlige Aufdeckung der ehemaligen Oligarchie des Standes Bern. Aus dem Französischen eines verstorbenen Schweizers übersetzt und mit Anmerkungen versehen*. It was a translation of letters from the 1793 French edition, *Lettres de Jean-Jacques Cart à Bernard de Mural, trésorier du pays de Vaud, sur le droit public et les événements actuel*.
129. G. W. F. Hegel, *Schriften zur Politik und Rechtsphilosophie*, ed. Georg Lasson (Leipzig: F. Meiner, 1923).
130. Franco, *Hegel's Philosophy of Freedom*; Losurdo, *Hegel and the Freedom of the Moderns*; Neuhaus, *Foundations of Hegel's Social Theory*.

Chapter 3: Phase One

1. Maximilien Rubel and Margaret Manale, *Marx without Myth* (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), p. 12.
2. Marx, 'Epigram on Hegel', *MECW*, Vol. I, pp. 576–577.

3. Marx, 'Letter to His Father', *MECW*, Vol. I, p. 18.
4. *Ibid.*
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
7. *Ibid.*
8. Norbert Waszek, 'Eduard Gans, die "Jahrbücher für wissenschaftlicher Kritik" und die französische Publizistik der Zeit', in Christoph Jamme (ed.), *Die Jahrbücher für Wissenschaftliche Kritik: Hegels Berlin Gegenakademie* (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1994), p. 93.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 100.
10. Norbert Waszek, 'Eduard Gans', in *Speculation und Erfahrung*, Section I, Volume 4, p. 200.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 210.
12. *MECW*, Vol. I, p. 699.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 700.
14. Waszek, 'Eduard Gans, die "Jahrbücher für wissenschaftlicher Kritik"', p. 100.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 101.
16. Warren Breckman, *Marx, the Young Hegelians, and the Origins of Radical Social Theory*, p. 147.
17. *MECW*, Vol. III, pp. 175–187.
18. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Mind*, pp. 228–240.
19. Aristotle, *De Anima (The Soul)*, in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: The Modern Library, 1941), pp. 593–595.
20. Marx to Ruge, March 5, 1842, in Heinz and Ingrid Pepperle (eds), *Die Hegelsche Linke* (Leipzig: Verlag Philipp Reclam, 1985), pp. 843–844.
21. *MECW*, Vol. I, p. 108.
22. *Ibid.*
23. *MEW*, Vol. 40, p. 10.
24. Pepperle (eds), *Die Hegelsche Linke*, pp. 848, 852–855.
25. *MEW*, Vol. I, p. 103.
26. Toews, *Hegelianism*, p. 121.
27. Pinkard, *Hegel*, pp. 630–634.
28. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, p. 10.
29. Eduard Gans, 'Enleitung', *Philosophie Des Rechts, Hegels Werke* (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker und Humblot, 1833), Vol. 8.
30. *Ibid.*
31. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, 'Preface', pp. 1–10.
32. Gans, 'Enleitung', *Philosophie Des Rechts*.
33. *Ibid.*
34. *Ibid.*
35. Toews, *Hegelianism*, p. 121.
36. Eduard Gans, *Das Erbrecht in weltgeschichtlichen Entwicklung* (Berlin: Maurerschen Buchhandlung, 1824), 2 Vols.
37. Anton Friedrich Justus Thibaut, *Über die sogenannte historische und nicht-historische Rechtsschule* (Heidelberg, 1838).
38. Pinkard, *Hegel*, pp. 393–395.
39. *Ibid.*, pp. 531–534.
40. Norbert Waszek, 'Eduard Gans', in *Rückblicke auf Personen und Zustände* (Stuttgart, 1995), pp. xlvii–xlviii.
41. Marx, 'Brief an den Vater', 10 November, 1837, *MEW*, Vol. 40, p. 4.
42. Thibaut, *Über die sogenannte historische und nicht-historische Rechtsschule* (Heidelberg 1838).
43. Gans, *Das Erbrecht in weltgeschichtlicher Entwicklung*, Vol. I, p. xv.

44. Peter F. Stühr, *Die Staaten des Alterthums und die christlichen Zeit in ihrem Gegensätze* (Heidelberg: Mohr und Zimmer, 1811).
45. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, pp. 120–121.
46. Gans, *Das Erbrecht in weltgeschichtliche Entwicklung*, Vol. I, p. 120.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 150.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 170.
49. Marx, 'The Leipzig Council', p. 127.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 196.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 197.
52. Carl Ludwig Michelet, *Geschichte der letzten Systeme der Philosophie in Deutschland von Kant bis Hegel* (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker und Humblot, 1837), Vol. I, p. 9.
53. Carl Ludwig Michelet, *Geschichte der letzten Systeme der Philosophie in Deutschland von Kant bis Hegel; Anthropologie und Psychologie der Subjektiv Spirit* (Berlin: Sanderschen Buchhandlung, 1840); *Naturrecht oder rechts-philosophie als die praktische Philosophie* (Berlin: Nicolai'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1866), 2 Vols; *Die Ethik der Aristotle in ihrem Verhältnisse zum Systeme der Moral* (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1829); *Die Lösung der gesellschaftliche Frage* (1849).
54. Michelet, *Geschichte der letzten Systeme der Philosophie*, Vol. 3, p. 669. In addition to Michelet and from a contemporary perspective, Herbert Schnädelbach's *Hegels praktische Philosophie* (Frankfurt-am-Main: Suhrkamp, 2000) is an outstanding exposition of Hegel's concept of practical activity. Any scholar investigating the thought of Hegel should consult this book. My reading of Schnädelbach confirmed my own impressions of the importance of subjective activity in the philosophy of 'The Master'. The question of subjective activity is one of the centers of contemporary Hegel studies and Schnädelbach is not alone in his explorations in this field. For additional penetrating studies of subjective activity in Hegel, see Adrian Peperzak, *Hegels praktische Philosophie* (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1991); Ludwig Siep, *Anerkennung als Prinzip der praktischen Philosophie* (München: Verlag Alber Freiburg, 1979); Lothar Eley, *Hegels Theorie der subjektiven Geistes* (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1990); Dirk Stederth, *Hegels Philosophie der subjektiven Geistes* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2001).
55. *Ibid.*, p. 611.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 669.
57. *Ibid.*, p. 611.
58. *Ibid.*, p. 612.
59. *Ibid.*
60. *Ibid.*, p. 613.
61. *Ibid.*
62. *Ibid.*, p. 619.
63. *Ibid.*, p. 622.
64. *Ibid.*, pp. 611–627.
65. *Ibid.*, p. 602.
66. *Ibid.*, p. 623.
67. See Note 53.
68. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, p. 456.
69. Michelet, *Naturrecht oder rechts-philosophie*, p. 158.
70. *Ibid.*, pp. 159–175.
71. Michelet, *Geschichte der letzten System*, Kapital 14.
72. *Ibid.*, Vol. 3, p. 590.
73. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, pp. 410–494.
74. Michelet, *Geschichte der letzten System*, Vol. 3, pp. 243–245.
75. *Ibid.*, p. 625.
76. *Ibid.*, pp. 604–605.

77. Karl Theodor Bayrhoffer, *Beiträge zur Naturphilosophie* (Berlin: Otto Wigand, 1839), 2 Vols.
78. Karl Theodor Bayrhoffer, *Die Idee und Geschichte der Philosophie* (Marburg, 1838).
79. Marx, 'The Leipzig Council', p. 197.
80. Bayrhoffer, *Die Idee und Geschichte der Philosophie*, p. 108.
81. Ibid.
82. Leopold von Henning, *Prinzipien der Ethik in historischer Entwicklung* (Berlin: Friedrich August Herbig, 1824). In his book *Hegelianism*, Toews places Henning on the Hegelian Right. Toews feels that the views of the Hegelian Right were 'best exemplified in the viewpoints of Marheineke and Henning' (p. 87). I disagree with Toews' judgment since Henning employed the concept of historicity in his investigation of ethics. Historicity was a vital concept for Hegel and the Hegelian Center in general and Henning's utilization of this methodology qualifies him to belong to that Center.
83. Ibid., p. xii.
84. Ibid., pp. 204–216.
85. Ibid., p. 217.
86. Hermann Friedrich Hinrichs, *Geschichte der Rechts- und Staatsprinzipien* (Leipzig: Verlag Gustav Mayer, 1850).
87. Hermann Friedrich Hinrichs, *Politische Vorlesungen* (Halle: G. U. Schwelschte und Sohn, 1843), 2 Vols.
88. Hermann Friedrich Hinrichs, *Das Leben in der Natur* (Halle: Verlag von H. M. Schmidt, 1854).
89. Toews, *Hegelianism*, p. 85.
90. Philipp Marheineke, *Bedeutung des Hegelschen Philosophie in der christlichen Theologie* (Berlin: Verlag Th.Chr.Fr. Ensen, 1842), p. 14.
91. Philipp Marheineke, *System der christlichen Dogmatik* (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1847), pp. 590–593.
92. Ibid., p. 2.
93. Marheineke, *Bedeutung des Hegelschen Philosophie*, pp. 52–58.
94. Marx to Arnold Ruge, March 5, 1842, quoted in Pepperle (eds), *Die Hegelsche Linke*, p. 843.
95. Marx to Arnold Ruge, July 9, 1842, *ibid.*, p. 850.
96. Marx, 'The Historical School of Law', *MECW*, Vol. I, p. 209.
97. Marx, 'The Leipzig Council', p. 101.
98. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, pp. 240–245.

Phase Two

1. Marx to His Father, 10 November, 1837, *MEW*, Vol. 40, p. 10.
2. Pepperle (eds), *Die Hegelschen Linke*, Bauer to Marx, December 11, 1839, p. 193; Bauer to Marx, April 5, 1840, p. 795; Bauer to Marx, June 5, 1842, p. 845; Bauer to Marx, December 13, 1842, p. 861.
3. Marx to Jenny, *MEW*, Vol. 40, pp. 613–615.
4. Marx to His Father, 10 November, 1837, *MEW*, Vol. 40, p. 8.
5. Ibid., p. 9.
6. Ibid., p. 5.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., p. 9.
9. Ibid., p. 4.
10. Ibid., pp. 6–7.
11. Ibid., p. 6.
12. Ibid., p. 5.

13. Ibid., p. 8. On the relationship between Fichte and Marx see Tom Rockmore, *Fichte and Marx and the German Philosophical Tradition* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1980). Rockmore was one of the first to describe the continuity between Fichte and Marx over the issue of subjective activity. Additionally, Rockmore traces a continuity between Aristotle and Marx, running through Fichte, on the powers of subjective practice. Prior to the work of George McCarthy (see Bibliography), Rockmore initiated the rethinking of Marx as an embodiment of the philosophy of praxis which found its origin in the thought of Aristotle. From this perspective Rockmore also recognized the disjuncture between Engels and Marx on the grounds that Engels ignored the philosophy of practice and embraced the metaphysics of natural science.
14. Ibid., pp. 5–6.
15. Marx to Ferdinand Lassalle, February 22, 1858, *MECW*, Vol. 40, p. 268.
16. Hegel, *The History of Philosophy*, Vol. I, pp. 110–114.
17. Ibid., pp. 109–11.
18. Ibid., p. 163.
19. Ibid., Vol. III, p. 546.
20. Ibid., p. 547.
21. Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 246–247.
22. Ibid., pp. 277–278.
23. Ibid., Vol. III, p. 161.
24. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, pp. 104–138.
25. Pepperle (eds), *Die Hegelschen Linke*, Bauer to Marx, 11 December, 1839, p. 794.
26. Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, pp. 824–844.
27. Marx to Ruge, 5 March, 1842, Pepperle (eds), *Die Hegelschen Linke*, pp. 843, 900.
28. Marx, *On the Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature*, *MECW*, Vol. I, p. 29.
29. Ibid., p. 30.
30. Marx, *On the Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature*, *MEW*, Vol. 40, p. 306.
31. Ibid., p. 367.
32. Marx, *MECW*, Vol. I, p. 29.
33. Ibid., p. 35.
34. Ibid., p. 105.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., p. 500.
37. Ibid., p. 784.
38. Marx, 'The Leipzig Council', p. 168.
39. Marx, 'Kritik der Hegelschen Dialektik und Philosophie überhaupt', *Mega2*, Abteilung I, Band II, p. 400.
40. Marx, *The Holy Family*, trans. R. Dixon (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1956), p. 170.
41. Marx, *On the Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature*, *MECW*, Vol. I, pp. 510–514.
42. Marx, *The Holy Family*, pp. 167–178.
43. Marx, *On the Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature*, *MECW*, Vol. I, pp. 423–424.
44. Hegel, *The History of Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 300.
45. Ibid., p. 298.
46. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 291.
47. Marx, *On the Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature*, p. 50.
48. Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, pp. 164–167.
49. Ibid., pp. 141–142.
50. Ibid., p. 157.

51. Marx, *On the Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature*, MECW, Vol. I, pp. 61–62.
52. Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, pp. 479–496.
53. Hegel, 'Logic', *The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, Vol. I, pp. 186–188.
54. Marx, *On the Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature*, MECW, Vol. I, pp. 38–45.
55. Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, p. 542.
56. *Ibid.*, pp. 541–553.
57. Marx, *On the Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature*, MECW, Vol. I, p. 506.
58. Hegel, *The History of Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 20.
59. Marx, *On the Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature*, MECW, Vol. I, pp. 85–86.
60. *Ibid.*, pp. 84–86.
61. *Ibid.*, pp. 438–439.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 439.
63. Marx, *MEW*, p. 29.
64. *Ibid.*
65. Marx, 'The Leipzig Council', p. 149.
66. Hegel, *The History of Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 100.
67. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 149–162.
68. *Ibid.*, pp. 367–371.
69. *Ibid.*, pp. 265–281.
70. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Mind*, *The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, Vol. III, p. 495.
71. *Ibid.*, pp. 289–291.
72. Marx, *On the Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature*, MECW, Vol. I, p. 18.
73. *Ibid.*, pp. 423–424.
74. Joe McCarney has written extremely perceptive books detailing the difference between the definitions of Marx and Hegel attributed to philosophy. See his *Social Theory and the Crisis of Marxism* (London: Verso Press, 1990) and his *Hegel on History* (London: Routledge, 2000). Also see Robert B. Pippin, *Hegel's Idealism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). In this book I particularly suggest pp. 130–170 in which Pippin offers a precise exposition of Hegel's understanding of the activity of self-consciousness.
75. Marx, *On the Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature*, MECW, Vol. I, p. 441.
76. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Nature*, *The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, Vol. II, p. 34.
77. *Ibid.*
78. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
79. Marx, *On the Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature*, MECW, Vol. I, p. 441.
80. *Ibid.*, pp. 510–514.

Phase Three

1. Marx, *On the Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature*, MECW, Vol. I, pp. 109–376.
2. Marx to Ruge, February 10, 1842, MECW, Vol. 1, p. 381.
3. Marx, 'Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie', *Mega2*, Abteilung IV, Band I, p. 368.
4. *Ibid.*
5. *Ibid.*
6. Andrew Chitty, 'The Basis of the State in the Marx of 1842', in Douglas Moggach (ed.), *The New Hegelians* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 220–241.

7. Ibid., p. 231.
8. Ibid., p. 232.
9. Michael Löwy, *The Theory of Revolution in the Young Marx* (Leiden: Brill, 2003), pp. 27–28.
10. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, p. 156.
11. Marx to Ruge, March 5, 1842, *MECW*, Vol. I, p. 382.
12. Marx to Ruge, March 5, 1842, Pepperle (eds), *Die Hegelsche Linke*, pp. 843–844.
13. Marx to Dagobert Oppenheim, August 25, 1842, *MECW*, Vol. I, p. 393.
14. Marx, 'Zum Ehescheidungsgesetzentwurf. Kritik der Kritik', *MEW*, Vol. 40, p. 389.
15. *MECW*, Vol. I, pp. 382–383.
16. Ibid., p. 393.
17. Ibid., p. 400.
18. Ibid., p. 608.
19. Arnold Ruge, 'Die Hegelsche Rechtsphilosophie und die Politik unserer Seit', in Pepperle (eds), *Die Hegelsche Linke*, pp. 462–463.
20. Ibid., p. 464.
21. *MECW*, Vol. I, p. 201. Although Warren Breckman's book, *Marx, the Young Hegelians and the Origins of Radical Social Theory* is a significant contribution to the study of the rise of Young Hegelianism and Marx, I disagree completely with his assessment of Marx's attitude toward Hegel while Marx was at the *Rheinische Zeitung*. On page 272 of his book Breckman wrote that Marx 'was embarked upon a critique of Hegel's treatment of the domestic constitution'. I reject Breckman's judgment and the remaining portions of this Phase will prove that Marx was a defender of Hegel during his association with the *Rheinische Zeitung*.
22. *MECW*, Vol. I, pp. 361–362.
23. K.-H. Ilting is an outstanding scholar on the political thought of Hegel. For penetrating insights into the political theory of both Hegel and Marx see the following two essays: 'Hegel and the Concept of the State and Marx's Early Critique' and 'The Dialectic of Civil Society', both of which are in Z. A. Pelczynski's *The State and Civil Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
24. Marx, *MECW*, Vol. I, pp. 181–194.
25. Ibid., p. 391.
26. Ibid., pp. 215–221.
27. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 272.
28. Schlomo Avineri, *Moses Hess* (New York: New York University Press, 1985), pp. 14–15.
29. Marx, *MECW*, Vol. I, p. 232.
30. Ibid., pp. 391, 393.
31. Ibid., p. 287.
32. Ibid., p. 394.
33. Ibid., p. 283.
34. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 493. See Schlomo Avineri, *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968). Avineri's book is indispensable to all those investigating the political philosophy of Marx. The book accomplishes three tasks: 1) It belongs to the camp of those who maintain that major differences separated Engels and Marx; 2) It belongs to the School of Continuity, or those who see a continuity between Hegel and Marx; 3) It refutes the theses that Marx perpetuated Babouvist and Blanquist revolutionary strategy. Avineri refutes J. Talmon's *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy*, or the totalitarian camp in general, who claim that Marx believed in the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' in the style of Stalin. Rather, Avineri correctly sees Marx's political theory as an outgrowth of Hegelian ethics. The Marx of August 1843 broke with Hegelian Liberal Monarchism, but Avineri recognized that Marx's communism continued the polis ideal that informed the theories of Hegel and Rousseau.
35. *MECW*, Vol. I, pp. 195–202.
36. Ibid., p. 175.
37. Hegel, *The History of Philosophy*, Vol. I, pp. 27–29.
38. *MECW*, Vol. I, pp. 294–306.

39. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, p. 174.
40. *MECW*, Vol. I, p. 202.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 296.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 297. See Richard Hunt, *The Political Ideas of Marx and Engels* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1974, 1982), 2 Vols. The lasting contribution that Hunt's books make is the demolition of the totalitarian distortion of Marx's political theory. Volume I studies the political maturation of both Marx and Engels from 1818 until 1850, almost duplicating the remit of *Marx's Discourse with Hegel*. Hunt destroys the Cold War theses of Jacob Talmon who saw Marx as a projection of Babouvist dictatorship, as a precursor of Stalinism. Correctly, Hunt presents Marx as a continuation of the Aristotelian ideal of the union of the public and private man, an ideal that lived on in Rousseau's effort to conflate *homme* and *citoyen*. Hunt's work is an introduction to the study of Marx's political theory as a re-thinking and expansion of the concept of democracy.
43. *MECW*, Vol. I, p. 205.
44. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, p. 158.
45. *MECW*, Vol. I, p. 204.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
47. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, p. 33.
48. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, p. 7. Even though I have disagreements with Gareth Stedman Jones in terms of the influence that Engels' 'Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy' exerted on the Marx of 1844, his section on 'The History of Law and Property' in the 'Introduction' to *The Communist Manifesto* (New York: Penguin, 2003) opened new vistas in the evolution of the thought of Marx. Stedman Jones is one of the first to draw attention to how the legal debates over the origins of property impacted the young Marx. He insightfully demonstrates how the controversies over legal philosophy, the battle of Gans and Thibaut against Savigny and the Historical School of Law, acquainted Marx with the fact that private property was not a natural law, but a historical legal definition. Marx obviously knew of these debates because when he was a student at the University of Berlin he took two courses from Gans and one course from Savigny. In addition, Hegel was also an opponent of the Historical School of Law and Marx's knowledge of Hegel's *The Philosophy of Right*, in which Hegel explicitly attacked the Historical School of Law, was another vital source in Marx's speculations about the origins of private property. Marx's conversion to communism was directly linked to these legal argumentations over the history of private property and Stedman Jones deserves credit for casting light on this crucial dimension of Marx's development.
49. *MECW*, Vol. I, p. 204.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
51. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, p. 14.
52. *MEW*, Vol. 40, pp. 389–390.
53. *MECW*, Vol. I, pp. 307–310.
54. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, p. 118.
55. *Ibid.*, pp. 110–122.
56. *Ibid.*, pp. 241–291.
57. *MECW*, Vol. I, p. 309.
58. *Ibid.*
59. *MECW*, Vol. I, p. 509.
60. *Ibid.*, pp. 311–329.
61. *Ibid.*, pp. 109–131.
62. *Ibid.*, pp. 132–181.
63. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, pp. 204–208.
64. *Ibid.*, p. 207.
65. *Ibid.*, pp. 165–174.
66. *Ibid.*, p. 169, 209.

67. Dickey, *Hegel: Political Writings*, p. 6.
68. Ibid., p. 12.
69. Pinkard, *Hegel*, pp. 392–393.
70. Marx, 'Debates on the Law on Thefts of Wood', *MECW*, Vol. I, p. 230.
71. Marx, 'Preface: To a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy', in Lucio Colletti (ed.), *Karl Marx: Early Writings* (London: New Left Review, 1974), p. 424.
72. Marx, 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction', in Colletti (ed.), *Karl Marx: Early Writings*, p. 256.
73. Ibid., pp. 254–255.
74. Ibid., pp. 256–257.
75. Marx, 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right', p. 165.
76. Marx, 'On James Mill', *MECW*, Vol. III, pp. 264, 270.
77. *MECW*, Vol. I, p. 231.
78. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, p. 20. For those who wish to attain a fuller grasp of Hegel's political philosophy than is possible within this book I recommend the work of Manfred Riedel. Riedel is an internationally respected scholar in terms of Hegel and Marx and the Hegel–Marx relationship. In terms of Hegel Riedel has specialized in Hegel's social and political theory and I have learned a great deal from his work. His books and essays on Hegel's view of bourgeois capitalist society establish a standard in the field. Riedel correctly understood the importance of historicity in Hegel's thought and from this perspective recognized that the description by 'The Master' of the state at the end of *The Philosophy of Right* was not intended to be a picture of a final, perfect state. Rather, history was the propellant and as civil society changed so would the spirit and structure of the state. Riedel saw Hegel as a Liberal Monarchist. One of the major debts Marx owed Hegel was the conviction that history would always reshape civil society. Riedel's books include: *System und Geschichte: Studien zum historischen Standort von Hegels Philosophie* (Frankfurt-am-Main: Suhrkamp, 1973); *Bürgerliche Gesellschaft und Staat* (Berlin: Hermann Luchterhand, 1970); *Materialen zu Hegels Rechtsphilosophie* (Frankfurt-am-Main: Suhrkamp, 1975); *Studien zu Hegels Rechtsphilosophie* (Frankfurt-am-Main: Suhrkamp, 1969); *Hegel und Antike Dialektik* (Frankfurt-am-Main: Suhrkamp, 1990); *Between Tradition and Revolution*, trans. Walter Wright (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1984); *Naturrecht und Universalrechtsgeschichte* (Hamburg: Klett-Cotta, 1990); 'Hegels Begriff der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft und das Problem seines geschichtlichen Ursprungs', in *Materialen zu Hegels Rechtsphilosophie*, pp. 254–270. However, Hegel's view of political theory also included his understanding of the structure of civil society, that is, there is a sociological component to Hegel. For an analysis of Hegel as a sociologist see Michael O. Hardimon, *Hegel's Social Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). Hardimon's work presents a clear picture of how Hegel viewed the social structure of Germany in the age of Frederick Wilhelm IV.
79. Ibid., p. 32.
80. Ibid., p. 31.
81. Ibid., pp. 134–135.
82. *MECW*, Vol. I, p. 229.
83. Ibid., pp. 224–263.
84. Marx, 'Justification of the Correspondent from the Mosel', *MECW*, Vol. I, pp. 332–358.
85. *MECW*, Vol. I, p. 200.
86. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, p. 10.
87. *MECW*, Vol. I, p. 202.
88. Ibid., p. 295.
89. Ibid., pp. 224–263.
90. Ibid., pp. 332–358.
91. Ibid., pp. 266–273.
92. Ibid., pp. 292–306.

93. Ibid., p. 306.
94. Ibid., p. 271.
95. Ibid., p. 296.
96. 'Communal Reform and the *Kölnische Zeitung*', *MECW*, Vol. I, pp. 266–273.
97. 'On the Commission of the Estates in Prussia', *MECW*, Vol. I, pp. 292–306.
98. *MECW*, Vol. I, p. 349.
99. Ibid., p. 292.
100. Ibid., p. 346.
101. Ibid., p. 234.
102. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, pp. 145–155.
103. Neuhouser, *Foundations of Hegel's Social Theory*.
104. Ibid., pp. 165–174.
105. Ibid., pp. 175–225.
106. C. D. MacPherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962).
107. Neuhouser, *Foundations of Hegel's Social Theory*, pp. 114–144.
108. *MECW*, Vol. I, p. 284.
109. Ibid., p. 365.
110. Ibid., p. 364.
111. Losurdo, *Hegel and the Freedom of the Moderns*, p. 88.
112. *MECW*, Vol. I, p. 503.
113. Ibid., p. 365.
114. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, p. 441. For a study of the general architecture of *The Philosophy of Right*, see Adrian Peperzak, *Modern Freedom* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Publishers, 2001). In a comprehensive, detailed study of Hegel's *The Philosophy of Right*, Peperzak faithfully describes each stage in the evolution of the state. Peperzak is a dutiful student of Hegel, attending to every detail, and in addition his analysis is generally correct. Peperzak also portrays Hegel as a Liberal Monarchist and discredited Haym's interpretation of Hegel as a defender of Frederick Wilhelm IV.
115. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, pp. 449–452.
116. Ibid., p. 456.
117. Ibid.
118. *MECW*, Vol. I, p. 297.
119. Ibid., p. 305.
120. Ibid., pp. 232–233.
121. Ibid., p. 173.
122. Ibid., pp. 264–265.
123. Ibid., p. 275.
124. Ibid., p. 309.
125. Ibid., p. 274.
126. Ibid., p. 247.
127. Ibid., p. 309.

Phase Four

1. Louis Althusser, *Reading Capital*, trans. Ben Brewster (London: New Left Books, 1970).
2. Louis Althusser, *For Marx*, trans. Ben Brewster (New York: Vintage Books, 1970).
3. Marx, 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right', *MECW*, Vol. III, p. 94.
4. Marx, 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction', *MECW*, Vol. III, p. 187.
5. Marx, 'Critical Notes on the Article "The King of Prussia and Social Reform" by a Prussian', *MECW*, Vol. III, pp. 189–206.
6. Marx, 'Kritik der Hegelschen Dialektik und Philosophie überhaupt', *Mega2*, Abteilung I, Band II, p. 411.

7. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Mind*, p. 302.
8. Ibid., pp. 313–314.
9. Ibid., pp. 191–227.
10. Ibid., p. 238.
11. Ibid., p. 230.
12. Ibid., p. 234.
13. Marx, 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction,' in Colletti (ed.), *Karl Marx: Early Writings*, p. 251.
14. Marx, 'Theses on Feuerbach', *ibid.*, p. 421.
15. Ibid., p. 423.
16. Marx, 'Critical Notes on the Article "The King of Prussia and Social Reform" by a Prussian', *ibid.*, p. 420.
17. Marx, 'Theses on Feuerbach', *ibid.*, p. 422.
18. Ibid., 423.
19. Marx, 'Marx to Ruge, Sept. 1843', *ibid.*, p. 207.
20. Marx, 'Marx to Ruge, Sept. 1843', *MECW*, Vol. I, p. 566.
21. Marx, 'Marx to Ruge, Sept. 1843', in Colletti (ed.), *Karl Marx: Early Writings*, p. 208.
22. Cieszkowski, August, 'Prolegomena zur Historiosophie', in Lawrence Stepelevich (ed.), *The Young Hegelians* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 57–107.
23. Avineri, Shlomo, *Moses Hess* (New York: New York University Press, 1985), p. 97.
24. Hess, Moses, 'Philosophie der Tat', in *Einundzwanzig Bogen aus der Schweiz* (Lichtenstein: Topos Verlag, 1977), pp. 309–334.
25. Marx, 'Marx to Arnold Ruge, 5 March, 1842', in Pepperle (eds), *Die Hegelsche Linke*, pp. 842–843.
26. Ruge, 'Hegel's "Philosophy of Right" and the Politics of Our Times', in Stepelevich (ed.), *The Young Hegelians*, pp. 211–236.
27. Ruge, 'Eine Selbstkritik des Liberalismus', in Pepperle (eds), *Die Hegelsche Linke*, p. 568.
28. Marx, 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction', in Colletti (ed.), *Karl Marx: Early Writings*, p. 251.
29. Marx, 'Marx to Ruge, Sept. 1843', *Ibid.*, p. 207.
30. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, pp. 211–216.
31. Ibid., p. 213.
32. Ibid., pp. 242–243.
33. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, p. 23.
34. Ludwig Feuerbach, 'Vorläufige Theses zur Reform der Philosophie', *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. Friedrich Jodl (Frankfurt-am-Main: Frommann Verlag, 1959), Vol. II, pp. 225–244.
35. Marx, 'On the Jewish Question', in Colletti (ed.), *Karl Marx: Early Writings*, p. 234.
36. Ibid., pp. 211–241.
37. Marx, 'Critical Notes on the Article "The King of Prussia and Social Reform" by a Prussian', *ibid.*, pp. 401–420.
38. Marx, 'On the Jewish Question', *ibid.*, p. 241.
39. Ibid., p. 234.
40. Ibid., p. 220.
41. Marx, 'Critical Notes on the Article "The King of Prussia and Social Reform" by a Prussian', p. 420.
42. Charles Louis Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws*, ed. David Wallace Carrithers (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977). Another study of the dialogue on civil society from Machiavelli until the 18th century is John Pocock's *The Machiavellian Moment* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975). I owe a debt of gratitude to Professor Pocock because he was one of the first to introduce me to the importance of the concept of civil society in 18th-century social theory. With the support of a Social Science Research Grant I was able to attend a seminar Professor Pocock offered in the summer of 1985 at the Folger Library, Washington, DC.

43. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, pp. 16, 161, 177–178, 292.
44. Waszek, *The Scottish Enlightenment and Hegel's Account of Civil Society*. Professor Waszek is the leading scholar of the influence of the Scottish Enlightenment in Germany and he is also recognized as an expert on the life of Eduard Gans, who was a close colleague of Hegel's. His knowledge of Gans and the impact of the Scottish Enlightenment in Germany put him in a unique position to trace these vital influences in the development of Hegelian thought. On the life of Gans see his *Eduard Gans* (Frankfurt-am-Main: Peter Lang, 1991), as well as his essay 'Eduard Gans, die "Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik" und die französische Publizistik der Zeit', in Christoph Jamme (ed.), *Die Jahrbücher für Wissenschaftliche Kritik: Hegels Gegenakademie* (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1994), pp. 93–119.
45. Marx, 'On the Jewish Question', in Colletti (ed.), *Karl Marx, Early Writings*, p. 234.
46. Marx, 'Critique of Hegel's Dialectic and Philosophy in General', *MECW*, Vol. III, p. 329.
47. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, pp. 111–119.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 112. Alexandre Kojève's *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969) is an extended analysis of the master–slave paradigm in Hegel. Kojève was one of the founders of the Hegel renaissance in France in the 1930s and he singled out the master–slave methodology as a salient element in Hegelian philosophy.
49. Marx, 'On James Mill', *MECW*, Vol. III, p. 227.
50. Marx, 'Critique of Hegel's Dialectic and Philosophy in General', *MECW*, Vol. III, p. 330.
51. Hegel, *The History of Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 35.
52. *Ibid.*
53. *Ibid.*
54. *Ibid.*, p. 54.
55. Hegel, *The History of Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 7.

Phase Five

1. *Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels Gesamtausgabe (Mega2)* (Berlin; International Marx-Engels Stiftung, 1982).
2. Marx, *The Holy Family*, p. 189.
3. Marx to Ruge, March 13, 1843, in Pepperle (eds), *Die Hegelsche Linke*, p. 872.
4. Marx, 'On James Mill', *MECW*, Vol. III, p. 227.
5. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, pp. 111–119.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 112.
7. Marx, 'On James Mill', *MECW*, Vol. III, p. 226.
8. Marx, 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right', *MECW*, Vol. III, p. 81.
9. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, pp. 46–263.
10. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Mind*, pp. 29–147.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 71–98.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 185.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 153–164.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 165.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 178.
16. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 105.
17. *Ibid.* Hegel research, particularly since the 1960s, has focused on the issues of labor and subjective activity in Hegel. A new Hegel has emerged since the 1960s, a Hegel totally different from the image of the 19th century, an image unfortunately adhered to by Marx. On the issue of work and labor, see Hans-Christoph Schmidt am Busch, *Hegels Begriff der Arbeit* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2002).

18. Ibid., p. 213.
19. Ibid., pp. 242–243. For Hegel's clearest expression of the theme of mutual recognition see pages 112–116 of *The Phenomenology of Mind*. In addition, for Hegel's most explicit description of 'work' and 'labor' see pages 240–245 in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*.
20. Ibid., p. 10.
21. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Mind*, pp. 253–293.
22. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, pp. 105–225. One of the leaders of the post-World War II discovery of the importance of intersubjectivity and mutual recognition in the work of Hegel is Ludwig Siep. In many ways Siep has resurrected the insights of Michelet and Bayrhammer and brought to prominence again Hegel's recognition of the importance of subjective activity. See Siep, *Anerkennung als Prinzip der praktischen Philosophie* (München: Verlag Karl Alber Freiburg, 1979); his essay 'Intersubjektivität, Recht und State in Hegels Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts', in Dieter Henrich and Rold-Peter Horstmann (eds), *Hegel's Philosophie des Rechts* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1982), pp. 254–276; and his *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1997).
23. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, pp. 294–363.
24. Diderot, Denis, *Rameau's Nephew and D'Alembert's Dream*, trans. Leonard Tancok (New York: Penguin Books, 1966).
25. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 263.
26. Ibid., p. 264.
27. Hegel, *The History of Philosophy*, Vol. I, pp. 20–25.
28. Ibid., pp. 32–36, 109–116.
29. Ibid., pp. 1–116.
30. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, pp. 1–57.
31. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Mind*, p. 21.
32. Ibid., p. 3.
33. Aristotle, *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: The Modern Library, 2001).
34. 'Logic', *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), Part I, pp. 47–60.
35. Ibid., pp. 60–65.
36. Marx, 'Aristotle: The Soul', *Mega2*, Abteilung IV, Band I, pp. 22–35.
37. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 264.
38. Ibid., p. 265.
39. Ibid.
40. *Mega2*, Abteilung I, Band II, p. 403.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid., pp. 399–400.
43. Ibid., p. 399.
44. Marx, *The Holy Family*, p. 189.
45. *Mega2*, Abteilung I, Band II, p. 401.
46. Ibid., p. 403.
47. Ibid., p. 399.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid., p. 400.
50. Marx, 'The Leipzig Council', p. 103.
- 51., Ibid., p. 164.
52. Marx, *Mega2*, Abteilung I, Band 2, p. 405.
53. Ibid., pp. 404–405.
54. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 7.
55. Hegel, *The History of Philosophy*, Vol. I, pp. 1–110.
56. Marx, 'Theses on Feuerbach', in Colletti (ed.), *Karl Marx, Early Writings*, p. 422.
57. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 294.
58. Ibid., p. 316.

59. Jean Hyppolite, *Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974). Hyppolite was a member of the Hegel renaissance in France prior to the outbreak of World War II. He was also one of the first to begin to explore the continuity between Hegel and Marx. *Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit* is particularly strong in analyzing Hegel's denunciation of the bourgeoisie as well as drawing attention to Hegel's theory of work and labor. In his analysis of the Marx–Hegel relationship, see his *Studies on Marx and Hegel*, trans. John O'Neill (New York: Basic Books, 1969).
60. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, pp. 310–315.
61. *Ibid.*, pp. 355–363.
62. Diderot, *Rameau's Nephew*.
63. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, pp. 298, 318, 332.
64. *Mega2*, Abteilung I, Band II, p. 413.
65. *Ibid.*, p. 402.
66. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, pp. 119–138.
67. Hegel, *The History of Philosophy*, Vol. II, pp. 314–316.
68. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, pp. 105–160.
69. *Mega2*, Abteilung I, Band II, p. 413.
70. *Ibid.*, p. 413.
71. *Ibid.*, p. 405.
72. *Ibid.*, p. 404.
73. *Ibid.*, p. 399.
74. *Ibid.*, p. 299.
75. Marx, 'The Leipzig Council', p. 460.
76. *Ibid.*, p. 460.
77. *Ibid.*, pp. 355–364.
78. Marx, 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction', in Colletti (ed.), *Karl Marx: Early Writings*, p. 256.
79. Marx, *The Holy Family*, pp. 160–167.
80. Marx, 'Critical Notes on the Article "The King of Prussia and Social Reform", by a Prussian', in Colletti (ed.), *Karl Marx, Early Writings*, p. 420. For further insights into Marx's political views, consult the following books: Francis Furet, *Marx and the French Revolution*, trans. Deborah Kan Furet (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); Richard Hunt, *Marxism and Totalitarian Democracy* and *The Political Ideas of Marx and Engels*; Michael Löwy, *The Theory of Revolution in the Young Marx*.
81. *Mega2*, Abteilung I, Band II, p. 402.
82. *Ibid.*, p. 405.

Phase Six

1. The work of Terrell Carver should be consulted regarding the issue of whether 'The Manuscripts' or the 'I. Feuerbach' chapter in 'The Leipzig Council' should be considered actual texts. Carver himself is a deconstructionist, as he seeks to de-certify these writings as texts. His work provides interesting insights into the gains to be won by deep philological probes, and ultimately give rise to the question of meaning and language. See his essay, 'The German Ideology Never Took Place', *History of Political Thought*, pp. 107–127.
2. Hegel, *The History of Philosophy*, Vol. III, pp. 162–164.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 157–161.
4. Marx, *The Holy Family*, p. 177.
5. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, pp. 351–352.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 352.
7. Marx, *The Holy Family*, p. 190.

8. Ibid., p. 139.
9. Ibid., p. 165.
10. Ibid., p. 168.
11. Ludwig Feuerbach, 'Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Philosophie (1839)', *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. Friedrich Jodl and Wilhelm Bolin (Stuttgart: Frommann Verlag, 1959), Vol. II, pp. 159–203.
12. Ibid., p. 203.
13. Ibid., p. 201.
14. Marx, 'Kritik der Hegelschen Dialektik und Philosophie überhaupt', *Mega2*, Abteilung I, Band II, p. 236.
15. Feuerbach, 'Principles of the Philosophy of the Future', in Stepelevich (ed.), *The Young Hegelians*, p. 156.
16. Hegel, *The History of Philosophy*, Vol. III, p. 112.
17. Feuerbach, *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie von Bacon von Verulam bis Benedict Spinoza*, *Sämtliche Werke*, Vol. III, pp. 111–126.
18. Marx, *The Holy Family*, p. 167.
19. Ibid., p. 170.
20. Ibid., p. 105.
21. Ibid., p. 115.
22. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, p. 10.
23. Marx, 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction', *MECW*, Vol. III, p. 181.
24. Ibid., p. 187.
25. Marx, *The Holy Family*, p. 255.
26. Ibid., p. 82.
27. Ibid., p. 51.
28. Ibid., pp. 253–254.
29. Marx, *Mega2*, Abteilung I, Band II, p. 326.
30. Douglas Moggach, *The Philosophy and Politics of Bruno Bauer* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
31. Ibid., p. 85.
32. Ibid., p. 144.
33. Breckman, Marx, *The Young Hegelians and the Origin of Radical Social Theory*, pp. 292–295.
34. Marx, 'Theses on Feuerbach', in Colletti (ed.), *Karl Marx, Early Writings*, p. 423.
35. Marx, *The Holy Family*, pp. 58–59.
36. Ibid., p. 56.
37. Ibid., pp. 168–169.
38. Ibid., pp. 187, 188.
39. Ibid., p. 189.
40. Ibid., p. 166.
41. Marx, 'The Leipzig Council', p. 135.
42. Ibid., p. 460.
43. Ibid., p. 354.
44. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Mind*, pp. 55–75.
45. C. B. MacPherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964).
46. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, p. 134. Also see Marx, 'The Leipzig Council', p. 354.
47. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, p. 134.
48. Marx, 'The Leipzig Council', p. 214.
49. Ibid., p. 127.
50. Ibid., p. 196.
51. Ibid., p. 197.
52. Ibid., p. 120.
53. Ibid., p. 409.
54. Max Stirner, *The Ego and Its Own*, ed. David Leopold (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 221–222.

55. Marx, 'The Leipzig Council', pp. 235–236.
56. Ibid., pp. 174–182.
57. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, pp. 79–102.
58. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Mind*, p. 42.
59. Stirner, *The Ego and Its Own*, p. 63.
60. Ibid., p. 63.
61. Marx, 'The Leipzig Council', p. 176.
62. Ibid., p. 177.
63. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, p. 85.
64. Ibid., p. 131.
65. Stirner, *The Ego and Its Own*, p. 79.
66. Ibid., p. 78.
67. Ibid., p. 88.
68. Hegel, *The History of Philosophy*, Vol. III, p. 172.
69. Ibid., pp. 170–171.
70. Marx, 'The Leipzig Council', p. 185.
71. Ibid., p. 189.
72. Ibid., p. 180.
73. Stirner, *The Ego and Its Own*, pp. 63–88.
74. Marx, 'The Leipzig Council', pp. 188–200.
75. Ibid., pp. 187–188.
76. Ibid., p. 187.
77. Ibid., p. 188.
78. Ibid., p. 102.
79. Ibid., p. 382.
80. Ibid., p. 366.
81. Ibid., pp. 406–407.
82. Marx, 'An Article on Friedrich List's book "The National System of Political Economy"', *MECW*, Vol. IV, pp. 265–293.
83. Ibid., p. 279.
84. Danga Vileisis, 'Der unbekannte Beitrag Adam Fergusons zum materialistische Geschichtsverständnis von Karl Marx', *Beiträge zur Marx-Engels-Forschung* (Neue Folge, 2009), pp. 7–60.
85. Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy* (New York: International Publishers, 1963), p. 103.
86. Ibid., p. 107.
87. Ibid., p. 110.
88. Ibid., p. 122.
89. Adam Ferguson, *An Essay on the History of Civil Society*, ed. Fania Oz-Salzberger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 74–105.
90. Ibid., p. 180.
91. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, p. 121.
92. Ferguson, *An Essay on the History of Civil Society*, pp. 118–130.
93. Ibid., p. 130.
94. James Steuart, *An Enquiry into the Principles of Political Economy* [1767], ed. Andrew S. Skinner (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 153.
95. Ibid., pp. 15–18.
96. Ibid., p. 28.
97. Ibid., p. 30.
98. Ibid., p. 46–48.
99. Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, p. 121.
100. Ibid., p. 122.
101. Ibid., p. 120.
102. Ibid., p. 130.
103. Ibid., p. 133.

104. Ibid.
105. Ibid., 126.
106. Ibid., p. 135.
107. Marx to Annenkov, December 28, 1846, in *The Poverty of Philosophy*, p. 180.
108. Ibid., p. 190.
109. Marx, 'Lohnarbeit und Kapital', *MEW*, Vol. 6, pp. 407–408. This is the author's translation.

Chapter 4

1. Marx, 'Kritik der Hegelschen Dialektik und Philosophie überhaupt', *Mega2*, Abteilung I, Band II, p. 405.
2. Josef Derbolev, 'Hegels Theorie der Handlung', in Manfred Riedel (ed.), *Materialen zur Hegel's Rechtsphilosophie* (Frankfurt-am-Main: Suhrkamp, 1975), pp. 201–215. This essay is an excellent study of the role played by subjective activity in the thought of Hegel. In terms of contemporary studies it is one of the more insightful treatments of this neglected area in Hegelian thought and I recommend it highly to all those who seek a more penetrating analysis of Hegel's thought. Another essay that should be consulted is Michael Theunissen, 'Begriff und Realität Hegels Aufhebung der metaphysischen Wahrheitsbegriff', in Rolf-Peter Horstmann (ed.), *Seminar; Dialektik in des Philosophie Hegels* (Frankfurt-am-Main: Suhrkamp, 1978), pp. 100–120. Theunissen agrees with the opinion expressed in this book that Hegel rebelled against the metaphysical definition of truth and logic. Another prominent German philosopher has also emphasized the role of subjective activity in Hegel's philosophy. See Ernst Tugendhat, *Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination*, trans. Paul Stern (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986). Tugendhat stressed the important of self-consciousness in the determination of the Self, a vital concept Marx missed. Tugendhat is part of contemporary Hegel scholarship that rejects the notion that Hegel was a Speculative philosopher.
3. Marx, 'Kritik der Hegelschen Dialektik und Philosophie überhaupt', *Mega2*, Abteilung I, Band II, pp. 402–403.
4. Ibid., p. 404.
5. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Mind*, p. 3.
6. Aristotle, 'On the Soul', in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: The Modern Library, 2001), p. 555. For a comprehensive overview of Hegel's relation to Aristotle see Alfredo Ferrarin, *Hegel and Aristotle* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Ferrarin devoted an entire chapter to Hegel and Aristotle's *De Anima* and describes in depth Hegel's understanding of subjective action.
7. Ibid., p. 558.
8. Hegel, *The History of Philosophy*, Vol. II, pp. 180–202.
9. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Nature*, p. 422.
10. Ibid., p. 311.
11. Ibid., p. 422.
12. Ibid., pp. 307–309, 314.
13. Ibid., pp. 415–416.
14. Ibid., p. 419.
15. Ibid., p. 399.
16. Ibid., p. 404.
17. Ibid.
18. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Mind*, p. 36.
19. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, p. 79.
20. Ibid., pp. 80–102.
21. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Mind*, pp. 40–45.
22. Ibid., pp. 46–51.

23. Ibid., p. 45.
24. Ibid., p. 40.
25. Ibid., p. 48.
26. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Nature*, pp. 48–51.
27. Heinrich Heine, *Religion and Philosophy in Germany*, trans. Howard Pollack-Milgate (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
28. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Mind*, pp. 71–152.
29. Ibid., pp. 153–178.
30. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, p. 51.
31. Ibid., p. 57.
32. Ibid., p. 116.
33. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, pp. 412–427.
34. Ibid., p. 350.
35. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, p. 155.
36. Ibid., p. 176.
37. Hegel, *The History of Philosophy*, Vol. II, pp. 109–114.
38. Ibid., p. 209.
39. Ibid., p. 109.
40. Ibid., p. 209.
41. Marx, *On the Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature*, MECW, Vol. I, p. 495.
42. Ibid.
43. Marx, *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, p. 20.
44. Ibid., p. 101.
45. Ibid., p. 102.
46. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, p. 57.
47. Marx, 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right,' trans. Annette Jolen and Joseph O'Malley, p. 15.
48. Ibid., p. 18.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid., p. 48.
51. Ibid., p. 25.
52. Ibid., p. 95.
53. Marx, 'Kritik der Hegelschen Dialektik und Philosophie überhaupt', *Mega2*, Abteilung I, Band II, p. 399.
54. Ibid., p. 413.
55. Marx, 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right', MECW, Vol.III, pp. 17–18.
56. Ibid.
57. See Franco, *Hegel's Philosophy of Freedom*. In particular I draw the reader's attention to Chapter 6, 'The Basic Structure of the "Philosophy of Right": From Abstract Right to Ethical Life'. Franco belongs to the more recent interpretations of Hegel who draw attention to Hegelian ethics.
58. See Daniel Brudney, *Marx's Attempt to Leave Philosophy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998). In particular, readers should familiarize themselves with pages 171 to 173. In these pages Brudney outlines an ethical theory for Marx, or begins to outline the ethical principles upon which a communist society could function. Brudney escapes from the Old Soviet claim that communism was economic egalitarianism and begins a re-formulation of Marx that is derived from ethical principles and I agree completely with Brudney's endeavor. The work of Herbert Schnädelbach is also relevant to the issue of ethics and Hegelian politics. See Herbert Schnädelbach, *System der Sittlichkeit* (Frankfurt-am-Main: Suhrkamp, 1976). The work of Schnädelbach focuses on the notion of subjective activity and ethicality in Hegel, and he understands Hegel's political philosophy as emerging out of a sense of human interaction in a society and the emergence of mutual recognition based on that interaction. This is an approach with which I agree.

An American scholar who notes Hegel's attack on excessive individualism is Steven B. Smith in his *Hegel's Critique of Liberalism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989). I agree with Smith's perception that Hegel rejected English and French Liberalism because of their excessive focus in individuality at the expense of community. On the issue of subjectivity and ethicality another essay of interest is Klaus Düsing, 'Endliche und Absolute Subjektivität. Untersuchung zu Hegels philosophischer Psychologie und zu ihrer spekulativen Grundlegung', in Lothar Eley, *Hegels Theorie des subjektiven Geistes* (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1990).

59. Although I have footnoted the work of George E. McCarthy in a previous chapter of this book it is called upon at this point to allude to his work again. His two books, *Marx and the Ancients*, and *Marx and Aristotle*, are indispensable to an understanding to Marx and the ancients. Since I close this book by emphasizing the continuity of the ancients in Marx it is appropriate that I allow McCarthy to appear again.

Chapter 5

1. Marx, *Das Kapital: A Critique of Political Economy*, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), p. 103. In terms of the origins of Marx's revolution in the methodology of social explanation it is important to read the work of D. R. Kelley. See his book, *Historians and the Law in Post-Revolutionary France* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980) and his article 'The Metaphysics of Law', *American Historical Review* (No. 83, 1978), pp. 350–367. Along with Gareth Stedman Jones, Kelley was one of the first interrogators who properly surmised the influence of early 19th-century legal theory on Marx. I met Kelley when I was at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton and although our meeting was brief his remarks focused my attention on the proto-Marxism that was gestating in the late 18th century and early 19th century. I wish to acknowledge my debt to him.
2. Hegel, 'Logic', *The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, Vol. I, p. 52.
3. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, pp. 58–103.
4. Hegel, 'Logic,' pp. 93–94.
5. Hegel, 'The Philosophy of Mind', *The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, Vol. III, pp. 20–23. Marx himself was familiar with Aristotle's *The Soul*. In Berlin in 1840 he took about 25 pages of *exzerpte* from *The Soul*. These *exzerpte* are located in *Mega2*, Abteilung IV, Band I, pp. 155–180. Marx was well read in Aristotle and in Volume One of *Das Kapital* quotes from the *Nicomachean Ethics*.
6. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, Vol. III, pp. 545–554.
7. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 546.
8. *Ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 552.
9. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, pp. 341–357.
10. Hegel, *The History of Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 319–349.
11. *Ibid.*, Vol. III, pp. 217–220.
12. Hegel, 'Preface', *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, pp. 1–45.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 147–179.
14. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, trans. J. H. Bernard (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 2000).
15. Hegel, 'The Philosophy of Nature,' *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, Vol. II, pp. 11–27.
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 273–441.
17. Hegel, 'The Philosophy of Mind', *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, Vol. III, pp. 314–315.
18. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 28.
19. Hegel, 'Logic,' *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, p. 296.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 285.

21. Ibid.
22. Ibid., p. 292.
23. Ibid., p. 293.
24. Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, p. 52.
25. Ibid., p. 53. Heinz Röttges agrees with my thesis that Marx borrowed the methodology of Hegel. Röttges concurs with my idea that Hegel jettisoned traditional logic and replaced this antiquated logic with method. Although I came to my conclusions independently of Röttges, before I read Röttges, it is still rewarding to know that others have also followed the same line of argument. See Röttges, *Der Begriff der Methode in der Philosophie Hegels* (Meisenheim-am-Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1976).
26. Ibid., p. 54.
27. Ibid., p. 57.
28. Ibid., pp. 825–841.
29. Ibid., pp. 841–844.
30. Ibid., p. 665.
31. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 2.
32. Ibid. In addition the reader's attention is drawn to the work of Allen W. Wood, who correctly sees that Hegel drew his preference for organic explanation from Kant's *Critique of Judgement*. Wood wrote: 'The conception to which Hegel is referring is that of a living organism or "organized being" through which Kant introduces the idea of natural teleology.' See Wood's *Karl Marx* (New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 200. I also call attention to another Wood contribution to the Hegel–Marx debate, an article he published entitled 'Hegel and Marxism', which appeared in Frederick C. Beiser's *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 414–441. In this article Wood draws attention to Hegel's awareness of some dangers within the capitalism system, such as the impoverishment of the working class. Hegel does not become a revolutionary like Marx, but he was sensitive to the economic problems created by capitalism.
33. Marx, *Grundrisse*, trans. Martin Nicolaus (New York: Penguin Books, 1973), p. 105.
34. Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, p. 514.
35. Ibid., 'The Doctrine of Essence', pp. 389–569.
36. Ibid., pp. 393–529.
37. Ibid., pp. 512–528.
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